Contract Law Flashcards
Partridge V Crittenden (1968)=
Originally a criminal case concerning the wild birds Act (1954) which made a criminal offense to sell wild birds.An advertisement was published by the defendant in which an advertised cox and henges 25 shilling each.The person was convicted because in breach of the act. He appealed and without denying the facts he appealed on the interpretation of the law by way of case stated Originally a criminal case concerning the wild birds Act (1954) which made a criminal offense to sell wild birds.An advertisement was published by the defendant in which an advertised cox and henges 25 shilling each.The person was convicted because in breach of the act. He appealed and without denying the facts he appealed on the interpretation of the law by way of case stated Originally a criminal case concerning the wild birds Act (1954) which made a criminal offense to sell wild birds.An advertisement was published by the defendant in which an advertised cox and henges 25 shilling each.The person was convicted because in breach of the act. He appealed and without denying the facts he appealed on the interpretation of the law by way of case stated Originally a criminal case concerning the wild birds Act (1954) which made a criminal offense to sell wild birds.An advertisement was published by the defendant in which an advertised cox and henges 25 shilling each.The person was convicted because in breach of the act. He appealed and without denying the facts he appealed on the interpretation of the law by way of case stated that there was no breach of the protection of wild birds act because an advertisement was not a sell nor an offer.that there was no breach of the protection of wild birds act because an advertisement was not a sell nor an offer.that there was no breach of the protection of wild birds act because an advertisement was not a sell nor an offer.that there was no breach of the protection of wild birds act because an advertisement was not a sell nor an offer.
R v Goldman (2001)=
The defendant’s conviction for an offence of attempting to incite another to distribute indecent photographs of children under 16 was safe because the defendant’s response to an advertisement was an offer capable of constituting incitement. An advertisement is not normally considered to be an offer BUT AN INVITATION TO TREAT.
Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co (1893)= Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co (1893)= Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co (1893)= Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co (1893)=
Newspaper published what seemed to be an advertisement in which they proposed a smoke ball as a sure protection against catching flue giving precise instructions as how to use it.Mrs Carlill saw it, read it thoroughly :“if you buy and use you will not catch the influenza.But should you catch it we will give you 100£”. The Court of Appeal held that Mrs Carlill was entitled to the reward as the advert constituted an offer of a unilateral contract which she had accepted by performing the conditions stated in the offer. The court rejected all the arguments put forward by the defendants for the following reasons:1. The statement referring to the deposit of £1,000 demonstrated intent and therefore it was not a mere sales puff.2. It is quite possible to make an offer to the world.3. In unilateral contracts there is no requirement that the offeree communicates an intention to accept, since acceptance is through full performance 4. Whilst there may be some ambiguity in the wording this was capable of being resolved by applying a reasonable time limit or confining it to anythose who caught flu while using the balls.
Dickinson v dodds
The defendant offered to sell his house to the claimant and promised to keep the offer open until Friday. On the Thursday the defendant accepted an offer from a third party to purchase the house. The defendant then asked a friend to tell the claimant that the offer was withdrawn. On hearing the news, the claimant went round to the claimant’s house first thing Friday morning purporting to accept the offer. He then brought an action seeking specific performance of the contract.Held:The offer had been effectively revoked. Therefore no contract existed between the parties. There was no obligation to keep the offer open until Friday since the claimant had provided no consideration in exchange for the promise.The offeror is free to withdraw the offer at any time before acceptance takes place unless a deposit has been paid.
