CRIM FALS Flashcards
[ G.R. No. 246674. June 30, 2020 ]
JORGE E. AURO, REPRESENTED BY HIS HEIRS, JOMAR O. AURO AND MARJORIE O. AURO-GONZALES, PETITIONERS, VS. JOHANNA A. YASIS, REPRESENTED BY ACHILLES A. YASIS, RESPONDENT.
Ruling of the MTC: the MTC found Jorge guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Falsification of Public Document and imposed the penalty of imprisonment of four months and one day of arresto mayor as minimum to three years, six months and 21 days of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay a fine of P1,000.00. Co-accused Fred Cornelio was acquitted by the lower court for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. With his motion for reconsideration denied by the lower court, Jorge filed his appeal before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Ruling of the RTC:Finding that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to prove the genuineness or falsity of the questioned signature on the subject Deed of Sale, the RTC, on January 31, 2018, rendered a Decision. The RTC acquitted Jorge, but ordered the cancellation of the tax declaration issued in his name by virtue of the alleged Deed of Sale. It ruled that the while it was established that the notary public who notarized the said Deed of Sale had no existing notarial commission, the prosecution failed to present a handwriting expert to prove the genuineness or falsity of the questioned signature of respondent Johanna A. Yasis (Johanna) in the said Deed of Sale. The RTC opined that an individual could have several ways of affixing his/her signature. Applying the equipoise rule, the trial court ruled that the acquittal of Jorge is warranted. However, the lower court treated the Deed of Sale as a mere private document, that is not. registrable, thus, the cancellation of the tax declaration is justified.
Ruling of the CA:On September 27, 2018, the CA issued the now appealed Decision denying petitioners’ appeal, and affirming the ruling of the trial court.
The CA notes that Jorge was not acquitted because there was no evidence against him, but by reason that the evidence for the prosecution and the defense were so evenly balanced as to call for the tilting of the scales in favor of Jorge. It does not necessarily mean that he did not commit the felony charged. The appellate court pointed out that the cancellation of the tax declaration was related to the felony charged against him because the said tax declaration would not have been issued in Jorge’s name without the alleged Deed of Sale executed in his favor. Since the Deed of Sale was defective, it cannot possibly give rise to a change of ownership in the tax declaration in favor of Jorge.** The CA agreed with the findings of the RTC** that while there is doubt on whether or not the signature of respondent Johanna A. Yasis (Johanna) in the alleged Deed of Sale was falsified, it is already established that Atty. David S. Eñano, Jr. (Atty. Eñano), who signed the notarial part, was not a commissioned notary officer in Quezon City or anywhere else in the Philippines in 2005.
FACTS: Petitioner Jorge E. Auro (Jorge) was charged with the crime of falsification of public document, as defined and penalized under Article 172,[4] in relation to Article 171[5] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Mercedes, Camarines Norte. The accusatory portion of the Information reads as follows:
That on or about January 7, 2005 at Brgy. Del Rosario, [Municipality of Mercedes, [P]rovince of Camarines Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another to attain a common purpose, being then private individuals, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale, a public document, by making it appear that private complainant JOHANNA A. YASIS, participated in the said Deed of Absolute Sale as vendor and by affixing her signature as such, that is, accused made it appear that complainant sold her 2.5000 hectares fishpond situated in Brgy. Del Rosario, Mercedes, Camarines Norte, where in truth and in fact said complainant never participated in the preparation, execution or signing thereof, as she was actually residing in the United States of America and has never returned to the Philippines on that particular year (2005), and as a direct consequence thereof, the tax declaration of the complainant was cancelled and in lieu thereof a new declaration was issued in favor of the accused Jorge E. Auro, to the great damage and prejudice of the private complainant.
ISSUE: Petitioners posit the sole assignment of error: “[t]hat the lower court and the CA committed serious error of law in ordering the cancellation of the tax declaration of the petitioner over the subject property as part of its adjudication in the civil aspect of a criminal case for falsification of a public document, such cancellation being a totally different issue should be threshed out in a separate proceeding.
HELD:
In this case, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC regarding the existence of Jorge’s civil liability in the criminal case charged against him, despite the fact that he was acquitted to the same, to wit:
At the outset, the Court notes that [Jorge] was acquitted not because there was no evidence against [Jorge], but because the evidence of the prosecution and the defense were so evenly balanced as to call for the tilting of the scales in favor of [Jorge]. Hence, while the RTC did acquit [Jorge], it did not necessarily mean that he did not commit the felony charged. The RTC only granted him the benefit of doubt under the equipoise doctrine. In other words, the evidence that [Jorge] committed falsification failed to hurdle the test or standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.[21] Thus, while the trial court had ruled that the prosecution had failed to prove Jorge’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt to the felony of falsification, it (prosecution) had nevertheless presented sufficient preponderance of evidence to establish the invalidity of the tax declaration issued in his name.
It is undisputed that the Deed of Sale was not validly notarized by an existing notary public in Quezon City or anywhere in the Philippines in 2005. Well-settled is the rule that deeds, conveyances, encumbrances, discharges, and other voluntary instruments, whether affecting registered or unregistered lands, should be notarized in order to be registrable.[22] Since the enabling document, i.e., the Deed of Sale was not validly notarized, it remains to be a private document that could not affect or cause the transfer of ownership of the tax declaration to the name of Jorge. Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the cancellation of the tax declaration is a necessary and direct consequence of the finding that the unnotarized Deed of Sale cannot give rise to any transfer of ownership to Jorge. Petitioners cannot have its cake and eat it too.
