Epistemology : Descartes Flashcards

1
Q

causal principle

A

things have to come from somewhere

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2
Q

causal adequacy principle

A

the source be the same level of reality or even more real

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3
Q

external world

A

objects that exist independent of the mediator’s mind

the furnitures of the world that exist independent to our minds

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4
Q

existence of God

A

proves the existence of clear & distinct ideas

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5
Q

D’s theory of ‘rational intuition’

proof of clear & distinct ideas

A

cogito : ‘ in this 1st item of knowledge there is simply a clear and distinct perception of what I am asserting ‘
if clarity & distinctness do >< guarantee truth -> then I can >< know that I exist
I do know that I exist
therefore general rule = whatever I perceive v clearly & distinctly is true

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6
Q

clear idea

A

’ open and present to the attending mind ‘

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7
Q

distinct idea

A

clear AND precise and separated from other ideas

‘ plainly contains in itself nothing other than what is clear ‘

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8
Q

D’s proof of an external world

A

reductio ad absurdum
strong intuition does >< count
we need a stronger proof than just 2ndary qualities
if it is based on the senses -> too superficial a grounding
proof concerned with => primary qualities of objects
conc. ‘ and accordingly one must confess that corporeal things exist’

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9
Q

how is self generation ruled out in D’s proof of an external world?

A

’ those ideas are frequently produced in my mind without my contributing to it in any way, and even frequently contrary to my will ‘

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10
Q

how is God deceiver ruled out in D’s proof of an external world?

A

God would >< deceive me and would >< let me be deceived by the “ agency of any other creature “
this includes the archdemon as well
maybe archdemons are not embodied but just deceive us?

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11
Q

type of argument :
ontological argument
D’s proof of an external world

A

both the ontological argument & D’s proof of an external world are reductio ad absurdum

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12
Q

ontological argument

A

example of an a priori k
akin to maths, cogito
since you do >< need to do any experiments

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13
Q
// formal structure //
reductio ad absurdum
A
(reduced to absurdity)
either X, Y or Z 
not X 
not Y 
(because it would result in being reduced to absurdity)
so it is Z
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14
Q

OBJ : we have an idea of God which is of a maximally great being

A

God’s definition is circular & not fleshed out :
what is a maximally perfect being? God
who is God? a maximally perfect being
[Zagzebski] : definitions should >< be circular

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15
Q

most critical CRIT : ontological argument

A

> < because it applies to islands
but what do we exactly mean by a maximally great being?
most problems in philosophy boil down to the language used and the meanings behind it
D draws a parallel between religion & maths too often

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16
Q
// formal structure // 
D's proof of an external world 
meditation 6
A

reductio ad absurdum
1. either our idea of an external world comes from a deceiver God (i), ourselves (ii) or from an external world (iii)
2. not (i)
3. not (ii) as all of this is too complex for me to imagine
we are imperfect beings and so we are >< capable of imagining everything
4. so our idea of an external world must come from (iii)
5. so an external world must exist

17
Q

why does D need God?

A

to guarantee clear & distinct ideas ( that I am not mis perceiving them )

18
Q

what type of an argument is the cogito?

A

it is >< a syllogism / inference / deduction

it is based on the rational induction thesis

19
Q

syllogism

A
numbers lead to a final conclusion 
eg. 
P1
P2
P3
C
20
Q

dilemma in logic

A

2 options where both are problematic

21
Q

[ Nietzche ]’s CRIT : cogito

A

[ beyond good and evil section 16 & 17 ]
contingent feature of language that lends itself to believe in things that don’t exist
D is assuming that there is an I that is thinking & an I that is existing
similar to the error -> it is sunny implies that there is an it that has a speparate metaphysical existence

22
Q

empircism CRIT : cogito

A

analyse + bewitchment of language
similar to N -> most I could know is that there is a process of thinking that happens to be going on
similar to tummies rumbling
nothing about the cogito proves the metaphysical existence
thinking might be another physical action that just happens to be happening

23
Q

what is D’s turning point and why?

A

cogito
I am thinking therfore I exist
to be decieved, there needs to be an intellect that is being deceived
i.e. there needs to be thoughts with content and these thoughts need a thinker
* escapes the 3 waves of doubt *
‘ myself, then, at least am I not something?’
‘ there is >< doubt … so long as I think I am something ‘

24
Q

CRIT 1 : cogito

- not a good foundation -

A

we can >< build upon it as we can >< infer anything from it
RESP 1 : >< a fair CRIT as it does >< meet the cogito squarely
the implication are unclear
parallel problem in moral philosophy w/ justifying other good things

25
Q

CRIT 2 : cogito

- applies to any action -

A

this move applies to any action
‘ I am walking therefore I am ‘ -> still prone to the 3 waves
cogito = >< an inference but a case of rational intuition
think about it to know that it is true
the contents of the thought do >< matter as much as the actual action of thinking