E&F - lecture 12 Flashcards

1
Q

Equity

A

By equity I mean that a just and humane society can define a minimum standard of medical care that should be available to all its members -essentially all the cost worthy medical care that can effectively prevent or cure diseases, relieve suffering, and correct dysfunction.
(By “cost worthy” I mean that marginal benefits equal marginal costs for persons of average incomes) . (Enthoven, 1988)

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2
Q

Social Health Insurance

A

Health insurance is social insurance. Health insurance is appropriately understood as social insurance and not casualty insurance. (…) Social insurance assures universal financial access to the decent minimum and requires the well to share in the cost of care of the sick. The element of cross-subsidy is essential.
Source: Enthoven (1988b) p. 4-5.

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3
Q

Equity: complete autonomy rejected

A
  • In a free market the outcome would be entirely based on individual choices;
  • A free market would result in market failures (e.g., risk rating and risk selection; discontinuity of coverage; to be discussed later);
  • A system with high ethical standards is necessary, with safegards to prevent abuse.
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4
Q

Equity: collective action is appropriate

A
  • Collective action is appropriate because market failure is endemic in health insurance.
  • Collective action is necessary and appropriate to assure that each person is protected from the high healthcare costs.
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5
Q

Equity: complete equality is rejected

A
  • The ’decent minimum‘ limits the choice of the poor to the standard of care that is cost-worthy for the average person, thus more than they would choose if they were given the money and a choice of how to use it.
  • Complete equality would limit the choice of those who could pay for more, and might prefer more.
  • Complete equality would block innovation and diversity.
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6
Q

Efficiency

A

An efficient allocation of health care resources is one that minimizes the social cost of illness, including its treatment. This is achieved when the marginal dollar spent on health care produces the same value to society as the marginal dollar spent on defense, education, consumption, or other uses. Relevant costs include the suffering and inconvenience of patients as well as the resources used in producing care.

This goal should not be confused with minimizing or containing health care expenditures. A lower percentage of GNP spent on health care does not necessarily mean greater efficiency – it may mean that costs have been shifted to patients by delaying or denying care. (Enthoven, 1988)

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7
Q

Efficiency has been ignored

A
  • In the Western European countries and North American democracies, social policy was initially preoccupied with equity, to extend equal financial protection and access to healthcare services to most or all of the population.
  • Compare the three waves described by Cutler! (Equity, Cost containment and Efficiency)
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8
Q

Perfect efficiency is not attainable

A
  • Health insurance and health care markets are not naturally competitive.
  • Efficiency of perfect market is not attainable in healthcare:
    – Information asymmetry;
    – Uncertainty –> health insurance –> moral hazard;
    – Medical services are largely locally provided, which limits the extent of competition.
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9
Q

Why has efficiency been ignored?

A
  1. There was not a great deal that medicine could do to alter the health status or outcomes of sick people. The really effective technologies – immunizations, antibiotics, and some surgery – were relatively simple and inexpensive.
  2. Total healthcare expenses relatively low.
  3. Differences in outcomes are difficult to define, measure, and value.
  4. Most people believe that more medical treatment is better than less.
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10
Q

Why is efficiency important now?

A
  1. The high level of HC expenses makes efficiency rewarding;
  2. There is choice among costly, effective treatments;
  3. Examples of huge efficiency differences (HMOs vs FFS; regional differences).
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11
Q

Equity and efficiency

A

Enthoven:
”I believe our ability to continue to pursue equity depends on our ability to improve efficiency in health care, and that the opportunities for doing so are substantial.”

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12
Q

‘Free market’-failures

A
  1. Risk rating and risk selection
  2. Market segmentation & product differentiation
  3. Information cost
  4. Discontinuity of coverage
  5. Free-riders
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13
Q

Why would an insurer apply risk selection (i.e. not accepting high risks) even if there are no legal restrictions on risk rating?

