Developmental Flashcards

1
Q

How do infants respond, by 3 months of age, to maternal expressions of: 1. Joy 2. Sadness 3. Anger

A
  1. Joy – express joy 2. Sad – mouthing to express distress 3. Anger – expressions of interest plummet, freezing rises, and a touch of anger
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2
Q

What are Trevarthen’s definitions of subjectivity and intersubjectivity?

A

Subjectivity - display individual consciousness and intentionality. Intersubjectivity - ability to adapt or fit this subjective control to the subjectivity of others.

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3
Q

What were the responses of infants in the three conditions of the Murray and Trevarthen still-face experiment?

A

Still (blank) face – signs of protest, regain mother’s attention then distress. Replay – baby disturbed, withdraws from interaction (disengagement), brings hands to face (self-regulation, comfort). Proves baby’s response is not due to lack of stimulation, but due to lack of contingent responding. Interruption – infants became quiet, less positive but not distressed or avoidant.

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4
Q

The failure of ___________ maternal responding to infant signals, by way of deliberate __________ or maternal __________, typically has a disruptive and disorganizing effect on infants under 4 months of age

A

The failure of contingentt maternal responding to infant signals, by way of deliberate perturbation or maternal depression, typically has a disruptive and disorganizing effect on infants under 4 months of age.

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5
Q

What 3 factors measured at 2 months predict insecure attachment at 18 months (Tomlinson et al. 2005)?

A

Maternal depression, maternal intrusiveness and maternal remoteness predicted predicted insecure attachment at 18 months.

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6
Q

In Tomlinson et al. (2005), which factors at 18 months predict attachment style at 18 months?

A

Only maternal sensitivity from 18 month assessment makes independent contribution to attachment.

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7
Q

Before 2 months, infants can do what with faces? (three things)

A
  1. Recognise faces/facial configurations. 2. Reproduce facial and gestural configurations. 3. Have structured responses to emotional facial expressions.
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8
Q

By 2 months, infants can… (three things)

A
  1. Engage in reciprocal dyadic (face-to-face) communicative interactions; proto-conversations (e.g., Trevarthen, 1979) 2. Are sensitive to perturbation of such interactions in a manner that suggests they have a ‘social expectancy’ and they are highly motivated to seek interactions (e.g., Murray & Trevarthen, 1985) 3. Make a fundamental distinction between people and objects in their orienting responses (Brazelton et al., 1974; Trevarthen, 1974)
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9
Q

One of the most commonly observed and ‘known’ changes in infant social interaction, which occurs at about 9 months, is…

A

Stranger wariness or stranger anxiety.

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10
Q

What is the method, rationale and key finding of the Gergely et al. (1995) experiment (balls and walls)?

A

Kids at 6 and 9 months are habituated to one of two stimuli. Experimental: Small ball jumps wall to big ball Control: Small ball jumps to big ball with no wall Then wall removed and kids shown either same jump or small just rolling to big. If kids respond only to novelty, according to classic habituation paradigm, we would expect to see higher attentional recovery to new trajectory - ball rolling. BUT, kids at 9 months showed greatest attentional recovery to ball jumping in absence of wall – they could understand that if the small wanted to join the big, this action didn’t make sense. Kids at 9 months can understand goal-directed agency. This effect not found at 6 months.

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11
Q

When do infants begin to demonstrate interest in outside entities (other than caregiver)?

A

Latter half of first year.

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12
Q

What are the 3 kinds of joint attention in triadic interactions?

A
  1. Sharing attention – all by 9 months Lowest level. Baby and caregiver look at object together. Gaze alternation between object and parent. Methodologically, want to be sure that looks to object and parent are not incidental. 2. Following attention – all by 14 months Infant now can follow gaze so well it knows what people are looking at. Deliberate attention following, much less ambiguous. Follow attention via gaze. Follow behaviour via imitation. 3. Directing attention – all by 15 months Imperative gestures (involves pointing) Declarative gestures (involves pointing) Verbal communication
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13
Q

What did Carpenter et al. (1998) report in their study of attention in triadic interactions from 9-15 months?

A

Majority of infants fail at 9 months but pass at 15 months. But at 15 months most of these kids still can’t do referential language.

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14
Q

What are the results of the visual cliff study?

A

Percentage of 12-month-old infants who crossed over when mother’s expression was: Joy - 74% Fear - 0% Interest - 73% Anger - 11% Sadness - 33%

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15
Q

What are two implications of the visual cliff study?

A
  1. Infants appreciate that parents can supply information–in the form of an emotional appraisal–about novel objects (i.e., person, thing or situation) 2. Infants spontaneously seek such information from a third party or referee (e.g., parent or experimental confederate) to resolve their own uncertainty and to guide their actions
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16
Q

What are the four prerequisites for social learning?

