defence in depth Flashcards

1
Q

Defence-in-Depth:
Concept: Applied throughout the ____ and ____ of the plan

A

design process
operation

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2
Q

Defence-in-Depth:
Concept: Provide a series of levels of defence aimed at:

A

aimed at preventing accidents, and
* ensuring appropriate protection in the
event that prevention fails.

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3
Q

Defence-in-Depth:
Concept: allows:

A

✓allows failure to be detected and
compensated for or corrected

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4
Q

Defence-in-Depth:
Concept: considers

A

considers organizational and human
performance

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5
Q

The levels of defence-in-depth shall be ____ to the extent practicable and subject to
_____.

A

independent
overlapping provision

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6
Q

Assumptions Inherent in the perspective
Defence in Depth Safety Philosophy and
Approach, assumes the following:

A

✓Nuclear station design will have some flaws
✓Equipment will occasionally fail and
✓Operating personnel will occasionally make
mistakes

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7
Q

Definition of Risk

A

✓Chance of injury, damage or loss
✓The frequency of an undesired event
multiplied by its consequences

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8
Q

ultimate goal

A

Reactor Safety

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9
Q

✓The key is to ensure sufficient DiD that:

A

flaws,
failures and mistakes can be accommodated
without increasing the risk or consequences
of an accident.

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10
Q
  • Allows failure to be______and _____for or _____
A

detected
compensated
corrected

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11
Q

Defence-in-Depth: Considers:

A

organizational and human performance

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12
Q

3 things that are bound for flaws/error

A

equipment will occasionally fail, operating personal make mistakes, nuclear station design has flaws

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13
Q
  • Undesired events at Nuclear
    stations could lead to the
    following consequences
A

✓Severe Core Damage ✓Large Off-Site Release ✓Public Fatalities (immediate and
delayed)

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14
Q
  • Potential consequences are
    given and _____, thus
    frequencies must be_____
A

severe
very low

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15
Q

Very low frequencies require
____ defence in depth

A

very deep
Reduces Risk
Nuclear Power Plant Risk ▪ The frequency of an undesired event
multiplied by its consequences

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16
Q

to minimize potential threat

A

number of principles have been developed
incorporated into design and operation of nuclear generating stations

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17
Q

golden rule of reactor safety

A

control cool contain
discussed in elements of design
provision of multiple redundant nuclear safety provisions to protect workers, public and environment from radiological hazards of nuclear power plant operations

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18
Q

Cool - Heatsinks-

A

primary, backup, emergency

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19
Q

Cool - Heatsinks-primary

A

normal means of cooling the fuel at
power or shutdown

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20
Q

Cool - Heatsinks- back-up

A

a designated alternate to maintain
normal fuel cooling in case of certain failures in the
primary heatsink when shutdown

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21
Q

Cool - Heatsinks-emergency

A

cools the fuel to ensure fission
products are contained in the event of an accident (LOCA,
LOFW, earthquake etc.)

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22
Q

slide 13

A
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23
Q

Three Mile Island – TMI
(PWR)

A
  1. Stuck valve.
  2. Operators were not
    trained.
  3. Lessons learned not
    captured
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24
Q

Three Mile Island – TMI
(PWR): 1. Was the accident a loss of:* Control ?
* Cool ?
* Contain ?
All the above

