Assignment for Feb. 28 STATcoMI Flashcards
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 141658. March 18, 2005 ]
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PETITIONER, VS. THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC., AND THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC., RESPONDENTS.
Tax laws DOCTRINE: The rule that tax exemptions should be construed strictly against the taxpayer presupposes that the taxpayer is clearly subject to the tax being levied against him. Unless a statute imposes a tax clearly, expressly and unambiguously, what applies is the equally well-settled rule that the imposition of a tax cannot be presumed. Where there is doubt, tax laws must be construed strictly against the government and in favor of the taxpayer. This is because taxes are burdens on the taxpayer, and should not be unduly imposed or presumed beyond what the statutes expressly and clearly import.
FACTS:Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the Decision[2] of 7 January 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36816. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision[3] of 5 January 1995 of the Court of Tax Appeals (“CTA”) in CTA Cases Nos. 2514, 2515 and 2516. The CTA ordered the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (“petitioner”) to refund a total of P29,575.02 to respondent companies (“respondents”).
ISSUE: WHETHER RESPONDENT INSURANCE COMPANIES ARE SUBJECT TO THE 3% PERCENTAGE TAX AS LENDING INVESTORS UNDER SECTIONS 182(A)(3)(DD) AND 195-A, RESPECTIVELY IN RELATION TO SECTION 194(U), ALL OF THE NIRC.[10]
HELD: We agree with the CTA and Court of Appeals that it does not. Insurance companies cannot be considered lending investors under CA 466, as amended.
Definition of Lending
Investors under CA 466 Does
Not Include Insurance
Companies.
The definition in Section 194(u) of CA 466 is not broad enough to include the business of insurance companies. The Insurance Code of 1978 is very clear on what constitutes an insurance company. It provides that an insurer or insurance company “shall include all individuals, partnerships, associations or corporations xxx engaged as principals in the insurance business, excepting mutual benefit associations.
More specifically, respondents fall under the category of insurance corporations as defined in Section 185 of the Insurance Code, thus:
SECTION 185. Corporations formed or organized to save any person or persons or other corporations harmless from loss, damage, or liability arising from any unknown or future or contingent event, or to indemnify or to compensate any person or persons or other corporations for any such loss, damage, or liability, or to guarantee the performance of or compliance with contractual obligations or the payment of debts of others shall be known as “insurance corporations.”
Plainly, insurance companies and lending investors are different enterprises in the eyes of the law. Lending investors cannot, for a consideration, hold anyone harmless from loss, damage or liability, nor provide compensation or indemnity for loss. The underwriting of risks is the prerogative of insurers, the great majority of which are incorporated insurance companies[23] like respondents.
G.R. No. 133834 August 28, 2006
COMPAGNIE FINANCIERE SUCRES ET DENREES, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
Tax exemption Doctrine: Along with police power and eminent domain, taxation is one of the three basic and necessary attributes of sovereignty. Thus, the State cannot be deprived of this most essential power and attribute of sovereignty by vague implications of law. Rather, being derogatory of sovereignty, the governing principle is that tax exemptions are to be construed in strictissimi juris (the strictest right or law) against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority; and he who claims an exemption must be able to justify his claim by the clearest grant of statute.
FACTS: For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 39501.
Compagnie Financiere Sucres et Denrees, petitioner, is a non-resident private corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of France.
On October 21, 1991, petitioner transferred its eight percent (8%) equity interest in the Makati Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Incorporated to Kerry Holdings Ltd. (formerly Sligo Holdings Ltd), as shown by a Deed of Sale and Assignment of Subscription and Right of Subscription of the same date. Transferred were (a) 107,929 issued shares of stock valued at P100.00 per share with a total par value of P10,792,900.00; (b) 152,031 with a par value of P100.00 per share with a total par value of P15,203,100.00; (c) deposits on stock subscriptions amounting to P43,147,630.28; and (d) petitioner’s right of subscription.
On November 29, 1991, petitioner paid the documentary stamps tax and capital gains tax on the transfer under protest.
On October 21, 1993, petitioner filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, herein respondent, a claim for refund of overpaid capital gains tax in the amount of P107,869.00 and overpaid documentary stamps taxes in the sum of P951,830.00 or a total of P1,059,699.00. Petitioner alleged that the transfer of deposits on stock subscriptions is not a sale/assignment of shares of stock subject to documentary stamps tax and capital gains tax.
However, respondent did not act on petitioner’s claim for refund. Thus, on November 19, 1993, petitioner filed with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) a petition for review, docketed as CTA Case No. 5042.
In its Decision2 dated October 6, 1995, the CTA denied petitioner’s claim for refund. The CTA held that it is clear from Section 176 of the Tax Code that sales “to secure the future payment of money or for the future transfer of any bond, due-bill, certificates of obligation or stock” are taxable. Furthermore, petitioner admitted that it profited from the sale of shares of stocks. Such profit is subject to capital gains tax.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but in a Resolution dated December 26, 1995, the CTA denied the same. This prompted petitioner to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 39501.
On October 27, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied the petition and affirmed the Decision of the CTA. The appellate court ruled that a taxpayer has the onus probandi of proving entitlement to a refund or deduction, following the rule that tax exemptions are strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the State. Petitioner failed to meet the requisite burden of proof to support its claim.
ISSUE: The sole issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the assignment of deposits on stock subscriptions is subject to documentary stamps tax and capital gains tax.
