Criminal Law Cases Flashcards
Δs cast away at sea; decided to kill young cabin boy for food; thought there was no rescue in sight; Δs argued necessity; Δs lose
• Holding: No common law defense of necessity for murder. Temptation =/ necessity.
• Example of case where retributivist and utilitarian arrive at different conclusion
o Retrib.: Not very blameworthy—boy would die anyway, adults had families
o Util.: We want to deter killings of “necessity” and protect weak from the strong
Regina v. Dudley and Stephens (England, 1884)
Ponzi scheme that robbed hundreds of life savings
• Holding: Sentenced to consecutive NOT concurrent sentences for symbolic effect
o Retributivist: Stole life savings and pensions, deserves full punishment (but less blameworthy because he turned himself in)
o Utilitarian: Symbolic effect aids general deterrence by restoring trust in institutions and victim compensation (but no specific deterrence because old)
United States v. Madoff (USDC, 2009)
LEGAL REQUIREMENT
Δ raised constitutional objection to Gang Congregation Ordinance that prohibits “staying in one place for no apparent purpose” with a suspected gang member and failing to follow a dispersal order. Police have full discretion as to which purposes are apparent and thus when to issue order.
• Holding: Law is unconstitutionally vague - – “apparent purpose,” “order,” and expected “dispersal” all unclear – Due Process Clause
• Majority’s Rule: Statutes can be invalidated for vagueness if they
o (1) Fail to provide notice to ordinary people as to what conduct is covered
o (2) Authorize and encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement
• Dissent’s (Thomas) Rule: If there is an unmistakable core that a reasonable person would know if forbidden by law, the enactment is constitutional
• Note: State Supreme Court = final arbiter of state statute interpretation – SCOTUS rules on constitutionality of that interpretation
City of Chicago v. Morales (SCOTUS, 1999)
Δ had three previous “violent felon” convictions and was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm under Armed Career Criminal Act. Trial court found that offense constituted “conduct that presents a serious risk of physical injury”
• Holding: Law is unconstitutionally vague: ACCA requires a categorical approach, forcing court to abstract what an ordinary “felony possession” crime looks like and how much risk it creates such that it constitutes a “violent felony”
• Majority’s Rule: Law can be invalidated when it is “so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.” Kolender.
• Dissent’s (Alito) Rule: Law invalid only if impermissibly vague in all of its applications. Hoffman Estates. Acts of Congress are presumptively valid.
United States v. Johnson (SCOTUS, 2015)
Δ was arrested by police officers and taken onto highway; while on highway, “manifested a drunken condition” by using loud and profane words; Δ was convicted of being drunk on a public highway
• Holding: The statute in question presupposes voluntary appearance on the public highway; Δ cannot be convicted of a crime under the statute if Δ was involuntarily taken to the highway. May have included a voluntary act if Δ started chain of events that would foreseeably lead to him appearing in public in a drunken place
• Would have been guilty under MPC §2.01(1) because he did at least one voluntary act
Martin v. State (AL, 1944)
punishing being cases
• Jones v. City of LA homeless people of LA bring a suit arguing that their sleeping in public is not voluntary and thus should not be criminal - the U.S. Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the state may not criminalize ‘being’ - Rymer J dissented, arguing that sitting, lying or sleeping on city sidewalks is conduct, not state of being
• Deportation: two cases where Δ evicted from Canada and charged with being “voluntarily present and found in the United States”
o Marcias: Second Circuit reversed conviction and held that they had been returned involuntarily
o Ambriz-Ambriz: Ninth Circuit upheld conviction because they never been in Canada illegally and thus they never left the United States
P’s friend’s baby lived with her. Conflicting evidence of whether there was a contract and whether mother also lived with them. Baby died. Δ innocent.
