Emergency Procedures (Ch. 12) Flashcards
Hung Droop Stop(s)
*1. Reengage rotor to greater than 75% Nr
Loss of Tail Rotor Control
APU Fire
*1. APU T-handle– Pull
*2. Confirm fire.
*3. FIRE EXTGH switch–RESERVE (MAIN if required and available)
- If airborne and fire continues:
*4. Land immediately
- If fire appears extinguished:
*5. Land as soon as possible.
- If on ground:
*6. Fire extinguisher–As required.
Categories of Tail rotor control malfunctions
- Tail rotor control cable failures
- Tail rotor servo failures
- Restriced flight controls
Engine Malfunction during Hover/Takeoff
FLIR Uncommanded Lasing
*1. MASTER ARM–SAFE
*2. LASER SELECT–SAFE
- If lasing continues:
*3. FLIR – OFF.
Engine High-Speed Shaft Failure
Engine Torque or TGT Spiking/Fluctuations
*1. EMIF–Perform
If fuel contamination is suspected:
*2. Land as soon as possible.
WARNING: PCL movement during engine fluctuations may precipitate an engine failure. Consider performing an APU Emergency Start procedure prior to manipulating the PCL. Maintaining a low power setting when moving the PCL will minimize Nr decay rate if the malfunctioning engine fails.
Dual-EGI Failure
*1. Backup instruments– Scan, as required.
*2. #1 and #2 EGI PWR switches– OFF, then ON
ENGINE LOW-SIDE FAILURE
*1. EMIF-PERFORM
Immediate Landing / Ditching
Utility Pump Caution
*1. Stop dome.
-Break out PCL-
Cockpit Fire / Cabin Fire
- If source is known:
*1. Affected power switches and cbs– Secure
*2. Portable Fire Extinguisher–As required
- If fire continues or source is unknown:
*3. Cabin/doors/vents/ECS – CLOSE/OFF, as required
*4. Unnecessary electrical equipment and cbs– secure
- If fire continues:
*5. Land as soon as possible.
WARNING
Loss of electrical power to the engine will result in engine anti-ice activation regardless of engine anti-ice or DE-ICE MASTER switch position, reducing max torque available by up to 18%. With a malfunctioning inlet anti-ice valve, torque available can be recued by as much as 49%.
Smoke and Funes Elimination
*1. Airspeed – adjust as required
*2. Doors/windows/vents – Open
*3. Aircraft – Yaw, as required
1 and #2 HYD PUMP Failure
(#1 and #2 HYD PUMP Caution and BACK UP PUMP ON Advisory)
*1. Restrict flight control movement
*2. Land as soon as possible
1 and #2 FUEL FLTR BYPASS
or
*1. Land as soon as possible
*2. APU Emergency Start procedure–perform
WARNING
Be prepared for dual-engine failure. Recommended airspeed is 80 KIAS to minimize Nr droop should dual-engine failure occur.
NOTE
Consideration should be given to performing applicable steps of the Immediate Landing/Ditching emergency procedure.
AFCS DEGRADED Caution
*1. Safe altitude and airspeed–Establish (waveoff/ITO as required.)
-Break out PCL-
ENGINE HIGH SIDE FAILURE ON DECK
- *1. PCLs–IDLE
Underwater Egress
External Engine Fire
*1. Confirm Fire
*2. EMIF ep–perform
*3. PCL (affected engine)–OFF
*4. Engine T-Handle (affected engine)–pull
*5. FIRE EXTGH switch–MAIN (RESERVE if required or ac power is off)
If airborne and fire continues:
*6. Land immediately
If fire appears extinguished:
*7. Land as soon as possible.
Tail / Intermediate Transmission Malfunction
EMIF
Loss of Tail Rotor Drive
Altitude and Airspeed Sufficient to Establish Autorotation
Hydraulic System Warning
*1. Land immediately
1 Primar Servo or #1 Transfer Module Leak
(#1 RSVR LOW and #1 HYD PUMP Cautions, and BACK UP PUMP ON Advisory)
Dual-Engine Failure
WARNINGS:
- Rotor rmp decays rapidly following a dual-engine failure of loss of hte second engine after a single-engine failure. Delay in lowering the collective will result in loss of rotor rmp and may cause catastrophic failure of the rotor system due to dynamic instability at low rpm.
- Altitude hold will remain engaged unless deselected. If the collective TRIM RLSE switch is not depressed, the AFCS will attempt to maintain aircraft altitude. AFCS commanded collective movement could result in a catastrophic loss of Nr
- Flying with greater than 110% torque with one engine inoperative, may result in unrecoverable Nr decay in the event of a dual-eng failure. (if both engines fail, generators will drop off line at approx 80% Nr resulting in loss of both pilot and copilot MD and FD.)
APU Emergency Start
*1. ECS–OFF
*2. AIR SOURCE ECS/START switch–APU
*3. FUEL PUMP switch– APU BOOST
*4. APU CONTR switch–ON
*5. APU GEN–ON
Main Transmission Malfunction
Electrical Power Failure / Dual Generator Failure
*1. Safe altitude and airspeed–Establish
*2. Stabilator–Check position, slew as required.