A
  1. Are the relevant risk factors known?
  2. If not, the insurer is not able to risk rate and therefore prefers to risk select
  3. Can they be measured?
  4. Not always
  5. Relation known between ‘loss’ & risk factors?
  6. Requires a lot of research
  7. What is socially more acceptable: rr or rs? Risk rating or risk selection
  8. Risk selection
  9. Transaction costs
  10. May be high
  11. How competitive is the market?
  12. If it not to competitive, they can afford it. Otherwise rr of rs
  13. Too small group; etc etc….
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14
Q

Risk rating and risk selection
In a free competitive insurance market insurers have to break even, in expectation, on each contract either by

A
  1. adjusting the premium to the consumer’s risk (risk-adjusted premiums),or
  2. by adjusting the accepted risk to the premium (risk selection), or
  3. Adjusting the product (product differentiation).
    * The premium differences can easily go up to a factor 1000.
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15
Q
  1. Segmentation and product differentiation
A
  • There are endless possibilities for differentiating insurance coverage from each other. This can be used as a tool for:
    – Risk selection, and
    – Segment the market to avoid price competition, i.e., differentiate the product in ways that make price comparison very difficult.
  • Although such segmentation can be responsive to consumer preferences, it comes at the expense of price competition, and may therefore reduce efficiency.
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16
Q
  1. Information costs
A
  • Health insurance coverages are complex and difficult to understand, evaluate, and compare  High information costs.
  • People may find it costly in terms of their own time to achieve a sufficient understanding of the different health insurance options offered.
  • High information costs reduce the price competition on the insurance market.
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17
Q
  1. Discontinuity of coverage
A
  • In a free-market insurers might drop coverage of people who develop a chronic condition as soon as their contract period expires (discontinuity of coverage), or they may raise the premium to reflect the patient’s new condition (risk rating).
  • In a free-market insurance contracts may contain a clause such as: no automatic coverage of newborns.
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18
Q
  1. Free-riders
A
  • Free-riders: people who go without insurance in the belief that if they become really sick, someone will take care of them.
  • They may wait until they are sick to buy health insurance.
    Insurers usually use tools to protect themselves against such free-riders, such as risk rating, exclusion of preexisting medical conditions, and denial of coverage. But how effective?
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19
Q

Why is the theory and practice of managed competition relevant for countries with a public non-competitive healthcare system?

A

In all countries there are policymakers who advocate a competitive healthcare market with the argument that competition would increase efficiency.
Often, however, they do NOT understand the complexity of the managed competition model.

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20
Q

Managed Competition

A

The essence of managed competition is the use of the available tools to structure cost-conscious consumer choice among health plans in the pursuit of equity and efficiency in health care financing and delivery. The market in a system of managed competition should be viewed not as merely two-sided but as three-cornered, including consumers, health plans, and sponsors. Enthoven, JHPPL, 1988.

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21
Q

Health Plan: different meanings

A

Enthoven (1988):
Health plans integrate the financing and provision of care.
Synonyms: e.g. Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), Alternative Delivery Systems, Integrated Delivery Systems (IDS).  insurers

Affordable Care Act (USA):
Health plan = a health insurance product.

When using the term ‘health plan’ clearly define it!

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21
Q

Managed competition (model 1c)

A

Sponsor (in Obama care: health insurance exchange)
* The sponsor sets the rules of the game
* Comes up with measures or regulation to achieve society’s goals
* Uses tools to counteract market failure
* Key task: to provide/ organize and administer subsidies to health plans, consumers (high risk)

22
Q

The goal of managed competition

A

The goal of managed competition is to reconcile equity and efficiency, at least to a reasonable degree.
Sponsors manage competition in order to achieve that goal by using tools to counteract market failures.
(Enthoven, 1988)

23
Q

Sponsors (1)

A

Sponsors are active collective agents on the demand side of the market who contract with competing health plans and continuously structure and adjust the market to overcome its tendency toward failure and inequity. The sponsor is the ultimate guarantor of coverage.

  • The main sponsors in the USA are federal and state governments, large employers, unions, and labor/management health and welfare trusts.
  • Europeans interested in managed competition will naturally think in terms of government as sponsor.
    (Enthoven, 1988)

Sponsor can also be seen as government

24
Q

Tools to counteract market failures (1)

A

The tools that a private-sector sponsor uses to counteract market failures (i.e., private contracts with the health plans and the consumer) differ from the tools that government uses (i.e., legislation and regulations).

