Contract Law Flashcards
Partridge V Crittenden (1968)=
Originally a criminal case concerning the wild birds Act (1954) which made a criminal offense to sell wild birds.An advertisement was published by the defendant in which an advertised cox and henges 25 shilling each.The person was convicted because in breach of the act. He appealed and without denying the facts he appealed on the interpretation of the law by way of case stated Originally a criminal case concerning the wild birds Act (1954) which made a criminal offense to sell wild birds.An advertisement was published by the defendant in which an advertised cox and henges 25 shilling each.The person was convicted because in breach of the act. He appealed and without denying the facts he appealed on the interpretation of the law by way of case stated Originally a criminal case concerning the wild birds Act (1954) which made a criminal offense to sell wild birds.An advertisement was published by the defendant in which an advertised cox and henges 25 shilling each.The person was convicted because in breach of the act. He appealed and without denying the facts he appealed on the interpretation of the law by way of case stated Originally a criminal case concerning the wild birds Act (1954) which made a criminal offense to sell wild birds.An advertisement was published by the defendant in which an advertised cox and henges 25 shilling each.The person was convicted because in breach of the act. He appealed and without denying the facts he appealed on the interpretation of the law by way of case stated that there was no breach of the protection of wild birds act because an advertisement was not a sell nor an offer.that there was no breach of the protection of wild birds act because an advertisement was not a sell nor an offer.that there was no breach of the protection of wild birds act because an advertisement was not a sell nor an offer.that there was no breach of the protection of wild birds act because an advertisement was not a sell nor an offer.
R v Goldman (2001)=
The defendant’s conviction for an offence of attempting to incite another to distribute indecent photographs of children under 16 was safe because the defendant’s response to an advertisement was an offer capable of constituting incitement. An advertisement is not normally considered to be an offer BUT AN INVITATION TO TREAT.
Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co (1893)= Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co (1893)= Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co (1893)= Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co (1893)=
Newspaper published what seemed to be an advertisement in which they proposed a smoke ball as a sure protection against catching flue giving precise instructions as how to use it.Mrs Carlill saw it, read it thoroughly :“if you buy and use you will not catch the influenza.But should you catch it we will give you 100£”. The Court of Appeal held that Mrs Carlill was entitled to the reward as the advert constituted an offer of a unilateral contract which she had accepted by performing the conditions stated in the offer. The court rejected all the arguments put forward by the defendants for the following reasons:1. The statement referring to the deposit of £1,000 demonstrated intent and therefore it was not a mere sales puff.2. It is quite possible to make an offer to the world.3. In unilateral contracts there is no requirement that the offeree communicates an intention to accept, since acceptance is through full performance 4. Whilst there may be some ambiguity in the wording this was capable of being resolved by applying a reasonable time limit or confining it to anythose who caught flu while using the balls.
Dickinson v dodds
The defendant offered to sell his house to the claimant and promised to keep the offer open until Friday. On the Thursday the defendant accepted an offer from a third party to purchase the house. The defendant then asked a friend to tell the claimant that the offer was withdrawn. On hearing the news, the claimant went round to the claimant’s house first thing Friday morning purporting to accept the offer. He then brought an action seeking specific performance of the contract.Held:The offer had been effectively revoked. Therefore no contract existed between the parties. There was no obligation to keep the offer open until Friday since the claimant had provided no consideration in exchange for the promise.The offeror is free to withdraw the offer at any time before acceptance takes place unless a deposit has been paid.
