E&F - lecture 11 Flashcards

1
Q

Rationale third-party in health care

A
  1. Risk and uncertainty;
    - We do not know when we get sick and what will be expenses and therefore there is a demand for insurance, thus a third party
  2. Information asymmetry;
    - Providers have more knowledge  SID  Supply induced moral hazard  third party needed to counteract these undesired effects
  3. Externalities (e.g. “altruïstic preferences”; contagious diseases).
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2
Q

Main functions for third parties in hc

A
  1. Insurance function;
  2. Agency function;
    – reducing moral hazard;
    – providing information about the quality of care;
    – being a prudent buyer of care on behalf of the consumer;
  3. Access function: to guarantee universal access to basic health services.
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3
Q

Major goal of healthcare reforms

A

Major goal of healthcare reforms:
Ø in many European / OECD countries: a Third Party acting as an effective agent on behalf of the consumer (the second function);
Ø in low-income countries: all three functions!

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4
Q

Who can perform third-party role?

A
  • Insurance companies;
  • Employers;
  • Unions;
  • Providers of care (e.g. polyclinic-fundholder);
  • Integrated insurer-provider organisations;
  • Government (national, regional and local).
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5
Q

Three models of paying providers by third-party payers (“insurers”):

A

a. reimbursement model;
b. contract model;
c. Integrated model.

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6
Q

Reimbursement model

A
  • Consumer pays premium
  • Consumer provides care and gets bill
  • Consumer informs insurer of expenses
  • Insurer reimburses to the consumer
  • Consumer pays provider
  • No contact between provider and insurer: supplier induced moral hazard, no influence on the delivery of health care
  • Insurer: third party payer
  • Examples mandatory: France
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7
Q

Contract model

A
  • Between insurer and provider: contracts
  • Insurer: purchaser of care on behalf of enrollees
  • There are a lot of transaction costs: negotiation
  • Examples mandatory: Germany and the Netherlands
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8
Q

Integrated model

A
  • Insurer and provider for one organization (to reduce transaction costs)
  • Examples mandatory: southern and northern European countries

From contract to integrated: competitive market
From integrated to contract: monopolistic market

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8
Q

Aspects crucial for the functioning, regulation and classification of healthcare systems:

A
  1. Yes/no competition among the third-party-payers?
  2. Yes/no competition among the providers of care?
  3. Which type of payment from the third-party payer to the providers of care?
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9
Q

Other aspects crucial for the functioning and regulation of healthcare systems:

A
  • Who is the third-party payer/purchaser?
  • Voluntary or mandatory health insurance?
  • Which benefits are (not) covered?
  • Cost sharing: how much? which forms?
  • Yes/no for-profit insurers and/or providers of care?
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10
Q

Model 1b or Model 2b?

A
  • Purchaser power;
  • largest in 2b
  • Transaction costs;
  • Larger in 1b
  • Coordination of local health care delivery;
  • In 1b
  • Incentive for third-party purchaser to act as an agent on behalf of the consumer;
  • Strong in 1b
  • Incentives for risk rating or –in case of premium rate restrictions- incentives for risk selection.
  • Issue in 1b, not in 2b
    We cannot say 1 is better than the other
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11
Q

(Dis)advantages model 4

A
  • Advantages model 4: strong ability to contain costs (e.g. budgeting), low administrative costs, relative simple legislation/regulation;
  • Disadvantages model 4: lack of incentives for efficiency, for innovation and for consumer responsiveness; bureaucracy, fiscal underfunding, waiting lists.
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12
Q

(Dis)advantages model 2

A
  • Advantages model 2: providers have incentives for efficiency, for innovation and for consumer responsiveness;
  • Disadvantages model 2: third-party purchasers have no/weak incentives for efficiency, for innovation and for consumer responsiveness;
    high transaction costs of contracting; complex regulation.
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13
Q

(Dis)advantages model 1

A
  • Advantages model 1: both third-party purchasers and providers have incentives for efficiency, for innovation and for consumer responsiveness;
  • Disadvantages model 1: high transaction costs of contracting; incentives for risk selection; complex regulation.
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14
Q

Model 1c

A

Model 1c = Enthoven’s model of ‘Managed Competition of Alternative Delivery Systems’ (e.g., HMOs).
Advantages of an HMO (health maintenance organization):
* One information system that all doctors and nurses use;
* Good coordination of care;
* Good planning of healthcare facilities;
* Low contracting costs;
* Incentives to avoid complications (= extra costs);
* Incentives to invest in prevention & health maintenance.

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15
Q

Typology of health care systems

A
  1. Traditional sickness fund insurance (Bismarck model)
  2. National health insurance
  3. National health services (Beveridge model and semashko model)
  4. Mixed systems
16
Q

Bismarck system (1883)

A
  • Contributions form both employers and employees
  • Contracts between sickness funds and providers of care
  • Compulsory for workers with an income below a certain level
  • Government determines the conditions that govern the relations between sickness funds, providers and consumers.
  • Original roots in work-related insurance, mostly up to a certain income.
  • Extension of Bismarck system to population-wide coverage:
    o Switzerland (1996);
    o Belgium (1998);
    o France (2000);
    o The Netherlands (2006).
17
Q

Semashko system (1918)

A
  • Highly centralized, funded by the state budget
  • Free access to health care for all
  • Facilities are state-owned and managed by district and regional authorities
  • Population allocated to the outpatient clinic in its area; no free choice of doctor
  • Hospital and outpatient clinics are budgeted
  • Physicians are salaried
  • Physicians ask for gratuities
  • Separate medical facilities for industrial workers
18
Q