Finally, petitioners bewail that they were not afforded due process and were not presented an opportunity to present their evidence to the contrary. Case law states that the touchstone of due process is the opportunity to be heard.[23] “To be heard” does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.[24]
In conclusion, while the evidence presented does not establish the fact of the crime with moral certainty, the civil action still prevails for as long as the greater weight of evidence tilts in favor of a finding of liability. This means that while the mind of the court cannot rest easy in penalizing the accused for the commission of the crime, it nevertheless finds that he/she committed or omitted to perform acts which serve as a separate source of obligation.[25]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is DENIED due to lack of merit. The Decision dated September 27, 2018 and the Resolution dated March 15, 2019 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 155932 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 233015. October 16, 2019 ]
LUIS L. CO AND ALVIN S. CO, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.
The Accused-Appellants were both shareholders and officers of Jade Bank at the time material to the case. Accused-Appellant Luis was a director in 1996 and Acting President in 1997 while Accused-Appellant Alvin was Assistant Vice President in 1996 and 1997.
FACTS: The CA summarized the factual and procedural antecedents thusly:
Accused-[a]ppellants Luis L. Co (Luis) and his son Alvin Milton S. Co (Alvin) were originally charged before the RTC with Estafa, as defined and penalized under Art. 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, in an Information, which reads:
That sometime during the period of March 1997 to December 1997, in the City of Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused[,] namely: LUIS L. CO and ALVIN MILTON S. CO[,] as principals by direct participation, with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, in their capacity (sic) as President and Assistant Vice President[,] respectively[,] of Jade Progressive Savings and Mortgage Bank, a thrift bank organized under the existing laws of the Republic of the Philippines, conspiring, confederating[,] and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously defraud Jade Progressive Savings and Mortgage Bank, its depositors and creditors[,] through the use of deceit by authorizing the release of the total amount ofTHREE MILLION, (sic) THIRTY[-]TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINE PESOS (P3,032,909.00)of the bank’s funds supposedly as payment for services rendered by ACME INVESTIGATION SERVICES, INC. (a non-existent security agency), when in truth and in fact, no such contract existed and no such security services were rendered by said ACME INVESTIGATION SERVICES, INC[,] in favor of Jade Progressive Savings and Mortgage Bank. Thereafter, once in possession of the aforesaid amount of P3,032,909.00[,] the accused willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously misappropriate and convert the same for their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of Jade Progressive Savings and Mortgage Bank, its depositors, creditors[,] and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, in the amount of P3,032,909.00, Philippine Currency.
The prosecution subsequently filed an amended Information this time charging the Accused-Appellants of Estafa, as defined and penalized under Art. 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC
ISSUE: 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE ESTABLISHED FACTS SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION OF BOTH THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ARTICLE 315, PAR. 2 (A) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
HELD: Ruling of the Court
We find merit in the appeal.
I
The crime charged was
falsification of a private document, not estafa
The RTC and the CA convicted the petitioners for the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
ARTICLE 315. Swindling (Estafa). — x x x:
x x x x
- By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
x x x x
To properly charge an accused with estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a), supra, the information should aver the following essential elements, to wit: (1) that the accused used a fictitious name or false pretense that he possesses power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business, imaginary transaction, or other similar deceits; (2) that the accused used such deceitful means prior to or simultaneous with the execution of the fraud; (3) that the offended party relied on such deceitful means to part with his money or property; and (4) that the offended party suffered damage.
It is a fundamental tenet in criminal procedure that the recital in the information of the facts constitutive of the offense, not the designation of the offense therein, determines the crime being charged against the accused. Thus, we turn to the amended information to know what crime the petitioners have been charged with.
The aforequoted allegations indicate that the petitioners signed the billing statements and requested payments on the basis that Acme Investigation Service, Inc. (Acme) had actually rendered security services to Jade Bank, prompting Jade Bank to pay. In other words, the amended information claimed that the fraud could not have been committed without the falsification of the private documents. Under such alleged circumstances,** the crime charged was falsification of private documents instead of estafa.**
It is not amiss to observe that there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of a private document considering that the damage essential to both is the same. As a result, having such offenses compounded or complexed in accordance with Article 48[9] of the Revised Penal Code is inherently disallowed. We reiterate the pronouncement made in Batulanon v. People,[10] to wit:
As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document, it is important to ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with falsification of a private document or with estafa. If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa. Thus, in People v. Reyes, the accused made it appear in the time book of the Calamba Sugar Estate that a laborer, Ciriaco Sario, worked 21 days during the month of July, 1929, when in reality he had worked only 11 days, and then charged the offended party, the Calamba Sugar Estate, the wages of the laborer for 21 days. The accused misappropriated the wages during which the laborer did not work for which he was convicted of falsification of private document.
In US. v. Infante, the accused changed the description of the pawned article on the face of the pawn ticket and made it appear that the article is of greatly superior value, and thereafter pawned the falsified ticket in another pawnshop for an amount largely in excess of the true value of the article pawned. He was found guilty of falsification of a private document. In U.S. v. Chan Tiao, the accused presented a document of guaranty purportedly signed by Ortigas Hermanos for the payment of P2,055.00 as the value of 150 sacks of sugar, and by means of said falsified documents, succeeded in obtaining the sacks of sugar, was held guilty of falsification of a private document.[11] [Bold underscoring supplied]
II
The Prosecution did not establish
the crime of falsification of a private document
Falsification of a private document under Article 172, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, has the following elements, namely: (1) that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in paragraph 7, enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) that the falsification was committed in any private document; and (3) that the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage.[12]
The Prosecution sought to establish that Acme did not exist; that Jade Bank did not benefit from any security services that could have been rendered by Acme; that petitioner Luis Co had signed the request for payment in favor of Acme; and that the checks issued as payments had been deposited under fictitious accounts the petitioners owned and controlled.