Harvey v Facey(1893)
harvey sent telegram to facey which stated “ will you sell us bumper-hall ? Telegraph lowest cash-price answer paid”.Facey replied by telegram “lowest price for bumper hall 900£”.Harvey then replied “we agree to buy bumper hall pen for the sum if nine hundred pountds asked by you. Please send us your title deed in order we may get early posession”.The Privy Council held that there was no contract concluded between the parties. Facey had not directly answered the first question as to whether they would sell and the lowest price stated was merely responding to a request for information not an offer. There was thus no evidence of anintentionthat the telegram sent by Facey was to be an offer
Gibson v Manchester city council (1979)
Manchester City Councilwas being run by theConservative Party, which was running apolicy of selling council housesto the occupants. Mr. Gibson applied for details of his house price and mortgage terms on a form of the council. In February 1971, the treasurer replied,”The corporation may be prepared to sell the house to you at the purchase price of £2,725 less 20% = £2,180 (freehold)… This letter should not be regarded as a firm offer of a mortgage. If you would like to make formal application to buy your Council house please complete the enclosed application form and return it to me as soon as possible.”n March 1971, Mr Gibson completed the application form, except for the date which his lease was to end, and returned it to the council. In May, the Labour party came back to power and halted new sales. Mr Gibson was told that he could not complete the purchase. So Mr Gibson sued the council, arguing that a binding contract had already come into force.Manchester City Councilwas being run by theConservative Party, which was running apolicy of selling council housesto the occupants. Mr. Gibson applied for details of his house price and mortgage terms on a form of the council. In February 1971, the treasurer replied,”The corporation may be prepared to sell the house to you at the purchase price of £2,725 less 20% = £2,180 (freehold)… This letter should not be regarded as a firm offer of a mortgage. If you would like to make formal application to buy your Council house please complete the enclosed application form and return it to me as soon as possible.”n March 1971, Mr Gibson completed the application form, except for the date which his lease was to end, and returned it to the council. In May, the Labour party came back to power and halted new sales. Mr Gibson was told that he could not complete the purchase. So Mr Gibson sued the council, arguing that a binding contract had already come into force.Manchester City Councilwas being run by theConservative Party, which was running apolicy of selling council housesto the occupants. Mr. Gibson applied for details of his house price and mortgage terms on a form of the council. In February 1971, the treasurer replied,”The corporation may be prepared to sell the house to you at the purchase price of £2,725 less 20% = £2,180 (freehold)… This letter should not be regarded as a firm offer of a mortgage. If you would like to make formal application to buy your Council house please complete the enclosed application form and return it to me as soon as possible.”n March 1971, Mr Gibson completed the application form, except for the date which his lease was to end, and returned it to the council. In May, the Labour party came back to power and halted new sales. Mr Gibson was told that he could not complete the purchase. So Mr Gibson sued the council, arguing that a binding contract had already come into force.Manchester City Councilwas being run by theConservative Party, which was running apolicy of selling council housesto the occupants. Mr. Gibson applied for details of his house price and mortgage terms on a form of the council. In February 1971, the treasurer replied,”The corporation may be prepared to sell the house to you at the purchase price of £2,725 less 20% = £2,180 (freehold)… This letter should not be regarded as a firm offer of a mortgage. If you would like to make formal application to buy your Council house please complete the enclosed application form and return it to me as soon as possible.”n March 1971, Mr Gibson completed the application form, except for the date which his lease was to end, and returned it to the council. In May, the Labour party came back to power and halted new sales. Mr Gibson was told that he could not complete the purchase. So Mr Gibson sued the council, arguing that a binding contract had already come into force.Gibson v Manchester City Council[1979]UKHL 6is anEnglish contract lawcase in which the House of Lords strongly reasserted that agreement only exists when there is a clear offer mirrored by a clear acceptance.Gibson v Manchester City Council[1979]UKHL 6is anEnglish contract lawcase in which the House of Lords strongly reasserted that agreement only exists when there is a clear offer mirrored by a clear acceptance.Gibson v Manchester City Council[1979]UKHL 6is anEnglish contract lawcase in which the House of Lords strongly reasserted that agreement only exists when there is a clear offer mirrored by a clear acceptance.Gibson v Manchester City Council[1979]UKHL 6is anEnglish contract lawcase in which the House of Lords strongly reasserted that agreement only exists when there is a clear offer mirrored by a clear acceptance.
Shuey v US (1875)
secretary of war published offer of reward for information leading to arrest of criminals.Offer mode on 28th april , on the 21st nvovember offer revoked.The next year someone provided some informationsecretary of war published offer of reward for information leading to arrest of criminals.Offer mode on 28th april , on the 21st nvovember offer revoked.The next year someone provided some informationsecretary of war published offer of reward for information leading to arrest of criminals.Offer mode on 28th april , on the 21st nvovember offer revoked.The next year someone provided some informationsecretary of war published offer of reward for information leading to arrest of criminals.Offer mode on 28th april , on the 21st nvovember offer revoked.The next year someone provided some informationit was held that the withdrawal had been made through the same channel and the offer no longer held by the time the pliaitff had provided the information. If it can be shown he knew of the revocation the revocation would be effective
Timothy v Simpson (1834)=
Timothy saw a clothing item with a price tag , walked into the shop but the offerer said it was actually more expensive.Timothy replied that the law said that the item had to be sold at the price in the shop window. Timothy was arrested, put in custody but sued for breach of contractDisplays of goods in window shops are mere invitations to treat
Pharmaceutical Society of GB v Boots cash Chemists (1953
Boots introduced the then new self service system into their shops whereby customers would pick up goods from the shelf put them in their basket and then take them to the cash till to pay. The Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain brought an action to determine the legality of the system with regard to the sale of pharmaceutical products which were required by law to be sold in the presence of a pharmacist. The court thus needed to determine where the contract came into existence.Goods on the shelf constitute an invitation to treat not an offer. A customer takes the goods to the till and makes an offer to purchase. The shop assistant then chooses whether to accept the offer. The contract is therefore concluded at the till in the presence of a pharmacist.
