Depth - Nile Valley 1882-1898 Flashcards
Arabi Pasha and Arab nationalism
Nationalist officer – led a group of army officers in protest Tewfik and Anglo-French interference in the country.
Dissatisfaction with the Dual Control’s financial measures existed among all the Egyptian bourgeoisie and the initial focus of Arabi’s protests from 1876 was the issue of army pay.
Widened into a nationalist platform, and he began to speak of ‘Egypt for the Egyptians’ and formed the Egyptian Nationalist Party in 1879. He commanded considerable support within the army, and appealed to the Egyptian peasants referring to himself in his proclamations as one of the fellahin.
1879 – led a coup following the attempt to dismiss 2,500 officers from the army and halve the salaries of those who remained, and he successfully forced Khedive Tewfik to appoint a nationalist ministry, including himself.
The new nationalist cabinet reversed this policy, borrowing another £400,000 from the Rothschilds to avoid the disputed cuts. The British and French feared that he would next force Tewfik to repudiate the loans and ignore the financial measures the Dual Control had insisted on. The British were deeply concerned by the volatility of the situation and in no way disposed to look kindly on the development of a distinct Egyptian nationalism which ran counter to their interests.
Protecting European loans and people.
Strategic
The Suez Canal was incredibly important to the British.
Shortened the journey to India and 80% of shipping that travelled through the canal was carried on British ships.
Main shareholders were the French – pushed through its investment and building
1875 – Disraeli had purchased the remaining 45% of shares from the bankrupt khedive.
Anglo-French rivalry
HOWEVER, there was co-operation over the protection of their investments, and Britain was not prepared to let France become too powerful in North Africa and the Middle East as the Ottoman Empire tottered.
Trade
The Egyptians provided a growing market for British exports during its period of modernisation under the khedives, and Khedive Ishmail’s railway and harbour building projects had provided attractive contracts for British businesses.
By 1880, Britain purchased 80 percent of Egypt’s exports (cotton) and supplied 44% of Egypt’s imports. British exports to Egypt in the 1880s were about 5% of its total exports.
Britain imported substantial amounts of cotton to make up for the loss of the American cotton from Blockaded Southern states
Once the war ended in 1865 – Britain reverted to American cotton – made Egypt’s economic situation worse
Financial
Bondholders in the City of London were exposed to any failure by Egypt to pay its debts.
Britain and France reacted to the khedive’s bankruptcy in 1875 by establishing financial control on the country through the Dual Control, and the British government was responsive to the demands of the City of London that Egypt must continue to pay its debts to bond-holders whatever that entailed. As much as 37% of Gladstone’s personal fortune was invested in Egyptian loans
People
In the short term, Britain could claim that intervention in Egypt was necessary to prevent European loss of life.
1882 – Alexandria, a city of 232,000 where every fifth person was European, tensions in the city boiled over and a row between an Egyptian donkey boy and a Maltese man escalated into violent anti-Christian riots across the city.
At least 50 Europeans were killed and 250 Egyptians. Britain blamed the riots on Arabi Pasha’s supporters incorrectly.
French withdrawal
1882
The British and French responded to the increasing tensions in Egypt by issuing the Gambetta Note
Stated that the two powers regarded the maintenance of the khedive’s power as the best guarantee for the order and development of prosperity in Egypt and intended to warn the nationalists that the powers were minded intervening militarily in Egypt should they deem the khedive’s powers to be under threat.
Nationalists responded by forcing a nationalist cabinet on the khedive and threatened to depose him. France and Britain, fearing that Arabi would reject Egyptian debt payments and determined to protect their bondholders, sent warships to Alexandria to threaten the nationalists and restore the authority of the khedive
Bombardment began in July, French warships did not participate, and they did not offer support for British military action on the ground.
Bismarck’s actions indicated that Germany had changed its position on Egypt and was no longer willing to support dual action by France and Britain in Egypt.
France was in no position to argue with Germany - defeated by them in 1870 and forced to surrender territory to the powerful military state that Bismarck was developing.
Bismarck, Russia, Italy, and Austria delivered notes to the sultan stating there should be no changes in Egypt without approval - French was in no doubt that the Germans were opposed to intervention by France and Britain without Bismarck’s agreement.
30 January - Gambetta fell from power in France and was replaced by Charles de Freycinet – less inclined to intervene in Egypt than Gambetta – French parliament, who feared Germany more than any losses to bondholders and who refused to back military intervention.
Not a total French withdrawal – frustrated by growing British control in Egypt and saw strategic interest in North Africa. Between 1882 and 1898, they challenged British dominance in the region on several occasions.
The British military campaign
1882
The occupation of Egypt in 1882 and Britain’s subsequent involvement in the partition of Africa was due to a mixture of power politics and economic motivation. The occupation of Egypt has received particularly detailed scrutiny by historians as its formal occupation kickstarted the process of the extremely swift colonisation of the rest of Africa.