The first element of the crime of falsification of a private document was not established beyond reasonable doubt. Several circumstances we outline hereafter show why.
First of all, the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced herein did not reliably establish the authorship by either petitioner of the billing statements that would have stemmed from the non-existent contract of security services. Although Prosecution witness Catalina Zamora, the former Chief Accountant of Jade Bank, attested that she had seen petitioner Alvin Co sign the billing statements over the printed name of Arturo dela Cruz, the managing director of Acme, and insisted that such billing statements would have proved the fictitiousness of the contract averred in the amended information, we have noted the observation by the RTC that on her cross examination Zamora had denied actually witnessing petitioner Alvin Co affixing his signature over the printed name Arturo dela Cruz in the billing statements.[13]** It thus appeared that Zamora’s only basis to declare that petitioner Alvin Co had authored the fictitious and falsified billing statements was her impression about the signatures of Arturo dela Cruz and petitioner Alvin Co looking similar.**
Zamora’s impression on the similarity in the signatures, which was clearly not derived from objective facts but upon her opinion, was testimony that had no probative value by virtue of its being the opinion of an ordinary witness. Indeed, the Prosecution did not show that her opinion came under any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 50, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. - The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding -
(a) The identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person. (44 a)
Secondly, Zamora declared that petitioner Alvin Co had used the aliases of Nelson Sia and Al Mendoza; and that petitioner Luis Co had used the alias of Antonio Santos. Her declarations became relevant to enable the tracing of the money back to the petitioners. But because she apparently had no personal knowledge on the use of the aliases by the petitioners, her declarations to that effect were hearsay and unreliable.
Thirdly, Zamora stated that petitioner Luis Co had ordered her to fill out the application card to open an account at Citytrust’s Reina Regente Branch; and that petitioner Luis Co and three others had signed the card in her presence. Her statement did not suffice to incriminate the petitioners in the crime of falsification simply because there was no showing that the card thus filled out and signed had actually been used to open the Citytrust account. The doubt against Zamora’s statement became pronounced in view of her admission that she had not herself delivered the card to Citytrust.
Moreover, although in most situations corroboration is not necessary for as long as the details of the crime have already been proved with sufficient clarity, we should point out that Zamora’s statement, standing alone, did not credibly establish the receipt by the petitioners of the proceeds of the fraud. As such, corroboration by other evidence became necessary herein to substantiate Zamora’s statement if the objective therefor was to enable the traceback of the proceeds of the fraud to either of the petitioners. The lack of corroboration accented that the Prosecution had been remiss in discharging its duty by leaving its proof of guilt inconclusive and incomplete. It also exposed her incrimination of the petitioners to be far from reliable and clear.
Fourthly, the Prosecution presented bank officers as witnesses against the petitioners. However, it was notable that said witnesses did not categorically certify that petitioner Alvin Co, on one hand, and either Nelson Sia or Al Mendoza, on the other, were one and the same person.
Lastly, Raul Permejo, another witness for the Prosecution, recalled that petitioner Alvin Co had instructed him to deposit checks in the accounts held in Citytrust and Metrobank; and that petitioner Alvin Co had used the name Nelson Sia in several bank transactions. Yet, Permejo was discredited as an unreliable witness in the face of his candid admission that he had received money from the counsel after each time he had testified in court against the petitioners. The financial incentives cast grave doubts on his sincerity and truthfulness, and negated the credibility of his recollections as a witness. The money was possibly a sufficient incentive for him to pervert his recollection and capacity for truth telling, rendering him untrustworthy for being fully biased against the petitioners. In this connection, a witness is said to be biased when his relation to the cause or to the parties is such that he has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color to his statements, or to suppress or to pervert the truth, or to state what is false.[14]
Faced with all the foregoing circumstances, the Court cannot but consider doubtful and suspicious the proof on the existence of the first element of the crime of falsification of a private document. A further discussion of the remaining elements of the offense has become unnecessary. Acquittal of the petitioners of the crime of falsification of a private document for failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt should follow.
Absolving the petitioners of the crime of falsification of a private document likewise clears them of the crime of estafa. We adopt with approval the commentary expressed by a respected treatise on criminal law on the matter, viz.:
When the offender commits on a document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 as a necessary means to commit another crime, like estafa, theft or malversation. The two crimes form a complex crime under Article 48. However, the document falsified must be public, official or commercial.
The falsification of a public, official or commercial document may be a means of committing estafa, because before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial document. (Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong v. People, GR No. 181409, February 11, 2010). In other words, the crime of falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud another is estafa. But damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document. Therefore, the falsification of the public, official or commercial document is only a necessary means to commit estafa.