Payne v cave (1789)=
Mr Cave made the highest bid for Mr Payne’s goods at an auction. But then, Mr Cave changed his mind and he withdrew his bid before the auctioneer brought down his hammer.It was held that Mr. Cave, the defendant, was not bound to purchase the goods. His bid amounted to an offer which he was entitled to withdraw at any time before the auctioneer signified acceptance by knocking down the hammer. Note: The common law rule laid down in this case has now been codified in many countries in variations of the Sale of Goods Act, e.g. UK 1979 s57(2).Payne v Cave(1789) 3 TR 148 is an oldEnglish contract lawcase, which stands for the proposition that an auctioneer’s request for bids is not an offer but aninvitation to treat. The bidders make the offers which can be accepted by the auctioneer.Payne v Cave(1789) 3 TR 148 is an oldEnglish contract lawcase, which stands for the proposition that an auctioneer’s request for bids is not an offer but aninvitation to treat. The bidders make the offers which can be accepted by the auctioneer.Payne v Cave(1789) 3 TR 148 is an oldEnglish contract lawcase, which stands for the proposition that an auctioneer’s request for bids is not an offer but aninvitation to treat. The bidders make the offers which can be accepted by the auctioneer.Payne v Cave(1789) 3 TR 148 is an oldEnglish contract lawcase, which stands for the proposition that an auctioneer’s request for bids is not an offer but aninvitation to treat. The bidders make the offers which can be accepted by the auctioneer.
Harris v Nickerson (1873
The Defendant placed an advertisement inLondonpapers that certain items, including brewing equipment and office furniture, would be placed up for auction over three days inBury St. Edmunds. The Plaintiff obtained a commission to buy the office furniture and expended time and expense to travel to Bury St. Edmunds to bid for the office furniture. On the third day, the lots for the office furniture were withdrawn. The Plaintiff sued for loss of time and expense. The judge at first instance found in favour of the Plaintiff. Leave was given to appeal to theHigh Court.The Defendant placed an advertisement inLondonpapers that certain items, including brewing equipment and office furniture, would be placed up for auction over three days inBury St. Edmunds. The Plaintiff obtained a commission to buy the office furniture and expended time and expense to travel to Bury St. Edmunds to bid for the office furniture. On the third day, the lots for the office furniture were withdrawn. The Plaintiff sued for loss of time and expense. The judge at first instance found in favour of the Plaintiff. Leave was given to appeal to theHigh Court.The Defendant placed an advertisement inLondonpapers that certain items, including brewing equipment and office furniture, would be placed up for auction over three days inBury St. Edmunds. The Plaintiff obtained a commission to buy the office furniture and expended time and expense to travel to Bury St. Edmunds to bid for the office furniture. On the third day, the lots for the office furniture were withdrawn. The Plaintiff sued for loss of time and expense. The judge at first instance found in favour of the Plaintiff. Leave was given to appeal to theHigh Court.The Defendant placed an advertisement inLondonpapers that certain items, including brewing equipment and office furniture, would be placed up for auction over three days inBury St. Edmunds. The Plaintiff obtained a commission to buy the office furniture and expended time and expense to travel to Bury St. Edmunds to bid for the office furniture. On the third day, the lots for the office furniture were withdrawn. The Plaintiff sued for loss of time and expense. The judge at first instance found in favour of the Plaintiff. Leave was given to appeal to theHigh Court.Harris v Nickerson(1873) is anEnglish law caseconcerning the requirements ofoffer and acceptancein the formation of acontract. The case established that an advertisement that goods will be put up forauctiondoes not constitute anofferto any person that the goods will actually be put up, and that the advertiser is therefore free to withdraw the goods from the auction at any time prior to the auction..Harris v Nickerson(1873) is anEnglish law caseconcerning the requirements ofoffer and acceptancein the formation of acontract. The case established that an advertisement that goods will be put up forauctiondoes not constitute anofferto any person that the goods will actually be put up, and that the advertiser is therefore free to withdraw the goods from the auction at any time prior to the auction..Harris v Nickerson(1873) is anEnglish law caseconcerning the requirements ofoffer and acceptancein the formation of acontract. The case established that an advertisement that goods will be put up forauctiondoes not constitute anofferto any person that the goods will actually be put up, and that the advertiser is therefore free to withdraw the goods from the auction at any time prior to the auction..Harris v Nickerson(1873) is anEnglish law caseconcerning the requirements ofoffer and acceptancein the formation of acontract. The case established that an advertisement that goods will be put up forauctiondoes not constitute anofferto any person that the goods will actually be put up, and that the advertiser is therefore free to withdraw the goods from the auction at any time prior to the auction..