Harvey v Facey(1893)
harvey sent telegram to facey which stated “ will you sell us bumper-hall ? Telegraph lowest cash-price answer paid”.Facey replied by telegram “lowest price for bumper hall 900£”.Harvey then replied “we agree to buy bumper hall pen for the sum if nine hundred pountds asked by you. Please send us your title deed in order we may get early posession”.The Privy Council held that there was no contract concluded between the parties. Facey had not directly answered the first question as to whether they would sell and the lowest price stated was merely responding to a request for information not an offer. There was thus no evidence of anintentionthat the telegram sent by Facey was to be an offer
Gibson v Manchester city council (1979)
Manchester City Councilwas being run by theConservative Party, which was running apolicy of selling council housesto the occupants. Mr. Gibson applied for details of his house price and mortgage terms on a form of the council. In February 1971, the treasurer replied,”The corporation may be prepared to sell the house to you at the purchase price of £2,725 less 20% = £2,180 (freehold)… This letter should not be regarded as a firm offer of a mortgage. If you would like to make formal application to buy your Council house please complete the enclosed application form and return it to me as soon as possible.”n March 1971, Mr Gibson completed the application form, except for the date which his lease was to end, and returned it to the council. In May, the Labour party came back to power and halted new sales. Mr Gibson was told that he could not complete the purchase. So Mr Gibson sued the council, arguing that a binding contract had already come into force.Manchester City Councilwas being run by theConservative Party, which was running apolicy of selling council housesto the occupants. Mr. Gibson applied for details of his house price and mortgage terms on a form of the council. In February 1971, the treasurer replied,”The corporation may be prepared to sell the house to you at the purchase price of £2,725 less 20% = £2,180 (freehold)… This letter should not be regarded as a firm offer of a mortgage. If you would like to make formal application to buy your Council house please complete the enclosed application form and return it to me as soon as possible.”n March 1971, Mr Gibson completed the application form, except for the date which his lease was to end, and returned it to the council. In May, the Labour party came back to power and halted new sales. Mr Gibson was told that he could not complete the purchase. So Mr Gibson sued the council, arguing that a binding contract had already come into force.Manchester City Councilwas being run by theConservative Party, which was running apolicy of selling council housesto the occupants. Mr. Gibson applied for details of his house price and mortgage terms on a form of the council. In February 1971, the treasurer replied,”The corporation may be prepared to sell the house to you at the purchase price of £2,725 less 20% = £2,180 (freehold)… This letter should not be regarded as a firm offer of a mortgage. If you would like to make formal application to buy your Council house please complete the enclosed application form and return it to me as soon as possible.”n March 1971, Mr Gibson completed the application form, except for the date which his lease was to end, and returned it to the council. In May, the Labour party came back to power and halted new sales. Mr Gibson was told that he could not complete the purchase. So Mr Gibson sued the council, arguing that a binding contract had already come into force.Manchester City Councilwas being run by theConservative Party, which was running apolicy of selling council housesto the occupants. Mr. Gibson applied for details of his house price and mortgage terms on a form of the council. In February 1971, the treasurer replied,”The corporation may be prepared to sell the house to you at the purchase price of £2,725 less 20% = £2,180 (freehold)… This letter should not be regarded as a firm offer of a mortgage. If you would like to make formal application to buy your Council house please complete the enclosed application form and return it to me as soon as possible.”n March 1971, Mr Gibson completed the application form, except for the date which his lease was to end, and returned it to the council. In May, the Labour party came back to power and halted new sales. Mr Gibson was told that he could not complete the purchase. So Mr Gibson sued the council, arguing that a binding contract had already come into force.Gibson v Manchester City Council[1979]UKHL 6is anEnglish contract lawcase in which the House of Lords strongly reasserted that agreement only exists when there is a clear offer mirrored by a clear acceptance.Gibson v Manchester City Council[1979]UKHL 6is anEnglish contract lawcase in which the House of Lords strongly reasserted that agreement only exists when there is a clear offer mirrored by a clear acceptance.Gibson v Manchester City Council[1979]UKHL 6is anEnglish contract lawcase in which the House of Lords strongly reasserted that agreement only exists when there is a clear offer mirrored by a clear acceptance.Gibson v Manchester City Council[1979]UKHL 6is anEnglish contract lawcase in which the House of Lords strongly reasserted that agreement only exists when there is a clear offer mirrored by a clear acceptance.