On the other hand, in the falsification of a private document, there is no crime unless another fact, independent of that of falsifying the document, is proved: i.e. damage or intent to cause it. Therefore, when one makes use of a private document, which he falsified, to defraud another, there results only one crime: the falsification of a private document. The damage to another is caused by the commission of the crime of falsification of falsification of private document. The intent to defraud in using the falsified private document is part and parcel of the crime, and cannot give rise to the crime of estafa, because the damage, if it resulted, was caused by, and became the element of, the crime of falsification of private document. The crime of estafa in such case was not committed, as it could not exist without its own element of damage.[15] [Bold emphasis supplied]
A final word needs to be said. We normally accord the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses the highest respect, and will not disturb the evaluation on appeal, but we also state that findings on the issue of credibility of witnesses and the consequent findings of fact could be reviewed and undone if we, as the ultimate dispenser of justice, find matters of substance and value whose proper significance and impact have been overlooked or incorrectly appreciated and which, if duly considered or properly appreciated, would alter the result of the case. No findings by the trial court are impervious to the onslaught of a just and fair appreciation by a higher court. After all, every appeal of a criminal conviction opens the entire records to review, and this is because our oaths as judges bind and commit us to ensure that no one should be held criminally responsible and condemned to suffer punishment unless the evidence against him has been sufficient and amounts to the moral certainty of his guilt.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on December 22, 2015 by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 35911; ACQUITS petitioners LUIS L. CO and ALVIN S. CO of the crime charged for failure of the Prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and ORDERS the DISMISSAL of Criminal Case No. 03-211251 without pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 228739. July 17, 2019 ]
ROSEMARIE ERIBAL BOWDEN, REPRESENTED BY FLORENCIO C. ERIBAL, SR., PETITIONER, VS. DONALD WILLIAM ALFRED BOWDEN, RESPONDENT.
FACTS: Rosemarie Eribal Bowden (petitioner) was the registered owner of a 2004 Mitsubishi Pajero (subject vehicle) with Plate No. FFD 228.[3] The subject vehicle was sold to Virgilio S. Ramos (Ramos) without petitioner’s consent by her then husband Donald William Alfred Bowden (respondent), a British national residing in Iloilo City. The marriage of petitioner and respondent was dissolved by virtue of a Decree of Divorce dated June 12, 2006.
Petitioner claimed that while she was in London, she entrusted the Original Receipt-Certificate of Registration (OR-CR) of the subject vehicle to her niece Juvelyn Enate.[4] However, during petitioner’s marriage with respondent, the latter executed an affidavit of loss[5] of the OR-CR and submitted it to the Roxas City District, Office of the Land Transportation Office (LTO). This paved the way for the issuance of a new OR-CR to respondent which he used to execute a deed of sale[6] of the subject vehicle in his favor. Respondent submitted the deed of sale to the LTO and a new CR was issued in his name. Both affidavit of loss and deed of sale bore forged signatures of petitioner, prompting her to file criminal complaints against respondent.
On August 28, 2006, Assistant City Prosecutor Alma N. Banias-Delfin filed two separate Informations before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Roxas City charging respondent of the crimes of falsification of public document by a private individual and use of falsified documents, which read:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. C-06-15995-10
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses DONALD WILLIAM ALFRED BOWDEN, a British national presently residing in Phase II, Land Heights Subd., Villa, Iloilo City, of the crime of FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT BY A PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL AND USE OF FALSIFIED DOCUMENTS, as defined and penalized under Article 172, in relation to Article 171, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed as follows:
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner fails to put up a prima facie case of use of falsified documents which justifies the grant of the demurrer but for a different reason
HELD: The Court agrees with the CA that the petitioner fails to put up a prima facie case of use of falsified documents which justifies the grant of the demurrer but for a different reason.
The last paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes two acts: first, the introduction of a falsified document as evidence in any judicial proceeding; and second, the use of a falsified document in any other transaction. The second punishable act presupposes that the person who used the falsified document is not the one who falsified such document. Thus, the elements of the crime of use of falsified document in any transaction (other than as evidence in a judicial proceeding) are: (1) the offender knew that a document was falsified by another person; (2) the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any of subdivisions Nos. 1 and 2 of Article 172; (3) he used such document (not in judicial proceedings); and (4) the use of the false document caused damage to another or at least it was used with intent to cause such damage.[30] A person who falsified a document and used such falsified document shall be punished for the crime of falsification.
The information in Criminal Case No. C-06-15995-10 alleges that respondent prepared and executed an affidavit of loss of OR-CR by “imitating the signature of Rosemarie Bowden y Eribal therein making it appear that she signed the same” and submits it to the LTO which resulted in the issuance of a second OR-CR in the name of petitioner. The information in Criminal Case No. C-06-15996-10 meanwhile states that respondent executed a deed of sale in his favor imitating petitioner’s signature and thereafter, submits said deed to the LTO. Consequently, the LTO issued a new CR, this time, in the name of respondent as the owner of the subject vehicle. Obviously, the averments in the informations implicate respondent as the person who falsified the affidavit of loss and the deed of sale and used said falsified documents to the damage of petitioner.
But it is striking to note that in the crime of use of falsified document, the person who used the falsified document is different from the one who falsified it such that “[i]f the one who used the falsified document is the same person who falsified it, the crime is only falsification and the use of the same is not a separate crime.”[31] Falsification of a public document and use of false document by the same person who falsified it constitute but a single crime of falsification. It follows, therefore, that with the dismissal of the case for falsification of public documents, the case for use of falsified documents has no leg to stand on.