25
Q

Sponsors (2)

A

The sponsor serves as the broker who
* structures the coverages,
* contracts with the beneficiaries and health plans regarding the rules of participation,
* manages the enrollment process,
* collects premium contributions from beneficiaries,
* pays premiums to health plans, and
* administers the cross-subsidies among beneficiaries.

26
Q

Regulated competition

A

Allocation and prices are in principle determined by the market, but government regulation offers guarantees for equity and set side-conditions for efficiency.
NB: A set of preconditions should be fulfilled to achieve efficiency and affordability!

27
Q

Tools for improving efficiency

A

Insurers have the following tools for improving the efficiency of healthcare:
– Selective contracting;
– Provider payments;
– Utilization management.

28
Q

Tools to counteract market failures

A

The tools that a private-sector sponsor uses to counteract market failures (i.e., private contracts with the health plans and the consumer) differ from the tools that government uses (i.e., legislation and regulations).

29
Q

Tools to counteract market failures

A
  1. Risk adjustment (Enthoven: ‘pricing’) and sponsors management of subsidies (in Europe: risk equalization)
  2. Standardized benefits packages
  3. Annual open enrollment process
  4. Continuity of coverage
  5. Surveillance by sponsors
  6. Quality assurance
30
Q
  1. Risk Equalization Fund (REF) in NL
A
  • Ref payments – between ref and insurers based on predicted expenses for each individual insured
  • Insurer receives a certain subsidy; a payment out of the ref based on the expected expenses for the next contract period of each individual out of the ref, which is filled with the income related contribution. Consumer pays premium.
  • Cross subsidies not only low risk to high risk, but also from low income to high income
31
Q
  1. Standardized benefits packages
A

Standardized benefits packages should prevent risk selection, product differentiation, and market segmentation.
However, exactly the same benefits package would reduce innovation and efficiency in the process of health care delivery.

32
Q
  1. Annual open enrollment process
A

Direct interaction between a health plan’s sales representative and a potential subscriber in the process of enrollment gives the health plan an opportunity to ask questions about health status and to discourage enrollment of the chronically ill.
The sponsor could manage the contacts between subscribers and health plans.
(NB: In Israel: enrollment via the postoffice)

33
Q
  1. Continuity of coverage
A
  • Subscribers should be able to renew their coverage in subsequent years;
  • There should be automatic coverage for newborns to prevent health plans from avoiding the risk of neonatal care.
  • This could be achieved via a periodic open enrollment requirement.
34
Q
  1. Surveillance by sponsors
A

Sponsors should monitor the performance of health plans, watch for signs of inappropriate risk-selecting behavior, and take corrective action when necessary.
Sponsors must be free to use judgement based on reasonable but less-than-conclusive evidence.

35
Q
  1. Quality assurance
A

A competitive market will not automatically produce high-quality care, especially to the extent that the market is characterized by poor information about quality.
Consumers need information and help in judging which providers produce good outcomes and which do not.
Quality evaluation is thus an appropriate role for sponsors.

36
Q

Efficiency = Cost-effectiveness

A

Treatment A is less effective than treatment B, but may be more efficient than B because of its lower costs: lowering the effectiveness while substantially reducing the costs may increase efficiency!

37
Q

Efficiency and affordability

A

The efficiency-goal relates to both technical and allocative efficiency of the care covered by the basic package.
Affordability implies that everyone has access to affordable health insurance covering a basic package of good quality care that is accessible within reasonable travel time and without undue waiting time.

38
Q

Ten specific preconditions

A
  1. Free consumer choice of insurer
  2. Consumer information & market transparency
  3. Risk-bearing buyers and sellers
  4. Contestable markets
  5. Freedom to contract and integrate
  6. Effective competition regulation
  7. Cross-subsidies without risk selection
  8. Cross-subsidies without free riding
  9. Effective quality supervision
  10. Guaranteed access to basic care.
39
Q

Free consumer choice of insurer

A

Ø Each consumer should have a free periodic choice of insurer and insurance products covering a basic benefits package.
Ø No high switching costs, such as search costs, filling out forms, or losing supplementary insurance.
Ø Insurers should not be allowed to refuse applicants for any basic health insurance product they offer.