A

all of the above

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25
Three Mile Island – TMI (PWR):2. Was the accident caused primarily by:* Equipment performance (design, equipment failure) ? * Human Performance (people, process) ?
Human performance was the primary cause.
26
Three Mile Island – TMI (PWR):3. What do you notice about the attitudes, values beliefs of the staff at TMI ?
Operators were not trained and were out in an analyzed state of the reactor.
27
Chernobyl – RBMK
1. Lowering power to a state that cannot be controlled 2. Design flaw 3. Rush to do a test ignoring safety
28
Chernobyl – RBMK:1. Was the accident a loss of: * Control ? * Cool ? * Contain ?
The Chernobyl event was primarily a loss of reactor power control
29
Chernobyl – RBMK:What is the primary cause of the accident? * Equipment performance (design, equipment failure) ? * Human Performance (people, process) ?
This accident is a combination of both equipment and human performance
30
Chernobyl – RBMK:3. What do you notice about the attitudes, values beliefs of the staff at TMI?
chernobyl staff were over-confident, had little respect for procedures, inadequate understanding of the potential of the reactor,
31
Fukushima BWR
1. Earthquake 2. Resulting Tsunami triggered events
32
Fukushima BWR:1. Was the accident a loss of: ✓Control ? ✓Cool ? ✓Contain ?
Fukushima event of loss of cooling caused by a total loss of AC power.
33
Fukushima BWR:2. Was the accident caused primarily by: ✓Equipment performance (design, equipment failure) ? ✓Human Performance (people, process) ?
This accident caused by a combination of both equipment and human performance failures
34
Fukushima BWR:3. What was significant values ✓Organizational values contributed to the severity of the event? ✓What is different from the Chernobyl event?
Very similar but of cause different challenge from the tsunami
35
slide 17
36
safety culture
as a nuclear safety concept was established after the Chernobyl accident.
37
Safety Culture - INSAG-4
* That assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance.
38
IAEA -
International Atomic Energy Agency
39
INSAG -
The International Safety Advisory Group
40
slide 19
41
defence in depth DOES NOT
translate precisely into a set of design rules
42
defence in depth is based on
ancient military philosophy of providing multiple barriers of defence and is used in the design of nuclear facilities the assessment of designs all aspects of regulation
43
multiple barriers to undesirable consequences (slides 21,22)
* No one single event causes accidents or incidents * It is almost always a link of different events * if any of them would have been done differently , the outcome would have been different
44
* Reliability is concerned with
with the overall operation of nuclear generating stations
45
overall station reliability is a function of
the reliability of systems and equipment.
46
Reliability R(t) definition
probability that a device will work adequately for the period intended (system will perform its design function for specifies mission time) under the operating conditions encountered
47
reliability is a probability with a numerical value ranging from
0 (totally unreliable) 1 (always operates for the time intended)
48
pump judged to have reliability of 0.99 for its first year of operation (based on historical data for this type of pump) it means for 1000 hours of operation the pump will be unavailable for no more than __ hours
10
49
Reliability is concerned with whether
an operating component in a process system is likely to fail.
50
process system
is a system that operates when the plant is producing power.
51
poised system
is sitting waiting to operate in the event of specific events
52
poised systems, the concern is
whether a system or component will be available when called upon to operate.
53
* Assume Valve reliability is 0.975/y * What is the system reliability of two valves in parallel if only valve is needed (i.e. one valve is redundant)?
Failure probability = 0.025 x 0.025 = 0.000625/y * Reliability = 1- 0.000325 = 0.999675/y
54
* Assume Valve reliability is 0.975/y * What is the system reliability of two valves in series (i.e. neither valve is redundant)?
* Failure probability = 0.025 + 0.025 = 0.050/y (approx.) * Reliability = 1- 0.05 = 0.95/y
55
* Availability, A,
is the fraction of time a component or system is available to perform its intended purpose
56
* Unavailability, Q,
is the fraction of time a component or system is unavailable when needed
57
RELATION OF A AND Q
Q + A = 1
58
The concept of availability is applied to ____ systems
POISED
59
Availability is related to reliability but is defined as the
fraction of time that a device is available to work if called upon to do so.
60
✓Availability has a value from
▪ 0 (never available) to 1 (always available) ▪ generally expressed as years per year or hours per year
61
✓The value, which is more frequently encountered, however, is ____
unavailability.
62
or example, if a poised system has an unavailability target of 10-3 years/year, this means that it will be unavailable for no more than ____
8 hours during the year (1 year = 8760 hours and 8/8760 is approximately 10-3 ).
63
______ of poised system is measured by ____ periodically
unavailability testing
64
lamda
systems failures per yeat
65
T
test period in years
66
r
repair time in years (if system is required during repairs)
67
Q
unavailability
68
Q eq
Q=(lamda)(T/2 + r)
69