A final note. The petitioner was given an opportunity to present her case. She has formally offered her evidence and actively participated in the trial. Petitioner was afforded her right to move for the reconsideration of the MTCC decision denying the demurrer to the charge of use of falsified documents. When the trial proceeded before the MTCC, the court allowed the petitioner to present Erwin Lou Calungcagin to whom respondent purportedly sold the subject vehicle. Indubitably, there is no denial of due process that warrants the filing of a Rule 65 petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 31, 2016 Decision and the October 26, 2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals-Cebu City in CA-G.R. SP No. 09291 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Caguioa, and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., on official leave.
Santidad v. People, GR. 222046
FACTS: The cases emanated from an Affidavit-Complaint5 dated February 2, 2007 filed by Special Investigator Claro C. Ramos of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Isabela District Office, before the OMB charging Santidad and several others, who had signed the Invoice Receipts for Property (IRPs), in relation to the transfer and receipt of twenty-one (21) units of Mitsubishi Delica vans, in violation of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act No. 3019. After evaluation of the complaint, it was determined that Santidad and the other named respondents therein may also be held administratively liable for their actions and, thus, an administrative complaint for Dishonesty and Gross Neglect of Duty was later filed against them by the NBI before the OMB which was docketed as OMB-L-A-07-0166-B.
Upon a finding of probable cause, Santidad was indicted for twenty one (21) counts of Falsification of Public Documents defined and penalized under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, in twenty-one (21) separate Informations filed before the Sandiganbayan. The accusatory portion of each of the Informations is similarly worded except as to the Engine Number, Chassis Number and Plate Number of the Mitsubishi Delica vans involved, to wit:
That on 29 March 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Mandaluyong City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Venancio G. Santidad, a public officer, being then the Director of the Procurement Supply and Property Management Service of the Department of Transportation and Communications, acting in relation to his office and taking advantage of his official position, did there and then deliberately, willfully and feloniously falsify the Invoice Receipt of Property by making it appear that he had transferred to Congressman Antonio Abaya of the 4th District of lsabela a Delica Van with Engine No. x x x, Chassis No. x x x and Plate No. x x x, when in truth and in fact, no such vehicle was transferred by him, to the damage and prejudice of public interest.
HELD:
The Court, however, finds Santidad’s conviction for twenty-one (21) counts of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Falsification of Public Documents to be improper. Falsification of Public Documents is an intentional felony committed by means of “dolo” or “malice” and could not result from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo), but likewise by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit when the wrongful act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. “In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence [quasi offenses], what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible.
In Jabalde v. People,37 the Court explained:
The term “dolo” or “malice” is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and intent. The element of intent is described as the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds. On the other hand, the term “felonious” means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose. With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act.38 (Citation omitted)
Intentional felony requires the existence of **dolus **malus - that the act or omission be done willfully, maliciously, with deliberate evil intent, and with malice aforethought. In culpable felonies or criminal negligence, the injury inflicted on another is unintentional, the wrong done being simply the result of an act performed without malice or criminal design.
A careful perusal of the provision of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes falsification of public documents, would readily reveal that the perpetrator must perform the prohibited act with deliberate intent in order to incur criminal liability thereunder, thus:
Article 171. Falsification by Public Officer, Employee or Notary or Ecclesiastical Minister. The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
- Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;
2 Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
- Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;
- Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
- Altering true dates;
6.Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;
7.Issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or
- Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book. (Italics supplied)
The crime of Falsification of Public Documents has the following elements: 1) the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; 2) he takes advantage of his official position; and 3) he falsifies a document by committing any of the acts enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. To warrant conviction for Falsification of Public Documents by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt the following elements: 1) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; 2) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and 3) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.
In Falsification of Public Documents, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position in making the falsification when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or, otherwise, to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies. By “legal obligation,” it means that there is a law requiring the disclosure of the truth of the facts narrated. In falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the falsification of a public document, what is punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.
Measured against the foregoing parameters, it is clear that the crime of Falsification of Public Documents, by its structure, could not be committed by means of culpa. Not to be overlooked is that this felony falls under the category of mala in se offenses that requires the attendance of criminal intent. A deliberate intent to do an untawful act is inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed by means of culpa. Being an intentional crime, Falsification of Public Documents is conceptually incompatible with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes. In fine, the crime of Falsification of Public Documents could not be committed by means of reckless imprudence.
Neither can Santidad be held criminally culpable for Falsification of Public Documents by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts (Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code) inasmuch as the records do not show that the prosecution was able to prove the existence of malicious intent when he affixed his signature on the IRPs certifying the transfer of the subject Mitsubishi Delica vans to Cong. Abaya of the 4th District of Isabela. To be criminally liable for falsification by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, the person making the narration of facts must be aware of the falsity of the facts narrated by him.45 Here, there is dearth of evidence to show that Santidad knew that there were no deliveries of vans to the recipients at the time he signed the IRPs. No matter how gross the nature and gravity of the imprudence or negligence attributable to Santidad, the same would not shatter the fine distinction between dolo and culpa so as to consider Santidad’s act as one committed with malicious intent.
In the light of the foregoing, the Court resolves to set aside the Sandiganbayan’s judgment of conviction against Santidad for twenty-one (21) counts of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Falsification of Public Documents.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 207154, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The May 29, 2012 Decision and the April 29, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 119936 are hereby SET ASIDE. A new one is ENTERED finding Venancio G. Santidad GUILTY of GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY. Accordingly, he is DISMISSED from government service with all the accessory penalties.