HELD: In the instant case, petitioner seeks a refund. Tax refunds are a derogation of the State’s taxing power. Hence, like tax exemptions, they are construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the State. Consequently, he who claims a refund or exemption from taxes has the burden of justifying the exemption by words too plain to be mistaken and too categorical to be misinterpreted.5 Significantly, petitioner cannot point to any specific provision of the National Internal Revenue Code authorizing its claim for an exemption or refund. Rather, Section 176 of the National Internal Revenue Code applicable to the issue provides that the future transfer of shares of stocks is subject to documentary stamp tax, thus:
SEC. 176. Stamp tax on sales, agreements to sell, memoranda of sales, deliveries or transfer of due-bills, certificates of obligation, or shares or certificates of stock. – On all sales, or agreements to sell, or memoranda of sales, or deliveries, or transfer of due-bills, certificates of obligation, or shares or certificates of stock in any association, company, or corporation, or transfer of such securities by assignment in blank, or by delivery, or by any paper or agreement, or memorandum or other evidences of transfer or sale whether entitling the holder in any manner to the benefit of such due bills, certificates of obligation or stock, or to secure the future payment of money, or for the future transfer of any due-bill, certificates of obligation or stock, there shall be collected a documentary stamp tax of fifty centavos (P1.50) on each two hundred pesos(P200.00), or fractional part thereof, of the par value of such due-bill, certificates of obligation or stock: Provided, That only one tax shall be collected on each sale or transfer of stock or securities from one person to another, regardless of whether or not a certificate of stock or obligation is issued, indorsed, or delivered in pursuance of such sale or transfer; and Provided, further, That in case of stock without par value the amount of the documentary stamp tax herein prescribed shall be equivalent to twenty-five percentum (25%) of the documentary stamp tax paid upon the original issue of the said stock. (Emphasis supplied).
Clearly, under the above provision, sales to secure “the future transfer of due-bills, certificates of obligation or certificates of stock” are liable for documentary stamp tax. No exemption from such payment of documentary stamp tax is specified therein.
Petitioner contends that the assignment of its “deposits on stock subscription” is not subject to capital gains tax because there is no gain to speak of. In the Capital Gains Tax Return on Stock Transaction, which petitioner filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the acquisition cost of the shares it sold, including the stock subscription is P69,143,630.28. The transfer price to Kerry Holdings, Ltd. is P70,332,869.92. Obviously, petitioner has a net gain in the amount of P1,189,239.64. As the CTA aptly ruled, “ a tax on the profit of sale on net capital gain is the very essence of the net capital gains tax law. To hold otherwise will ineluctably deprive the government of its due and unduly set free from tax liability persons who profited from said transactions.”
Verily, the Court of Appeals committed no error in affirming the CTA Decision.
We reiterate the well-established doctrine that as a matter of practice and principle, this Court will not set aside the conclusion reached by an agency, like the CTA, especially if affirmed by the Court of Appeals. By the very nature of its function, it has dedicated itself to the study and consideration of tax problems and has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject, unless there has been an abuse or improvident exercise of authority on its part, which is not present here.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39501 is AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
G.R. Nos. 92981-83 January 9, 1992
INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR and ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION (ALU), respondents.
E.B. Ramos & Associates for petitioner.
Celso C. Reales for private respondent.
Social Legislation Doctrine: Moreover, the rule is that all doubts in the interpretation and implementation of labor laws should be resolved in favor of labor. In upholding the assailed orders of the Secretary, the Court is only giving meaning to this rule. The Court should help labor authorities provide workers immediate access to their rights and benefits, without being hampered by arbitration or litigation processes that prove to be not only nerve-wracking, but financially burdensome in the long run. 13 Administrative rules of procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote their object and assist the parties, especially the workingman, in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses. By virtue of the assailed orders. The Union and its members are relieved of the burden of litigating their interrelated cases in different tribunals.
FACTS: Prior to the expiration on January 1, 1989 of the collective bargaining agreement between petitioner International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (hereafter, Company) and the Associated Labor Union (Union, for brevity), the latter submitted to the Company its economic and political demands. These were not met by the Company, hence a deadlock ensued.
On June 27, 1989, the Union filed a notice of strike with Regional Office No. VII of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board, Department of Labor and Employment, which was docketed as NCMB-RBVII-NS-06-050-89. After all conciliation efforts had failed, the Union went on strike on August 8, 1989 and the Company’s operations were completely paralyzed.
Meanwhile, considering that the Company belongs to an industry indispensable to national interest, it being engaged in the manufacture of drugs and pharmaceuticals and employing around 600 workers, then Acting Secretary of Labor, Ricardo C. Castro, invoking Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, issued an order dated September 26, 1989 assuming jurisdiction over the aforesaid case docketed as NCMB-RBVII-NS-06-050-89 and directing the parties to return to the status quo before the work stoppage.
ISSUE: whether or not the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment has the power to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute and its incidental controversies, including unfair labor practice cases, causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest.
HELD: The foregoing provisions persuade us that the Secretary did not gravely abuse his discretion when he issued the questioned orders.
As early as 1913, this Court laid down in Herrera vs. Baretto, et al., 7 the fundamental normative rule that jurisdiction is the authority to bear and determine a cause — the right to act in a case. However, this should be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a case at all and not the decision rendered therein is what makes up jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction. 8
In the present case, the Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same accordingly. Necessarily, this authority to assume jurisdiction over the said labor dispute must include and extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases over which the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.
Moreover, Article 217 of the Labor Code is not without, but contemplates, exceptions thereto. This is evident from the opening proviso therein reading “(e)xcept as otherwise provided under this Code . . .” Plainly, Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code was meant to make both the Secretary (or the various regional directors) and the labor arbiters share jurisdiction, subject to certain conditions. 9 Otherwise, the Secretary would not be able to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute. To hold the contrary may even lead to the absurd and undesirable result wherein the Secretary and the labor arbiter concerned may have diametrically opposed rulings. As we have said, “(i)t is fundamental that a statute is to be read in a manner that would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it.” 10
In fine, the issuance of the assailed orders is within the province of the Secretary as authorized by Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code and Article 217 (a) (1) and (5) of the same Code, taken conjointly and rationally construed to subserve the objective of the jurisdiction vested in the Secretary.
