Democracy and Participation - voting behaviour and interest groups Flashcards
Explain coalitions of interests in relation to political parties
American political parties are best through of as coalitions of interest (broad churches). Those coalitions may be more narrowly drawn than they were three or four decades ago but they still need to be coalitions in order to garner enough support from the electorate to win the presidency.
When choosing how to cast their vote, a voter is likely to consider which party has policies that will be most beneficial to them. This is most likely to be determined by a range of socio-economic and demographic factors.
As seen with voter data from the last five presidential elections which show common trends in which groups vote either democrat or republican. Even in 2016, the election of Trump did not really change these patterns, with white people, men and older people continuing to vote for republicans in a majority.
State statistics on groups that gave the democrats more than 50% of their votes
Democrats:
Black community - 88%
Liberals - 84%
Hispanics - 65%
Asians - 65%
City/Urban - 59%
Aged 18-29 - 55%
Women - 54%
Earning under $30K - 53%
State statistics on groups that gave the republicans more than 50% of their votes
Republicans:
Conservatives - 88%
Small town/rural - 61%
White - 57%
Males - 52%
Aged over 65 - 52%
Aged 45-64 - 52%
High school only - 51%
Explain gender in relation to voting behaviour
There is a gender gap in voting. In nine out of ten elections between 1964 and 2000, women were significantly more supportive of the democrat candidate than men.
In 2016 and 2020, the gender gap for Trump was 11 points - with 53% of men and 42% of women voting for the republican candidate in over half of century.
The gender gap for Clinton was even wider at 13 points - with 53% of women and 42% of men voting for her. Perhaps, her status as the first female major-party presidential candidate and the perceived attitude of her opponent towards women helped the stretch the gap - gender gap.
Trump’s attitude towards and treatment of women became a prominent issue in the 2016 campaign, not only during the primaries, when he made embarrassingly rude remarks about fellow candidate Carly Fiorina (‘Look at that face. Would anyone vote for that?’), as well as the political commentator Megyn Kelly but in the general election as well.
Just a month before Election Day, a videotape was released into the public domain showing Trump bragging in the most vulgar terms about kissing, groping and trying to have sex with different women including women he knew to be married ‘When you’re a star, they let you do it. You can do anything’. Trump boasted.
One might have expected the female vote to dessert him in droves. However, exit poll data showed 41% of women supporting Trump, only 3% points down from 44% that voted for Romney in 2012. But that 41% was the lowest level of support from women voters for a R candidate in a two-party contest since Barry Goldwater’s 38% in 1964.
Among non-married women, his support fell to 32%. The gender gap for Biden was 12 points, with 57% of women and 45% of men voting for him.
How can the gender gap in voting behaviour be explained through policy differences
The reason for the gender gap is often thought to be connected with policy differences between the two parties. In five major policy areas: abortion, defence, law and order, gun control and women’s rights - the democrats tend to take positions that are more favoured by women. Democrats are pro-choice on abortion tend to favour lower levels of spending on defence, oppose capital punishment and support gun control.
It was the democrats who pushed albeit unsuccessfully, for an equal rights Amendment to the constitution protecting the civil rights of women. It could also be because of the democrats have more female representatives in both houses of congress and typically has more female candidates running for election (Nancy Pelosi: House speaker and VP Kamala Harris: the first women to hold this office. The ability to vote for someone can descriptively represent women is therefore higher in the democrat party.
what do turnout on racial groups in America show about voting behaviour
Turnout for the two most significant minority racial groups in the American electorate (African-Americans and Hispanics), in general elections is typically far lower than the percentage of white Americans who vote.
Like women, racial minorities in the US have typically been more likely to vote for the Ds. In the eleven elections between 1980 and 2020, African-Americans never gave less than 83% support to the Ds. President Clinton was said to have a particular affinity with African-Americans during his presidency, and they were his most loyal group of supporters, especially during the difficult period of his impeachment and trial.
With Obama as the first African-American presidential candidate for a major party in 2008, the share of black people voting D rose from 88% in 2004 to 95% in 2008. Black turnout was also up, accounting for 13% of the electorate.