Once the British were in control in Egypt, no matter how often they asserted that this was a merely a temporary measure, the other Great Powers began to seize territory in Africa in what became the greatest land grab in history.
The emphasis that the many interpretations place on events differs greatly and there is certainly no definitive explanation for the occupation of Egypt or subsequent events in the scramble for Africa. When considering the occupation of Egypt by the British in 1882, three clear interpretations exist.
Egypt as a Veiled Protectorate
1882 - 1914
The British occupation of Egypt, the result of Britain’s actions in 1882, was never intended at the outset to be permanent, and Gladstone reiterated endlessly that, as soon as financial stability was assured, the British advisers to the khedive would withdraw. This would leave Egypt as an autonomous country, nominally under the control of the Ottoman Empire.
However, there was no retreat from Egypt and, consequently, the country remained under the control of the British for the next 32 years in what is commonly referred to as the veiled protectorate, as the fiction of the British being there merely to assist the khedive was maintained during this period.
The reasons for continuing British involvement were:
The defeat in November 1883 of the Egyptian army under the leadership of Sir William Hicks, who had entered the khedive’s service following the occupation of 1882, by radical jihadist forces under the leadership of the Mahdi in Sudan, Muhammad Ahmad
The nature of the British administrator Sir Evelyn Baring and his agenda for Egypt
The defeat of Gladstone over the question of Irish Home Rule in 1886 and the dominance of Tory Lord Salisbury for the last years of the century.
The Promise to Withdraw
At the outset, occupation was intended to be a temporary expedient
Between 1882 and 1914, the British announced its intention of withdrawing from Egypt on 66 separate occasions.
Maintained that Egypt was a province of the Ottoman Empire, ruled by its own khedive.
Unable to make political decisions without the agreement of the British consul general
More numbers of British appointees in the Egyptian army and administration.
The nationalists in the Egyptian army had been crushed and the British set about reforming the finances of the country to assure its continuing stability.
A different consul general might have ensured that the country was subject to financial controls and worked towards the departure of British officials, but Baring was not that man.
Sir Evelyn Baring (Consul general 1883–1907)
Key factor in the continuation of the occupation – believed that it needed fundamental changes made in the agricultural infrastructure and governmental institutions of the country and that he was the man to deliver the necessary changes.
Wholesale participation in infrastructure projects could never have been achieved in the short term and if he overextended, London did nothing to stop him.
Failure to withdraw - Emergence of Radical Islam in the Sudan
It convinced the British that it would be dangerous for the British to withdraw and it became a justification for their continuing presence.
Unsurprisingly, with its own internal problems, Egyptian control of Sudan (the Ottoman Empire placed Sudan under Egypt’s control) faltered by the 1870s.
1873 - Khedive Ismail had appointed, with London’s support, Charles George Gordon as governor general of Sudan. He’d put down a series of revolts against the khedive and acted to suppress the slave trade, in line with his strong Christian principles. He resigned and returned to England when Ismail was deposed - successors failed to maintain order in the country or prevent resurgence of the slave trade.
As Egyptian control slipped further and further away, the situation in the Sudan was complicated by the appearance in 1881 of a radical jihadist leader, the Mahdi, intent on driving out their Egyptian-Ottoman overlords and establishing a purer form of Islam.
Mahdist forces had a number of victories against the Egyptian army, but the wiping out of all but 300 of an original 7,000 troops under the command of William Hicks in November 1883 convinced London that Egypt no longer exercised any level of control over the province. Sudan was of little interest to British politicians, with Gladstone, and later Salisbury, determined not to become involved in the affairs of the country.
However, London had no intention of allowing similar forces to take control of Cairo and Alexandria, places which really mattered in the maintenance of British interests. As they had no confidence in the khedive’s ability to control the mahdi in Sudan or prevent the spread of the mahdi’s brand of militant Islam into Egypt, the chances of British withdrawal from Egypt were extremely reduced by the emergence of the mahdi.
Failure to withdraw - Collapse of Liberalism in Britain
Gladstone’s commitment to Home Rule in Ireland resulted in the splitting of the Liberal Party and the dominance of the Conservatives for most of the last decade of the century. Their leader, Lord Salisbury was too clever a politician to be carried away by imperial rhetoric and jingoism, and he began his premiership frustrated by Britain’s presence (of dubious legality) in Egypt. He was not prepared to give the French any potential strategic advantage in North Africa by withdrawal from Egypt and he was aware of the patriotic sentiments stirred up by the actions of the Mahdi.
Although he agreed with Baring’s assessment that full reform of Egypt would take at least 15 years, Salisbury was prepared to sacrifice building projects in Egypt in the interests of withdrawal if he could protect Britain’s interests in the region.