Our pronouncement on this point should be distinguished from the situation which obtained and our consequent ruling in Servando’s, Inc. vs. The Secretary of Labor and Employment, et al. 11 wherein we referred to the appropriate labor arbiter a case previously decided by the Secretary. The said case was declared to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter since the aggregate claims of each of the employees involved exceeded P5,000.00. In Servando, the Secretary invoked his visitorial and enforcement powers to assume jurisdiction over the case, the exclusive and original jurisdiction of which belongs to the labor arbiter. We said that to uphold the Secretary would empower him, under his visitorial powers, to hear and decide an employee’s claim of more than P5,000.00. We held that he could not do that and we, therefore, overruled him.
In the present case, however, by virtue of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, the Secretary has been conferred jurisdiction over cases which would otherwise be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of labor arbiters. There was an existing labor dispute as a result of a deadlock in the negotiation for a collective bargaining agreement and the consequent strike, over which the Secretary assumed jurisdiction pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code. The three NLRC cases were just offshoots of the stalemate in the negotiations and the strike. We, therefore, uphold the Secretary’s order to consolidate the NLRC cases with the labor dispute pending before him and his subsequent assumption of jurisdiction over the said NLRC cases for him to be able to competently and efficiently dispose of the dispute in its totality.
Petitioner’s thesis that Section 6, Rule V of the Revised Rules of the NLRC is null and void has no merit. The aforesaid rule has been promulgated to implement and enforce Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code. The rule is in harmony with the objectives sought to be achieved by Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, particularly the Secretary’s assumption of jurisdiction over a labor dispute and his subsequent disposition of the same in the most expeditious and conscientious manner. To be able to completely dispose of a labor dispute, all its incidents would have to be taken into consideration. Clearly, the purpose of the questioned regulation is to carry into effect the broad provisions of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code.
By and large, Section 6, Rule V of the Revised Rules of the NLRC is germane to the objects and purposes of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, and it is not in contradiction with but conforms to the standards the latter requires. Thus, we hold that the terms of the questioned regulation are within the statutory power of the Secretary to promulgate as a necessary implementing rule or regulation for the enforcement and administration of the Labor Code, in accordance with Article 5 of the same Code.
Besides, to uphold petitioner Company’s arguments that the NLRC cases are alien and totally separate and distinct from the deadlock in the negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement is to sanction split jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice. 12
Moreover, the rule is that all doubts in the interpretation and implementation of labor laws should be resolved in favor of labor. In upholding the assailed orders of the Secretary, the Court is only giving meaning to this rule. The Court should help labor authorities provide workers immediate access to their rights and benefits, without being hampered by arbitration or litigation processes that prove to be not only nerve-wracking, but financially burdensome in the long run. 13 Administrative rules of procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote their object and assist the parties, especially the workingman, in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses. By virtue of the assailed orders. The Union and its members are relieved of the burden of litigating their interrelated cases in different tribunals.
WHEREFORE. there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the petition at bar is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Nocon, J., took no part.
Procedural Rules
Office of the Court Administrator v. Garong, A.M. No. P99-1311, 15 August 2001
DOCTRINE (Procedural): The Court emphasized the importance of strict compliance with procedural rules but also recognized that procedural rules should serve the demands of substantial justice.
If a stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter. Pursuant to this, Rule 1, Section 6,19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that:
SEC. 6. Construction. -These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. (Emphasis ours)
FACTS: Respondent Alberto V. Garong, Court Interpreter III of the Regional Trial Court of Calapan City, Mindoro, Branch 40, was charged with frustrated homicide before Branch 39 of the same court, in Criminal Case No. C-3406. On March 3, 1993, then Presiding Judge Marciano T. Virola rendered judgment finding respondent guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide and sentencing him to imprisonment of four (4) months of Arresto Mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of Prision Corrrecional, as maximum, together with accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs.1
The judgment of the trial court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in a Decision promulgated on August 9, 1996,2 and the same became final on November 15, 1996, for which Entry of Judgment was accordingly made.3
On May 24, 1999, Judge Tomas C. Leynes, Executive Judge and Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40 wrote a letter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) stating that he had issued the corresponding warrant of arrest to execute the aforesaid final Decision against respondent Garong. However, the latter remained at large, had not yet been terminated from the service and continued to receive his salaries and other fringe benefits as Court Interpreter III despite the accessory penalty imposed on him.4 Hence, in the interest of the service, Judge Leynes requested that respondent Garong be terminated from the service and that his position of Court Interpreter III be declared vacant.
On June 1, 1999, the OCA filed a formal Administrative Complaint against respondent praying for his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and leave credits, and with prejudice to his re-employment in any government agency or government owned and controlled corporation.5
Upon evaluation, the OCA recommended that the administrative complaint be treated as an administrative matter; that the findings of the lower court as affirmed by the appellate court be adopted in lieu of an investigation; that respondent Garong be dismissed from the service by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude with forfeiture of all benefits and leave credits with prejudice to his re-employment in any government agency or government-owned or controlled corporation; and that thereafter his position be declared vacant.
This Court, in a Resolution dated July 5, 1999, noted the administrative complaint and docketed the same as Administrative Matter No. P-99-1311.
On September 23, 1999, respondent filed a Manifestation With Motion To Dismiss, praying that the Court’s Resolution dated July 5, 1999 be recalled and the administrative case be dismissed for lack of cause of action averring, among others, that as early as March 5, 1999, he had already been contesting the validity and due execution of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated February 24, 1999, which directed the Entry of Judgment in the criminal case against him, namely, CA-G.R. CR No. 14852. While this was pending, an Order of Execution of Judgment6 and Warrant of Arrest dated March 4, 19997 were surreptitiously issued by Acting Presiding Judge Tomas C. Leynes of Branch 39, RTC of Calapan City in Criminal Case No. C-3406. To forestall the execution of the warrant, respondent alleged that he filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Warrant of Arrest.8
ISSUE: Whether or not the administrative complaint against Garong should be dismissed for lack of cause of action.
HELD: We find the foregoing legal dissertation of the Court of Appeals to be well taken.
Rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. Strict compliance with such rules is mandatory and imperative.18 Nevertheless, procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter. Pursuant to this, Rule 1, Section 6,19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that:
SEC. 6. Construction. -These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. (Emphasis ours)
The liberal construction of the rules with regard to motions for reconsideration is set forth in the case of Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,20 where this Court made the following pointed statements, viz:
Admittedly, the filing of respondents-spouses’ motion for reconsideration did not stop the period of appeal because xxx the reglementary period within which respondents-spouses should have appealed expired on 23 November 1989.
But where a rigid application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, then the rule may be relaxed especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein. Technicalities may thus be disregarded in order to resolve the case. After all, no party can even claim a vested right in technicalities. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities.
In the case of Paz Reyes Aguam v. Court of Appeals, et al.,21 this Court repeated what has been consistently adhered to in a litany of cases that with regard to the disposition of appeals filed with the appellate court:
The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court’s primary duty is to render or dispense justice. “A litigation is not a game of technicalities.” “Law suits unlike duels are not to be won by a rapier’s thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts.” Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not miscarriage of justice. (Emphasis and italics ours; citations omitted)
In this case, respondent’s life and liberty is at stake. The trial court sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) months of Arresto Mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of Prision Correccional, as maximum, together with the accessory penalties provided by law plus costs, not to mention the social stigma of being branded a convicted criminal for life. It is but just, therefore, that respondent be given every opportunity to defend himself and to pursue his appeal. To do otherwise would be tantamount to a grave injustice. A relaxation of the rules considering the particular circumstance prevailing in this case is justified.22 Where personal liberty is involved, a democratic society employs a different arithmetic and insists that it is less important to reach an unshakable decision than to do justice.23
Considering that this Court cannot be divested of its supervisory power to discipline errant members of the Judiciary, as well as those employed therein, the administrative proceedings should be held in abeyance pending the final outcome of the appeal in the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the proceedings in the administrative complaint against respondent is hereby HELD IN ABEYANCE pending the final outcome of his appeal in CA-G.R. CR No. 14852.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, JJ., concur.
Almeda vs CA, GR 121013; July 16, 1998; 292 SCRA 587
Doctrine (Procedural): the right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of this right must strictly comply with the statutes or rules as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for an orderly discharge of judicial business.15 In the absence of highly exceptional circumstances warranting their relaxation, they must remain inviolable.
FACTS: This is an action by petitioner Jose Almeda for quieting of title, annulment of sale and/or reconveyance with damages against respondent spouses Artemio L. Mercado and Josefina A. Mercado, and Teresita, Gregorio Jr., Ignacio and Violeta, all surnamed Espeleta, filed on 22 September 1992 before the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna. Also named defendants were the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna, and a certain Atty. Agapito G. Carait.
Jose Almeda was the registered owner of Lot No. 312 situated in Bo. San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna. Subsequently, he sold portions thereof to various individuals. Adjacent to Lot No. 312 is Lot No. 308 registered in the name of the late Gregorio Espeleta, father of respondents Teresita, Gregorio Jr., Ignacio and Violeta Espeleta.
On 19 January 1990 a portion of Lot No. 308 denominated as Lot No. 308-B was sold by Gregorio Espeleta to herein respondent spouses Artemio L. Mercado and Josefina A. Mercado. Later, petitioner instituted the present action praying that the deed of sale in favor of respondent Mercado spouses be declared null and void, and that they and/or the heirs of the deceased Gregorio Espeleta be ordered to reconvey the lot to petitioner.
Petitioner admits that his notice of appeal was filed five (5) days late but explains that his former counsel who took over from another former counsel must have overlooked its due date. He then argues that the fact that he was not notified of the pre-trial conference falls within the ambit of liberal application of the rules so as not to frustrate a party’s right to appeal. He reiterates his allegation that his signature on the registry return receipt was fake and expresses his apprehension that an unfavorable resolution on this issue would throw into the dustbin his claim over the subject property.
We uphold respondent Court of Appeals. The period to appeal is prescribed not only by the Rules of Court but also by statute, particularly Sec. 39 of BP 129 which provides -
HELD: A careful scrutiny of the records readily discloses the lack of merit in petitioner’s reason for the late filing of his notice of appeal.
It was only after the notice had been filed that he effected a change of counsel.12 Once again we stress that a lawyer has the responsibility of monitoring and keeping track of the period of time left to file an appeal.13 Although the notice of pre-trial conference appears to have been received by somebody else for petitioner and that the signature on the registry return receipt was not his, the fact is that he and his former counsel who was then handling his case were duly notified in open court much earlier, or specifically on 12 November 1993, of the resetting to 24 February 1994.14 Hence, there was no reason at all for him to complain about lack of notice.
As may now be too familiar, the right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of this right must strictly comply with the statutes or rules as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for an orderly discharge of judicial business.15 In the absence of highly exceptional circumstances warranting their relaxation, they must remain inviolable.
It appearing therefore that the judgment has already become final and executory, we have no recourse but to deny the instant petition. This Court, as a result, need no longer concern itself with the reasonableness of the monetary awards since its hands are tied by the finality of the trial court’s judgment through nobody else’s fault but petitioner’s by allowing his reglementary period to lapse through his inexcusable negligence without perfecting his appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming the disapproval by the Regional Trial Court of petitioner’s notice of appeal is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
ORIENTAL SHIPMANAGEMENT CO., INC. vs Bastol, G.R. No. 186289, 29 June 2010
FACTS: OSCI is a domestic manning agency engaged in the recruitment and placement of Filipino seafarers abroad. Paterco Shipping Ltd. (PSL) is a foreign shipping company which owned and operated the vessel MV Felicita and a client of OSCI. Protection & Indemnity Club (PIC) was the insurer of PSL covering contingencies like illness claims and benefits of seamen. Pandiman Philippines, Inc. (PPI) is the local representative of PIC.