But with Hillary Clinton in 2016, black support for the Ds fell back to 89%. High profile social media support for Trump was provided by Kayne West and Chance the Rapper tweeting, ‘Black people don’t have to be DS.
Explain how the hispanics are a growing group in relation to race and ethnicity voting behaviour
Hispanics are a growing group. According to the 2000 census, they formed 12% of the population, but by the 2010 census this figure had increased to over 16%. Furthermore, because they are a young group and a significant proportion are not yet of voting age, their full political importance is yet to show. The states where Hispanics make up more then 25% of the population include California, Nevada, Arizona, Texas and New Mexico.
Hispanics are a disparate group, including those from Mexico, Puerto Rico and Cuba, as well as other Central American countries. In 2020, country of origin affected the way this group voted.
How have presidential candidates attempted to gain the hispanic vote
Bush’s R campaign in 2000 made a significant pitch for the Hispanic vote. He speaks fluent Spanish. His brother Jeb, the former governor of Florida is married to a Hispanic woman.
The republican vote among Hispanics increased significantly from 20% in 1996, to 31% in 2000 and to 43% in 2004. But by 2016, the figure was down to 28% with Clinton holding a 28% point lead among Hispanic Voters.
Trump’s case was hardly helped by his aggressive tone about Mexican immigrants, saying ‘they’re bringing drugs. they’re bringing crime, they’re rapists and promising to build a wall to keep illegal Mexican immigrants out of the US.
Given all that it was surprising to some that more than quarter of Hispanic Voters gave Trump their vote. Indeed, the Hispanic republican vote was even a percentage point up from 2012. Despite the media rhetoric, twice as many Hispanic Voters in 2016 considered immigration policy in the US to be too lax rather than too strict, therefore Trump’s hard-line immigration policies in fact won him support.
It provided even stronger in 2020, fuelled in part by the administration among some Hispanic men for the machismo image of Trump and the successful if rather exaggerated link that he made between the democrats, socialism and communism
Explain how the democrats have been representative of minority groups
The defendants have also been more representative of these minority groups in terms of people who run in elections. There are far more democrats African-American and Hispanic members of congress who have run for office and been elected, than republican.
Furthermore, of huge concern for both of these minority groups is the economy. While there is an increasing number of African-American and Hispanic millionaires, the wealth gap between these groups and white Americans continues to grow. Therefore, it would be over-simplistic to attribute their voting behaviour to their ethnicity alone.
Explain class and education in relation to voting behaviour
Traditionally, educational qualifications alone may not have been discussed by political pollsters and pundits. Age, race, gender, region and religion were all common delineators of how people voted in elections but education was more commonly viewed as part of ‘class’. However, in 2016, the level of education held by those voting became a big headline.
The key trend seemed to be that those who had a higher level of education were more likely to vote for Trump. However, this division was further accentuated when race and gender and education were taken together. For example, in 2020, 54% of non-college educated voters voted for Trump, that figure rose to 67% among white non-educated voters and 70% among white non-college educated men.
Much of this difference was down to whether voters felt each candidate understood the issues facing them. Far more white working-class Americans believed Trump understood their challenges while far fewer believed Clinton did. - portrayed himself as a ‘common man’
Explain class and education in relation to white working class voters
Thirty years ago, commentators discussed ‘Reagan democrats’. These were white, working class voters, mostly living in the Northeast and Midwest, often employed in blue-collar jobs in what is often referred to as the rust belt - a swathe of America’s former industrial heartland stretching from eastern Iowa and south-eastern Wisconsin, through northern Illinois, the lower peninsula of Michigan, the states of Indiana and Ohio and then down from Western New York to Pennsylvania and West Virginia.
By 1970, these traditional democrat voters were disillusioned with the economic malaise of President Carter and were attracted by Reagan economic plans and conservative agenda. They played a significant role in getting him elected in 1980 and in delivering his landslide re-election for years later and even in electing Reagan’s vice president, George W.H Bush in 1988.
But during the next two decades, they tended to return to the democrat party, giving their support to both Clinton and Obama. Some of them, however, stayed in the republican tent and would eventually join the Tea Party Movement.