Barry v Davies 2001
The auctioneer withdrew goods from an auction (the goods had no reserve price) when abona fidebid of £200 was effective. The court held that an auctioneer is bound to sell to the highest bidder where there is no reserve price, and can’t withdraw the sale simply because the price is too low. A bid in an auction, the possibility of acceptance of the bid, unless the bid is withdrawn, and the benefit to the auctioneer of driving up the price bid is sufficientconsideration. The contract in an auction is between the buyer and the seller, not the buyer and the auctioneer, although the buyer has acollateral agreementwith the auctioneer.The auctioneer withdrew goods from an auction (the goods had no reserve price) when abona fidebid of £200 was effective. The court held that an auctioneer is bound to sell to the highest bidder where there is no reserve price, and can’t withdraw the sale simply because the price is too low. A bid in an auction, the possibility of acceptance of the bid, unless the bid is withdrawn, and the benefit to the auctioneer of driving up the price bid is sufficientconsideration. The contract in an auction is between the buyer and the seller, not the buyer and the auctioneer, although the buyer has acollateral agreementwith the auctioneer.The auctioneer withdrew goods from an auction (the goods had no reserve price) when abona fidebid of £200 was effective. The court held that an auctioneer is bound to sell to the highest bidder where there is no reserve price, and can’t withdraw the sale simply because the price is too low. A bid in an auction, the possibility of acceptance of the bid, unless the bid is withdrawn, and the benefit to the auctioneer of driving up the price bid is sufficientconsideration. The contract in an auction is between the buyer and the seller, not the buyer and the auctioneer, although the buyer has acollateral agreementwith the auctioneer.The auctioneer withdrew goods from an auction (the goods had no reserve price) when abona fidebid of £200 was effective. The court held that an auctioneer is bound to sell to the highest bidder where there is no reserve price, and can’t withdraw the sale simply because the price is too low. A bid in an auction, the possibility of acceptance of the bid, unless the bid is withdrawn, and the benefit to the auctioneer of driving up the price bid is sufficientconsideration. The contract in an auction is between the buyer and the seller, not the buyer and the auctioneer, although the buyer has acollateral agreementwith the auctioneer.Theremedyis the difference between the contract value, and the current market value of the goods under theSale of Goods Act 1979s51(3). The value in this case was £27,600.Theremedyis the difference between the contract value, and the current market value of the goods under theSale of Goods Act 1979s51(3). The value in this case was £27,600.Theremedyis the difference between the contract value, and the current market value of the goods under theSale of Goods Act 1979s51(3). The value in this case was £27,600.Theremedyis the difference between the contract value, and the current market value of the goods under theSale of Goods Act 1979s51(3). The value in this case was £27,600.