As agent of PSL, OSCI hired Romy B. Bastol (Bastol) as bosun on November 29, 1995 evidenced by a Contract of Employment.7 On December 5, 1995, Bastol was deployed on board the vessel MV Felicita.
The genesis of the instant case emerged when, on February 17, 1997, while on board the vessel, Bastol suffered chest pains and cold clammy perspiration. He was hospitalized in Algiers and found to be suffering from anterior myocardial infarction.8 In short, he had a heart attack. He was subsequently repatriated due to his illness on March 7, 1997.
Upon arrival here in the Philippines, on March 8, 1997, he was referred to the Jose L. Gutierrez Clinic in Malate, Manila for a follow-up examination where Dr. Achilles J. Peralta examined and found him to be suffering from “T/C Ischemic Heart Disease. Ant. Myocardial Infection.” Dr. Peralta issued a Medical Report9 certifying that he was “Unfit for Sea Duty.” In a follow-up medical examination on April 1, 1997, Dr. Peralta still found Bastol “Unfit for Sea Duty.”10
Thus, PPI referred Bastol for medical treatment to the Metropolitan Hospital under the care of company-designated physician Dr. Robert D. Lim, a Diplomate in Rehabilitation Medicine. On April 10, 1997, Bastol was confined and treated at said hospital until May 7, 1997. Dr. Lim certified that Bastol had “Coronary artery dse; S/P Ant. wall MP; Hypercholesterolemia; Hyperglycemia.”11 Thereafter, Bastol had regular laboratory and medical examinations with the company-designated physician.
Unsatisfied with the treatment by Dr. Lim and seeking a second opinion, he went to Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo, a Cardiologist and Congenital Heart Disease Specialist of the Philippine Heart Center, who diagnosed him to be suffering from “Coronary Artery Disease and Extensive Anteriorseptalmia” with the corresponding remarks: “For Disability, Impediment Grade 1 (120%).”12
Feeling abandoned and aggrieved with OSCI and PSL, Bastol, through counsel, sent a November 27, 1997 letter on December 2, 1997 to Capt. Rosendo C. Herrera, the President of OSCI, for a possible settlement of his claim for disability benefits.13 He attached the Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Vicaldo. His letter did not merit a response from OSCI.
Thus, Bastol was compelled to file a Complaint14 before the Labor Arbiter on May 8, 1988 for: (a) medical disability benefit (Grade 1) of USD 60,000; (b) illness allowance until he is deemed fit to work again; (c) medical benefits for the treatment of his ailment; (d) moral damages of PhP 100,000; and (e) attorney’s fee of 10% of the total monetary award.
OSCI countered that Bastol is not entitled to his indemnity claims, among others, for disability benefits on account of non-compliance with the requirements of the 1994 revised Standard Employment Contract (SEC) by failing to properly submit himself for treatment and examination by the company-designated physician who is the only one authorized to set the degree of disability, i.e., disability grade.
**ISSUE: **
Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation vs. City of Pasig, GR 152230, August 9, 2005
Doctrine: Strict Construction and Burden of Proof
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation (a lessening or weakening of power, authority, position, etc.) of private rights. It is one of the harshest proceedings known to the law. Consequently, when the sovereign delegates the power to a political unit or agency, a strict construction will be given against the agency asserting the power.
It is incumbent upon the condemnor to exhaust all reasonable efforts to obtain the land it desires by agreement. Failure to prove compliance with the mandatory requirement will result in the dismissal of the complaint.
FACTS: The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a municipal road near the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig, where 60 to 70 houses, mostly made of light materials, were located. The road had to be at least three meters in width, as required by the Fire Code, so that fire trucks could pass through in case of conflagration. Likewise, the residents in the area needed the road for water and electrical outlets.3 The municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791-square meter property of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. PT-66585,4 which is abutting E. R. Santos Street.
On April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and appropriate the fund therefor. The ordinance stated that the property owners were notified of the municipality’s intent to purchase the property for public use as an access road but they rejected the offer.
On July 21, 1993, the municipality filed a complaint, amended on August 6, 1993, against the Ching Cuancos for the expropriation of the property under Section 19 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code. The plaintiff alleged therein that it notified the defendants, by letter, of its intention to construct an access road on a portion of the property but they refused to sell the same portion. The plaintiff appended to the complaint a photocopy of the letter addressed to defendant Lorenzo Ching Cuanco.
The plaintiff deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of the property based on the latest tax declaration covering the property. On plaintiff’s motion, the RTC issued a writ of possession over the property sought to be expropriated. On November 26, 1993, the plaintiff caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal portion of TCT No. PT-92579 under the name of the Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Incorporated (JILCSFI) which had purchased the property.7 Thereafter, the plaintiff constructed therein a cemented road with a width of three meters; the road was called Damayan Street.
In their answer, the defendants claimed that, as early as February 1993, they had sold the said property to JILCSFI as evidenced by a deed of sale bearing the signature of defendant Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho and his wife.
ISSUES: (1) whether the respondent complied with the requirement, under Section 19 of the Local Government Code, of a valid and definite offer to acquire the property prior to the filing of the complaint; (2) whether its property which is already intended to be used for public purposes may still be expropriated by the respondent; and (3) whether the requisites for an easement for right-of-way under Articles 649 to 657 of the New Civil Code may be dispensed with.
HELD: Strict Construction and Burden of Proof
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights. It is one of the harshest proceedings known to the law. Consequently, when the sovereign delegates the power to a political unit or agency, a strict construction will be given against the agency asserting the power.43 The authority to condemn is to be strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the condemnor.44 When the power is granted, the extent to which it may be exercised is limited to the express terms or clear implication of the statute in which the grant is contained.45
Corollarily, the respondent, which is the condemnor, has the burden of proving all the essentials necessary to show the right of condemnation.46 It has the burden of proof to establish that it has complied with all the requirements provided by law for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.
The grant of the power of eminent domain to local government units is grounded on Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160 which reads:
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. - A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.