1887 to 1889 – Salisbury worked with Turkey, France, and Germany to get an agreement where the British could re-enter the country if necessary. Agreement for withdrawal was made with the sultan in Constantinople on 22 May 1887 with the Constantinople Convention, only to be wrecked by the French and the Russians threatening the sultan with the invasion of Syria by the French and Armenia by the Russians if the British were granted ongoing rights to re- enter Egypt.
The sultan immediately buckled under the pressure and, if their threats were designed to convince Salisbury he should withdraw, they had the opposite effect as Salisbury drew the conclusion that the French remained the greatest threat to the British Empire.
The combination of the threat Russia posed to India’s borders and French aggression in the Mediterranean led Salisbury to conclude that Britain’s strategic interests could only be guaranteed by maintaining Britain’s presence in Egypt. He could hardly have taken any other position given the power politics of the 1890s and his own understanding of Britain’s position in the world.
Achievements of Sir Evelyn Baring
Stringent financial controls and cuts in public spending allowed him to restore the gov of Egypt to solvency by 1887.
Was the stated British objective for the occupation in the 1st place.
1885 - London Convention agreed a loan of £9 million to Egypt and £8 million was spent on stabilising the debt situation of the country.
Debt repayment constituted ½ of the money raised in tax during the Baring years.
Spent the remaining £1 million of the Convention loan on irrigation and clearing the silted drainage canals of the Nile’s flood plains to improve agriculture.
Firmly convinced the ongoing stability of the country rested on proper drainage to improve the agricultural output of the country, thereby improving the lot of the peasant farmers or fellahin.
1882-1902 - 8% of gov revenue was devoted to agriculture and hydraulic improvements under the Public Works Department of the Baring years.
Failures of Sir Evelyn Baring
Baring’s annual budget was largely allocated to debt repayments and military spending to protect the population against the Mahdi and to irrigation.
Spending was limited and that progress was slow or non-existent.
Constrained by other budgetary demands and cautious of upsetting the large landowners, he put off fundamental taxation reform until a full land survey was completed early in the 20th century, and the inequality in the system was not addressed until then
Although agriculture was boosted by improved irrigation, its development was held back by the inequality of the land tax system.
Investment in education was also limited.
Believed increased secondary education was not the gov’s responsibility so refused to fund secondary education, limiting the upward mobility of the fellahin
In 1901, raised tuition fees in existing primary schools to decrease enrolment.
Believed that too much progress, too quickly would destabilise society and that the responsibility of the governing class was to ensure material prosperity and not to get involved with the state provision of education.
Greatest weakness was his complete underestimation of the strength of developing nationalism in Egypt at the end of the 19th century
Laid dormant in the early years of the veiled protectorate, but the death of Tewfik in 1892 and the succession of his son, Abbas Hilmi (far less compliant), saw the return of Egyptian nationalism amongst the ruling classes.
Khedive Abbas plotted against the protectorate with intellectuals including Mustafa Kamil, financing his journey to France where he hoped he would influence foreign opinion against British rule.
Baring remained oblivious to the significance of the growth of fellahin nationalism at the end of the 19th century, remaining firmly convinced that all nationalistic feeling emanated from the new khedive and completely underestimated its existence among the fellahin.
Believed his reforms had brought warm gratitude from the masses towards the British, conveniently forgetting the limits to fellahin mobility caused in part by the restrictions placed on the extension of education, and the long delay in reforming the land tax.
Problems of the Sudan - the Mahdi
The rise of a militant Islam under Muhammad Ahmad, (proclaimed himself the Mahdi in 1881) fuelled the rapid destabilisation of the area.
Capitalised on Sudanese resentment about Egyptian taxes and authority, and support grew rapidly.
An unintended result of the attack on the slave traders by Gordon was that it left an important gap in traditional society by removing the only local leaders who might have provided effective opposition to Mahdist forces.
The Egyptian army launched several operations against the Mahdi, which were conspicuously unsuccessful and culminated in the wiping out of the 1883 expedition, led by the British Sir William Hicks, at Kashgil.
Hicks entered the khedive’s service after the occupation in 1882 and was leading an Egyptian force of 7,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalries. All but 300 were killed by Mahdist forces.
Problems of the Sudan - Gladstone’s concerns and policy
Gladstone and Baring feared that the problems would destabilise their programme of financial consolidation in Egypt, and they judged the Egyptians to be unable to rule the Sudan effectively.
Although they did not like the Mahdi’s ideas, they were prepared to cut Sudan loose in the interests of maintaining stability and control in Egypt.
They concluded that evacuation of Egyptian garrisons in the Sudan (often under the command of Englishmen) was necessary, as Egypt could not fund the continuing cost of attempting to keep order in the province.
Gladstone could see no reason for Britain to be drawn into the problems of the Sudan. Unlike in Egypt, Britain had no strategic interests or economic interests in the area. Sudan was largely desert, inhabited with warlike tribes, and its main economic basis was the slave trade, which Britain was committed to stamping out.