safety systems are tested often enough to _____ ______ with design and licensing availability requirements
demonstrate compliance
70
Typical Unavailability Targets Special Safety Systems:___ Standby Safety Support:___
0.001 year/year: (10^-3 y/y) 0.01 year/year : (10^-2 y/y)
71
For Special Safety Systems, another way of saying this is that a SSS is expected to respond sufficiently to a process failure ___ times out of ___ demands
999 times out of 1000 demands (“reliability”)
72
Design Methods for Improving System Reliability/Availability
redundancy independence elimination of common cause effects fail-safe
73
fail-safe
* failure results in function performed
74
Elimination of common cause effects
* environmental qualification * seismic qualification * group 1 and 2 systems * diversity
75
independence
* channelization ✓safety system trip channels ✓odd and even power * different supplies (e.g. fuel tanks, suction supply, etc.)
76
High reliability and availability can be achieved by attention to a number reliability of principles during design and operation of a station. They are:
✓Redundancy ✓Independence ✓Diversity ✓Periodic testing ✓Fail-safe operation ✓Single-failure criterion ✓Operational Surveillance ✓Preventative maintenance and ✓Predictive maintenance
77
redundancy
* more than one way to do a job
78
Redundancy:
✓ If only one component exists to perform a certain function, when it fails, the system fails.
79
Redundancy: how to improve
✓ This problem can be reduced by installing additional components, so that if one fails, there is another to do the job. ✓ In other words, higher reliability can be attained by providing a backup (or redundant) component.
80
s redundancy is provided primarily to
to ensure reliable operation, not to allow more convenient maintenance.
81
in Nuclear Plant Design - Redundancy is the provision of
components or capacity in excess of 100% of system requirements, such that failures of excess components or capacity do not disable the system function. ✓ e.g. two 100% capacity pumps placed in parallel
82
✓ Redundant equipment must be _____ and ____ from external common cause failures.
independent protected
83
t or f Redundancy does not by itself protect against system failures
t
84
Result of Taking redundant equipment out of service for maintenance
will lower the reliability of the system.
85
✓ Balance of Plant Systems
▪ SST and UST ▪ Digital Computer o DCCX AND DCCY
86
✓ Space shuttle program
▪ The computer control system in each shuttle contains more than one computer. ▪ Redundancy is provided by running the same software control program on more than one computer. If one computer fails, another is immediately available to assume control.
87
“Redundant” means
“Redundant” means having a second source of power or piece of equipment that acts as a backup in case the first fails to operate properly.
88
single failures is an aspect of the defense-in-depth design mentality
No single failure can result in unacceptable consequences
89
✓Single Failure Criterion is a requirement that a system which is designed to carry out a defined safety function must be capable
of carrying out its mission in spite of the failure of any single component within the system or in an associated system which supports its operation
90
✓Prevention of Consequences for Single failures
▪ Redundancy, Diversity, Separation, Fail-Safe Design and Safety Margin (ALARA) ▪ Example, Emergency Core Cooling System. o Its electrical power system can be performed by an “Electrical isolation” achieved “by the use of separation distance, isolation devices, shielding and wiring techniques, or combinations thereof.”
91
All safety groups shall function in the presence of a______
single failure.
92
The single-failure criterion requires that each safety group can perform all safety functions required for a PIE in the presence of any single component failure, as well as:
▪ all failures caused by that single failure ▪ all identifiable but non-detectable failures, including those in the nontested components ▪ all failures and spurious system actions that cause (or are caused by) the PIE
93
Common Mode/Cause Failures
* A concurrent failure of two or more structures, systems or components due to a single specific event or cause, such as natural phenomena design deficiency, manufacturing flaws, operation and maintenance errors, and human-induced destructive events.
94
* Design Methods to Counter Common Mode/Cause Failures
✓Independence ✓Odd/Even equipment ✓Diversity ✓Separation ✓Channelization
95
Electrical power supplies are designated as
odd or even
96
✓odd and even supplies are____ which is an example of ___
independent channelization
97
Typically, half the equipment providing a function is supplied by an __
even source, and half by an odd source, so that the effect of one power supply failure is limited to either odd or even equipment
98
Odd and Even Equipment
✓This eliminates some power failures as a common mode failure for odd and even equipment. ✓If the odd and even equipment provides at least 100% redundancy, then system failure is prevented for these power failures (e.g. SDC pumps)
99
Reliability principles - Independence
* physical separation of systems or components so that a fault in one system will not affect the others.
100
how is independence achieved
having no shared components or common services (functional separation), and by physical separation.
101
reliability principles - Independence- in CANDU