Hyde v Wrency (1840)
The defendant offered to sell a farm to the claimant for £1,000. The claimant in reply offered £950 which the defendant refused. The claimant then sought to accept the original offer of £1,000. The defendant refused to sell to the claimant and the claimant brought an action for specific performance.There was no contract. Where a counter offer is made this destroys the original offer so that it is no longer open to the offeree to accept
This has been distinguished from providing information in Stevenson v Mclean (1880)
The defendant held documents of title to certain quantities of iron and offered to sell them to the plaintiff for 40/- cash, indicating that the offer would be held open until the following Monday. The plaintiff was a broker and would only buy once they had lined up a buyer to take from them.On Monday at 9:42am P sent a telegram to D sounding out what flexibility there might be to negotiate before the days trading got under way. The market was unstable and P wanted to know the negotiating range.”Please wire whether you would accept 40 for delivery over 2 months, if not, longest time limit.”There was no response from D and P later purported to accept the original offer. D claimed that the acceptance was not effective as their telegram had rejected the offer by way of counter-offerThe defendant held documents of title to certain quantities of iron and offered to sell them to the plaintiff for 40/- cash, indicating that the offer would be held open until the following Monday. The plaintiff was a broker and would only buy once they had lined up a buyer to take from them.On Monday at 9:42am P sent a telegram to D sounding out what flexibility there might be to negotiate before the days trading got under way. The market was unstable and P wanted to know the negotiating range.”Please wire whether you would accept 40 for delivery over 2 months, if not, longest time limit.”There was no response from D and P later purported to accept the original offer. D claimed that the acceptance was not effective as their telegram had rejected the offer by way of counter-offerThe defendant held documents of title to certain quantities of iron and offered to sell them to the plaintiff for 40/- cash, indicating that the offer would be held open until the following Monday. The plaintiff was a broker and would only buy once they had lined up a buyer to take from them.On Monday at 9:42am P sent a telegram to D sounding out what flexibility there might be to negotiate before the days trading got under way. The market was unstable and P wanted to know the negotiating range.”Please wire whether you would accept 40 for delivery over 2 months, if not, longest time limit.”There was no response from D and P later purported to accept the original offer. D claimed that the acceptance was not effective as their telegram had rejected the offer by way of counter-offerThe defendant held documents of title to certain quantities of iron and offered to sell them to the plaintiff for 40/- cash, indicating that the offer would be held open until the following Monday. The plaintiff was a broker and would only buy once they had lined up a buyer to take from them.On Monday at 9:42am P sent a telegram to D sounding out what flexibility there might be to negotiate before the days trading got under way. The market was unstable and P wanted to know the negotiating range.”Please wire whether you would accept 40 for delivery over 2 months, if not, longest time limit.”There was no response from D and P later purported to accept the original offer. D claimed that the acceptance was not effective as their telegram had rejected the offer by way of counter-offerThis case should be distinguished fromHyde v Wrench(1840). In that case D had offered his estate for £1000. P offered to pay £950. When this was refused, P then purported to agree to pay the full £1000. P could not claim the estate, because his original counter-offer had put an end to D’s offer.Here, the telegram was not a counter-proposal, but a mere inquiry “which should have been answered” [morally or legally?]. It was not as a rejection of the offer.Pothierhas suggested a more subjective view. He has argued that if the offeror changes their mind (but does not communicate this) before acceptance, then at the moment of acceptance, there is no meeting of minds, and therefore no contract (Cooke v Oxley).However a more objective view is preferable. Once an offer is made, it is taken to be continuing each moment until accepted or withdrawn. The law will regard the intention evidenced in the offer as continuing, until notice of its revocation has been communicated to the other party. As stated inByrne v Van Tienhoven(1880)”an uncommunicated revocation is, for all practical purposes and in point of law, no revocation at all”.As no notice of withdrawal was given by the offeror, the P could regard it as a continuing offer, and their acceptance of it made the contract complete.This case should be distinguished fromHyde v Wrench(1840). In that case D had offered his estate for £1000. P offered to pay £950. When this was refused, P then purported to agree to pay the full £1000. P could not claim the estate, because his original counter-offer had put an end to D’s offer.Here, the telegram was not a counter-proposal, but a mere inquiry “which should have been answered” [morally or legally?]. It was not as a rejection of the offer.Pothierhas suggested a more subjective view. He has argued that if the offeror changes their mind (but does not communicate this) before acceptance, then at the moment of acceptance, there is no meeting of minds, and therefore no contract (Cooke v Oxley).However a more objective view is preferable. Once an offer is made, it is taken to be continuing each moment until accepted or withdrawn. The law will regard the intention evidenced in the offer as continuing, until notice of its revocation has been communicated to the other party. As stated inByrne v Van Tienhoven(1880)”an uncommunicated revocation is, for all practical purposes and in point of law, no revocation at all”.As no notice of withdrawal was given by the offeror, the P could regard it as a continuing offer, and their acceptance of it made the contract complete.This case should be distinguished fromHyde v Wrench(1840). In that case D had offered his estate for £1000. P offered to pay £950. When this was refused, P then purported to agree to pay the full £1000. P could not claim the estate, because his original counter-offer had put an end to D’s offer.Here, the telegram was not a counter-proposal, but a mere inquiry “which should have been answered” [morally or legally?]