Shuey v US (1875)
secretary of war published offer of reward for information leading to arrest of criminals.Offer mode on 28th april , on the 21st nvovember offer revoked.The next year someone provided some informationsecretary of war published offer of reward for information leading to arrest of criminals.Offer mode on 28th april , on the 21st nvovember offer revoked.The next year someone provided some informationsecretary of war published offer of reward for information leading to arrest of criminals.Offer mode on 28th april , on the 21st nvovember offer revoked.The next year someone provided some informationsecretary of war published offer of reward for information leading to arrest of criminals.Offer mode on 28th april , on the 21st nvovember offer revoked.The next year someone provided some informationit was held that the withdrawal had been made through the same channel and the offer no longer held by the time the pliaitff had provided the information. If it can be shown he knew of the revocation the revocation would be effective
Timothy v Simpson (1834)=
Timothy saw a clothing item with a price tag , walked into the shop but the offerer said it was actually more expensive.Timothy replied that the law said that the item had to be sold at the price in the shop window. Timothy was arrested, put in custody but sued for breach of contractDisplays of goods in window shops are mere invitations to treat
Pharmaceutical Society of GB v Boots cash Chemists (1953
Boots introduced the then new self service system into their shops whereby customers would pick up goods from the shelf put them in their basket and then take them to the cash till to pay. The Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain brought an action to determine the legality of the system with regard to the sale of pharmaceutical products which were required by law to be sold in the presence of a pharmacist. The court thus needed to determine where the contract came into existence.Goods on the shelf constitute an invitation to treat not an offer. A customer takes the goods to the till and makes an offer to purchase. The shop assistant then chooses whether to accept the offer. The contract is therefore concluded at the till in the presence of a pharmacist.
Payne v cave (1789)=
Mr Cave made the highest bid for Mr Payne’s goods at an auction. But then, Mr Cave changed his mind and he withdrew his bid before the auctioneer brought down his hammer.It was held that Mr. Cave, the defendant, was not bound to purchase the goods. His bid amounted to an offer which he was entitled to withdraw at any time before the auctioneer signified acceptance by knocking down the hammer. Note: The common law rule laid down in this case has now been codified in many countries in variations of the Sale of Goods Act, e.g. UK 1979 s57(2).Payne v Cave(1789) 3 TR 148 is an oldEnglish contract lawcase, which stands for the proposition that an auctioneer’s request for bids is not an offer but aninvitation to treat. The bidders make the offers which can be accepted by the auctioneer.Payne v Cave(1789) 3 TR 148 is an oldEnglish contract lawcase, which stands for the proposition that an auctioneer’s request for bids is not an offer but aninvitation to treat. The bidders make the offers which can be accepted by the auctioneer.Payne v Cave(1789) 3 TR 148 is an oldEnglish contract lawcase, which stands for the proposition that an auctioneer’s request for bids is not an offer but aninvitation to treat. The bidders make the offers which can be accepted by the auctioneer.Payne v Cave(1789) 3 TR 148 is an oldEnglish contract lawcase, which stands for the proposition that an auctioneer’s request for bids is not an offer but aninvitation to treat. The bidders make the offers which can be accepted by the auctioneer.