• Holding: Legal duty must be established to find that an omission of care is manslaughter. Four situations create a legal duty: “Jones factors”
o (1) statute (2) special relationship (3) contract (4) exclusory undertaking
• Lord Macaulay: No general duty to aid because line too blurry. How much hardship must someone take on to help other people? How rich to help beggar? (US freedom bias)
• Mill and Bentham: Duty to aid because harm by not aiding (see laws in not-US – fines)
• Special relationships
o 1 way: Parents to minor child; Captain to crew/passenger; bartender to drunk
o 2 way: Spouses to each other; not siblings (only enforce relationships chosen)
• De Facto Special Relationships Circuit split:
o Beardsley: Man lets mistress overdoes in his presence. NL – not de facto spouse
o Carol: Stepmother fails to stop dad from killing his child. L – de facto mom
o Miranda: Live-in bf fails to stop gf from killing her child. NL – not de facto dad
o Difference: (1) gender bias (2) Do not want to disincentivize third parties from taking an interest in an at-risk child for fear of liability via special relationship (Masur disagrees: no one considers liability in forming relationships) (3) Carol married, so some form of legal relationship unlike Miranda and Beardsley
• Additional duty to aid from torts: MPC §2.01(3)(b)
o If one has put another in a dangerous position, she owes that person a duty to aid
Omitting aid establishes a higher mens rea, and greater penalty
E.g., if A recklessly runs into B and B falls into the water. A has a duty to save B. If A chooses not to, this implies a much more culpable state of mind, enabling the prosecutor to increase A’s level of liability
Jones v. United States (CoA, 1962)
Staples purchased a semi-automatic weapon, didn’t know it had been modified to be an automatic weapon (which qualifies as a firearm), didn’t register gun; Δ was convicted of violating National Firearms Act (making possession of unregistered [automatic] firearm punishable for up to 10 years in prison);
• Holding: Absent a clear Congressional statement that mens rea is not a required element of an offense, the Court should construe the statute in light of the rules embodied in the common law which require some mens rea as an element of an offense
• Distinguished: Freed (S.L. okay for unregistered grenades) on the grounds that Leg. did not seek to criminalize reasonable mistake re: gun ownership (50% of households)
Staples v. US (SCOTUS, 2011)
- Defendant knew thing he shipped was a “visual depiction,” didn’t know content
- Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation of 1977 (1. Transport (visual depiction) 2. Minor 3. Explicit)
- Holding: “knowingly” applies to all pieces. Purposivism: Absurd to think knowing only applied to shipping—how do you accidentally ship something?
- Scalia dissent: “knowingly” applies to immediate verbs, so defendant should be guilty even though claims he didn’t know it was child pornography. Never read in knowing when statute makes clear it does not intend there to be a mens rea requirement
United States v. X-Citement Video Inc. (SCOTUS 1994)
Δ convicted for taking 14-year-old unmarried girl out of the possession and without the consent of her parents; she had told Δ and Δ reasonably believed she was 18; statute was silent as to mental state required; Δ loses
• Holding: Mistake of fact does not stand as a defense to a crime where the statute making the act a crime contains no requirement of knowledge of that fact to begin with. The forbidden act is wrong in itself and the legislature has enacted that if anyone does this act, he does so at his own risk. He should be put on notice by the wrongness of his act.
• Dissent: Judges do not get to decide what is morally wrong. “A mistake of facts, on reasonable grounds, to the extent that if the facts were as believed the acts of the prisoner would make him guilty of no criminal offence at all, is an excuse”
Regina v. Prince (England, 1875)
Δ was Federal Corrections Officer; arrested for unlicensed possession of loaded pistol in violation of statute that made such possession a crime except for “peace officers”; defined as “correction officers of any state correctional facility or of any penal correctional institution”; Δ was actually a federal corrections officer; Δ loses
• Holding: Mistake of law is not a valid defense unless the mistaken belief is based on an official statement of the law or “intent” was an element of the crime (Weiss). Purpose of having an “official statement” mistake of law defense was (1) the legislative belief people should not face prosecution for reliance on an official interpretation of a statute and (2) to encourage reliance on official interpretations. Should not encourage ignorance or fraud.