. It was not as a rejection of the offer.Pothierhas suggested a more subjective view. He has argued that if the offeror changes their mind (but does not communicate this) before acceptance, then at the moment of acceptance, there is no meeting of minds, and therefore no contract (Cooke v Oxley).However a more objective view is preferable. Once an offer is made, it is taken to be continuing each moment until accepted or withdrawn. The law will regard the intention evidenced in the offer as continuing, until notice of its revocation has been communicated to the other party. As stated inByrne v Van Tienhoven(1880)”an uncommunicated revocation is, for all practical purposes and in point of law, no revocation at all”.As no notice of withdrawal was given by the offeror, the P could regard it as a continuing offer, and their acceptance of it made the contract complete.This case should be distinguished fromHyde v Wrench(1840). In that case D had offered his estate for £1000. P offered to pay £950. When this was refused, P then purported to agree to pay the full £1000. P could not claim the estate, because his original counter-offer had put an end to D’s offer.Here, the telegram was not a counter-proposal, but a mere inquiry “which should have been answered” [morally or legally?]. It was not as a rejection of the offer.Pothierhas suggested a more subjective view. He has argued that if the offeror changes their mind (but does not communicate this) before acceptance, then at the moment of acceptance, there is no meeting of minds, and therefore no contract (Cooke v Oxley).However a more objective view is preferable. Once an offer is made, it is taken to be continuing each moment until accepted or withdrawn. The law will regard the intention evidenced in the offer as continuing, until notice of its revocation has been communicated to the other party. As stated inByrne v Van Tienhoven(1880)”an uncommunicated revocation is, for all practical purposes and in point of law, no revocation at all”.As no notice of withdrawal was given by the offeror, the P could regard it as a continuing offer, and their acceptance of it made the contract complete.
Butler machine tool co v ex cell o corporation (1969
The offer to sell the machine on terms provided by Butler was destroyed by the counter offer made by Ex-Cell-O. Therefore the price variation clause was not part of the contract. The contract was concluded on Ex-Cell-O’s terms since Butler signed the acknowledgement slip accepting those terms. Where there is a battle of the forms whereby each party submits their own terms the last shot rule applies whereby a contract is concluded on the terms submitted by the party who is the last to communicate those terms before performance of the contract commences.Where there is a battle of the forms whereby each party submits their own terms the last shot rule applies whereby a contract is concluded on the terms submitted by the party who is the last to communicate those terms before performance of the contract commences.Where there is a battle of the forms whereby each party submits their own terms the last shot rule applies whereby a contract is concluded on the terms submitted by the party who is the last to communicate those terms before performance of the contract commences.Where there is a battle of the forms whereby each party submits their own terms the last shot rule applies whereby a contract is concluded on the terms submitted by the party who is the last to communicate those terms before performance of the contract commences.
entores v miles far east corporation (1955)
The claimant sent a telex message from England offering to purchase 100 tons of Cathodes from the defendants in Holland. The defendant sent back a telex from Holland to the London office accepting that offer. The question for the court was at what point the contract came into existence. If the acceptance was effective from the time the telex was sent the contract was made in Holland and Dutch law would apply. If the acceptance took place when the telex was received in London then the contract would be governed by English law.To amount to an effective acceptance the acceptance needed to be communicated to the offeree. Therefore the contract was made in England.:“if the offerer was on the bank of a river and shouted his offer to the offeree on the other bank of the river and the offeree accepted but at the same time an airplane flew over there would be no formation of contract because the acceptance would have failed to be communicated
Taylor v Laird (1856
nTaylor v Laird (1856)the captain of a ship resigned during a voyage. The former captain provided navigation services for the remainder of the voyage even though this had not been requested by the owner of the ship. The former captain later claimed in the courts for proper remuneration for his services from the owner. The captain had not communicated his offer to provide such services. As such the owner did not have the opportunity to refuse or accept the offer as he had no knowledge of its existence. There was no binding contract.nTaylor v Laird (1856)the captain of a ship resigned during a voyage. The former captain provided navigation services for the remainder of the voyage even though this had not been requested by the owner of the ship. The former captain later claimed in the courts for proper remuneration for his services from the owner. The captain had not communicated his offer to provide such services. As such the owner did not have the opportunity to refuse or accept the offer as he had no knowledge of its existence. There was no binding contract.nTaylor v Laird (1856)the captain of a ship resigned during a voyage. The former captain provided navigation services for the remainder of the voyage even though this had not been requested by the owner of the ship. The former captain later claimed in the courts for proper remuneration for his services from the owner. The captain had not communicated his offer to provide such services. As such the owner did not have the opportunity to refuse or accept the offer as he had no knowledge of its existence. There was no binding contract.The court held that the claimant was not entitled to wages for the return journey on the basis that he