Harris v Nickerson (1873
The Defendant placed an advertisement inLondonpapers that certain items, including brewing equipment and office furniture, would be placed up for auction over three days inBury St. Edmunds. The Plaintiff obtained a commission to buy the office furniture and expended time and expense to travel to Bury St. Edmunds to bid for the office furniture. On the third day, the lots for the office furniture were withdrawn. The Plaintiff sued for loss of time and expense. The judge at first instance found in favour of the Plaintiff. Leave was given to appeal to theHigh Court.The Defendant placed an advertisement inLondonpapers that certain items, including brewing equipment and office furniture, would be placed up for auction over three days inBury St. Edmunds. The Plaintiff obtained a commission to buy the office furniture and expended time and expense to travel to Bury St. Edmunds to bid for the office furniture. On the third day, the lots for the office furniture were withdrawn. The Plaintiff sued for loss of time and expense. The judge at first instance found in favour of the Plaintiff. Leave was given to appeal to theHigh Court.The Defendant placed an advertisement inLondonpapers that certain items, including brewing equipment and office furniture, would be placed up for auction over three days inBury St. Edmunds. The Plaintiff obtained a commission to buy the office furniture and expended time and expense to travel to Bury St. Edmunds to bid for the office furniture. On the third day, the lots for the office furniture were withdrawn. The Plaintiff sued for loss of time and expense. The judge at first instance found in favour of the Plaintiff. Leave was given to appeal to theHigh Court.The Defendant placed an advertisement inLondonpapers that certain items, including brewing equipment and office furniture, would be placed up for auction over three days inBury St. Edmunds. The Plaintiff obtained a commission to buy the office furniture and expended time and expense to travel to Bury St. Edmunds to bid for the office furniture. On the third day, the lots for the office furniture were withdrawn. The Plaintiff sued for loss of time and expense. The judge at first instance found in favour of the Plaintiff. Leave was given to appeal to theHigh Court.Harris v Nickerson(1873) is anEnglish law caseconcerning the requirements ofoffer and acceptancein the formation of acontract. The case established that an advertisement that goods will be put up forauctiondoes not constitute anofferto any person that the goods will actually be put up, and that the advertiser is therefore free to withdraw the goods from the auction at any time prior to the auction..Harris v Nickerson(1873) is anEnglish law caseconcerning the requirements ofoffer and acceptancein the formation of acontract. The case established that an advertisement that goods will be put up forauctiondoes not constitute anofferto any person that the goods will actually be put up, and that the advertiser is therefore free to withdraw the goods from the auction at any time prior to the auction..Harris v Nickerson(1873) is anEnglish law caseconcerning the requirements ofoffer and acceptancein the formation of acontract. The case established that an advertisement that goods will be put up forauctiondoes not constitute anofferto any person that the goods will actually be put up, and that the advertiser is therefore free to withdraw the goods from the auction at any time prior to the auction..Harris v Nickerson(1873) is anEnglish law caseconcerning the requirements ofoffer and acceptancein the formation of acontract. The case established that an advertisement that goods will be put up forauctiondoes not constitute anofferto any person that the goods will actually be put up, and that the advertiser is therefore free to withdraw the goods from the auction at any time prior to the auction..
Barry v Davies 2001
The auctioneer withdrew goods from an auction (the goods had no reserve price) when abona fidebid of £200 was effective. The court held that an auctioneer is bound to sell to the highest bidder where there is no reserve price, and can’t withdraw the sale simply because the price is too low. A bid in an auction, the possibility of acceptance of the bid, unless the bid is withdrawn, and the benefit to the auctioneer of driving up the price bid is sufficientconsideration. The contract in an auction is between the buyer and the seller, not the buyer and the auctioneer, although the buyer has acollateral agreementwith the auctioneer.The auctioneer withdrew goods from an auction (the goods had no reserve price) when abona fidebid of £200 was effective. The court held that an auctioneer is bound to sell to the highest bidder where there is no reserve price, and can’t withdraw the sale simply because the price is too low. A bid in an auction, the possibility of acceptance of the bid, unless the bid is withdrawn, and the benefit to the auctioneer of driving up the price bid is sufficientconsideration. The contract in an auction is between the buyer and the seller, not the buyer and the auctioneer, although the buyer has acollateral agreementwith the auctioneer.The auctioneer withdrew goods from an auction (the goods had no reserve price) when abona fidebid of £200 was effective. The court held that an auctioneer is bound to sell to the highest bidder where there is no reserve price, and can’t withdraw the sale simply because the price is too low. A bid in an auction, the possibility of acceptance of the bid, unless the bid is withdrawn, and the benefit to the auctioneer of driving up the price bid is sufficientconsideration. The contract in an auction is between the buyer and the seller, not the buyer and the auctioneer, although the buyer has acollateral agreementwith the auctioneer.The auctioneer withdrew goods from an auction (the goods had no reserve price) when abona fidebid of £200 was effective. The court held that an auctioneer is bound to sell to the highest bidder where there is no reserve price, and can’t withdraw the sale simply because the price is too low. A bid in an auction, the possibility of acceptance of the bid, unless the bid is withdrawn, and the benefit to the auctioneer of driving up the price bid is sufficientconsideration. The contract in an auction is between the buyer and the seller, not the buyer and the auctioneer, although the buyer has acollateral agreementwith the auctioneer.Theremedyis the difference between the contract value, and the current market value of the goods under theSale of Goods Act 1979s51(3). The value in this case was £27,600.Theremedyis the difference between the contract value, and the current market value of the goods under theSale of Goods Act 1979s51(3). The value in this case was £27,600.Theremedyis the difference between the contract value, and the current market value of the goods under theSale of Goods Act 1979s51(3). The value in this case was £27,600.Theremedyis the difference between the contract value, and the current market value of the goods under theSale of Goods Act 1979s51(3). The value in this case was £27,600.
