Dworkin Flashcards
What is the difference between rules and principles?
Principles require consideration, but do not clearly direct a decision (eg. freedom of contract).
On the other hand, rules explicitly work to direct a decision (eg. contract requires an offer and acceptance).
What is the distinction between Fuller and Dworkin?
Fuller locates morality in the procedure of law. The fact that law is decided by an impartial judge, for example, makes it morally fair.
Dworkin locates morality both in the process and the substantive content of law.
How does Dworkin falsify Hart’s pedigree thesis?
Dworkin claims that Hart’s concept of law does not recognise principles, only rules.
Principles are not explicitly recognised by any secondary RoR in law. Yet, they are relevant in deciding cases.
Therefore, Hart is wrong in saying that law is only law if it has pedigree. Principles are an important part of law, yet they do not have “pedigree”.
How does Dworkin’s principles show that law is inseparable from morality?
Principles are effectively legal ‘values’.
Values are a product of moral reasoning.
Therefore, principles work to incorporate morality into the law.
What does the exclusive positivist argue?
Principles themselves have pedigrees. It is a form of judicial custom, and thus has pedigree in that sense.
Principles are ‘extra-legal’ standards, similar to foreign laws in choice of law cases. Both principles and foreign law remain outside of the legal system.
What does the inclusive positivist argue?
Like punitive sanctions, morality can also be a part of law. They are just not essential parts of the law, in the way that secondary rules like the RoR are.
What are the two points of view that Dworkin describes in his semantic critique of Hart’s methodology?
The external, sociological point of view. Observing the legal system as an outsider without participating in it. This is Hart’s approach.
The internal point of view. The perspective of those who argue over law. This is a perspective into the heart of legal arguments. This is Dworkin’s approach.
What are empirical disagreements?
Disagreement about legal facts (eg. did this action actually occur; did this statute actually follow the procedures necessary to product a valid statue) are ‘empirical disagreements’
What are theoretical disagreements?
Disagreement about the grounds of law; Whether a legal decision is the right or wrong one.
These are questions of social construction.
They cannot be resolved empirically.
According to Hart, what happens when the ‘law runs out’?
When the law runs out, there is no rule of recognition that tells the judge the law to apply to resolve the particular case.
When this happens, the judge is left to use their own discretion.
According to Dworkin, what happens when the ‘law runs out’?
Judges engage in an actual dispute over what to do when the law runs out. They argue over which principle of law should be applied to resolve the case. They assess the merits behind competing approaches to resolving the case.
According to Hart, what is going on when judges are involved in a theoretical disagreement?
They are arguing whether the law has in fact run out; whether the law that they want to apply is recognised by a rule of recognition.
What are questions of repair?
Questions that judges engage in over how to best remedy a defect in the law.
What is Dworkin’s initial critique over Hart’s plain fact view of the law?
He believes that when the ‘law runs out’, judges genuinely disagree over the grounds of law.
They are not simply deciding a result based on discretion alone.
Cases like Elmer’s Case, the Snail Darter case, and Mcloughlin v O’Brian show judges arguing over the relevant legal principles that should apply in the case.
What is Hart’s plain fact view of the law?
When there is no law that appears to govern the facts of a case, judges argue over whether the law has in fact run out. This is an argument over whether there is a law recognised by a RoR that should be applied to resolve the case. When they cannot do so, judges are simply left to their own discretion.