Why did Trump appeal to white working class voters
These were voters to whom Trump’s campaign seemed to speak most directly in 2016, not only in the Republican primaries but then in the general election. Of these nine Rust Belt states, Trump won the primaries in six of them and even managed a respectable second-place finish in Ohio, despite the fact that he was competing against the state’s incumbent governor, John Kasich.
In the general election, Trump won seven of these states, with their 86 ECVs including four that Obama had won both in 2008 and 2012. Indeed, in 2008 Obama had won Pennsylvania by 11 points, Wisconsin by 14 points and Michigan by 16 points and yet Trump won all three in 2016
How does Arlie Hochschild explain why Trump’s message resonated with older, poorer white Americans
Writing in 2016, Arlie Hochschild drew attention to poorer and older white male Americans who ‘suffer a higher than average death rate due to alcohol, drugs and even suicide’. She continued; ‘Although life expectancy for nearly every group is rising, between 1990 and 2008, the life expectancy of older white men without high school diplomas has been shortened by three years - and truly it seems despair… They also feel culturally marginalised: their views about abortion, gay marriage, gender roles, race, guns and the confederate flag are held up to ridicule in the national media is backward.
They begun to feel a ‘besieged minority’. These white older blue collar workers are more likely to be men were also characterised by being those whose education, for most at least had finished when they graduated from high school or even before that. They were not college graduates.
Trump’s message of bringing home American jobs, curbing illegal immigration, safeguarding American’s borders from potential terrorists and restoring a sense of national and civic pride - of ‘making America great again’ - was what they had been longing to here for decades. And it was just these same voters with whom Clinton had failed to resonate - in her 2008 and 2016 primary campaigns and in her general election campaign against trump.
These groups flocked to support Trump, indeed probably secured his election, some 62% of white men and 62% of white 45-64 years old voted for him and white non college men who made up nearly one-sixth of the electorate voted 71% for Trump and just 23% for Clinton
How did Biden make significant gains among the white working class vote in america
However, while only 23% of white non college men in 2016 voted for Clinton, 28% voted for Biden in 2020.
In some key battleground states, he made some really significant gains among this group of voters: 26% to 35% Wisconsin and 24% to 34% in Michigan - this contributed to significantly to Biden’s success in reclaiming these two key states for the democrats in 2020 and thereby winning the presidency
Explain geographic region of the Northeast in relation to voting behaviour
These are two important trends when it comes to voting in relation to geographic region.
First the Northeast has become the new heartland of the democrat party. In the seven elections from 1984 to 2008, the Northeast gave the democrat candidate his largest percentage of the vote. In 2012, the democrats won every north-eastern state and in 2016, they won all bar Pennsylvania.
However, the Northeast is the one region that has a declining proportion of the nation’s population. In 2016, Trump broke through what has been called the ‘Blue Wall’ - a block of states in the upper Midwest and industrial Northeast that had voted solidly for the democrats over a number of elections - when he won in Iowa, Wisconsin and Michigan as well as Pennsylvania.
Explain geographic region of the South in relation to voting behaviour
Second, the South has moved from being ‘solid’ for democrats to being very supportive of the republicans. This was shown most clearly when in 1996, the South was the only region in which the democrat ticket of Clinton and Gore - both southerners - failed to beat the republican ticket of Dole and Kemp, neither of whom was from the south.
In 2000, the republicans won every state in the south, including the democrat nominee Al Gore’s home state of Tennessee, and they did the same thing again in 2004. In 2008, Obama managed to flip three southern states - Virginia, North Carolina and Florida - into the democrat column. In 2012, the republicans won back North Carolina, leaving Obama with just two southern states.
In 2016, Clinton was left the only Virginia in the South and that was mostly because she had chosen a Virginia, Tim Kaine as her running-mate, through the state is trending more Democrat recently as is North Carolina.
Explain the democrats hold in West Coast
The democrats continue their hold on the West Coast - with California, Oregon and Washington lining in democrats in every election from 1992 to 2016.
George W.H Bush is the last republican candidate to win a West Coast state when he won California in 1988. The republicans have a similar stranglehold on a swathe of states running from Idaho through the Dakotas, Montana, Wyoming, Kansas and Missouri.
How did the 2016 elections show America has become more divided in relation to geographic region
The 2016 election also revealed how America is more and more divided by community, with urban areas heavily supported the democrats while small towns and rural areas swung significantly to the republicans.