Hyde v Wrency (1840)
The defendant offered to sell a farm to the claimant for £1,000. The claimant in reply offered £950 which the defendant refused. The claimant then sought to accept the original offer of £1,000. The defendant refused to sell to the claimant and the claimant brought an action for specific performance.There was no contract. Where a counter offer is made this destroys the original offer so that it is no longer open to the offeree to accept
This has been distinguished from providing information in Stevenson v Mclean (1880)
The defendant held documents of title to certain quantities of iron and offered to sell them to the plaintiff for 40/- cash, indicating that the offer would be held open until the following Monday. The plaintiff was a broker and would only buy once they had lined up a buyer to take from them.On Monday at 9:42am P sent a telegram to D sounding out what flexibility there might be to negotiate before the days trading got under way. The market was unstable and P wanted to know the negotiating range.”Please wire whether you would accept 40 for delivery over 2 months, if not, longest time limit.”There was no response from D and P later purported to accept the original offer. D claimed that the acceptance was not effective as their telegram had rejected the offer by way of counter-offerThe defendant held documents of title to certain quantities of iron and offered to sell them to the plaintiff for 40/- cash, indicating that the offer would be held open until the following Monday. The plaintiff was a broker and would only buy once they had lined up a buyer to take from them.On Monday at 9:42am P sent a telegram to D sounding out what flexibility there might be to negotiate before the days trading got under way. The market was unstable and P wanted to know the negotiating range.”Please wire whether you would accept 40 for delivery over 2 months, if not, longest time limit.”There was no response from D and P later purported to accept the original offer. D claimed that the acceptance was not effective as their telegram had rejected the offer by way of counter-offerThe defendant held documents of title to certain quantities of iron and offered to sell them to the plaintiff for 40/- cash, indicating that the offer would be held open until the following Monday. The plaintiff was a broker and would only buy once they had lined up a buyer to take from them.On Monday at 9:42am P sent a telegram to D sounding out what flexibility there might be to negotiate before the days trading got under way. The market was unstable and P wanted to know the negotiating range.”Please wire whether you would accept 40 for delivery over 2 months, if not, longest time limit.”There was no response from D and P later purported to accept the original offer. D claimed that the acceptance was not effective as their telegram had rejected the offer by way of counter-offerThe defendant held documents of title to certain quantities of iron and offered to sell them to the plaintiff for 40/- cash, indicating that the offer would be held open until the following Monday. The plaintiff was a broker and would only buy once they had lined up a buyer to take from them.On Monday at 9:42am P sent a telegram to D sounding out what flexibility there might be to negotiate before the days trading got under way. The market was unstable and P wanted to know the negotiating range.”Please wire whether you would accept 40 for delivery over 2 months, if not, longest time limit.”There was no response from D and P later purported to accept the original offer. D claimed that the acceptance was not effective as their telegram had rejected the offer by way of counter-offerThis case should be distinguished fromHyde v Wrench(1840). In that case D had offered his estate for £1000. P offered to pay £950. When this was refused, P then purported to agree to pay the full £1000. P could not claim the estate, because his original counter-offer had put an end to D’s offer.Here, the telegram was not a counter-proposal, but a mere inquiry “which should have been answered” [morally or legally?]