Court Cases Flashcards
Kelo v. City of New London (
New London, a city in Connecticut, used its eminent domain authority to seize private property to sell to private developers. The city said developing the land would create jobs and increase tax revenues. Susette Kelo and others whose property was seized sued New London in state court. The property owners argued the city violated the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause, which guaranteed the government will not take private property for public use without just compensation. Specifically, the property owners argued taking private property to sell to private developers was not public use. The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled for New London.
In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the majority held that the city’s taking of private property to sell for private development qualified as a “public use” within the meaning of the takings clause. The city was not taking the land simply to benefit a certain group of private individuals, but was following an economic development plan. Such justifications for land takings, the majority argued, should be given deference. The takings here qualified as “public use” despite the fact that the land was not going to be used by the public. The Fifth Amendment did not require “literal” public use, the majority said, but the “broader and more natural interpretation of public use as ‘public purpose.’”
HADACHECK v. SEBASTIAN
Police power to regulate location of land uses. In HADACHECK v. SEBASTIAN (1915), the court first approved regulating the location of land uses. City of Los Angeles passed an ordinance barring brick manufacturing within the residential section of city. The Petitioner, Hadacheck, owned land that was annexed into the city and which contained valuable clay deposits. After erecting expensive machinery for the
manufacture of bricks of fine quality which were being used for building purposes in and about the City, he was convicted of a misdemeanor violation of the ordinance prohibiting the establishment or operation of a brick kiln within the City Limits. The court ruled that under the police power, a state may validly declare a particular business to be a nuisance under the facts and circumstances (i.e. brickmaking within a designated area), as it relates to public health. Supreme Court Justice McKenna, writing for a unanimous court, upheld that the ordinance was a legitimate use of the police power. He analogized this case to an earlier one, Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915), which dealt with a similar ordinance banning livery stables. Reinman was distinguishable on the grounds that a livery stable could be moved and operated anywhere, while bricks can only be manufactured where suitable clay is found. Hadacheck contended that the removal of clay from his land was not physically impossible, but was prohibitively expensive. The Court held that even though relocating the brick factory would be costly, the ordinance did not amount to a complete denial of the use of Hadacheck’s property, because the ordinance did not completely deny Hadacheck the use of the clay on his land.
WELCH v. SWASEY
(1909), the court first approved building height controls.
EUBANK v. CITY OF RICHMOND
(1912), the court first approved setback regulations, although it overturned the particular setback scheme in this case
VILLAGE OF EUCLID v. AMBLER REALTY CO.
1926), the Court stated that modern zoning is a proper use of the police power. In doing so, the court brought together all the other cases mentioned in this question. Alfred Bettman filed a brief with the court that largely changed its mind over Euclid.
Dolan v. City of Tigard
Exactions “rough proportionality.” 1994. Dolan, of a Plumbing & Electrical Supply store in the city of Tigard, Oregon, applied for a permit to expand the store and pave the parking lot of her store. The city planning commission granted conditional approval, dependent on Dolan dedicating land to a public greenway along an adjacent creek, and developing a pedestrian and bicycle pathway in order to relieve traffic congestion. The decision was appealed to the Oregon State Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA), alleging that the land dedication requirements were not related to the proposed development, and thus constituted an uncompensated taking of her property. The Supreme Court held that the requirement for a public greenway (as opposed to a private one, to which Dolan would retain other rights of property owners, such as the right of exclusive access), was excessive, and that the City failed to meet its burden of establishing that the proposed pathway was necessary to offset the increased traffic which would be caused by the proposed expansion (i.e. rough proportionality).
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
Exactions “essential nexus,” 1987. connection between means and end.
Mugler v Kansas Supreme Court
Upheld the state’s use of “police power.” The Mugler v. Kansas (1887) Supreme Court decision held that a state’s legislation prohibiting the manufacture of intoxicating liquor within its jurisdiction does not infringe on any right or privilege secured by the Constitution of the United States, including the 14th amendment, was not a taking, and found that the authority for the statute strictly relied upon Kansas’s police power.
right-to-farm
“coming the the nuisance.” Right-to-farm laws are designed to accomplish one or both of the following objectives: (1) to
strengthen the legal position of farmers when neighbors sue them for private nuisance; and (2)
to protect farmers from anti-nuisance ordinances and unreasonable controls on farming operations. In most states, “coming to the nuisance” does not necessarily prevent farm neighbors from winning in court, but a farmer usually has a stronger legal case if his or her operation was there before the plaintiff moved to the area. Right-to-farm laws give farmers a legal defense against nuisance suits; the strength of that defense depends on the provisions of the law and the circumstances of the case.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon
In 1878, Pennsylvania Coal Company granted a deed to homeowner Mahon for all surface property rights, but expressly reserved the right to mine coal beneath the surface, with Mahon waiving all rights to any damages caused. Mahon sued under Pennsylvania’s Kohler Act (1921), which forbade mining activities that caused any homes to subside.