• Dissent: (1) textualist interp. of NY’s omission of “afterwards determined to be invalid and (2) Policy justifications not to convict:
o Justice. System exists to punish those who choose to do wrong—not those who acted without intent to do wrong
o Waste. Punishment is unnecessary to supply deterrence—he would not have committed the unlawful act if he knew them to be such
Heien: SC upheld constitutionality of police office erroneously using the mistaken belief that one taillight being broken is a statutory offense to justify an investigative stop,
• Supreme court permits police officers to make reasonable mistakes of law
People v. Marrero (NY, 1987)
SC upheld constitutionality of police office erroneously using the mistaken belief that one taillight being broken is a statutory offense to justify an investigative stop,
• Supreme court permits police officers to make reasonable mistakes of law
Heien:
Police spotted Δ driving stolen vehicle; high speed chase; police helicopters from 4 towns were mobilized; two collided when one maneuvered after terminating radio communications (violation of FAA); three people died; Δ loses
Holding: [Extraordinary Results Test] (1) The collision of two police helicopters during the course of a pursuit of a fleeing suspect was not a highly extraordinary outcome. Rather, it was within the realm of likelihood that, in the heat of such a chase, one of the helicopter operators might act in a negligent manner. (3) Therefore, risky maneuvers do not break the causal chain. Defendant could have foreseen such a consequence arising from his own reckless conduct.
Dissent: [(2) Zone of Danger Test]: Scope of proximal cause is determined by whether the harm that occurred was of a type that should be reasonably contemplated. Helicopter was outside of Δ’s range of reasonable apprehension
People v. Acosta (CA, 1991)
Δ set fire to couch on 5th floor of office building; firemen attempted to put it out but gave up; on the way out, noticed another arson fire on 2nd floor; one fireman received fatal injuries from the 2nd floor blaze; no evidence that Δ had caused it; Δ loses
• Holding: An intervening harm that is the ultimate cause of death does not excuse the defendant from culpability provided the defendant should have foreseen the harm as reasonably related to his actions. (1) It was foreseeable by the defendant that firemen would respond to the arson he did commit, which would put them in danger of their lives. (3) This arson fire, set by the defendant, was therefore an indispensable link in the chain of events that resulted in the death of a fireman. (2) The cause of death, a second fire, is the same type of harm that Δ should have anticipated
People v. Arzon (NY, 1978)
It is not necessary that the harm be intended by the actor, only that the ultimate harm is something that could have been foreseen as reasonable related to the criminal acts (e.g., Kibbe left person drunk on side of road in winter, person hit by truck) - guilty
• Kibbe
Prosecutor must prove that D’s conduct was an actual cause of death, in that it forged a link in the chain of causes which actually brought about the death (stab wound, unrelated hernia, dies in surgery)– not guilty
• Stewart
Terrible choice doctrine - Δ abducts women and tortures her sexually; women bought poison tablets and took them; Δ delayed in getting emergency medical treatment; Δ loses for murder
• Preslar: D is not guilty for murder when his wife left without necessity and died from exposure to the cold.
• Valade: D is guilty for murder when his sexual assault victim jumped out the window out of necessity to escape him to her death.