In G.R. No. 222046, the petition is GRANTED. The September 24, 2015 Decision and the November 25, 2015 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. SB-10-CRM-0261 to SB-10-CRM-0281 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 221857. August 16, 2017 ]
JESUS O. TYPOCO, JR., PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1] dated October 15, 2015, and Resolution[2] dated December 8, 2015 of the Sandiganbayan (SB) in SB-11-CRM-0159 finding petitioners Jesus O. Typoco, Jr. (Typoco) and Noel D. Reyes (Reyes) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Falsification of Public Document defined and penalized under Article 171, paragraphs (5) and (6) of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS: Petitioners and their co-accused Aida B. Pandeagua (Pandeagua) and Angelina H. Cabrera (Cabrera) were charged with Falsification of Public Documents defined and penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners were found guilty as charged, but their co-accused Pandeagua and Cabrera were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. Also, the petitioners and the aforementioned accused, together with Arnulfo G. Salagoste (Salagoste), were charged with Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, but all the accused were acquitted of the charge.[3]
The instant petitions review the conviction of the petitioners of the crime of falsification, hence, the discussion will merely focus on the charge of falsification. The accusatory portion of the Amended Information for falsification states:
That on or about 21 April 2005, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Camarines Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Jesus O. Typoco, Jr., Salary Grade 30; Noel D. Reyes, Salary Grade 22; and Aida B. Pandeagua, Salary Grade 9, holding the position of Governor, OIC-General Service Office, and Buyer II, respectively, all public officers, taking advantage of their public positions, acting together, conspiring and confederating with one another and with one Angelina H. Cabrera, owner of Cabrera’s Drugstore and Medical Supply, did then and there falsify Purchase Order No. 0628 involving the purchase of various medicine by the Provincial Government by changing its original date from April 21, 2005 to May 20, 2005 in order to conceal that an order has been (sic) made with Cabrera’s Drugstore and Medical Supply prior to the bidding conducted on May 18, 2005 to the damage and prejudice of the Provincial Government.
ISSUES: Issues raised before the Court on whether the prosecution’s evidence proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, whether the presumption of innocence was properly accorded the accused, whether there was sufficient evidence to support a charge of conspiracy, or whether the defense of good faith was correctly appreciated, are all, in varying degrees, questions of fact. As a rule, the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive on this Court, subject to limited exceptions.
HELD: We find none of these exceptions in the present case.
Petitioners were charged with the crime of falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of falsification by a public officer or employee or notary public as defined in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code are that: (1) the offender is a public officer or employee or notary public; (2) the offender takes advantage of his official position; and (3) he or she falsifies a document by committing any of the acts mentioned in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
The first element is indisputably present in this case. Petitioners were public officers being the Governor and Officer-in-Charge of the General Services Office of the Province of Camarines Norte at the time of the commission of the offense.
As to the second element, the offender takes advantage of his official position in falsifying a document when (1) he has the duty to make or to prepare, or otherwise to intervene, in the preparation of the document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.[49] In the case at bar, petitioners took advantage of their respective official positions because they had the duty to make or prepare or otherwise intervene, in the preparation of the subject PO. Accused Pandeagua prepared the subject PO and petitioner Reyes was the one who issued the same. Upon order of petitioner Reyes, the date in the subject PO was changed by accused Pandeagua, and petitioner Typoco approved the subject PO.
As to the third element, the Sandiganbayan found petitioners guilty of the offense of falsification of public document defined and penalized under paragraphs (5) and (6), Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, which pertinently state:
Article 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. - The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
x x x x
- Altering true dates;
- Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;
x x x
The act of “altering true dates” requires that: (a) the date mentioned in the document is essential; and (b) the alteration of the date in a document must affect either the veracity of the document or the effects thereof.[50]
On the other hand, “making alteration or intercalation in a genuine document” requires a showing that: (a) there be an alteration (change) or intercalation (insertion) on a document; (b) it was made on a genuine document; (c) the alteration or intercalation has changed the meaning of the document; and (d) the change made the document speak something false.[51]
In the case at bar, the original date of the PO is essential because it affects not only the veracity or effect thereof but also determinative of the time when it was prepared and approved so that the change or alteration made the document speak something false. We quote herein the ratiocination of the Sandiganbayan:
In this regard, the Court takes note that accused Aida Pandeagua admitted that she was the public officer who prepared Purchase Request (PR) No. 0628 and PO No. 0628 on April 21, 2005, and Disbursement Voucher (DV) No. 101-04-04-2398 on April 26, 2005; that at the time she prepared said documents, she did not find anything irregular or mistake in the respective dates that she had typewritten therein until her superior in the GSO, accused Noel Reyes, instructed her to change the original date of the subject PO from “4/21/05” to “5/20/05” when it was returned to their office on May 23, 2005; and that at the time she prepared the subject PO on April 21, 2005, there was yet no bidding for the said purchase of medicines.
**Undoubtedly, this alteration or change in the original date of the subject PO constitutes falsification of official document because it affected not only its veracity but it also changed the time when it was prepared and approved to make the document speak something false, i.e., that said PO was approved on “5-20-05” by accused Jesus O. Typoco, Jr. in favor of Cabrera Drugstore and Medical Supplies and after a public bidding was conducted on May 18, 2005, when in truth and fact the PO in question was already approved on April 21, 2005 without any public bidding. **Hence, the crime of falsification of document by a public official under paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code has been sufficiently established to sustain a verdict of conviction.[52]
It was sufficiently shown from the evidence adduced that PO No. 0628 was actually prepared on April 21,2005 prior to the conduct of public bidding, and that petitioner Reyes gave the directive to change the original date in the subject PO only on May 23, 2005, after the conduct of public bidding. Hence, the changing of the date in the subject PO from April 21, 2005[53] to May 20, 2005[54] was not a mere correction but an act of falsification to make it appear that a bidding was conducted prior to ordering the medicines from CDMS.