A
  1. Infant must be able to decode signal 2. Infant must understand referential quality of information 3. Infant must appreciate the potential for social communication of information * 4. Infant should have the skills to elicit information
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17
Q

What do the Liszkowski et al. (2007) pointing study reveal, and what does this mean?

A

Infants more likely to point when confederate looking away from referent. This means they usual social gestures to convey information. Infants similarly likely to point when confederate is looking AT referent and has positive expression. This means they use social gestures to share.

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18
Q

What are Trevarthen’s notions of innate infant intersubjectivity and secondary intersubjectivity?

A

Intersubjectivity – The infant is born with an awareness specifically receptive to the subjective states in other persons. Secondary Intersubjectivity – person-person-object awareness in triadic interactions.

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19
Q

What differentiates humans from apes in the way they can share attention?

A

Apes can follow gaze, BUT they do not seem to grasp that partners in communication share a joint attentional frame – they look where you look but don’t assume that you are trying to share a point of view. Thus, in game of hide-and-seek, 14-month-olds understand adult pointing to bucket may reveal something within (assumption follows from joint attentional frame) In similar game with chimp, point or look to the very same bucket elicits a response of the type: Bucket? So what? Where food?

20
Q

How are these four domains, each of which is seen in an individualistic manner, transformed by shared intentionality? Gaze following → Social manipulation → Group activity → Social learning →

A

Gaze following → joint attention Social manipulation → cooperative learning Group activity → collaboration Social learning → instructed learning

21
Q

What is the difference between sympathy, empathy and personal distress?

A

Empathy – feeling what the other person would be expected to feel. Sympathy – feeling sorrow or concern for the distressed or needy other. Involves other-oriented altruistic motivations and probably originates with empathic responding in many situations. Personal distress – self-focused, aversive emotional reaction to another person’s demotion or condition (e.g., discomfort, anxiety). Also probably stems from empathic responding but involves an ‘egoistic’ motivation to alleviate one’s own distress rather than the other’s.

22
Q

By 12 months infants can… (4 things)

A
  1. Make a sharp distinction between people who are known and those who are not known (e.g., stranger wariness). 2. Are sensitive to goal directed agency, they know that people are acting in the service of their goals. 3. Engage in triadic social communication, including social referencing. 4. Spontaneously inform and share with others, particularly when they (the others) are nice!
23
Q

What are Hoffman’s 4 stages of development of empathy?

A
  1. Global Empathy (pre-person permanence): • There is a fusion between self and other (out of date - by 6 months kids see themselves as agents) • Later empathy is built on this identification (contagion) 2. “Egocentric” Empathy (12 to 24 months): • Proper understanding of self-other distinction - the experience of others, BUT • Poor understanding of others’ inner states 3. Empathy for another’s feelings (3 years): • Children understand that others’ feelings differ from their own • Better able to make empathic overtures 4. Empathy for another’s general plight (>5 years): • Emergent concept of person as continuous; having separate histories and identities • Life condition of others informs children’s actions
24
Q

How does empathy develop behaviourally? (Based on Zhan-Wexler et al. study of how children react to another’s distress) 3 stages

A
  • 10 to 12 months • Children often unresponsive to distress – they just ‘watch’ • ~50% time, show some distress themselves (frown, look sad or cry) - 12 to 24 months • Fewer signs of personal distress • Active interventions increase • Approach and touch person in distress • From ~18 months: bringing objects to distressed person; seeking help for or protecting the distressed person - From 24 months • Children often respond to distress, regardless of their role in creating it. • There are considerable individual differences.
25
Q

What physiological changes occur when a young children views someone in distress?

A

It’s complex, but heart rate usually fluctuates.

26
Q

How might the extent of physiological arousal on viewing another’s distress influence response?

A

When experiencing empathy: Well-modulated arousal can lead to sympathetic responses to others. Poorly modulated overarousal can lead to personal distress

27
Q

Can young children feel empathy in the absence of emotional input? Cite a study that proves it.

A

Vaish, Carpenter & Tomasello (2009) Child watches E1 admiring her objects, then sees E2 destroy either those objects or just some random objects. The child looks much more at the victim, and shows more facial concern, in the harm condition. E1 shows no emotion, so child must infer that E1 is sad. If the child was in the hostile condition, 66% gave a balloon, vs. 36% in control situation.

28
Q

It seems that even __-month-olds can sympathize with someone who is in a negative situation but shows no affective cues.

A

It seems that even 18-month-olds can sympathize with someone who is in a negative situation but shows no affective cues.

29
Q

What are the 3 facets of Social-Cognitive understanding?

A
  1. False belief understanding 2. Theory of mind comprehension 3. Emotion understanding - recognising and producing emotional expression - understanding emotion relations (no expressive element), e.g. if you expect a certain thing you will feel a certain way - understanding complex emotional situations and concomitant displays
30
Q

What is the classic Sally-Anne task?