• Holding: Women was rendered mentally irresponsible as a result of the environment that Δ created; woman’s suicide was necessary, natural, and probable cause of Δ’s abuse
• Masur: Terrible Choice Doctrine – Women was not mentally irresponsible, she just had to choose between terrible options. This does not cut off the causal chain. SEE KERN
• Discussion: Court had to rule that victim was rendered mentally irresponsible by Δ’s actions to find that her suicide did not cut off the causal chain
Stephenson v. State (IN, 1932)
Δ accepted deceased’s challenge to drag race on highway; both were speeding; deceased served into oncoming traffic to pass Δ’s car; innocent
• Holding: (1) (2) Though Δ was driving recklessly at a speed far above the legal limit, decedent himself was engaged in willful recklessness by participating in the race and swerving into a lane of oncoming traffic. (3) Decedent’s decision to race his car in a lane of oncoming traffic was the actual cause of his death – not Δ’s own reckless driving
• Rule: Intervening free will decisions break the causal chain
• Masur: victim wasn’t forced into decision
• Dissent: (3) Deceased acts were a natural reaction to the stimulus of the situation
Commonwealth v. Root (PA, 1961)
Δ and friends assaulted group of black men, Kern et al. chased the men with weapons, threatened to kill them, Griffith tried to escape by crossing parkway, was hit by a truck
• Holding: Terrible Choice Doctrine – Kern guilty because created the situation: Griffith stuck between two terrible choices (stop and be possibly killed by Kern or run across road and possibly be hit and die), Griffith’s choice and eventual harm were foreseeable
People v. Kern (NY 1989)
eggshell skull rule cases
Stamp: Robbery victim suffered from coronary disease. Died of a heart attack triggered by fright.
Lane: Punched a chronic alcoholic in the face. Later died from brain swelling which he was at risk for by his chronic drunkenness
• Guilty either way – Courts do not distinguish between preexisting conditions that the victim is and isn’t responsible for
• Note: if death caused by disease unforeseeably contracted by victim after assault, defendant not liable
(WRONG and BAD) Δ married schizophrenic woman; she requested that Δ keep loaded pistol on windowsill; there was violent fight; Δ reached up to grab pistol and shot wife twice in back of head; Δ testified that only remembered “hearing two shots and feeling myself go cold”; Δ argued for no premeditation; Δ loses
• Holding: The specific intent to kill may be found from a defendant’s words or conduct or from the attendant circumstances and may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of another human being.
• Masur: Courts view premeditation through a subjective lens, but state of mind is identified through the objective circumstances
• Note 1: If a killing is intentional, willful, deliberate and premeditated, the amount of time between the premeditation and the actual killing is immaterial.
• Note 2: Lack of escape plan does not negate premeditation
• Note 3: Court disfavors transient, adversarial psychological testimony
Commonwealth v. Carroll (PA, 1963)
Δ and victim were coworkers; victim and a few others were making fun of Δ’s bad mood; victim snapped Δ with towel; Δ killed victim and argued for heat of passion; Π loses
• Holding: Intent to kill (which Δ had) does not equal premeditation and deliberation. To allow the State to prove premeditation and deliberation by demonstrating that the intention to kill was in existence only at time of the killing completely eliminated the distinction between the two degrees of murder. Reversed and remanded.
• Masur: Premeditation is weighing the intent to kill and then deciding to go through it
o Carroll approach is wrong: intent =/ premeditation; need separate degrees
State v. Guthrie (OH, 2012)
Δ finds out that his wife cheated on him; Δ confronted her and then went to lie down; wife comes in and abuses / taunts him; wife says “what are you going to do, hit me?”; when she stopped; Δ went to kitchen and got long knife; put it under pillow; after more insults, Δ stabbed wife 19 times; attempted to commit suicide then called police; Δ loses
• Holding: Words alone (absent threat of bodily injury) are not adequate provocation in order to reduce murder to manslaughter
• Objective prong is judged by a reasonable person standard w/o regard for mental frailties
Girouard v. State (MD, 1991)
Δ entered saloon and shot victim with non-fatal wound; Δ produced evidence showing victim and Δ’s wife had sex less than hour before assault; Δ was denied from admitting the evidence in trial court; Π loses
• Holding: The evidence offered by Defendant would have been enough to allow the issue of provocation to go to the jury and it would have been up to the jury to find that the act was adequately provoked such that the charge of homicide, had the shooting resulted in death, would have been reduced to manslaughter
• Governing principle: Jury is a better arbiter of the reasonable man than the judge
• Dissent: The provocation must be given in the presence of the person committing the homicide—must be definite, not second-hand retelling and circumstantial evidence
Maher v. People (MI, 1862)
D assaulted his mom’s rapist several hours after learning about it at an all-day drinking party. D left and came back to kill him. Court did not permit provocation defense.
o Bordeaux
Bouncer forcefully removed man. Man later shot who he thought to be bouncer but was not. Murder charge reversed.
o Mauricio
Man killed bystander who tried to restrain him from going after a provoker. Court did not permit provocation defense.