The Court declared that the following requisites for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain by a local government unit must be complied with:
- An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
- The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
- There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
- A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.47
Valid and Definite Offer
Article 35 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code provides:
ARTICLE 35. Offer to Buy and Contract of Sale. - (a) The offer to buy private property for public use or purpose shall be in writing. It shall specify the property sought to be acquired, the reasons for its acquisition, and the price offered.
(b) If the owner or owners accept the offer in its entirety, a contract of sale shall be executed and payment forthwith made.
(c) If the owner or owners are willing to sell their property but at a price higher than that offered to them, the local chief executive shall call them to a conference for the purpose of reaching an agreement on the selling price. The chairman of the appropriation or finance committee of the sanggunian, or in his absence, any member of the sanggunian duly chosen as its representative, shall participate in the conference. When an agreement is reached by the parties, a contract of sale shall be drawn and executed.
(d) The contract of sale shall be supported by the following documents:
(1) Resolution of the sanggunian authorizing the local chief executive to enter into a contract of sale. The resolution shall specify the terms and conditions to be embodied in the contract;
(2) Ordinance appropriating the amount specified in the contract; andcralawlibrary
(3) Certification of the local treasurer as to availability of funds together with a statement that such fund shall not be disbursed or spent for any purpose other than to pay for the purchase of the property involved.
The respondent was burdened to prove the mandatory requirement of a valid and definite offer to the owner of the property before filing its complaint and the rejection thereof by the latter.It is incumbent upon the condemnor to exhaust all reasonable efforts to obtain the land it desires by agreement. Failure to prove compliance with the mandatory requirement will result in the dismissal of the complaint.
An offer is a unilateral proposition which one party makes to the other for the celebration of a contract. It creates a power of acceptance permitting the offeree, by accepting the offer, to transform the offeror’s promise into a contractual obligation.Corollarily, the offer must be complete, indicating with sufficient clearness the kind of contract intended and definitely stating the essential conditions of the proposed contract.An offer would require, among other things, a clear certainty on both the object and the cause or consideration of the envisioned contract.
The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to be first made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid the expense and delay of a court action.The law is designed to give to the owner the opportunity to sell his land without the expense and inconvenience of a protracted and expensive litigation. This is a substantial right which should be protected in every instance. It encourages acquisition without litigation and spares not only the landowner but also the condemnor, the expenses and delays of litigation. It permits the landowner to receive full compensation, and the entity acquiring the property, immediate use and enjoyment of the property. A reasonable offer in good faith, not merely perfunctory or pro forma offer, to acquire the property for a reasonable price must be made to the owner or his privy.57 A single bona fide offer that is rejected by the owner will suffice.
The expropriating authority is burdened to make known its definite and valid offer to all the owners of the property. However, it has a right to rely on what appears in the certificate of title covering the land to be expropriated. Hence, it is required to make its offer only to the registered owners of the property. After all, it is well-settled that persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens certificate of title are not required to go beyond what appears on its face.58
In the present case, the respondent failed to prove that before it filed its complaint, it made a written definite and valid offer to acquire the property for public use as an access road. The only evidence adduced by the respondent to prove its compliance with Section 19 of the Local Government Code is the photocopy of the letter purportedly bearing the signature of Engr. Jose Reyes, to only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco. The letter reads:
MR. LORENZO CHING CUANCO
18 Alcalde Jose Street
Capasigan, Pasig
Metro Manila
Dear Mr. Cuanco:
This refers to your parcel of land located along E. Santos Street, Barangay Palatiw, Pasig, Metro Manila embraced in and covered by TCT No. 66585, a portion of which with an area of fifty-one (51) square meters is needed by the Municipal Government of Pasig for conversion into a road-right of way for the benefit of several residents living in the vicinity of your property. Attached herewith is the sketch plan for your information.
In this connection, may we respectfully request your presence in our office to discuss this project and the price that may be mutually agreed upon by you and the Municipality of Pasig.
Thank you.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
ENGR. JOSE L. REYES
Technical Asst. to the Mayor
on Infrastructure
It bears stressing, however, that the respondent offered the letter only to prove its desire or intent to acquire the property for a right-of-way.The document was not offered to prove that the respondent made a definite and valid offer to acquire the property. Moreover, the RTC rejected the document because the respondent failed to adduce in evidence the original copy thereof. The respondent, likewise, failed to adduce evidence that copies of the letter were sent to and received by all the co-owners of the property, namely, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Kho.
The respondent sought to prove, through the testimony of its messenger, Rolando Togonon, that Lorenzo Ching Cuanco received the original of the said letter. But Togonon testified that he merely gave the letter to a lady, whom he failed to identify. He stated that the lady went inside the store of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, and later gave the letter back to him bearing the signature purportedly of one Luz Bernarte. However, Togonon admitted, on cross-examination, that he did not see Bernarte affixing her signature on the letter. Togonon also declared that he did not know and had never met Lorenzo Ching Cuanco and Bernarte:
Q And after you received this letter from that lady, what did you do afterwards?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A I brought it with me, that letter, and then I went to Caruncho.
Q So, [M]r. Witness, you are telling this Honorable Court that this letter intended to Mr. Lorenzo was served at Pasig Trading which was situated at No. 18 Alkalde Jose Street on February 23, 1993?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Yes, Ma’am.
ATTY. TAN:
That is all for the witness, Your Honor.
COURT:
Do you have any cross-examination?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ATTY. JOLO:
Just a few cross, Your Honor, please. With the kind permission of the Honorable Court.
COURT:
Proceed.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY ATTY. JOLO:
Q Mr. Witness, do you know Mr. Lorenzo Ching [Cuanco]
A I do not know him.
Q As a matter of fact, you have not seen him even once, isn’t not (sic)?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Yes, Sir.
Q This Luz Bernarte, do you know her?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A I do not know her.
Q As a matter of fact, you did not see Mrs. Bernarte even once?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A That is correct.
Q And as a matter of fact, [M]r. Witness, you did not see Mrs. Luz Bernarte affixing her signature on the bottom portion of this demand letter, marked as Exh. “C-2”?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Yes, Sir.