In CANDU use of two independent shutdown systems SDS1 and SDS2 ➢ Two systems are independent if the failure of one, or the failure of any system or structure necessary to support it, cannot cause the other to fail. ➢ SDS1 failure of power it works as rods ➢ SDS2 actuation of helium gas injection of poison
102
SDS1 and SDS2 - Independence
SDS 1 and 2 have no shared components or services, such as electrical power, and components are physically separated North and South of the reactor
103
reliability principles - Diversity
is variety in design, manufacture, operation and maintenance of redundant components or systems for the purpose of reducing unavailability due to common cause effects, such as design or manufacturing flaws, unforeseen failure modes, and Operating and Maintenance (O&M) errors.
104
✓Diversity is an attempt to
ensure that there is more than one way of doing a job.
105
how to reduce the possibility of common-cause failure.
✓The presence of two or more redundant systems or components to perform an identified function, where the different systems or components have different attributes
106
* Diversity avoids
Common Cause Failure
107
how does diversity avoid Common Cause Failure
✓Using the space shuttle, diversity is provided by running entirely different software control programs on different computers to achieve the same purpose. ✓The software is even created by a different design team. This ensures that a bug in one piece of software is not duplicated in the other so that one mistake cannot disable more than one computer (common cause failures)
108
Reliability principles - Diversity in CANDU
* In CANDU use of two diverse shutdown systems SDS1 and SDS2 ✓ SDS1 achieves emergency shutdown by dropping shutoff rods into core under gravity, whereas SDS2 injects liquid absorber under pressure. ✓ SDS1 and SDS2 components, and SGs and EPGs are from different manufacturers * Balance of Plant Systems ✓ Four Classes of Power ✓ Digital Computers DCCX and DCCY
109
Reliability principles - Fail-Safe Operation
A system or component is called fail-safe if after failing it leaves the remainder of the system in a safer state. ✓Failure does not contribute to system unavailability. ✓Failures are not eliminated, but the failures are safe:
110
Reliability principles - Fail-Safe Operation: examples Train locomotives are equipped with a deadman brake
✓It must be depressed by the engineer to allow the locomotive to move. ✓If the engineer falls over dead, his foot will come off the brake and the locomotive will come to a halt
111
Reliability principles - Fail-Safe Operation: examples CANDU
* SDS1; Power failure releases the rods into the core ✓ Rods are energized during operation
112
Reliability principles- Separation
Cables routed in different cable trays * Separate rooms for odd and even Class III switchgear * Separate control areas. (MCR, SCAs - secondary control areas)
113
Failure of a poised system,
is not readily apparent and can only be determined by testing.
114
Unavailability can be kept low by ________
more frequent testing.
115
Since it is not possible to determine at what point the failure occurred,______
unavailability is considered to be half the time since the system was last tested (plus however long it takes to make the repairs).
116
Reliability principles – Periodic Testing: The frequency of testing must, however, be balanced against:
▪ Wear and tear on the system and components caused by testing, ▪ Unavailability due to removing components from service for the duration of the test ▪ The risk (by human error) of leaving the system in a degraded state after a test, and ▪ The danger of activating the system during the testing process.
117
Reliability principles – Operational Surveillance
Process of continual monitoring and trending of process parameters and equipment with the intent of spotting potential problems before they become real problems ✓Thus, corrective action can be taken before a major problem occurs
118
Operational surveillance- Example
✓An example is vibration monitoring of rotating equipment. If unusual vibrations are detected, the equipment can be stopped and repaired before the vibration causes serious damage.
119
Reliability data on different types of equipment offers_______
a means of estimating when failures are likely to occur.
120
By planning replacement or maintenance before any appreciable deterioration occurs that can contribute to the predicted failure, it is possible to
reduce the number of unscheduled outages and consequent loss of production.
121
appearance of throwing away good equipment, but____
the reliability statistics indicate that the equipment is likely to fail shortly and probably inconveniently (remember Murphy’s Law).
122
* The best form of preventive maintenance is
predictive maintenance
123
Predictive Maintenance
* Based on equipment condition. * Maintenance or replacement is only done when diagnostic test results (such as vibration monitoring) indicate equipment degradation.
124
SLIDE 52
125
Multiple Physical Barriers
* Multiple fission product barriers * Multiple radioactivity barriers
126
* The multiple barrier approach that has been built into station design: ✓is intended to ___
prevent or impede the release of radioactivity from the fuel to the public
127
There are _____ passive radioactivity barriers continuously available
five
128
five passive radioactivity barriers continuously available