Distinguished from Mauricio b/c of knowledge of who you harmed
o Scriva
D threatened man. Man pinned him to the wall and punched him. D drew a knife and killed him. CoA held that jury should be given the manslaughter instruction on account of provocation.
o Masur: Courts don’t dig too deeply into how the fight began
o Welsh
Attempted to run over husband with car due to “significant mental trauma that has been affecting D’s mind for some time and inexplicitly coming to the surface in full force.” Court permitted EED defense despite no provoking event
White
Killed brother who he had been afraid of for a long time.
Elliot
For criminal liability, jury must find Δ’s negligence went beyond a matter of compensation; Δ showed such disregard for life as to be a crime vs. the state
Rex v. Bateman (England, 1925)
Δ nightclub had artificial palm tree; caught fire and spread; killed patrons who were unable to exit club; Δ charged with involuntary manslaughter based on overcrowding, installation of flammable decorations, locking of fire doors, failure to maintain proper evacuation; Δ loses
• Holding: Reckless conduct requires only that the conduct itself is intentional not the risk taking. Where there is a duty of care for the safety of invitees onto the premises of a business, there is a duty of care owed by the person who maintains the premises for the safety of those visitors. Therefore, intentional failure to take such care in disregard of the probable harmful consequences of that failure constitutes reckless or wanton conduct
• Wanton / reckless conduct: Usually an affirmative act, but can be any intentional conduct (commission or omission) where Δ has a duty to act and there is a high likelihood that substantial harm will result to another
• Distinguish recklessness from negligence
o Higher degree of risk – objective standard (PXL), must be apparent
o Intentional/voluntary taking of the risk (intend the risk, not the result)
o Deviation from ordinary person – Acts raise pre-existing risks above baseline
• D does not need to be aware if risk should be known by ordinary man
o Exit doors obscured, locked from outside
o D spends a lot of time at club, should realize risk
Commonwealth v. Welansky (MA, 1944)
Δ ski trainer; went on dangerous slope and hit victim; Δ loses
• Holding: Δ’s conduct reveals sufficient probable cause of reckless manslaughter because Δ acted “despite his subjective awareness of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death from his conduct.”
• Specifically, Δ appreciated the risk of harm because he was a former ski racer trained in ski safety. Δ’s increase in risk was unjustifiable because only for his own enjoyment. Δ’s risk creating was a gross deviation from a law-abiding person because there is a rebuttable presumption of negligence upon any collision + skied unsafely over a great distance
• Masur: We should look at marginal contribution to risk
o How much did he increase baseline risk in terms of magnitude and likelihood?
Did it constitute a gross deviation?
o Was the marginal increase justified or excusable?
o Was the marginal contribution known to the risk-taker?
People v. Hall (CO, 2004)
Δs were aware that son was ill; did not realize extent of illness; did not seek medical treatment; child dies and Δs convicted with manslaughter under ordinary ignorance; Δ loses
• Holding: Under the penal code of Washington, ordinary negligence is sufficient to support a manslaughter conviction. The question is whether a reasonable person, under similar circumstances, would have been sufficiently put on notice concerning the severity of the child’s medical condition such that failure to seek medical attention constitutes negligence
State v. Williams (WA, 1971)
Δ driving with excessive speed while drunk; loses control of car and kills victim; convicted of second-degree murder which required showing of malice; Δ loses
• Holding: Malice can be established by evidence that Δ acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others. Recklessness can be shown by evidence that Δ’s actions were a gross deviation from a reasonable standard of care or of such a nature that a jury is warranted in inferring that Δ was aware of a serious risk of harm to others
• Note 1: Malice aforethought (18 U.S.C §1111(a)) is the distinguishing characteristic which makes a homicide a murder; if evidence proves Δ acted in a way that was “reckless and wanton, gross deviation from reasonable standard of care”, jury can infer that Δ was aware of serious risk at law – even if not subjectively aware
• Masur: Difference between malice (murder) and gross negligence (manslaughter) is degree rather than kind
o Drunk driving is reckless. Dangerous drunk driving is recklessness+.
