Corporate Finance Flashcards

1
Q

What Determines PVGO?

A
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2
Q

Formula for estimating TV and CFs with Terminal Growth Method

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3
Q

The price of a stock can be decomposed into two components

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4
Q

Assume that the firm follows a policy of reinvesting a fraction k of its yearly earnings in new projects. k is called…

A

the plowback ratio and (= reinvestment rate or retention rate) and 1 - k is the payout ratio

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5
Q

Equation sources and uses of funds

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6
Q

Dividend Policy - Stylized facts documented by Lintner (1956):

A
  • Firms have long-run target dividend payout ratios
  • Dividend policies are sticky. Cuts are extremely rare, and managers will only raise the dividend if long-run sustainable earnings have risen
  • Managers focus more on dividend changes than on absolute levels
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7
Q

Does dividend policy matter? In theory?

A

Famous 1961 article by Miller and Modigliani (MM), showing that in a perfect capital market (no taxes, transactions costs, or inefficiencies), dividend policy is irrelevant.

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8
Q

Firm has 1,000 shares outstanding, and assets worth £ 12,000 so that the share price is £ 12 - if dividend of £ 1,000 is paid out, what are the new shares worth?

A
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9
Q

The above argument shows the fallacy of arguments often made in favor of dividend payments:
-) Dividend irrelevance is inconsistent with the stock price being the PV of future dividends.
-) The ‘bird-in-the-hand’ fallacy : since dividends are cash in hand, while capital gains are risky, increasing dividends should make the equity less risky, and hence more valuable.

A
  • Paying a dividend of $1,000 entails a capital loss of $1,000 for certain. Thus, it trades a certain income (dividend) with a certain loss (capital loss), rather than trading something certain for something risky
  • Both of these notions are fully consistent. Dividends are irrelevant because a higher dividend today requires you to sell more stock to finance the dividend. Therefore, future dividends are lower because they are shared among a greater number of shareholders. It is exactly because the stock price is the PV of all future dividends that makes dividends irrelevant - even though the immediate dividend rises, future dividends fall and these effects cancel out.
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10
Q

Dividends as Signals:

A
  • A higher dividend may raise a firm’s value by signaling management’s favorable information about the firm’s future earnings
  • Evidence supports this signaling hypothesis: Aharony and Swary (1980) found that dividend decreases (increases) are associated with the stock price falling 3.76% (rising 0.72%)
  • More recently, Ham, Kaplan, and Leary (2020) found that dividend decreases (increases) are associated with the stock price falling 3.3% (rising 0.9%)
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11
Q

MM does not apply in the presence of market imperfections, which e.g. are:

A
  • Issuance costs
  • Taxes
  • Agency costs
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12
Q

Pfizer’s stock price is expected to be $112.50 next year. It is paying no dividend, and its stock price is currently $100. The current tax rate on dividends is 50%, and that on capital gains is 20%. Suppose that Pfizer announces that it will pay a $10 dividend next year. What will happen to the stock price upon announcement?

A
  • Step 1: Calculate the after-tax rate of return under the current no-dividend policy: Capital gain is $112.50 - $100 = $12.50 –> tax rate of 20%, the tax is $2.50. The after-tax income is $12.50 - $2.50 = $10 = 10%
  • Step 2: Under the new policy, the after-tax rate of return must remain at 10%. Pfizer’s business and financial risk are unchanged by the dividend policy, so the rate of return must also be unchanged
  • Step 3: Solve for the new stock price that gives an after-tax rate of return of 10%. New capital gains is $2.5, after tax $2.0; dividend $10 * 0.5 (tax rate); Total after-tax
    income is given by Post-Tax Dividend + Post-Tax Capital Gain
    = 10 (1 - 0.5) + (102.50 - P)(1 - 0.2) = 87 - 0.8P –> of
    (87 - 0.8P) / P = 10% which yields P = $96.67
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13
Q

If taxes matter, then high-dividend stocks should offer higher pre-tax returns. What does research find?

