Civil Procedure Flashcards
Statute of limitations defense
When filing an answer to a complaint in federal district court, a defendant must “affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense, including . . . statute of limitations . . ..” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1). Although the Federal Rules do not specify the consequences of a party’s failure to plead an affirmative defense, “[i]t is a frequently stated proposition of virtually universal acceptance by the federal courts that a failure to plead an affirmative defense as required by Federal Rule 8(c) results in the waiver of that defense and its exclusion from the case.” Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & A. Benjamin Spencer, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1278 (2021). The Supreme Court has similarly stated that “[o]rdinarily in civil litigation, a statutory time limitation is forfeited if not raised in a defendant’s answer or in an amendment thereto.” Day v. McDonnough, 547 U.S. 198, 201 (2006). Applying this basic rule, Tech’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations did not properly raise the defense because the defense was forfeited when Tech failed to raise it in its answer.
[NOTE: The district court could, if requested, grant Tech leave to amend its answer to add the statute of limitations defense. The Federal Rules empower district courts to allow parties to amend their pleadings and direct that leave to amend should be “freely” given “when doing so will aid in presenting the merits” and the objecting party has not persuaded the court that it will be prejudiced. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b). However, no such request has been made here. Moreover, this point was not raised by the question prompt.]
Motion for summary judgement
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion” and must identify “those portions of [the record] . . . which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The nonmoving party can then avoid summary judgment only if it responds with admissible evidence of “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “On a motion for summary judgment, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . if there is a genuine dispute as to those facts.”
Sua sponte determination
The district court should, sua sponte, determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction. Although Diner’s complaint alleges, and Tech’s answer admits, the existence of diversity jurisdiction, the undisputed facts establish that diversity jurisdiction does not exist. Thus, the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and must dismiss the complaint.
Federal courts are expected to police subject-matter jurisdiction “on their own initiative even at the highest level.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). Even when neither party raises the issue, a district court has “an obligation to inquire sua sponte into [its] ability to exercise subject matter jurisdiction.” DuLaurence v. Telegen, 94 F. Supp. 3d 73, 78 (D. Mass. 2015). Moreover, a district court must dismiss an action if “the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
The district court should therefore sua sponte raise and determine the question of its subject-matter jurisdiction.
No SMJ
Diner’s complaint asserts that the court has diversity jurisdiction. Federal district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction in diversity cases when “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 . . . and is between . . . citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). In this case, although the amount-in-controversy requirement is met, the requirement that the parties be “citizens of different States” is not satisfied.
The statute designates a corporation’s citizenship to be of the state of its incorporation as well as of the state “where it has its principal place of business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c). The Supreme Court has “conclude[d] that the phrase ‘principal place of business’ refers to the place where the corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80–81 (2010).