United States v. Fleming (4th Cir., 1984)
Man recklessly killed woman in drunken orgy. Convicted of murder.
• He argued that even if intoxication was immaterial on the issue of “reckless,” it should be relevant for “extreme indifference to human life” and therefore intoxication should be admissible as a defense for murder
• “Circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life” is as an objective rather than subjective test
o “A degree of divergence from the norm of acceptable behavior even greater than a ‘gross deviation from a law-abiding person’ by which recklessness is defined”
o The fact that voluntary intoxication blinded a D to risks of extreme behavior is irrelevant so long as the conduct itself objectively manifests a supreme indifference to human life
State v. Dufield
D and copilot crashed into mountain carrying 500lbs of weed. NL because the felony of drug-distribution was not the proximate cause of the copilot’s death, since they were not flying at low altitudes to avoid detection
• Court requires the crash to be a foreseeable result of the felony such that the accident was more likely as a result of committing a felony
o i.e., people fly differently as a result of flying with contraband and as a result of the different flying, they crash
• Masur: The commission of the felony itself must causally increase the risk of danger
King
Robbery victim had heart disease. Died of a heart attack triggered by fright. Guilty of FM
• The felonious robbery increased risk that a vulnerable victim would die
Stamp
Δ Serne and co-defendant Goldfinch set fire to Δ’s house to collect insurance policy; Δ’s sons died inside; Δ loses on FMR
• Holding: Any act that is known to be dangerous and likely to cause death, if done for the purpose of committing a felony which causes death, amounts to murder. If the Δs set fire to the house when Δ’s family was in it, and if that fire caused the death of Δ’s sons, then the Δs are as guilty of murder as if they had actually gone stabbed the children
Regina v. Serne
Δ chiropractor told victim’s parents that Δ could cure victim’s eye cancer; parents had been told by doctors that removing eye was the only way to prolong child’s life; Δ charged $700 and child died; Δ charged with grand theft and FMR; Π loses
• Holding: Grand theft is not an inherently dangerous felony. The strict liability of the felony murder rule is limited to those felonies that are inherently dangerous. In determining whether a felony is inherently dangerous, the underlying felony should be assessed in the abstract rather than the specific facts of the case as committed
• Categorical Approach to inherent dangerousness: inherently dangerous felony if the felony itself is objectively + necessarily dangerous (not all grand thefts are dangerous)
• Compare: Burroughs – Similar fact pattern, but predicate felony was felonious unlicensed practice of medicine. Prosecution chose a felony necessarily dangerous
People v. Phillips (CA, 1966)
Δ convicted felon went hunting with friends; heard turkey gobble and shot at it; was a friend gobbling; friend died; Δ convicted of being a convicted felon possessing a firearm and charged with FMR; Δ loses
• Holding: A convicted felon possession of a firearm can be inherently dangerous felony that serves as the predicate felony for felony murder. The circumstances surrounding the case such as the intentional firing of the gun, drinking before and during the hunt, knowing that the potential victims were nearby and firing an unsafe shot all demonstrates that Δ’s possession of a firearm as a convicted felon was an inherently dangerous activity
• Ad hoc Approach to inherent dangerousness: A felony is inherently dangerous if, as it was committed, its commission raised risk to the lives of others
• Dissent: Patterson rule is better: “high probability of death” – facts of case establish negligence NOT a high probability of death. Ought not convict for murder on neg. theory
Hines v. State (GA, 2003)
Δ was committing an armed robbery (includes assault with a deadly weapon; has severe criminal penalties); wound up killing someone; trial judge instructed jury that Δ could be found guilty of first-degree murder under FMR; Δ argued for merger doctrine; Δ wins this arg. – loses on other grounds
• Holding: Merger doctrine says that certain violent felonies already include the possibility of a killing in their definitions and sentencing guidelines. Therefore, it is unfair to use them as the underlying (aka predicate) felony for a felony murder charge
• Masur: Independent Purpose Test – If you are trying to something other than hurt the person, then there is no merger. As long as the felony has a purpose OUTSIDE of hurting the person, then FM doctrine does not apply.