Moreover, conspiracy among the petitioners exists despite the acquittal of accused Pandeagua and Cabrera. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to commit a felony. A conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. The crime depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. As long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not remove the basis of a charge of conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.[55]
The Sandiganbayan correctly found that there was conspiracy between petitioners as shown in their respective participations in the alteration of the date on the PO in question. It found that it was petitioner Reyes who instructed accused Pandeagua to alter or change the date “4/20/05” in the PO with “5/20/05” to make it appear that it was on May 20, 2005 that the procurement covered by the PO was approved by petitioner Typoco after the conduct of a public bidding on May 18, 2005. After the bidding, petitioner Typoco immediately issued the Notice of Award to CDMS, then a Contract for the procurement of medicines was executed by and between the Province of Camarines Norte and CDMS. The Sandiganbayan opined that the respective acts of petitioners - Reyes directing the alteration of the date on the PO to make it appear that the PO was approved after the bidding was conducted on May 18, 2005, and Typoco in entering into a contract with CDMS knowing fully well that the procurement of medicines had already been done before the bidding - are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.
The Sandiganabayan, however, acquitted accused Pandeagua and Cabrera. It held that accused Pandeagua considering that she made the alteration in obedience to the instruction of her superior (petitioner Reyes), had nothing to do with the procurement in question except in the preparation of the procurement documents, her duties and responsibilities being clerical in nature. In the judicial affidavit of accused Pandeagua, she stated - “I merely prepared or typed the said documents according to the specific instructions of my superiors.”[56]
Likewise, accused Cabrera, the owner of CDMS, was acquitted upon the testimony of accused Pandeagua that when she made the alteration on May 23, 2005, accused Cabrera had already signed the unaltered PO on April 21, 2005. Accused Cabrera had no knowledge or concurred in the act of alteration there being no showing that she had access to or custody of the procurement documents.
Conspiracy need not be shown by direct proof of an agreement of the parties to commit the crime, as it can be inferred from the acts of the accused which clearly manifest a concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime.[57] An accepted badge of conspiracy is when the accused by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part of and another performing another so as to complete it with a view to the attainment of the same object, and their acts although apparently independent were, in fact, concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.[58]
As correctly argued by the Office of the Ombudsman through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, the chronological timeline of the preparation, approval and issuance of the procurement documents simply point to a concurrence of sentiments and a perfect blending of conspiratorial act to achieve a common purpose. Hence, the unity of criminal design and execution was very patent.
In addition, petitioners argue that damage to the government should have been proven considering that this was alleged in the Information. We do not agree. In falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the falsification of a public document, what is punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.[59]
The law is clear that wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a third person is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of public document. It is jurisprudentially settled that in the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officers or private persons, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. In falsification of public documents, therefore, the controlling consideration is the public character of a document; and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial.[60]
Furthermore, both petitioners claim that the alteration was made only to reflect the truth. Obviously, such is a not the case as revealed by the other documents/exhibits of the prosecution. The subject PO was not the only one falsified; the Acceptance and Inspection Report and Sales Invoice were likewise tampered:
The date of inspection as stated in the Inspection and Acceptance Report was changed from “4-28-05” to “5-23-05”. In the same document, the date of acceptance was also tampered and changed from “5-20-05” to “5-23-05”. As in fact, there appears a note on the face of the disbursement voucher which reads: “Note: Supporting paper #15 inspection report inspected 5/20/05”.
The date of the Sales Invoice was changed from “4-28-05” to “5-23-05”. The original date is the same as the original date of inspection. The new date appearing on the document is now “5-28-2005” which also means that the supplies were delivered on “5-28-2005”. This alteration makes the new inspection date “5-23-05” questionable as it would be impossible to inspect the medicines on “5-23-05” if the delivery had been made on “5-28-2005”.
This Court’s observation was properly discussed by the Office of the Ombudsman in its comment to the petitions, thus:
For his part, petitioner Reyes claims that he ordered the alteration of the date in the purchase order “to reflect the truth.” Aside from this bare allegation, however, Reyes has not presented any feasible explanation for all the other alterations and irregularities attending the documents supporting the transaction. For one, he has not explained why the disbursement voucher in the name of Cabrera Drugstores and Medical Supplies was also dated 26 April 2005, when the bidding was allegedly conducted on 18 May 2005. For another, he has not explained why the dates in the inspection and acceptance report and the sales invoice also had to be altered, if the original date indicated in the purchase order was a mistake. On the contrary, the dates in all the documents submitted by the local government of Camarines Norte to the COA clearly show that the order and delivery of machines transpired before the alleged conduct of bidding. It becomes utterly obvious that the alteration made on the purchase order and the other documents was for the sole purpose of making it appear that the order and delivery of medicines were done after the alleged bidding on 18 May 2005. The truth, however, is that an order had been placed as early as 21 April 2005, without the requisite public bidding.[61]
Petitioner Typoco invokes the Arias doctrine which states that “all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations.”[62]
The factual circumstances which led to the Court’s ruling in Arias were such that there was nothing else in the documents presented before the head of office therein that would have required the detailed examination of each paper or document, viz.:
We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records, inspected documents, received procedures, and questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly-sized office could personally do all these things in all vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would be asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. If a department secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected to call the restaurant about the amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was.present at the luncheon, inquire whether the correct amount of food was served, and otherwise personally look into the reimbursement voucher’s accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be some added reason why he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed. x x x[63] (Emphasis supplied)
Simply put, when a matter is irregular on the document’s face, so much so that a detailed examination becomes warranted, the Arias doctrine is unavailing.[64] Petitioner Typoco, therefore cannot rely on the Arias doctrine because the falsification of the documents in it was not apparent. As discussed above, aside from the alteration in the subject PO, the other documents were also obviously tampered which could have not escaped his attention.