Beveridge system (NHS, 1948)

A
  • Centralized and funded by the state
  • (nearly) free access to health care for all
  • Facilities are state-owned and budgeted
  • Hospital physicians are salaried
  • Government regulation less strong than in semashko systems
  • Some room for private services and private health insurance
  • General practitioner: contract with the NHS
    no extensive occupational health care sector
18
Q

Typology of health care systems (Toth)
Toth (2016) discern:

A
  • three ideal types of financing systems:
    – Voluntary insurance
    – Social health insurance
    – Residual programs
  • and two additional models:
    – Compulsory national health insurance
    – Universalist system.
19
Q

Typology of health care systems (Toth)
Five different financing models:

A
  • Voluntary insurance
    1. Citizens are free to obtain coverage, or pay out-of-pocket;
    2. Competing private insurers, risk rating;
  • Social health insurance
    1. e.g., Bismarckian system;
    2. Mandatory for certain categories of workers;
    3. Contribution related to salary;
    4. Workers assigned to non-competing sickness funds;
  • Residual programs
    1. Financed by the community, but only available to particular categories;
    2. e.g., elderly, low-income, serious disease, minors, …
  • compulsory national health insurance
    1. The state requires all residents to take out private health insurance covering essential health services;
    2. Competing private insurers;
    3. Subsidies for low-income citizens;
    4. Multi-payer system.
  • Universalist system
    1. Single-payer system;
    2. For the entire population;
    3. Right to health care is linked to being a resident;
    4. Mandatory contributions.
20
Q

As an additional criterion Toth (2016) discern integrated versus separated models:

A

Ø Integrated model
Ø Insurers provide most of the care needed by their policy holders directly through their own facilities and healthcare personnel.
Ø Insurer and providers coincide, constituting a single organization.
Ø Sperated model
Ø Insurers and providers are functionally separated;
Ø Insurers reimburse the expenditures of health care.

21
Q

Three waves of health care reforms

A
  • Universal coverage and equal access;
  • Controls, rationing and expenditures caps;
  • Incentives and competition.
22
Q

Features & Problems after the first wave

A
  • Common features:
    – mandatory comprehensive coverage;
    – limited co-payments;
    – free choice of health care providers;
    – open-ended financing system.
  • Common problem:
    – uncontrollable health care cost inflation;
    – (due to) the absence of constraints on demand and supply.
23
Q

Second wave: cost containment

A
  • Introduction of constraints on demand:
  • co-payments, coinsurance and deductibles;
  • moderately used in most G7-countries.
  • Introduction of constraints on supply:
  • control of capacity and entry;
  • rate regulation;
  • overall expenditure caps for health professionals;
  • global budgeting of hospitals;
  • extensively used in all G7-countries.
24
Q

Problems after the second wave

A
  • Increasing conflicts between rationing policies and the “right” to health care;
  • Supply and price regulation result in inefficient allocation of resources (government failure);
  • Supply and price regulation cannot contain long-run cost growth;
  • A lack of incentives for efficiency!
25
Q

Third wave: incentives and competition

A
  1. At the patient level (at the time that services are used);
  2. Competition at the level of insurance purchase (rather than at the time of services used);
  3. Incentives within the provider community.
26
Q

From model 2b towards model 1b

A

Possible transition paths:
1. Monopolistic insurer & several branches, that over time become independent;
2. Give choice to groups of insured;
3. Give consumers the option to conclude a contract with a neighbouring ‘purchaser’;
4. Coalitions of GP-fundholders;
5. Give consumers the option to opt-out.

27
Q

Dutch health care system

A
  • Much private initiative and private enterprise: physicians, hospitals, insurers;
  • Still much (detailed) government regulation;
  • GP-gatekeeper;
  • Health insurance before 2006 a mixture of:
    Ø mandatory public insurance (67%),
    Ø voluntary private insurance (33%).
  • From 2006: mandatory private insurance (100%).
28
Q

Reforms since the early 1990s

A

The core of the reforms is that:
Ø Risk-bearing insurers will be the prudent buyer of care on behalf on their members;
Ø Government will deregulate existing price- and capacity-controls;
Ø Government will “set the rules of the game” to achieve public goals: access, affordability, good quality.

29
Q

Health Insurance Act (since 01jan06)

A
  • Mandate for everyone in the Netherlandsto buy individual private health insurance from a private insurer;
  • Standard benefits package;
  • Broad coverage: e.g. physician services, hospital care, drugs, medical devices, rehabilitation, prevention, mental care, dental care (children);
  • Mandatory deductible: €385 (in 2018) per person (18+) per year.
  • Individual insurer is assumed to be(come) the prudent buyer of care;
  • Much flexibility in defining the consumer’s concrete insurance entitlements;
  • Selective contracting insurers - providers;
  • Open enrolment & ‘community rating per insurer’ for each type of health insurance contract;
  • Income-related care allowances per household;
  • Risk equalization.
30
Q

Consumer choice

A
  • Annual consumer choice of insurer and choice of insurance contract:
    – in kind, or reimbursement, or a combination;
    – preferred provider arrangement;
    – voluntary additional deductible: at most + €500 per person (18+) per year.
  • Voluntary supplementary insurance.
31
Q

Regulated Competition

A
  • Competition among health insurers:
    consumers have a periodic choice among health insurers or ‘health plans’ (‘organizations in which insurer and providers are integrated’);
  • Competition among providers of care:
    insurers may selectively contract with providers;
  • Not a free market; regulation to achieve society’s public goals.