1. The uranium fuel is molded into ceramic fuel pellets which have a high melting point and lock in most of the fission products 2. The fuel sheath which is made of high integrity welded metal (zircaloy) and contains the ceramic fuel 3. The heat transport system which is constructed of high strength pressure tubes, piping and vessels and contains the fuel bundles 4. The containment system which provides a relatively leak tight envelope maintained slightly below atmospheric pressure (Except CANDU-6). This partial vacuum encourages air to leak in instead of out thereby helping to prevent release of radioactivity that escapes from the heat transport system, and 5. The exclusion zone of at least one kilometre radius around the reactor that ensures any radioactive releases from the station are well diluted by the time they reach the boundary
129
LABEL SLIDE 54
130
Process systems
are those systems performing a continuous function in the normal operation of the plant.
131
Process systems EXAMPLE
✓For example, the primary heat transport system is a process system that is continuously active in the removal of heat from the fuel ✓The reactor regulating system is a process system that is continuously active in the normal control of reactor power.
132
* Reliable process systems ensure that:
✓heat is produced and electricity generated ✓while maintaining control, cooling and containing.
133
Safety systems are poised systems that
operate only to compensate for the failure of process systems
134
Reliable Safety Systems They can do this by shutting down the reactor to regain control (shutdown systems),
✓by providing additional cooling to the fuel (emergency coolant injection system), and ✓by containing radioactivity, which has escaped from the fuel (containment system).
135
Reliable Safety Systems: Reliability in this context means that in the rare event these systems are called upon to act, they will
be available to perform their intended function.
136
The safety systems are designed to operate automatically and the five passive barriers are always in place, but the DiD concept
does not allow reliance on equipment and systems to prevent accidents.
137
✓It is important that operating and maintenance staff are
knowledgeable about system conditions, alert for any evidence that systems or equipment may be on the verge of failure, and act promptly to prevent or minimize the consequences of such failures.
138
Competent Operating and Maintenance Staff
✓To achieve a high level of competence, the qualification criteria for each job family are clearly defined. ✓Considerable effort goes into performancebased training of staff to meet those criteria and maintain their qualification.
139
Adequate detection and correction of failures requires
not just competent staff but also processes and procedures for the staff to carry out in a systematic fashion.
140
Detect and Correct Failures Example
✓For example, a routine testing program for safety systems helps meet the availability targets
141
✓_______________program in conjunction with a planned _____________ helps to ensure that equipment and systems are monitored, inspected and repaired before they fail.
An operational surveillance preventive maintenance program
142
_____________ exist, allowing the quick reporting, prioritizing and repair of deficiencies.
✓Elaborate work control processes
143
✓Failures, when they do occur, are __________ through a rigorous change approval process.
are thoroughly investigated and solutions applied
144
* Section 6.1 Application of defence in depth
✓The design of an NPP shall incorporate defence in depth. The levels of defence in depth shall be independent to the extent practicable. ✓Defence in depth shall be achieved at the design phase through the application of design provisions specific to the five levels of defence.
145
REGDOC 2.5.2; How many levels of defence
5
146
REGDOC 2.5.2- Level 1
shall include conservative design and high-quality construction to provide confidence that plant failures and deviations from normal operations are minimized and accidents are prevented. This shall entail careful attention to selection of appropriate design codes and materials, design procedures, equipment qualification, control of component fabrication and plant construction, and use of operational experience
147
REGDOC 2.5.2- Level 2
shall be achieved by controlling plant behaviour during and following a postulated initiating event (PIE) using both inherent and engineered design features to minimize or exclude uncontrolled transients to the extent possible
148
REGDOC 2.5.2- Level 3
- shall include the provision of inherent safety features, fail-safe design, engineered design features, and procedures that minimize the consequences of DBAs. These provisions shall be capable of leading the plant first to a controlled state, and then to a safe shutdown state, and maintaining at least one barrier for the confinement of radioactive material. Automatic activation of the engineered design features shall minimize the need for operator actions in the early phase of a DBA.
149
REGDOC 2.5.2- Level 4
- shall be achieved by providing equipment and procedures to manage accidents and mitigate their consequences as far as practicable. Most importantly, adequate protection shall be provided for the confinement function by way of a robust containment design. This includes the use of complementary design features to prevent accident progression and to mitigate the consequences of DECs. The confinement function shall be further protected by severe accident management procedures
