EPC Flashcards
Williams v. State of Mississippi (1898)
Williams v. State of Mississippi (1898) (170 U.S. 213) (Canvas)
14TH AMENDMENT ONLY PROTECTS AGAINST LAWS OF STATE, NOT ADMINISTRATION OF LAWS
Henry Williams, an African American man, was indicted and convicted of murder before an all-white jury. The jury was all-white as a consequence of the rules for jury selection in Mississippi – they had to be chosen from individuals on the voter rolls. Williams challenges the 1890s Constitution by arguing that the jury was all white by force of law, and thus, his conviction was invalid.
MJ Harlan: No EPC violation – Constitution worked to exclude “vicious” people from voting and the fact that African Americans were uniformly vicious means they can’t be jurors
Brown v. The Board of Education of Topeka (Brown I) (347 U.S. 483) (CB 488-489)
Brown v. The Board of Education of Topeka (Brown I) (347 U.S. 483) (CB 488-489) Oliver Brown in Topeka, Kansas, lived within walking distance from an all-white school but his daughter was forced to go to a separate, equal black school. The NAACP got them to file suit.
MJ Warren: “Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.” The lasting feeling of inequality created by segregation denies the children equal protection.
Bolling v. Sharpe (1954) (347 U.S. 497)
on the same day as Brown v. Board, the Court held segregation in DC schools was unconstitutional based on the 5th DPC (14th is for states) “discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative”
What are some of the different ways the holding in Brown could have been more explicit?
o Anti-Classification: All classifications based on race are invalid (Clarence Thomas)
o Anti-Caste – we don’t have apartheid in this country (Charles Black)
o Adequate Education – every child has a right to an adequate education (Lani Guinier)
Missouri v. Jenkins (1995)
State of Missouri challenges District Court’s order of salary increases and continued funding remedial quality education programs for Kansas City, Missouri, School District. They were ordered because student achievement levels were still at or below national average. The solution imposed focused on “desegregative attractiveness” and “suburban comparability” – plan = remedy deficit in student achievement and attract nonminority students via elaborate program of capital improvements, course enrichment and extracurricular enhancement in schools throughout the district (including nonblack ones)
• MJ Rehnquist: the remedial plan goes beyond the scope of Brown to make the district into a magnet district. “[t]his inter district goal is beyond the scope of this intra district violation.” The district court is trying to accomplish indirectly what it cannot accomplish directly. “Too far removed from an acceptable implementation of a permissible means to remedy previous legally mandated segregation.”
• Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. Of Ed (1971)
• Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. Of Ed - no using school desegregation cases for purposes beyond their scope
The Supreme Court approved a district court’s bussing plan implemented in 1968, after years of failing to desegregate a school district that had been de jure segregated until 1954 – three important principals: (1) constitutional violation stemmed from state’s manipulation of racial composition (2) scope of judial power limited by scope of constitutional violation (3) once school district achieved “unitary” status, judicial intervention should cease
• Milliken v. Bradley
• Milliken v. Bradley held District Court exceeded its authority in fashioning interdistrict relief where individual school districts were not guilty of constitutional violation
• Milliken II
three part FW to guide district courts in administration of equitable remedy
o Nature of remedy should be determined by nature of violation – remedy must be related to condition alleged to offend constitution
o Designed as nearly as possible to restore victims of discriminatory conduct to position they would have been in without the conduct
o Must take into account interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs
• Freeman v. Pitts
factors which must inform discretion of court in ordering partial withdrawal
o 1. whether there has been full and satisfactory compliance re: aspect where supervision will be withdrawn
o 2. Whether retention of judicial control is necessary or practicable to achieve compliance with decree in other facets of school system
o 3. Whether school district has demonstrated to public and parents of disfavored race good faith commitment to whole of court’s decree
o Ultimate inquiry: “whether [constitutional violator] has complied in good faith with the desegregation decree and whether the vestiges or past discrimination ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent practicable”
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (Brown II) (1955 ) (CB 349-294) (349 U.S. 194)
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (Brown II) (1955 ) (CB 349-294) (349 U.S. 194) the court considers how to accord relief based on the decision in Brown I.
CB Warren: the cases are remanded to the courts which originally heard them and are instructed to provide relief based on equitable principals – balancing the personal interests of the plaintiffs with the admission to public schools as soon as is practicable and the public interest in eliminating the obstacles to enrolment in a systematic and effective manner. The burden rests on the defendants to establish a prompt and reasonable start and courts may find that additional time is required if it is necessary to the public interest and consistent with good faith compliance.
Cooper v. Aaron (1958) (354 U.S. 1)
e. Cooper v. Aaron (1958) (354 U.S. 1) Arkansas governor sent the Arkansas National Guard to block the planned new African American pupils from attending a school for integration and Eisenhour had to dispatch troops. After a district court gave a school district permission to cease desegregation in light of the violent response “by the public,” the Court held “[Law] and order are not here to be preserved by depriving the Negro children of their constitutional rights.”
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Strauder v. West Virginia (1880) (100 U.S. (10 Otto) 303) (CB 530-32)
Strauder v. West Virginia (1880) (100 U.S. (10 Otto) 303) (CB 530-32) black man convicted of murder before all-white jury, West Virginia Statute limited jury service to “white male persons who are twenty-one years of age and who are citizens of this State” – Strauder claims conviction by jury chosen pursuant to this provision violated 14th Amendment
• MJ Strong: facially discriminating against potential black jurors is unconstitutional – they have historically been discriminated against and excluding them from jury services just because of their color is “practically a brand upon them”
Korematsu v. United States (1944) (323 U.S. 214) (CB 532-36)
Korematsu v. United States (1944) (323 U.S. 214) (CB 532-36) Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 specifically excluded Japanese Americans from remaining in San Leandro, California, a region designated as a “Military Area.” Korematsu (defendant) was an American citizen of Japanese descent convicted by the United States Government (plaintiff), in federal district court for violating Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34. No questions were raised as to Korematsu’s loyalty to the United States.
• MJ Black: “unable to conclude that it was beyond the war power of Congress and the Executive to exclude those of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war area” – “definite and close relationship to the prevention of espionage and sabotage” – hardships part of war, would have been impossible to separate loyal from disloyal – BUT such classifications “immediately suspect and held to the most rigid scrutiny”
no invidious discrimination
Loving v. United States (1967) (388 U.S. 1) (CB 536-538)
Loving v. United States (1967) (388 U.S. 1) (CB 536-538) a West Virginia statute criminalized interracial marriages between white and nonwhite people
• MJ Warren: EPC demands racial classifications be held to the “most rigid scrutiny” + necessary to “some permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimination” – because West Virginia prohibits inly interracial marriages involving white persons, the racial justifications fail as intending only to maintain White Supremacy