Petitioner Typoco’s defense that he relied on his subordinates does not find support in the circumstances surrounding his actions. As Governor and concurrent Chairman of the BAC, he was the approving authority in the transaction with CDMS. As such, he was expected to exercise due diligence in the performance of his duties.
We need to stress that the COA Annual Audit Report on the Province of Camarines Norte for the Year ended December 31, 2005 (Exhibit “C”) revealed that: (a) there was no attached list of individual recipients to the voucher; (b) the date of inspection was changed; and (c) Sales Invoice No. 4325 and the subject PO were undated/apparently changed.[65]
Further, in the Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2006-005 dated April 18, 2006 addressed to petitioner Typoco, the following audit observations were made: (a) there are alterations in the Purchase Order and Purchase Request; (b) the dates of Delivery Receipt and Acceptance in the Sales Invoice were tampered vis-a-vis in the Inspection and Acceptance Report; and (c) the list of individual recipients of the drugs and medicines were not submitted.[66]
Thus, the irregularities are very apparent on the face of the documents. Had petitioner Typoco exercised the due diligence expected of him, he would have easily noticed the irregularities on the documents. As held in Cesa v. Office of the Ombudsman,[67] when there are facts that point to an irregularity and the officer failed to take steps to rectify it, even tolerating it, the Arias doctrine is inapplicable.[68]
To clarify, the Arias doctrine is not an absolute rule. It is not a magic cloak that can be used as a cover by a public officer to conceal himself in the shadows of his subordinates and necessarily escape liability. Thus, this ruling cannot be applied to exculpate petitioner Typoco in view of the peculiar circumstances in this case which should have prompted him, as head of office, to exercise a higher degree of circumspection and, necessarily, go beyond what his subordinates had prepared.[69]
In the case of LihayLihay v. People,[70] We ruled that:
In this relation, it must be clarified that the ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan (Arias) cannot be applied to exculpate petitioners in view of the peculiar circumstances in this case which should have prompted them to exercise a higher degree of circumspection, and consequently, go beyond what their subordinates had prepared. In particular, the tampered dates on some of the RIVs, the incomplete certification by GSC SAO Mateo on the date of receipt of the CCIE items, the missing details on the Reports of Public Property Purchased and the fact that sixteen checks all dated January 15, 1992 were payable to PNP SSS should have aroused a reasonable sense of suspicion or curiosity on their part if only to determine that they were not approving a fraudulent transaction. x x x[71]
As held in the case of Bacasmas v. Sandiganbayan, et al.[72] when there are reasons for the heads of offices to further examine the documents in question, they cannot seek refuge by invoking the Arias doctrine:
Petitioners cannot hide behind our declaration in Arias v. Sandiganbayan charge just because they did not personally examine every single detail before they, as the final approving authorities, affixed their signatures to certain documents. The Court explained in that case that conspiracy was not adequately proven, contrary to the case at bar in which petitioners’ unity of purpose and unity in the execution of an unlawful objective were sufficiently established. Also, unlike in Arias, where there were no reasons for the heads of offices to further examine each voucher in detail, petitioners herein, by virtue of the duty given to them by law as well as by rules and regulations, had the responsibility to examine each voucher to ascertain whether it was proper to sign it in order to approve and disburse the cash advance.
The case of Cruz v. Sandiganbayan[73] carved out an exception to the Arias doctrine, stating that:
Unlike in Arias, however, there exists in the present case an exceptional circumstance which should have prodded petitioner, if he were out to protect the interest of the municipality he swore to serve, to be curious and go beyond what his subordinates prepared or recommended. In fine, the added reason contemplated in Arias which would have put petitioner on his guard and examine the check/s and vouchers with some degree of circumspection before signing the same was obtaining in this case.
Lastly, in criminal cases, to justify a conviction, the culpability of the accused must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, as the accused enjoys a constitutionally enshrined disputable presumption of innocence. The court, in ascertaining the guilt of the accused, must, after having marshalled the facts and circumstances, reach a moral certainty as to the accused’s guilt. Moral certainty is that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Otherwise, where there is reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted.[74]
In this case, the Court is convinced that the guilt of the petitioners was proven beyond reasonable doubt and that the Sandiganbayan did not err in its findings and conclusion. The totality of the facts and circumstances demonstrates that they committed the crime of falsification by a public officer under Article 171, paragraphs 5 and 6, of the Revised Penal Code. The moral certainty required in criminal cases has been satisfied.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 15, 2015 and Resolution dated December 8, 2015 of the Sandiganbayan in SB-11-CRM-0159 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