Even if the letter was, indeed, received by the co-owners, the letter is not a valid and definite offer to purchase a specific portion of the property for a price certain. It is merely an invitation for only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, to a conference to discuss the project and the price that may be mutually acceptable to both parties.
There is no legal and factual basis to the CA’s ruling that the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal portion of petitioner’s TCT No. PT-92579 is a substantial compliance with the requisite offer. A notice of lis pendens is a notice to the whole world of the pendency of an action involving the title to or possession of real property and a warning that those who acquire an interest in the property do so at their own risk and that they gamble on the result of the litigation over it. Moreover, the lis pendens was annotated at the dorsal portion of the title only on November 26, 1993, long after the complaint had been filed in the RTC against the Ching Cuancos.
Neither is the declaration in one of the whereas clauses of the ordinance that “the property owners were already notified by the municipality of the intent to purchase the same for public use as a municipal road,” a substantial compliance with the requirement of a valid and definite offer under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. Presumably, the Sangguniang Bayan relied on the erroneous premise that the letter of Engr. Reyes reached the co-owners of the property. In the absence of competent evidence that, indeed, the respondent made a definite and valid offer to all the co-owners of the property, aside from the letter of Engr. Reyes, the declaration in the ordinance is not a compliance with Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160.
The respondent contends, however, that the Ching Cuancos, impliedly admitted the allegation in its complaint that an offer to purchase the property was made to them and that they refused to accept the offer by their failure to specifically deny such allegation in their answer. This contention is wrong. As gleaned from their answer to the complaint, the Ching Cuancos specifically denied such allegation for want of sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to its correctness. Under Section 10,64 Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, such form of denial, although not specific, is sufficient.
Public Necessity
We reject the contention of the petitioner that its property can no longer be expropriated by the respondent because it is intended for the construction of a place for religious worship and a school for its members. As aptly explained by this Court in Manosca v. Court of Appeals,65 thus:
It has been explained as early as Seña v. Manila Railroad Co., that:
‘A historical research discloses the meaning of the term “public use” to be one of constant growth. As society advances, its demands upon the individual increases and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted. ‘for “whatever is beneficially employed for the community is a public use.”
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states:
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirements of public use.
Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia in J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, has viewed the Constitution a dynamic instrument and one that “is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically so as to enable it to meet adequately whatever problems the future has in store.” Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a noted constitutionalist himself, has aptly observed that what, in fact, has ultimately emerged is a concept of public use which is just as broad as “public welfare.”
Petitioners ask: But “(w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that the expropriation of (Felix Manalo’s) birthplace become so vital as to be a public use appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminent domain” when only members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit? This attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property, does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.
The petitioner asserts that the respondent must comply with the requirements for the establishment of an easement of right-of-way, more specifically, the road must be constructed at the point least prejudicial to the servient state, and that there must be no adequate outlet to a public highway. The petitioner asserts that the portion of the lot sought to be expropriated is located at the middle portion of the petitioner’s entire parcel of land, thereby splitting the lot into two halves, and making it impossible for the petitioner to put up its school building and worship center.
The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road. The respondent is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code. Case law has it that in the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken66 unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious.67 Expropriation is justified so long as it is for the public good and there is genuine necessity of public character.68 Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken.69
The respondent has demonstrated the necessity for constructing a road from E. R. Santos Street to Sto. Tomas Bukid. The witnesses, who were residents of Sto. Tomas Bukid, testified that although there were other ways through which one can enter the vicinity, no vehicle, however, especially fire trucks, could enter the area except through the newly constructed Damayan Street. This is more than sufficient to establish that there is a genuine necessity for the construction of a road in the area. After all, absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice.70
Nonetheless, the respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioner’s property and not elsewhere.71 We note that the whereas clause of the ordinance states that the 51-square meter lot is the shortest and most suitable access road to connect Sto. Tomas Bukid to E. R. Santos Street. The respondent’s complaint also alleged that the said portion of the petitioner’s lot has been surveyed as the best possible ingress and egress. However, the respondent failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence to prove its claims.
On this point, the trial court made the following findings:
‘The contention of the defendants that there is an existing alley that can serve the purpose of the expropriator is not accurate. An inspection of the vicinity reveals that the alley being referred to by the defendants actually passes thru Bagong Taon St. but only about one-half (1/2) of its entire length is passable by vehicle and the other half is merely a foot-path. It would be more inconvenient to widen the alley considering that its sides are occupied by permanent structures and its length from the municipal road to the area sought to be served by the expropriation is considerably longer than the proposed access road. The area to be served by the access road is composed of compact wooden houses and literally a slum area. As a result of the expropriation of the 51-square meter portion of the property of the intervenor, a 3-meter wide road open to the public is created. This portion of the property of the intervenor is the most convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid since it is not only a short cut to the interior of the Sto. Tomas Bukid but also an easy path for vehicles entering the area, not to mention the 3-meter wide road requirement of the Fire Code.72
However, as correctly pointed out by the petitioner, there is no showing in the record that an ocular inspection was conducted during the trial. If, at all, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the subject property during the trial, the petitioner was not notified thereof.The petitioner was, therefore, deprived of its right to due process. It bears stressing that an ocular inspection is part of the trial as evidence is thereby received and the parties are entitled to be present at any stage of the trial.73 Consequently, where, as in this case, the petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection of the property, any factual finding of the court based on the said inspection has no probative weight. The findings of the trial court based on the conduct of the ocular inspection must, therefore, be rejected.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The RTC is ordered to dismiss the complaint of the respondent without prejudice to the refiling thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 92299 April 19, 1991
REYNALDO R. SAN JUAN, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CECILIA ALMAJOSE, respondents.
Legal Services Division for petitioner.
Sumulong, Sumulong, Paras & Abano Law Offices for private respondent.