40
Q

Consumer information

A

Ø There should be sufficient public information on the price, quality and other relevant aspects of both the offered health insurance products and the medical products and their providers.
Ø This information must be relevant, valid, reliable, objective, transparent and easily understandable.

40
Q

Market transparency

A

Effective competition also requires transparency, e.g. a manageable number of medical products and a manageable number of insurance products with a standardized benefits package. Otherwise value-for-money comparisons are impossible.

41
Q

Risk-bearing buyers and sellers

A

Ø The buyers and sellers should be risk-bearing (i.e. price- and cost-sensitive), both on the insurance market and on the healthcare provision market.
Ø Insurers should individually, and not collectively, bear the financial responsibility of purchasing.
Ø Providers of care should bear the full risk of running their practices, including the capital costs.

42
Q

Contestable markets

A

A fourth precondition for efficiency is that the provider and insurer markets are contestable (Baumol, 1982) as much as possible, i.e. there ought to be no unnecessary barriers to enter or exit the market.
E.g. no financial support by government to failing hospitals, because that reduces the competitive advantage of efficient competitors.

43
Q

Freedom to contract / integrate

A

The individual insurers and individual providers of care should have sufficient freedom to (selectively) contract and negotiate the content of contracts (e.g., prices, quality, capacity and services), and to reduce the contracting costs by internalizing them through vertical integration (Williamson, 1971).

44
Q

Selective contracting

A

Selective (differentiated) contracting is expected:
Ø to increase quality (keeping price equal);
Ø to reduce the price (keeping quality equal);
Ø to increase dynamic efficiency (innovation);
Ø to increase the providers’ responsiveness to consumers’ preferences, e. g. opening hours, waiting times, respectful treatment, coordinated care.

45
Q

Effective competition regulation

A

Ø A sixth precondition is that there is effective competition regulation to prevent anticompetitive mergers and cartels, and to prevent abuse of dominant positions.
Ø This precondition is complementary to (but not a substitute for) the precondition ‘contestable markets’.

46
Q

No incentives for risk selection

A

It is difficult to organize cross-subsidies in a competitive health insurance market without providing insurers with incentives for risk selection and without reducing the buyers’ financial risk.
To prevent overlap with precondition 3 (‘risk-bearing buyers’) we focus here on cross-subsidies that do not provide insurers with incentives for risk selection.

47
Q

No opportunities for free riding

A

Ø There should be no opportunities for free riding behavior. Free riders are individuals who avoid paying premiums and/or cross-subsidies.
Ø The presence of free riders increases the payments by the non-free-riders and thereby reduces the willingness to cross-subsidize that is essential to achieve or maintain affordability.

48
Q

Effective quality supervision

A

Ø Because the consumer in healthcare is in a vulnerable position (e.g. information asymmetry, supply induced demand) it is necessary that the individual consumer is effectively protected against quackery and substandard quality care.
Ø This type of consumer protection also exists in other industries (e.g. airline industry and food).

49
Q

Guaranteed access to basic care

A

Ø Individual consumers should have a guaranteed access to sufficient healthcare facilities at reasonable travel time without undue waiting times.
Ø This guarantee may be given by government, insurers, employers or another ‘third party’.

50
Q

The following preconditions are least fulfilled:

A

Ø consumer information and transparency,
Ø contestable markets,
Ø freedom to contract and integrate,
Ø effective competition regulation,
Ø no incentive for risk selection.

50
Q

Preconditions are not fulfilled

A
  • Because regulated competition in healthcare is complex (preconditions!) its implementation will take considerable time, and the short-term effects may be limited, or even negative.
  • Policy makers may then wrongly conclude that the regulated competition in health care does not work, rather than conclude that important preconditions have not (yet) been fulfilled.