A

Mixed/weak evidence

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14
Q

Dividend Policy - The Effect of Agency Costs

A
  • Agency costs are the loss in frm value that results from managers having different interests from shareholders
  • Dividends force the payout of excess cash, preventing managers from wasting it. This is particularly the case since dividends are sticky and hard to cut later without a strong negative market reaction
  • If we agency costs matter, we would expect dividends to be higher if: (-) High agency costs, measured by a high number of shareholders (Shhr) and a low percentage of the firm held by insiders (Ins). (-) Low cash needs (since dividends are a use of cash), measured by a low growth rate in revenues (Grow) and low volatility (Beta).
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15
Q

Costs / benefits of dividends:

A
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16
Q

Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) Proposition I states that in a perfect capital market, a firm’s value…?

A

…is independent of capital structure

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17
Q

How Leverage A§ects Expected Returns - rE and rA

A
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18
Q

What are Miller and Modigliani’s (MM) two propositions?

A
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19
Q

WACC and rA are conceptually different, but in a perfect capital market…

A

…they are numerically the same. A company cannot reduce its WACC below the level that it would have if it were all Equity-financed: In a perfect capital market, WACC is always rA

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20
Q

Formula for asset beta

A
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21
Q
A
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22
Q

Where might violations of MMís propositions arise from?

A
  • Taxes
  • Bankruptcy costs
  • Agency costs
  • Asymmetric information
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23
Q

Value of the tax shield for a firm (APV)

A
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24
Q

The tax advantage of debt in the presence of both corporate and personal taxes becomes

A
25
Q

Reasons why the value of a firm decreases in a bankruptcy

A
  • lawyer’s fees
  • fire sales
  • intangible assets (e.g. half-finished R&D project cancelled because of people leaving, etc.)
  • Even before bankruptcy, employees, customers, and suppliers may leave a firm
26
Q

WACC with Corporate and Personal Taxes

A
27
Q

With taxes and bankruptcy costs, the WACC curve now becomes:

A
28
Q

Why does biotechnology has so little debt?

A

Low profits, thus a much lower tax shield & very high bankruptcy costs (tax shield)

Opposite:

Air transport - very highly levered, because much lower bankruptcy costs

29
Q

With taxes and bankruptcy cost, firm value consists of Vu + …

A
30
Q

Agency Costs of Equity - why it can be good to take on debt

A
  • management is forced to be more capita-disciplined
  • It forces the manager to pay out free cash rather than wasting it
  • changes in equity value have a much higher effect, thus “concentrating” effect of a CEO’s actions
31
Q

Agency costs - risk-shifting /

A

Even if debt has a tax shield, and reduces agency costs –> covenants will go up, potentially preventing investments in profitable

32
Q

When are agency costs very high

A

If you have a lot of risky investments/investment opportunities

33
Q

The joint effect of taxes, bankruptcy costs and agency costs leads to a trade-off theory of capital structure. The firm’s target debt-equity ratio depends on a trade-off between:

A
34
Q

WACC curve with agency costs and bankruptcy costs

A
35
Q

The APV of a project is…

A
36
Q

MM-theorem: Examples of real-world “market imperfections”

A
  • Transaction costs
  • Taxes
  • Market inefficiencies (e.g. government subsidy)
37
Q

We have calculated Cytec’s WACC at 16.0% - now unlever it to get to rA

A
38
Q

The MM formula assumes that the project supports a permanent additional debt ∆D issued at rD - i.e., what is r* if you have found rA and assume fixed or amortized debt

A

We now relever Inditherm’s rA of 19.5% to take into account the 30% debt financing:
r* = rA(1 - tcL) = 0.195(1 - 0.34 * 0.3) = 17.5%

39
Q

Key Takeaways: Interaction of Investment and Financing
Decisions

A
40
Q

The baseline rule for choosing between alternative investments is simple: pick the one with the highest NPV. However, this does not apply when comparing investments with different lives. In this case we can use one of two equivalent criteria:

A
41
Q

compute the equivalent annual cost: the cash flow C of an annuity having the same life and PV as the machine - for Machine B

A
42
Q

If resource constraints, calculate Profitability Index:

A
43
Q

Using the CAPM to Evaluate Risky Projects - Correct discount rate for a project and correct measure of project risk is its…

A
44
Q

What Determines the Equity Beta? What is the formula for Equity Beta?