had not entered into any contractual agreement with the defendant for the performance of his work as an ordinary crew member. The defendant had not received any communication or offer of work in this capacity from the claimant, and there was therefore no basis for a contract. The court reasoned that it would be unjust to hold a party bound by an offer which he had not been made aware of, and therefore had no opportunity to accept or reject; as such it is not possible in English contract law to accept an offer ‘in ignorance’.owners said there was no offer, no new contract. (went to help them by himself)The court held that the claimant was not entitled to wages for the return journey on the basis that he had not entered into any contractual agreement with the defendant for the performance of his work as an ordinary crew member. The defendant had not received any communication or offer of work in this capacity from the claimant, and there was therefore no basis for a contract. The court reasoned that it would be unjust to hold a party bound by an offer which he had not been made aware of, and therefore had no opportunity to accept or reject; as such it is not possible in English contract law to accept an offer ‘in ignorance’.owners said there was no offer, no new contract. (went to help them by himself)The court held that the claimant was not entitled to wages for the return journey on the basis that he had not entered into any contractual agreement with the defendant for the performance of his work as an ordinary crew member. The defendant had not received any communication or offer of work in this capacity from the claimant, and there was therefore no basis for a contract. The court reasoned that it would be unjust to hold a party bound by an offer which he had not been made aware of, and therefore had no opportunity to accept or reject; as such it is not possible in English contract law to accept an offer ‘in ignorance’.owners said there was no offer, no new contract. (went to help them by himself)
Felthouse v Bindley (1862)
uncle + nephew->uncle was interested in buying the horse et wrote to the nephew “if I hear no more about it I consider the horse mine”.Nephew didn’t answerbut sold the horse to a 3rd party.The uncle sued the owner for a tort of conversion.uncle + nephew->uncle was interested in buying the horse et wrote to the nephew “if I hear no more about it I consider the horse mine”.Nephew didn’t answerbut sold the horse to a 3rd party.The uncle sued the owner for a tort of conversion.uncle + nephew->uncle was interested in buying the horse et wrote to the nephew “if I hear no more about it I consider the horse mine”.Nephew didn’t answerbut sold the horse to a 3rd party.The uncle sued the owner for a tort of conversion.The court held that there had been no contract between plaintiff and nephew => necessity of communication. There was no contract. You cannot have silence as acceptance.The court held that there had been no contract between plaintiff and nephew => necessity of communication. There was no contract. You cannot have silence as acceptance.The court held that there had been no contract between plaintiff and nephew => necessity of communication. There was no contract. You cannot have silence as acceptance.
Wilkie v London passenger Transport Board (1947)
when passenger steps on bus he accepts offer the bus to move from one stop to the other.acceptance could be affected simply by contact
Adams v Lindsell (1818)=
The defendant wrote to the claimant offering to sell them some wool and asking for a reply ‘in the course of post’. The letter was delayed in the post. On receiving the letter the claimant posted a letter of acceptance the same day. However, due to the delay the defendant’s had assumed the claimant was not interested in the wool and sold it on to a third party. The claimant sued for breach of contract.The defendant wrote to the claimant offering to sell them some wool and asking for a reply ‘in the course of post’. The letter was delayed in the post. On receiving the letter the claimant posted a letter of acceptance the same day. However, due to the delay the defendant’s had assumed the claimant was not interested in the wool and sold it on to a third party. The claimant sued for breach of contract.The defendant wrote to the claimant offering to sell them some wool and asking for a reply ‘in the course of post’. The letter was delayed in the post. On receiving the letter the claimant posted a letter of acceptance the same day. However, due to the delay the defendant’s had assumed the claimant was not interested in the wool and sold it on to a third party. The claimant sued for breach of contract.There was a valid contract which came in to existence the moment the letter of acceptance was placed in the post box.This case established the postal rule. This applies where post is the agreed form of communication between the parties and the letter of acceptance is correctly addressed and carries the right postage stamp. The acceptance then becomes effective when the letter is posted.It was held that in the case of communication by post the contract is formed at the very moment the letter is put in the box. The offerer may well never receive it and still be bound so long as there is proof.There was a valid contract which came in to existence the moment the letter of acceptance was placed in the post box.This case established the postal rule. This applies where post is the agreed form of communication between the parties and the letter of acceptance is correctly addressed and carries the right postage stamp. The acceptance then becomes effective when the letter is posted.It was held that in the case of communication by post the contract is formed at the very moment the letter is put in the box. The offerer may well never receive it and still be bound so long as there is proof.There was a valid contract which came in to existence the moment the letter of acceptance was placed in the post box.This case established the postal rule. This applies where post is the agreed form of communication between the parties and the letter of acceptance is correctly addressed and carries the right postage stamp. The acceptance then becomes effective when the letter is posted.It was held that in the case of communication by post the contract is formed at the very moment the letter is put in the box. The offerer may well never receive it and still be bound so long as there is proof.