Whereas in 2012, Mitt Romney won small towns and rural areas by 2% points (50-48) in 2016, Trump won the same communities (61-34). It was particularly in small town and rural communities that were slowly withering away, that Trump found his voice and his message of ‘Make America great again’ resonated, especially with those white, older, blue-collar workers.
When the economy went into a recession in 2008-09, many blue-collar, small town Americans felt that they had been made to carry most of the resulting financial hardship. Obama boosted about having saved America from going over the fiscal cliff and claimed credit for the recovery. But politicians of both parties underestimated the degree of anger and pain the nation - the degree to which the recovery had been only for a fortunate few while many experienced stagnation or decline - as the protest chant went ‘Banks got bailed out, we got sold out’.
Illegal immigration, globalisation, trade, corporate greed, their own decaying communities and bank bailouts all helped stroke the feelings of anger and resentment in many small town and rural communities - especially those east of the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers.
Just after the 2016 election, Ronald Brownstein wrote in The Atlantic magazine that ‘not since the election of 1920 has the cultural chasm between urban and non-urban America shaped the struggle over the country’s direction as much as today’. He saw Trump’s victory as an ‘empire-strikes-back moment’ for all those places that ‘felt left behind in an increasingly diverse, post-industrial and urbanised America’
Explain religion in relation to voting behaviour
In a country with a strict separation between church and state, it is perhaps surprising in the (21st to find religion as an issue in deciding which party to vote for). But religion is closely linked to the social and moral issues that divide the parties: abortion, the death penalty and laws surrounding marriage etc
Explain Jewish Americans in relation to their voting behaviour and religion
Jewish Americans are reliable democrat voters, traditionally being far more liberal in their views and sharing sympathy with minority groups
Explain Christians in relation to voting behaviour
Protestant Christianity is closely linked with the religious right with social conservatism with the Bible Belt - a line of southern states from Texas to southern and central Virginia. Protestants are a staple support group for the republican party, giving it between 54 and 59% of their votes in each last five presidential elections.
Within that group white evangelicals provide even more solid support. Indeed, Trumps 81% support among this group in 2016 was one of the highest levels of support enjoyed by a republican presidential candidate, through this might have had more to do with their antipathy towards Clinton than their commitment to Trump.
One of the most important issues garnering this high level of support from white evangelicals is appointments to the supreme court. This group more than any other puts a high premium on the appointment of strict constructionist judges who will hand down decisions in line with evangelicals conservative agenda - note the June 2022 Supreme Court decision to overturn Roe v Wade (1973)
Explain the differences between evangelicals and Christian nationalists
In today political landscape it is necessary to distinguish between ‘evangelicals’ whose priorities are mainly spiritual, and ‘Christian nationalists’ whose priorities are almost exclusively political.
Many of those whom pollsters refer to as ‘evangelicals’ are more accurately described as Christian Nationalists.
Explain Trump in relation to Evangelicals and Christians
Trump had little or no time for the practice of evangelical Christianity while holding many of the beliefs of Christian nationalism - the promotion of religious symbolism in the public area and the promotion of public policy that is supported by Christian beliefs. His brandishing of a Bible outside a Washington Church in June 2020 in order to make a political point, when he himself rarely if ever attends a place of worship, illustrates this distinction.
Explain Biden in relation to white evangelicals
What was surprising in 2020 was Biden attracting the support of nearly one quarter of the white evangelical vote nationwide. In Michigan, Biden won 29% of the white evangelical vote. In Georgia, he won just 14% of white evangelicals but in doing so nearly tripled Hilary Clinton’s 5% support among these voters in 2016 - and they constitute one-third of all voters in Georgia.
The Biden campaign had a well-planned series of radio ads running on Christian radio stations. Voters may have been more convinced by Biden’s compassionate tone and devout faith than Trump’s photo opportunity of waving a Bible.
Explain the support of Catholics in relation to the democrat part
The support of Catholics traditionally went to the democrat party with its strong link to European Catholicism among the immigrant communities, especially among Irish Americans in the Northeast.