*3. APU Emergency start procedure-perform
WARNING
Ensure airspeed vs. stab angle limits are not exceeded. Stab auto mode is in operative.
NOTE
The stab position indicator will be inoperative with no power to the ac essential bus. Attempt to check visually.
Stabilator Auto Mode Failure
- *1. PAC call–“STAB STAB STAB”
- *2. Cyclin–arrest pitch rate
- *3. Collective– do not reduce
- *4. MAN SLEW switch–adjust to 0°
WARNING
- Its possible for the stab to fail w/o illumination of the stab caution and aural warning tone. In this case, the first indication of failure will be an uncommanded pitch change.
- Reengagement of the auto mode after a shutdown results in teh auto mode oeprating for 1 second. If a hardover signal to 1 actuator was teh casuse of the initial shutdown, and reengagment is attempted, the actuator will move before another disengagement is commanded. In this case, subsequent reengagement shall not be attempted since it may result in additoinal stab movement. If acceleration is continued with the stab in the full down position, longitudinal control will be lost. The stab shall be slewed to 0° as a/s increases above 40 KIAS
- With large fixed stab angles, reduction in collective pitch results in increased aft cyclic requirements. Collective reduction during recovery from a trailing edge down stab flight condition should be minimal. If the stab becomes fixed @ or near 0°, nose-high attitudes may occur at slow speeds.
- A combination of high airspeed/low altitude coupled w/ a runaway down stab (indicated by a significant uncommanded nose-down pitch change) will necessitate immediate pilot action to maintain control of the aircraft. Primary consideration is to disengage the auto mode by activating manual mode slewing as required.
- At high airspeeds, immediate recognition and flight control input are essential to avoid an unrecoverable attitude. it is essential for the PNAC to slew the stab to 0 immediately to gain control of the aircraft. If acceleration is continued with the stab in the full down position, logitudinal control will be lost.
- Without stab auto mode, careful aircrew coordination to manually slew the stab is required to avoid undesirable and potentially dangerous flight regimes and/or aircraft attitudes.
INPUT CHIP (#1 / #2) Caution
Boost Servo Hardover
*1. PAC call–“BOOST, BOOST, BOOST”
*2. SAS/BOOST pushbutton–OFF
-Break out PCL-
Loss of Tail Rotor Control
Altitude and Airspeed NOT Sufficient to Establish Autorotation
Tail Rotor Control Cable Failures
- TAIL ROTOR QUADRANT caution light. No change in handling qualities, but land as soon as practicable.
- If both fail: tail rotor control will be lost.
- tail rotor assumes preset spring-loaded position setting.
- @ approx 19,500lbs fixed pitch setting will provide balanced level flight at about 25 AND 145 KIAS
- Below 25 and above 145 the tail rotor doesn’t produce enough thrust to counteract main rotor, and will YAW RIGHT. (Control by reducint collective and/or adjusting airspeed to appropriate range)
- Between 25 and 145 t/r produces too much thrust, helo will YAW LEFT. (Control by increasing collective and/or adjusting airspeed toward etiher balanced airspeed.)
Internal Engine Fire
*1. Starter– Engage. Motor Engine
ENGINE HIGH SIDE FAILURE IN FLIGHT
Compressor Stall
*1. EMIF–Perform
*2. PCL (malfunctioning engine)–IDLE
1 or #2 FUEL FLTR BYPASS
or
*1. Fuel selector lever (affected engine)– XFD (DIR if currently in XFD)
Engine Air Restart
Abort Start
*1. PCL–OFF
*2. ENGINE IGNITION switch–OFF
If engine oil pressure is indicated:
*3. Starter–ENGAGE.
LOW ROTOR RPM Warning
*1. Control Nr
Single-Engine Failure in Flight
*1. EMIF–Perform
Tail Rotor Servo Failures
- Loss of #1 HYD pump and B/U HYD pump result in both stages of t/r servo being unpressurized.
- yaw boost servo is still pressurized
- Normal yaw control is available between approx. 40 and 120 KIAS.
- At airspeeds lower than 40 and higher than 120, aerodynamic loads on t/r cannot be overcome by the yaw boost servo.
- as a/s is decreased toward 40 or increased to 120 yaw reponse to pedal inputs becomes less effective
- reduced yaw response at larger pedal inputs.
- if a/s decreases below 40, a loss of t/r control will likely occur.
- a roll on landing above 40 KIAS is recommended.
Unusual Vibrations on Deck
*1. Collective–Lower
*2. PCLs–OFF
*3. Rotor brake–Apply as required.
2 Primary Servo or #2 Transfer Module Leak
(#2 RSVR LOW and #2 HYD PUMP Cautions and BACK UP PUMP ON Advisory)
Unusual Attitude Recovery
*1. Level wings
*2. Nose on horizon
*3. Center ball
*4. Stop rate of climb/descent
*5. Control airspeed