The rise of radical Islam and growing support for the Mahdi made Gladstone even more cautious about the possibility of being drawn into a long campaign.
1884 – Gordon was dispatched to the Sudan to organise the evacuation, with instructions from both London and Baring in Cairo. 1885 – the Mahdi broke through British fortifications at Khartoum and the entire un-evacuated garrison was wiped out.
Problems of the Sudan - Gordon’s mission
1884 - 1885
Instead of withdrawing the garrison in Khartoum, he spent early time in the city wiring plans to London for handing over authority to an anti-Mahdist popular figure and sending messages to Baring for more troops.
When the Mahdi drew close, instead of withdrawal by river, Gordon refused to leave on the grounds that there were still more people to be evacuated from outlying areas and fortified the city, necessitating the dispatch of a relief operation.
His diary, written with an eye to posterity, shows a man with strong Christian principles prepared for the worst, and a contempt for the politicians, whom he blamed for the predicament
When things had almost reached their worst, Gordon arranged for copies of the journal to be smuggled out of Khartoum, demonstrating a sharp appreciation of the value of publicity as they were intended for publication.
The siege of Khartoum was followed in the newspapers and there was a vociferous campaign for a relief expedition to be organised. One was dispatched by the reluctant Gladstone, but it arrived two days too late to rescue Gordon.
The Mahdi broke through the fortifications at Khartoum on 26 January and the entire garrison was killed, with Gordon’s decapitated head being presented to the Mahdi as a prize.
The Conquest of Sudan
1896 – Salisbury ordered a campaign in Sudan to secure the source of the Nile – led by Kitchener resulted in annexation of Sudan and crushing of Mahdist forces.
Early 1880s - partition of Africa had not happened, and British interests were served best by the occupation of Egypt only.
1890s – Africa looked very different, and people thought that, to protect British interests in Egypt (which secured the vital route to India), they needed to control the Nile.
Forward policy in the Sudan by the British was dictated by two threats to British interests in the region.
France – latest fight was for control of the headwaters of the Nile.
Fears of Mahdist forces and problems that pan-Islamic nationalism might cause in Egypt
1896 – expedition under Kitchener tried to address the two threats to British interests posed by the French and the Mahdi.
Battle of Adowa in 1896 – Italians beat by Mahdist forces – convinced Salisbury that the time was now for a show of force against the jihadists to reassert European superiority and prevent the spread of pan- Islamism into Egypt.
Its scope and nature were cautious at the outset and the British objective was initially set as Dongola, about halfway between Egypt and Khartoum if one follows the Nile.
The expedition was to proceed with care, ensuring supply lines always remained intact. Culminated in the conquest of the Sudan and the defeat of the Mahdi at Omdurman, one of the bloodiest and most unequal battles of all time.
The Conquest of Sudan - French Occupation
1890 – British declared Nile valley was its ‘sphere of influence’ – successful in its diplomatic efforts with Italy, Germany and Belgium to get recognition of it, but not with the French.
1894 – Edward Grey told the Commons that French interference in the Nile valley would be interpreted as an unfriendly act (statement intended for the French as well)
Salisbury decided Britain’s interests must move to a more visible presence in the Sudan – stop French expansion and protect the water available to irrigate the cotton fields in Egypt, securing Egyptian stability by preventing competitors from getting the Nile.
Ultimate French ambition in Africa in the partition was to link its western colonies with its port in Djibouti, on the Horn of Africa, following first the Niger and then the Blue Nile.
British interests were almost exactly the reverse. Apart from Egypt, Britain’s territorial interests lay in South Africa and British East Africa. The White Nile linked Egypt with Britain’s colonies in East Africa.
1898 – two armed forces met at Fashoda – one of the great set piece stand-offs in the history of Anglo-French relations. A tiny French force of about 120 men under the leadership of Major Marchand had reached Fashoda after a long 14-month journey from Brazzaville.
They waited there in vain for another French expedition travelling from Djibouti, when Kitchener’s 1,500 strong force, accompanied by five gunboats and fresh from his victory over the Mahdi at Omdurman, arrived at the oasis on 18 September, having travelled on the White Nile. Kitchener had a letter from Salisbury telling him to establish British claim over the Upper Nile, rejecting rival claims.
Tact on Kitchener’s part in allowing the French flag to remain flying, the overwhelming British force, the restraint shown by Marchand/general relief on the part of the French that they were dealing with a British force rather than trying to repel Mahdists meant that both sides agreed to refer the matter to London and Paris
Back in Europe, the press and public of both wound up in a frenzy of jingoist imperial sentiment and navies were mobilised. The French government, aware of Britain’s naval superiority and caught up in its own internal crisis, were prepared to back down. On 3 November, the French quietly dropped their claim to Fashoda