But since the 1970s, the support from Catholics for the democrat party has wavered because of the democrats support for abortion, which runs contrary to the Catholic Church’s official teaching. Thus, devout and practicing Catholics tend to be drawn to the republican party on this issue.
Democrats won the Catholic vote in three of the last five presidential elections but in 2016, only 45% voted democrat - the lowest figure in a two-party contest since 1984. This improved in 2020 as Biden turned a 4-point deficit into a 5 point lead.
What is correlation between party support and frequency of attendance
Another trend noticed by pollsters over the past decade or so is the strong correlation between frequency of attendance at a religious service and party support. In 2020, of those voters who lack any formal religious affiliation (a growing segment of the American electorate - especially among younger urban voters), 72% backed Biden over Trump. This again links with stance of the parties on social and moral issues
Explain the key voter trends 2020 elections
Key voter trends 2020 election -
Although the result, certainly in terms of the popular vote, was a clear victory for Biden, the swing towards the democrats was not uniform across all groups for voters. Trump actually gained votes among black and Hispanic voters compared to 2016, through the democrats retained a clear advantage in both groups. Among white voters, Trump lost ground and it was probably this drop in support that ultimately cost him the election. While white voters continued to back the republican candidate as they have in every presidential election since 1968, it is notable that this margin was reduced from 12 to 8 percentage points.
The decisive group where Trump lost support and so handed victory to Biden was non-college educated white voters, who were a group where he polled very well in 2016. Trump also lost further ground with both white-college-educated men and women. Overall, Trump’s share of the white vote remained at 58% while Biden’s share grew by 4 percentage points. When it come to gender, the democrats retained their lead over the republicans among women voters but their lead increased by only 3 percentage points with women voting 57-42% for Biden. Among male voters, Trump retained a lead but it was cut from 12 percentage points in 2016 to 8 in 2020 with men voting 53-42% for Trump.
In terms of religion, the republicans continued to dominate the white evangelical vote with 76% backing Trump in 2020 compared with 81% in 2016 - still a commanding lead but reduced. The importance of this group should not be underestimated, as they comprised 28% of the 2020 voters. There was also a significant switch among catholic voters away from Trump to Biden. Just over half of Catholics (52%) voted for Biden compared with 46% who voted democrat in 2016.
A total of 47% of Catholics voted for Trump in 2020, compared with 50% in 2016. It might well have helped that Biden himself is practising Catholic. The growing number of religiously non-affiliated Americans (28% of the 2020 electorate, up from 15% in 2008) backed Biden by 65% to 30%. Finally, more than three-quarters (77%) of Jewish voters backed Biden, with just 21% supporting Trump. This represented an increase from 2012 when 71% of Jewish voters chose Clinton.
Explain the polarisation of American politics
The 1990s brought a seismic shift in American Politics. Up to then, both parties included a wide ideological range from liberals to conservatives.
But with the break-up of the old Solid South, southern conservative Democrats began to cross to the republican party, making the republicans a far more ideologically conservative party and leaving the democrats as a more homogeneous, liberal party.
Commentators began to talk of a 50-50 nation, Red America and Blue America - and of the Red-Blue divide. As the (21st dawned, many states were becoming reliably Red (R) or Blue (D).
Explain Red America
Red America was characterised as white, overwhelmingly Protestant (and specifically evangelical) but often joined by practising Catholics (because of the abortion issue). It was wealthy, rural or suburban and unmistakably conservative.
In Red America, the majority of voters think that the government does too many things which would be better left to private businesses and individuals. They think that tax should be cut even if that means cuts in federally funded services.
Red America is pro-life, pro-guns and pro-traditional marriage and is opposed to Obamacare, It gets its news from Fox News and listens to conservative talk radio and loathed Clintons and Obama
Explain Blue America
Blue America is racially a rainbow coalition of white, black, Asian and Hispanic Americans. It tends to be wealthier, predominately urban and unmistakably liberal.
The majority of voters think that the federal government should do more to solve problems and they think that federal income tax should be increased on the more wealthy in order to protect federally funded services.
Blue America is pro-choice favours gun-control legislation, is pro same-sex marriage and is supportive of Obamacare. It gets its news from CNN. It loathed George W Bush and hates Trump.