150
REGDOC 2.5.2- Level 5
The design shall provide adequately equipped emergency support facilities, and plans for onsite and offsite emergency response
151
Canadian Approach -Defence in Depth DiD levels match (approximately) to plant states:
1. Normal operation (NO) 2. Anticipated Operational Occurrences (AOO) 3. Design Basis Accidents (DBA) 4. Design Extension Conditions (DEC) 5. Events more severe than DEC
152
slide 63
153
Defence-in-Depth Framework; Level 1 and implementation
1. To prevent deviations from normal operation, and to prevent failures of structures, systems and components important to safety * Conservative design * High-quality construction (e.g., appropriate design codes and materials, design procedures, equipment qualification, control of component fabrication and plant construction, operational experience) (NO)
154
Defence-in-Depth Framework; Level 2 and implementation
2. To detect and intercept deviations from normal operation, to prevent anticipated operational occurrences from escalating to accident conditions and to return the plant to a state of normal operation. * Inherent and engineered design features to minimize or exclude uncontrolled transients to the extent possible (AAOs)
155
Defence-in-Depth Framework; Level 3 and implementation
3. To minimize the consequences of accidents, and prevent escalation to beyond-design-basis accidents * Inherent safety features * Fail-safe design * Engineered design features, and procedures that minimize consequences of DBAs (DBA)
156
Defence-in-Depth Framework; Level 4 and implementation
4. To ensure that radioactive releases caused by severe accidents or design-extension conditions are kept as low as practicable. * Equipment and procedures to manage accidents and mitigate their consequences as far as practicable * Robust containment design * Complementary design features to prevent accident progression and to mitigate the consequences of design-extension conditions * Severe accident management procedures (DEC)
157
Defence-in-Depth Framework; Level 5 and implementation
To mitigate the radiological consequences of potential releases of radioactive materials that may result from accident conditions. * Emergency support facilities * Onsite and offsite emergency response plan (Beyond DEC)
158
Canada (CNSC) follows IAEA SSR-2/1 requirements for design
* 5 levels of Defence in Depth ✓Independent to the extent practicable * Plant States which correspond (roughly) to levels * Plant equipment for use at each level (not a perfect match) * Safety assessment demonstrates that design meets safety objectives
159
Relevant Canadian / regulatory documents
* REGDOC-2.5.2, Design of Reactor Facilities, Nuclear Power Plants * REGDOC-2.4.1, Deterministic Safety Analysis * REGDOC-2.4.2, Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) for Nuclear Power Plants * CSA Standard N290.16, Requirements for beyond design basis accidents
160
Plant States Considered in the Design:* Canada (CNSC) follows SSR-2/1 for plant states considered in design
✓Normal Operation - 1 ✓Anticipated Operational Occurrences 1 > f > 10^-2 ✓Design Basis Accidents 10^-2 > f > 10^-5 ✓Design Extension Conditions 10^-5 > f > Practically Eliminated
161
Events leading to a large radioactive release or an early radioactive release must be ___
practically eliminated.
162
* Frequency is not only consideration for____
practical elimination hence no frequency cut-off is defined. ✓Severe scenario than DEC
163
* The approach to safety analysis is compatible with SSG-2 Rev 1,
, Deterministic Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants * Section 7 describes the requirements for each plant state * IAEA Document
164
Safety Analysis:* CNSC Uses
REGDOC-2.4.1, Deterministic Safety Analysis
165
Slide 69
166
Design Considerations in DiD Design and Analysis Rules
* Design and analysis rules for NO, AOO, DBA are well established ✓Provide high confidence that events up to DBA will not require offsite
167
* Design rules for Design Extension Conditions (DEC) allow more judgement and the objective is __
“reasonable confidence” that equipment will function as intended in the accident environment, e.g. ✓best-estimate safety analysis, not conservative ✓survivability assessment, not full EQ ✓reasonable estimates of operator action times, not “30 minute rule” ✓no application of Single Failure Criterion
168
Safety objectives and safety goals are met through
implementation of the defence-in-depth framework ✓results in a strong safety case
169
* Elements of the defence-in-depth framework are found in the
CNSC’s regulations and regulatory documents, and in national and international standard
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* General nuclear safety objective:
✓ Design and operate nuclear power plants (NPPs) in a manner that will protect individuals, society and the environment from harm. ✓ This objective relies on the establishment and maintenance of effective defences against radiological hazards in NPPs.
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* Technical safety objective
✓ Provide all reasonably practicable measures to prevent accidents in the NPP, and mitigate the consequences of accidents if they do occur. ✓ This takes into account all possible accidents considered in the design, including those of very low probability. Any radiological consequences will be below prescribed limits, and the likelihood of accidents with serious radiological consequences will be extremely low