The court held that the Kohler Act did not constitute an exercise of legitimate police power, because it would prevent the property owner (in this case, Pennsylvania Coal, the subsurface property owner) from its right to gain profit from the use of its property (by mining coal). In other words, “To make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it.” According to the court, “The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”
Significance: For the first time, the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that regulation of land use, including regulation that destroys the economic value of a property, might constitute a taking
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York
In 1965, two years after the demolition of historic Pennsylvania Station in Manhattan, New York adopted its Landmarks Preservation Law. The law established a Landmarks Preservation Commission, which among other duties regulated alterations to landmarked buildings, and included a provision allowing historic property owners to sell air development rights to owners of nearby parcels. Penn Central, owner of the historic landmark Grand Central Terminal, leased the building to a developer in 1968 in order to increase its income by building a 50-plus story skyscraper on top of the terminal. The Landmarks Commission denied building permits for the project, citing impact both to the historic resource and the surrounding viewshed. Claiming that the denial constituted both a taking and a violation of due process, Penn Central sought compensation from the City equal to the fair market value of the property’s air rights.
Citing Euclid, the court argued that diminution in property value alone cannot establish a taking, which must apply to an entire property, not just a “discrete segment” (in this case, air space). In addition, because the landmarks program, which benefited the public, applied to hundreds of properties, Penn Central was not solely burdened by the law. The court thus concluded that the Landmark Commission’s action did not constitute a taking, that the Landmarks Law did not interfere with the “present uses” of the terminal, and that Penn Central could still obtain a reasonable return on its investment by selling its development rights.
Significance: Introduced a means-end balancing test for regulatory takings and validated historic preservation controls.
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego
In 1972, San Diego enacted an ordinance prohibiting all off-site outdoor advertising display signs, i.e. any signs not identifying the use, facility, or service located on the premises where a product was produced, sold, or manufactured. Under the ordinance, all existing signs had to be removed after an amortization period ranging from 90 days to four years, depending on the location and depreciated value of the sign. Metromedia, Inc., owner of many off-site billboards in the San Diego area, filed several complaints against the city, centering on the financial consequences of the ban for billboard companies.
Supreme Court ruled that the ban’s exception allowing “onsite” advertising discriminated against noncommercial speech. It allowed businesses in commercial properties to interrupt city motorists so long as it was with their own messages yet barred noncommercial advertisers from causing the same level of interruption. Court held that affording “a greater degree of protection to commercial than to noncommercial speech” reversed the long-standing Court precedent to show greater deference to noncommercial speech.
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
Nevada and California established the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) to study the impact of growth on Lake Tahoe and to create moratoria, one lasting two years and another for an ensuing eight months (for a total of 32 months), on all development in the Lake Tahoe Basin. The petitioners, the Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., representing about 2,000 owners of about 400 individual owners of vacant lots in the basin, filed suit in federal court, alleging that the moratoria facially violated the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
The Court held that the moratoria did not constitute a taking. The Court observed that creating a categorical rule that temporary deprivations always constitute a taking would run afoul of important planning principles advanced through moratoria.
Significance: Recognizes that partial, temporary deprivations of property may constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment, but must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis under the regulatory taking framework of Penn Central.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
In 1986, Lucas bought two residential lots on the Isle of Palms, a South Carolina barrier island. He intended to build single-family homes as on the adjacent lots. In 1988, the state legislature enacted a law which barred Lucas from erecting permanent habitable structures on his land. The law aimed to protect erosion and destruction of barrier islands. Lucas sued and won a large monetary judgment. The state appealed.
Does the construction ban depriving Lucas of all economically viable use of his property amount to a “taking” calling for “just compensation” under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?
Yes. In a 6-to-2 decision, the Court relied on the trial court’s finding that Lucas’s lots had been rendered valueless by the state law. “[W]hen the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good…he has suffered a taking.”
Significance: Defined categorical regulatory takings and an exception for regulations rooted in background principles of law; compensation to be paid to landowners when regulations deprive them of all economically beneficial land use unless uses are disallowed by title or by state law background principles of private and public nuisances.
Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo
The Town of Ramapo, New York, enacted a concurrency ordinance prohibiting any proposed development unless developers obtained a special permit. Permits were awarded based on a point system that took into account available municipal facilities in the development area, including sewerage, drainage, roads, firehouses, park and recreation space, and public schools. The ordinance was designed to phase development over time —as long as 18 years —although developers could accelerate the approval process by constructing their own infrastructure. Golden protested the denial of a special permit to construct a residential subdivision.
After confirming that the ordinance was permissible under the local zoning enabling act, the court asserted that the “restrictions conform to the community’s considered land use policies as expressed in its comprehensive plan and represent a bona fide effort to maximize population density consistent with orderly growth.” Furthermore, the court argued, the temporary nature of the growth controls allowed properties to be put to profitable uses within a reasonable time, meaning that the permit system did not qualify as a form of confiscation. In addition, property owners could develop their land if they provided their own infrastructure.
Significance: Recognized growth phasing programs as valid exercises of police power.
