contrinue Flashcards

1
Q

What is the owner-manager agency problem?

A

A situation where the manager (agent) may not act in the best interest of the owner (principal) due to conflicting incentives.

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2
Q

What happens if a manager is paid a fixed salary without monitoring?

A

The manager will shirk, resulting in agency costs.

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3
Q

What is a first-best solution in agency theory?

A

A scenario where the owner can perfectly monitor the manager, eliminating agency costs.

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4
Q

What is a second-best solution in agency theory?

A

Compensation based on performance measures like net income, aligning incentives but not eliminating agency cost.

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5
Q

How can indirect monitoring work in agency theory?

A

By linking manager pay to observable outcomes indirectly related to effort, like performance thresholds.

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6
Q

What are the risks of renting the firm to the manager?

A

Reduces agency cost but increases inefficiency as the risk-averse manager bears all the risk.

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7
Q

What is the effect of tying pay to net income with noise?

A

It reduces agency costs compared to firm rental, but some inefficiency remains.

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8
Q

What happens when the manager can manage earnings?

A

They might report consistently high net income to increase compensation, leading to higher agency cost.

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9
Q

What is the implication of adding share price as a second performance measure?

A

It may better align incentives by combining sensitivity (share price) and precision (net income).

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10
Q

Why use both share price and net income in compensation?

A

To balance sensitivity and precision in evaluating managerial performance.

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11
Q

What are desirable properties of performance measures?

A

Sensitivity (effort affects the measure) and precision (measure predicts payoff).

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12
Q

When is share price preferred in executive compensation?

A

For long-term goals like R&D, due to high sensitivity to future performance.

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13
Q

When is net income preferred in executive compensation?

A

For short-term goals like cost-cutting, due to high precision in reflecting cash flow.

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14
Q

What is the worst outcome in agency theory?

A

When a manager always reports managed earnings and shirks, increasing agency costs beyond rental case.

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15
Q

What does earnings management imply in contracts?

A

The potential for performance-based contracts to backfire if managers distort reported metrics.

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16
Q

What is earnings management?

A

The use of accounting techniques to produce financial reports that present an overly positive view of a company’s financial position.

17
Q

What are the three main patterns of earnings management?

A

Big Bath, Income Smoothing, Income Maximization.

18
Q

What is Real Activities Management (RAM)?

A

Manipulating operational decisions, like overproduction or cutting R&D, to meet earnings targets.

19
Q

What are some RAM tactics?

A

Offering discounts, delaying R&D, overproducing to spread fixed costs.

20
Q

Why do managers manage earnings?

A

To hit compensation targets, avoid covenant violations, or reduce political costs.

21
Q

How can accountants help curb earnings management?

A

Through full disclosure of revenue policies and special items.

22
Q

What is the role of net income in executive compensation?

A

It serves as a performance measure but may be manipulated.

23
Q

What does the Burgstahler & Dichev (1997) study suggest?

A

Earnings distributions show signs of manipulation, as they deviate from expected normal distribution.