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Qualitative Safety Objectives for New Nuclear Power Plants* A limit is placed on the societal risks posed by
posed by NPP operation Individual members of the public shall be provided a level of protection from the consequences of NPP operation, such that there is no significant additional risk to the life and health of individuals. ✓ Societal risks to life and health from NPP operation shall be comparable to or less than the risks of generating electricity by viable competing technologies, and shall not significantly add to other societal risks.
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Qualitative Safety Objectives for New Nuclear Power Plants* plant states that could lead to significant radioactive releases are
are practically eliminated. ✓ For plant states that are not practically eliminated, only protective measures that are of limited scope in terms of area and time shall be necessary for protection of the public, and sufficient time shall be made available to implement these measures
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Quantitative Safety Goals for New Nuclear Power Plants (1);Core damage frequency
* The sum of frequencies of all event sequences that can lead to significant core degradation shall be less than 10^-5 per reactor year.
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Quantitative Safety Goals for New Nuclear Power Plants (1);Small release frequency
* The sum of frequencies of all event sequences that can lead to a release to the environment of more than 10^15 becquerels of iodine-131 shall be less than 10^-5 per reactor year. * A greater release may require temporary evacuation of the local population.
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Quantitative Safety Goals for New Nuclear Power Plants (1); Large release frequency
The sum of frequencies of all event sequences that can lead to a release to the environment of more than 10^14 becquerels of cesium-137 shall be less than 10^-6 per reactor year. A greater release may require long term relocation of the local population.
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SLIDE 74
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SLIDE 75
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SLIDE 76
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SLIDE 78
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Canadian Nuclear Power Plants
* Defence in depth * Large inventory of water * Many hours of passive cooling * In-ground spent fuel pools
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* In-ground spent fuel pools
✓Seismically qualified ✓Diverse means of adding water
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* Many hours of passive cooling
✓Extended recovery time
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* Large inventory of water
✓Primary/secondary coolant ✓Moderator coolant
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Defence in depth
✓Reliable safety system ✓Independence of process, control and safety systems ✓Multiple barriers
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CANDU Design Overview Based on the CANDU-6 Design Emergency water supply (simplified) SLIDE 80
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CANDU Design Overview Passive Heat Removal SLIDE 81
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SLIDE 84
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Fukushima BWR:Lessons Learned
ALL ACCIDENTS PREVENTABLE organizational safety culture in place design enhancements from lessons learned
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Lessons Learned and Design Enhancements (DiD): The 2011 Nuclear Power Plant Accident in Fukushima
✓Nuclear safety issues ✓Raised many questions ✓provided opportunities * Fukushima accident ✓External event can act as a common mode initiator ✓Failure of the safety provisions in several levels of DiD
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Review of DiD in CANDUs - Post Fukushima
* DiD remains valid * OFI * Implementation of DiD needs further work * external hazards; * Additional guidance * harmonisation; * Improvements focus * preventing accidents is key but consider mitigation
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Post-Fukushima Enhancements to Defence in Depth (1) : general conclusion
✓ Canadian nuclear power plants are safe ✓ Risk posed to the health and safety of Canadians or to the environment is small. ✓ Recommended improvements will further reduce the risk to as low as reasonably practicable.
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Post-Fukushima Enhancements to Defence in Depth (1) : general recommendations
✓ Strengthening defence in depth ▪ external events and beyond design basis accidents ▪ design and safety analysis ▪ severe accident management ✓ Enhancing emergency preparedness ▪ onsite and offsite emergency response ✓ 5 Levels of DiD ✓ adequate ✓ opportunity for improvement ✓ Improving regulatory framework and processes ▪ Regulatory framework ▪ Industry and operator oversight procedures ✓ International collaboration ▪ CANDU countries ▪ Other NPP regulators
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Post-Fukushima Enhancements to Defence in Depth (3): Level 3
* Level 3: Protecting spent fuel pools ✓ Makeup water capability and instrumentation
