Criminal Law & Procedure

Question 1

Summary

Answer 1

The trial court should deny each motion. The trial court should not suppress Adam’s statement on Miranda grounds because, although Officer One interrogated Adam at the scene, Adam was not formally arrested or restrained to the degree of arrest at the time he made the incriminating statement to Officer One.
The trial court should not suppress Ben’s statement on Miranda grounds because, although Ben was under custodial arrest and Officer Two’s Miranda warning was substantively flawed, Ben offered his incriminating statement voluntarily without interrogative prompting.
The trial court should not apply Miranda to suppress Carl’s incriminating statement to Officer Three because the officer gave Carl a valid Miranda warning, Carl did not unambiguously and unequivocally invoke his right to have his attorney present for questioning, and Carl implicitly waived his right to remain silent and his right not to be questioned without his attorney when he responded to Officer Three’s final question.
Finally, the trial court should not suppress Dillon’s statement to Cellmate on Miranda grounds because, although Cellmate was a police agent who encountered and questioned Dillon at police direction, jailhouse confessions to fellow inmates do not implicate Miranda.

Question 2

The Miranda Standard

Answer 2

Extrapolating from a criminal defendant’s Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to testify against himself, the Supreme Court held in Miranda v. Arizona that specific warnings must be given before a suspect’s statement made during custodial interrogation can be admitted into evidence in the trial against the suspect. 384 U.S. 436, 478–79 (1966). Specifically, the Court held that “the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless [the prosecution] demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” Id. at 444. The Court reaffirmed this bright-line requirement in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 431–32 (2000), prohibiting Congress’s effort to alter it. The Miranda decision and the Supreme Court cases that have interpreted and applied it continue to govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432.
[NOTE: The preceding paragraph articulates the basic standard of law of Miranda that applies to each of the four parts of this question. A complete answer must include the standard but need not repeat it in each of the four parts of the analysis.]

Question 3

Custody

Answer 3

The trial court should not apply Miranda to suppress Adam’s incriminating statement to Officer One. Two elements are necessary to trigger a potential Miranda violation: custody and interrogation. The focus here will be on the first—custody—because Officer One’s question about Adam’s whereabouts constituted interrogation, i.e., was intended to elicit an answer that would inform the officer’s suspicion about whether Adam had been involved in a crime.

Question 4

Sixth Amendment

Answer 4

[NOTE: A person incarcerated and charged with a crime may have the protection of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, not merely the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination as protected by Miranda’s prophylactic rule requiring an express warning. Examinees should not discuss the Sixth Amendment, however, because the question calls only for analysis under the Fifth Amendment and Miranda. Dillon had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel before he spoke with Cellmate because the Sixth Amendment affords only the “accused” the right to counsel in “all criminal prosecutions,” and the right does not attach until a prosecution commences. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991). The Court has established that “[A] criminal defendant’s initial appearance before a judicial officer, where he learns the charge against him and his liberty is subject to restriction, marks the start of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Tex., 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008). Because Dillon did not face charges until two days after his arrest (and after his encounter with Cellmate), and he had not yet appeared in a judicial proceeding, he had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the time he made his incriminating statement to Cellmate.]