Doctrine: The issue before the Court is not limited to the validity of the appointment of one Provincial Budget Officer. The tug of war between the Secretary of Budget and Management and the Governor of the premier province of Rizal over a seemingly innocuous position involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
FACTS: On March 22, 1988, the position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) for the province of Rizal was left vacant by its former holder, a certain Henedima del Rosario.
In a letter dated April 18, 1988, the petitioner informed Director Reynaldo Abella of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Region IV that Ms. Dalisay Santos assumed office as Acting PBO since March 22, 1988 pursuant to a Memorandum issued by the petitioner who further requested Director Abella to endorse the appointment of the said Ms. Dalisay Santos to the contested position of PBO of Rizal. Ms. Dalisay Santos was then Municipal Budget Officer of Taytay, Rizal before she discharged the functions of acting PBO.
In a Memorandum dated July 26, 1988 addressed to the DBM Secretary, then Director Abella of Region IV recommended the appointment of the private respondent as PBO of Rizal on the basis of a comparative study of all Municipal Budget Officers of the said province which included three nominees of the petitioner. According to Abella, the private respondent was the most qualified since she was the only Certified Public Accountant among the contenders.
On August 1, 1988, DBM Undersecretary Nazario S. Cabuquit, Jr. signed the appointment papers of the private respondent as PBO of Rizal upon the aforestated recommendation of Abella.
In a letter dated August 3, 1988 addressed to Secretary Carague, the petitioner reiterated his request for the appointment of Dalisay Santos to the contested position unaware of the earlier appointment made by Undersecretary Cabuquit.
On August 31, 1988, DBM Regional Director Agripino G. Galvez wrote the petitioner that Dalisay Santos and his other recommendees did not meet the minimum requirements under Local Budget Circular No. 31 for the position of a local budget officer. Director Galvez whether or not through oversight further required the petitioner to submit at least three other qualified nominees who are qualified for the position of PBO of Rizal for evaluation and processing.
On November 2, 1988, the petitioner after having been informed of the private respondent’s appointment wrote Secretary Carague protesting against the said appointment on the grounds that Cabuquit as DBM Undersecretary is not legally authorized to appoint the PBO; that the private respondent lacks the required three years work experience as provided in Local Budget Circular No. 31; and that under Executive Order No. 112, it is the Provincial Governor, not the Regional Director or a Congressman, who has the power to recommend nominees for the position of PBO.
On January 9, 1989 respondent DBM, through its Director of the Bureau of Legal & Legislative Affairs (BLLA) Virgilio A. Afurung, issued a Memorandum ruling that the petitioner’s letter-protest is not meritorious considering that public respondent DBM validly exercised its prerogative in filling-up the contested position since none of the petitioner’s nominees met the prescribed requirements.
ISSUE: whether or not the private respondent is lawfully entitled to discharge the functions of PBO of Rizal pursuant to the appointment made by public respondent DBM’s Undersecretary upon the recommendation of then Director Abella of DBM Region IV.
HELD: When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the recommending power of the Provincial Governor as purely directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions on local autonomy. If the DBM Secretary jealously hoards the entirety of budgetary powers and ignores the right of local governments to develop self-reliance and resoluteness in the handling of their own funds, the goal of meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and set back.
The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 which states:
Sec. 6.0 — The DBM reserves the right to fill up any existing vacancy where none of the nominees of the local chief executive meet the prescribed requirements.
is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.
**The PBO is expected to synchronize his work with DBM. More important, however, is the proper administration of fiscal affairs at the local level. **Provincial and municipal budgets are prepared at the local level and after completion are forwarded to the national officials for review. They are prepared by the local officials who must work within the constraints of those budgets. They are not formulated in the inner sanctums of an all-knowing DBM and unilaterally imposed on local governments whether or not they are relevant to local needs and resources. It is for this reason that there should be a genuine interplay, a balancing of viewpoints, and a harmonization of proposals from both the local and national officials. It is for this reason that the nomination and appointment process involves a sharing of power between the two levels of government.
It may not be amiss to give by way of analogy the procedure followed in the appointments of Justices and Judges.1âwphi1 Under Article VIII of the Constitution, nominations for judicial positions are made by the Judicial and Bar Council. The President makes the appointments from the list of nominees submitted to her by the Council. She cannot apply the DBM procedure, reject all the Council nominees, and appoint another person whom she feels is better qualified. There can be no reservation of the right to fill up a position with a person of the appointing power’s personal choice.
The public respondent’s grave abuse of discretion is aggravated by the fact that Director Galvez required the Provincial Governor to submit at least three other names of nominees better qualified than his earlier recommendation. It was a meaningless exercise. The appointment of the private respondent was formalized before the Governor was extended the courtesy of being informed that his nominee had been rejected. The complete disregard of the local government’s prerogative and the smug belief that the DBM has absolute wisdom, authority, and discretion are manifest.
In his classic work “Philippine Political Law” Dean Vicente G. Sinco stated that the value of local governments as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy that they enjoy. Citing Tocqueville, he stated that “local assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free nations. . . . A people may establish a system of free government but without the spirit of municipal institutions, it cannot have the spirit of liberty.” (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Eleventh Edition, pp. 705-706).
Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which these provisions are based.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are SET ASIDE. The appointment of respondent Cecilia Almajose is nullified. The Department of Budget and Management is ordered to appoint the Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal from among qualified nominees submitted by the Provincial Governor.
SO ORDERED.
Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 10 November 2003
Doctrine: First verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
**Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. **The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers.
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.
In other words, the court must harmonize them
FACTS: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Suplico, Zamora and Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The House Committee on Justice ruled that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same for being insufficient in substance.
On October 23, 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.”
ISSUES: In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.
HELD:
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ, which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed “judicial supremacy” which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this “moderating power” to “determine the proper allocation of powers” of the different branches of government and “to direct the course of government along constitutional channels” is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is “the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.”
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus, these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers.
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear.
Debates in the constitutional convention “are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face.” The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers’ understanding thereof.