A

Sally leaves her ball in a basket and goes away. While she is away, the ball is moved by Anne into the box and the child is simply asked: Where will Sally look for her ball?

31
Q

How do kids from 2-4 years perform on the Sally-Anne task compared to >4?

A

2-4 – fail task, think Sally will look where the ball is in the box >4 – pass task, think Sally will look where she thinks the ball is, in the basket

32
Q

What does the Sally-Anne task tell us?

A

From about 4 years, children are able to understand that people’s actions are linked to their beliefs, even when they are false.

33
Q

What are 3 caveats to the Sally-Anne test?

A
  1. Children refer spontaneously to FB before they pass FB tasks/tests 2. Between 3.5 and 5 years of age, there are considerable inter-individual and intra-individual differences in children’s performance. 3. Children do not go from reliably failing to reliably passing FB in one swift movement: mastery takes time and task factors are significant.
34
Q

ToM doesn’t just cover beliefs and knowledge, it also covers ________.

A

ToM doesn’t just cover beliefs and knowledge, it also covers emotion.

35
Q

What are six domains of Theory of Mind? In order of developmental emergence.

A
  1. Diverse desires 2. Diverse beliefs (where will Linda look for her cat?) 3. Knowledge access (child sees what’s in box, judges knowledge of other person who can’t see) 4. False belief (Sally-Anne) 5. Belief-based emotion (Max and the peanuts/chocolates) 6. Real versus apparent emotion (Anna has all the marbles; Lucy smiles; doesn’t want Anna to know she’s upset)
36
Q

To understand false beliefs, a child needs to be able to think separately about the ___ _____ of the _____ (there is an apple) and the _____ of the ______ ________ in another’s mind (other child thinks there is an apple).

A

To understand false beliefs, a child needs to be able to think separately about the real state of the world (there is an apple) and the state of the world represented in another’s mind (other child thinks there is an apple).

37
Q

Wellman (1990) After the age of 3, the child acquires the ability to represent mental states and so moves from being a _____ psychologist to a _________ psychologist

A

Wellman (1990) After the age of 3, the child acquires the ability to represent mental states and so moves from being a desire psychologist to a belief-desire psychologist

38
Q

What does the child as desire psychologist see?

A

Children see behaviour as action. Actions are imbued with intentions.

39
Q

What does the child as belief-desire psychologist see?

A

Children still rely on desires, which are still the primary motivation, but this is reframed in the field of what the person believes to be true.

40
Q

What does the Onishi & Baillargeon (2005) watermelon study demonstrate?

A

That infants have false belief understanding.

41
Q

What is an alternate reading of the results of the watermelon study?

A

Csibra and Gergely (2009) have argued that human beings are specifically able to communicate/transmit generic knowledge (so-called natural pedagogy) – that specific information should be acquired and generalised. Infants think of people as goal directed agents. They know that seeing leads to knowing. These skills might be adequate to solve FB tasks like the watermelon task – without a representational theory of belief.

42
Q

Over 40 independent research groups have found that children’s ________ _________ is linked to their Theory of Mind (including false belief and emotion understanding), both concurrently and longitudinally

A

Over 40 independent research groups have found that children’s linguistic competence is linked to their Theory of Mind (including false belief and emotion understanding), both concurrently and longitudinally

43
Q

How did Astington and Jenkins untangle the causal relationship between linguistic competence and theory of mind? And what factors in the conversational environment predict ToM?

A

Hierarchical regression analyses showed that linguistic ability at T1 predicted theory of mind at T2 and T3. The reverse relationship did not hold. The same model also holds for mental state discourse, which also predicts theory of mind at T2 and T3 (Ruffman et al. 2002)

44
Q

Which aspects of linguistic competence have the strongest effect on theory of mind (from strongest to weakest?

A
  1. memory for complements 2. syntax 3. general language ability 4. semantics 5. receptive vocabulary
45
Q

Which 6 factors have been suggested as likely boosters of children’s social-cognitive understanding?

A
  1. Internal-state language – any reference to internal state, e.g. emotion 2. Emotionally elaborated discourse – how mothers talk to children about emotional events 3. Mental-state discourse – how much mother uses: to know, think, believe 4. Mind-mindedness – the caregiver’s proclivity to treat his/her infant or child as an intentional agent, with their own mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions, etc) 5. Causally coherent psychological discourse – he is happy because… 6. Connected discourse – when you say something to your child, does child say something back that’s related, and then you say something back that’s related?
46
Q

Children’s linguistic competence (i.e., verbal ability) and their conversational environments BOTH contribute to SCU, and they seem to be largely ___________

A

Children’s linguistic competence (i.e., verbal ability) and their conversational environments BOTH contribute to SCU, and they seem to be largely independent