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Post-Fukushima Enhancements to Defence in Depth (3): Level 4
Level 4: Preventing and mitigating severe accidents ✓ Protecting fuel ✓ Makeup water capability to steam generators / primary heat transport system / emergency core coolant / dousing spray ✓ Preventing severe core damage ✓ Makeup water capability to moderator system and calandria vessel/vault ✓ Protecting containment ✓ Passive recombiners and containment venting ✓ Severe accident management guidelines validation/exercise
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Post-Fukushima Enhancements to Defence in Depth (3): Level 5
* Level 5: Protecting the public ▪ Containment filtered venting ▪ Integrated emergency plans and full-scale emergency exercises
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Reactor Defence in Depth Protect Fuel (1) : * Analyses and reassessments
✓ site-specific magnitudes of external events * high winds, seismic, tsunami /storm surges, flooding ✓ station blackout event on spent fuel bundles inside fueling machine ✓ Multi -unit events
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Reactor Defence in Depth Protect Fuel (1) : Design improvements
✓ Emergency mitigating equipment ▪ mobile equipment ✓ Water makeup connections to ▪ steam generators ▪ heat transport system ✓ Provision for main steam safety valves after station blackout ✓ Upgrades of power systems ▪ load shedding to extend battery availability ▪ power supply for key instrumentation ✓ Protection against flooding (barriers, water - tight doors, sealing penetrations
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Reactor Defence-in-Depth Prevent Severe Core Damage:* Analyses and reassessments
✓ modelling for multi-unit plant events ✓ Reassessment of control room habitability during emergencies ✓ Instrumentation qualification for severe accident
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Reactor Defence-in-Depth Prevent Severe Core Damage:* Design improvements
✓ Water makeup connections to ▪ calandria vessel ▪ calandria vault ▪ relief capability of calandria/vault ▪ Instrumentation upgrades
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Reactor Defence in Depth Protect Containment:* Analyses and reassessments
* Analyses and reassessments ✓ Enhancement of filtered containment venting system ✓ Severe accident management guidelines (SAMGs) ✓ Instrumentation for SA conditions monitoring (qualify existing or new) ✓ Control facilities’ habitability during SA ✓ Improved modelling of SAs for multi-unit plants
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Reactor Defence in Depth Protect Containment:* Design improvements ✓ Filtered containment venting ✓ Passive autocatalytic recombiners (PARS)
* Design improvements ✓ Filtered containment venting ✓ Passive autocatalytic recombiners (PARS)
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Reactor Defence in Depth Protect Spent Fuel Pools:* Analyses and reassessments
✓Structural integrity check for temperatures
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Reactor Defence in Depth Protect Spent Fuel Pools:* Design improvements
* Design improvements ✓Instrumentation for pool parameters ✓Piping and connections for extra heat sinks ✓Procedure in event of loss of heat sinks (pool water)
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Enhancing Emergency Preparedness (Onsite) Implemented Safety Enhancements:* Onsite emergency preparedness
✓ Incorporating SA management into emergency plans
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Enhancing Emergency Preparedness (Onsite) Implemented Safety Enhancements: * Backup power and telecommunications
✓ Implementation of backup power to emergency facilities and telecommunications equipment ✓ Formalized mutual aid agreement for external support ▪ Regional Emergency Response Support Centre
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Enhancing Emergency Preparedness (Onsite) Implemented Safety Enhancements:* Station boundary monitoring and dose modelling
✓ Installation of automated real-time boundary radiation monitoring ✓ Development of source term estimation capability
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Enhancing Emergency Preparedness (Offsite);* Integration of Federal and Provincial Nuclear Emergency Plans
✓ national-level oversight process for offsite nuclear emergency programs ✓ Review planning basis of offsite arrangements * developing capability for predicting offsite effects – needs for sheltering and evacuation * simple instructions to public in case of nuclear emergency ✓ Monitor performance of full scale emergency drills involving multi -levels Federal/provincial/municipal
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Improvements to Regulatory Framework and Processes
Amendments to REGDOCS ✓Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations ✓Radiation Protection Regulations * Developing new regulatory documents ✓Design of reactor facilities ✓Periodic safety review process ✓accident management and nuclear emergency preparedness * Implementing new licence conditions ✓accident management ✓public information program
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DiD Worldwide and In Canada Post Fukushima
* IAEA Safety Standards and Guides ✓Re-evaluated and improved * Canada (CANDU Reactors) ✓Alignment based on IAEA Safety Standards and Guides ✓Well informed by the Defence in Depth concept * Improvement and retrofits to the CANDU design