People v. Burton (CA, 1971)
Man entered store shot 11 people to kill an unrequited lover
• Enumerated felonies (now) never merge
o If intended to assault 1, FM rule applies
o If intended to assault all, merger per independent purpose test
o Independent purpose test is absurd
o Assaultive test solves this (Chun dissent points this out)
Intent to assault someone is an assaultive felony, so auto-merger
Farley
Man tried to scare a person who he thought was trying to steal his hub caps by firing a gun at him. Man died.
• Holding: Court found that “negligent discharge of a firearm” was for an independent purpose from the murder: he was trying to scare him
• Dissent: Stupid that a man is strictly liable for murder because he said it was on accident.
o I.P. rule precludes assessment of mens rea in the cases where it is most relevant
• Masur: Assaultive rule would lead to more just results in this case—Chun overruled ^
Robertson
Δ fired gunshots at vehicle parked beside theirs; Δ argued had not specifically pointed gun at any one person; trial judge instructed jury on second-degree felony murder based on underlying felony of shooting at occupied motor vehicle; Δ argued cannot be FMR because invalid when assaultive felony merges into homicide; Π loses
• Holding: Elements of crimes, rather than the facts surrounding an issue, are looked into by the court in order to determine whether the felony charge merges with homicide.
• Masur: Assaultive Rule – The crime only merges with homicide on the ground that the elements of the underlying felony have an assaultive aspect. In this particular scenario, the felony charge cannot serve as the basis for a second-degree felony murder charge because shooting at an occupied vehicle is assaultive in nature
• Dissent: Get rid of FM rule because only makes a difference in cases where extreme indifference to human life is hard to prove cases most likely to result in injustice
Chun
Lookout panicked and shot a people. Leader killed the lookout. Fellow co-conspirators also guilty for first degree murder of the lookout.
• Holding: Killing the lookout was a foreseeable event in furtherance of a common objective. All parties were liable.
• Co-conspirators are culpable for acts of their co-conspirators when those acts are
o (1) encouraged or intentionally aided by the co-conspirators or
o (2) reasonably foreseeable and in furtherance of a common goal
• Masur: We look to concepts of what people signed up for and what they can reasonably expect NOT whether it made crime more likely to succeed b/c courts are bad at that
o Is there causal connection between the frolic of homicide and agreed upon felony
o When you go into an armed robbery, you can reasonably foresee violence
Cabaltere
Δ and three confederates were robbing store when owner engaged in physical skirmish with one of the four robbers; another robber started shooting and owner shot back; owner and one robber was killed; Δ charged with murder of both under FMR; Π loses on felon’s death
• Holding: Traditionally, FMR limited to situations where Δ or associates did the killing; statute did not compel felony murder to extend to situations where 3rd party did so
• Agency Theory of FM: Confederates only responsible for death directly attributable to one of them (not 3rd party actor)
o Only some jurisdictions CHECK statute on exam
State v. Canola (NJ, 1977)
Innocent Victim Rule: FM rule only applies to death of innocent people because purpose is to protect the public (does not apply to deaths of co-felons)
o Only some jurisdictions CHECK statute on exam
Williams