A
45
Q

three forms of market efficiency:

A
46
Q

Market efficiency is a theory of…

A

sharks, not of the average investor

47
Q

Public debt offerings are subdivided into two types:

A
  • A general offer is made directly to the public at large
  • A rights issue is made to existing shareholders only, although these shareholders can sell their right to subscribe to the offering to non-shareholders
48
Q

Reasons to do mergers

A
  • Economies of scale
  • Economies of scope (cross-selling)
  • Market power
49
Q

Three Types of Mergers

A
  • Mergers that create value: grow the pie
  • Mergers that redistribute value: split the pie differently
  • Mergers that destroy value: shrink the pie
50
Q

M&A Operational synergies - Contracts:

A

M&A should only be used if superior to contracts: incomplete
contracts can lead to hold-up problem if high relationship specificity (i.e. the supplier can only supply this company, and you can’t cover “all” possible problems/changes in the contract, apart from e.g. FX, wages, etc.)

51
Q

Revenue synergies through

A
  • Economies of scope: cross-selling, R&D spillovers
  • Combining complementary assets (Pixar’s animated films and Disney’s marketing, advertising and merchandising)
52
Q

Cost synergies through:

A
  • Economies of scale in R&D, purchasing, production etc.
  • Consolidation of excess capacity in declining industry (U.S. commercial banking in 1980s, defence industry in early 1990s)
  • Example: Exxon-Mobil led to 14,000 jobs cut and $3.8b of annual pretax savings
  • Financial synergies: create internal capital markets
  • Disciplinary: get rid of underperforming target management
53
Q

Mergers That Redistribute Value

A
  • Tax inversion or unused tax shields: redistribute from government
  • Market power: redistribute from customers and suppliers
  • Market inefficiency: redistribute from target shareholders - Target is undervalued by the market and/or acquirer is overvalued
54
Q

Mergers That Destroy Value

A
  • Agency problems - Size: not for economies of scale but prestige, higher salary
  • Private benefits: buy attractive sector or people (e.g. Block-Tidal)
  • Behavioral: overconfident about synergies and ability to manage target
  • Surplus funds: Firm has declining investment opportunities, so it uses spare cash to buy a target - But it should return spare cash to shareholders
  • Diversification: conglomerates avoid idiosyncratic risk - But investors can diversify themselves; conglomerates suffer a diversification discount
  • EPS accretion: merger will increase EPS - A merger is accretive if the post-merger earnings per share (EPS) of the acquiring firm goes up, and dilutive if EPS goes down
55
Q

While borrowing at a lower promised rate is not necessarily a good
rationale for a merger, related (financing/financial) reasons may be valid:

A
  • The diversified merged company has lower bankruptcy risk, thus reducing expected bankruptcy costs
  • The firm can take on more debt and enjoy a larger tax shield
  • A large debt issue is more liquid than two smaller debt issues and investors are willing to pay a premium for this
  • Caveat: Financial synergies typically used to justify conglomerate mergers where operational synergies are weak
56
Q

Resistance methods (pre-offer of M&A):

A
  • Staggered board: only part of the board is elected each year. Therefore
    control cannot be gained immediately
  • Supermajority: high percentage of shares needed to approve a merger, usually 80%
  • Poison pills: shareholders have rights to buy bonds or preferred stock - Upon a merger these are convertible into stock of the acquiring firm or must be repurchased by the acquiring firm
57
Q

Resistance methods (post-offer of M&A):

A
  • Litigation: file suit against bidder for violating antitrust or securities laws
  • Public relations: argue that acquirer is undervaluing target or will harm stakeholders (e.g. Unilever’s defence against Kraft)
  • White knight: invite a ìfriendly investorî to compete with an initial bid
  • Asset restructuring: buy assets that the bidder does not want or sell assets that bidder wants (crown jewels)
  • Implementing the changes the bidder was intending to undertake (e.g.
    Unileverís strategic review)
58
Q
A