Household fire and carriage accident insurance (1879)=
Mr Grant applied for shares in the Household Fire and Carriage Accident Insurance Company. The company allotted the shares to the defendant, and duly addressed to him, posting a letter containing the notice of allotment. The letter was lost in the post and he never received the acceptance. Later the company went bankrupt, and asked Mr Grant for the outstanding payments on the shares, which he refused saying there was no binding contract. The liquidator sued. The question was whether Mr Grant’s offer for shares had been validly accepted and as such whether he was he legally bound to pay.A letter of revocation must reach the offeree, the acceptance must only be sent The mailbox rule does not apply to revocation; revocation sent by post does not take effect until received by offeree. An offer cannot be revoked after it has been accepted-> Byrone v Tienhoven (1880)A letter of revocation must reach the offeree, the acceptance must only be sent The mailbox rule does not apply to revocation; revocation sent by post does not take effect until received by offeree. An offer cannot be revoked after it has been accepted-> Byrone v Tienhoven (1880)A letter of revocation must reach the offeree, the acceptance must only be sent The mailbox rule does not apply to revocation; revocation sent by post does not take effect until received by offeree. An offer cannot be revoked after it has been accepted-> Byrone v Tienhoven (1880)
Byrne v Tienhoven (1880)
On October 1st Van Tienhoven mailed a proposal to sell 1000 boxes of tin plates to Byrne at a fixed price. On October 8th, Van Tienhoven mailed a revocation of offer, however that revocation was not received until the 20th. In the interim, on October 11th, Byrne received the original offer and accepted by telegram and turned around and resold the merchandise to a third party on the 15th. Byrne brought an action for non-performance.What is the relation between the postal acceptance rule and revocation?Lindley held that the revocation of the offer was not effective until it had been communicated to Byrne. While the postal rule remains good law for acceptance, he finds no support for the premise that revocation of an offer is also completed once it has been put in the mail. As a result, the revocation was not communicated to Byrne until the 20th, at which point the contract was already formed and thus the revocation is of no effect. To rule otherwise would be impractical for commercial realities.Revocation must be communicated to the offeree so that the offeree has knowledge of the revocation.Mere posting of a revocation is not sufficient communication.
Holwell v Hughes (1974
Dr Hughes granted Holwell Securities an option to purchase his house for £45,000. The option was to be exercisable ‘by notice in writing’ within 6 months. Five days before the expiry, Holwell posted a letter exercising the option. This letter was never received by Hughes. Holwell sought to enforce the option relying on the postal rule stating the acceptance took place before the expiry of the optionBy requiring ‘notice in writing’, Dr Hughes had specified that he had to actually receive the communication and had therefore excluded the postal rule
Tinn v Hoffman (1873)=
The defendant, Mr Hoffman wrote to the complainant, Mr Tinn with an offer to sell him 800 tons of iron for the price of 69s per ton. He requested a reply to this offer by post. On the same day, without knowing of this offer, Mr Tin also wrote to Mr Hoffman. He offered to buy the iron on similar terms. This case concerned the validity of these two cross offers.The issue in this case was whether there was a valid contract between Mr Tinn and Mr Hoffman for the sale of the iron. There was also the issue if acceptance had to be by post for it to be valid, as this was specified in the offer.if offeree gets quicker way to accept it will be valid even though it has not been made in stipulated manner.It was held in this case that there was no contract between Mr Tinn and Mr Hoffman for the iron. The cross offers were made simultaneously and without knowledge of one another; this was not a contract that would bind the parties for the iron. There is a difference between a cross offer and a counter offer. In order to form a valid contract, there must be communication that consists of an offer and acceptance. There was no acceptance by post, as had been stated in the offer. The court also said that while post had been indicated in the offer, another equally fast method would have been successful, such as a telegram or verbal message.