Explain Arlie Hochschild’s findings on the social landscape of America
In 2015, California socialist Arlie Hochschild, a native of Blue America, wanted to better understand those who lived in Red America.
So she went to live for a time in Louisiana, deep in Red America and wrote a book of her experience ‘Strangers in Their On Land’ (2016)
Towards the start of the book she writers how different this social landscape was coming from Berkley California to Lake Charles Louisiana:
Certain absences reminded me I was not at home. No New York Times at the newsstand, almost no organic produce in grocery stores or farmers markets, no foreign films in movie houses, few small cars, fewer petite sizes in clothing stores, fewer pedestrians speaking foreign languages into cell phones - indeed, fewer pedestrians.
These were fewer yellow Labradors and more pit bulls or bulldogs. Forget bicycle lanes, colour-coded recycling bins, or solar panels on roofs. In some cafes, virtually everything on the menu was fried. There were no questions before meals about gluten-free entrees and dinner generally began with prayer.
Explain the portrait of generalisation that Arlie Hochschild found
This portrait is a generalisation, but it does show two starkly different Americas: there are red states like Texas, South Carolina and Kansas and blue states such as California, Massachusetts and Oregon.
Twenty seven states have voted for the same party candidates in the last five elections. However, states are not uniform there are blue enclaves in Texas, like South Austin, as well as red enclaves in California.
But this polarisation of the country and of the parties is the most significant change to occur in American politics this century and it has huge implications for how America government and politics work today. - Biden - wanted to be a president for everyone as a result of the polarised nature of US Politics e.g. January 6th Capitol
Explain third parties
Third Parties -
Despite the domination of the US politics by the democrats and republicans, third parties do exist. There are different types: national, regional and state-based: permanent and temporary: issue-based and ideological
What are the best known third parties in America
The best known national third parties are the Libertarian Party and the Green Party. The Libertarian Party presidential candidate Gary Johnson was on the ballot in all 50 states in the 2016 presidential election, while Green Party candidate Jill Stein was on the ballot in 44 states and was a write-in candidate in three more
Explain regional third parties
Regional third parties have included Storm Thurmond’s States Rights Party (founded 1948) and George Wallace’s American Independent Party (founded 1968)
Explain regional third parties
Regional third parties have included Storm Thurmond’s States Rights Party (founded 1948) and George Wallace’s American Independent Party (founded 1968)
Explain permanent and temporary third parties
The green party and the libertarian party are examples of permanent third parties and while the Reform Party and the American Independent Party are examples of temporary third parties
Explain issue-based and ideological third parties
The green party and the Prohibition Party are both examples of issue-based third parties, while the socialist party and libertarian party are ideological third parties
Explain the status of third parties in US
While the US does not have are national, permanent, third parties that regularly win a sizeable proportion of the votes in general elections. There are reasons for this.
The status of third parties in US politics is something of a paradox: they are both unimportant and important. Their combined popular vote in 2012 was less than 2% and just 6% in 2016.
But their potential importance is shown in the fact that in three out of the nine presidential elections between 1968 to 2000 it could be argued that a third party affected the outcome - in 1968, 1992 and 2000
In the 2000 presidential elections, Nader’s 2.7% for the Green Party almost certainly cost Al Gore the presidency.
In Florida, where Bush won by 537 votes, Nader polled nearly 100,000 votes. In New Hampshire, where Bush won by just 7,000 votes, Nader had over 22,000 votes
And exit poll data suggested that at least half of those Nader voters would have been Gore Voters - and the other half would probably not have voted at all had Nader not have been on the ballot.
In the house elections between 2008 and 2016, the combined votes for third parties never exceeded 3.6% (2012), while in the Senate races during the same period third-party support averaged 4.5% with the highest figure being 6.6% in 2010.
In those elections, the green party candidate won 9.4% in South Carolina, the constitution party won 5.75% in Utah, and the Libertarian party won 5.4% in Indiana
State the third party support in the 2016 presidential election
Libertarian Party (Gary Johnson) - 3.27% (4,489,233)
Green (Jill Stein) - 1.06% (1,457,222)
Independent (Evan McMullin) - 0.53% (728,860)
Constitution (Darrell Castle) - 0.15% (203,039)