. It was not as a rejection of the offer.Pothierhas suggested a more subjective view. He has argued that if the offeror changes their mind (but does not communicate this) before acceptance, then at the moment of acceptance, there is no meeting of minds, and therefore no contract (Cooke v Oxley).However a more objective view is preferable. Once an offer is made, it is taken to be continuing each moment until accepted or withdrawn. The law will regard the intention evidenced in the offer as continuing, until notice of its revocation has been communicated to the other party. As stated inByrne v Van Tienhoven(1880)”an uncommunicated revocation is, for all practical purposes and in point of law, no revocation at all”.As no notice of withdrawal was given by the offeror, the P could regard it as a continuing offer, and their acceptance of it made the contract complete.This case should be distinguished fromHyde v Wrench(1840). In that case D had offered his estate for £1000. P offered to pay £950. When this was refused, P then purported to agree to pay the full £1000. P could not claim the estate, because his original counter-offer had put an end to D’s offer.Here, the telegram was not a counter-proposal, but a mere inquiry “which should have been answered” [morally or legally?]. It was not as a rejection of the offer.Pothierhas suggested a more subjective view. He has argued that if the offeror changes their mind (but does not communicate this) before acceptance, then at the moment of acceptance, there is no meeting of minds, and therefore no contract (Cooke v Oxley).However a more objective view is preferable. Once an offer is made, it is taken to be continuing each moment until accepted or withdrawn. The law will regard the intention evidenced in the offer as continuing, until notice of its revocation has been communicated to the other party. As stated inByrne v Van Tienhoven(1880)”an uncommunicated revocation is, for all practical purposes and in point of law, no revocation at all”.As no notice of withdrawal was given by the offeror, the P could regard it as a continuing offer, and their acceptance of it made the contract complete.This case should be distinguished fromHyde v Wrench(1840). In that case D had offered his estate for £1000. P offered to pay £950. When this was refused, P then purported to agree to pay the full £1000. P could not claim the estate, because his original counter-offer had put an end to D’s offer.Here, the telegram was not a counter-proposal, but a mere inquiry “which should have been answered” [morally or legally?]. It was not as a rejection of the offer.Pothierhas suggested a more subjective view. He has argued that if the offeror changes their mind (but does not communicate this) before acceptance, then at the moment of acceptance, there is no meeting of minds, and therefore no contract (Cooke v Oxley).However a more objective view is preferable. Once an offer is made, it is taken to be continuing each moment until accepted or withdrawn. The law will regard the intention evidenced in the offer as continuing, until notice of its revocation has been communicated to the other party. As stated inByrne v Van Tienhoven(1880)”an uncommunicated revocation is, for all practical purposes and in point of law, no revocation at all”.As no notice of withdrawal was given by the offeror, the P could regard it as a continuing offer, and their acceptance of it made the contract complete.This case should be distinguished fromHyde v Wrench(1840). In that case D had offered his estate for £1000. P offered to pay £950. When this was refused, P then purported to agree to pay the full £1000. P could not claim the estate, because his original counter-offer had put an end to D’s offer.Here, the telegram was not a counter-proposal, but a mere inquiry “which should have been answered” [morally or legally?]. It was not as a rejection of the offer.Pothierhas suggested a more subjective view. He has argued that if the offeror changes their mind (but does not communicate this) before acceptance, then at the moment of acceptance, there is no meeting of minds, and therefore no contract (Cooke v Oxley).However a more objective view is preferable. Once an offer is made, it is taken to be continuing each moment until accepted or withdrawn. The law will regard the intention evidenced in the offer as continuing, until notice of its revocation has been communicated to the other party. As stated inByrne v Van Tienhoven(1880)”an uncommunicated revocation is, for all practical purposes and in point of law, no revocation at all”.As no notice of withdrawal was given by the offeror, the P could regard it as a continuing offer, and their acceptance of it made the contract complete.
Butler machine tool co v ex cell o corporation (1969
The offer to sell the machine on terms provided by Butler was destroyed by the counter offer made by Ex-Cell-O. Therefore the price variation clause was not part of the contract. The contract was concluded on Ex-Cell-O’s terms since Butler signed the acknowledgement slip accepting those terms. Where there is a battle of the forms whereby each party submits their own terms the last shot rule applies whereby a contract is concluded on the terms submitted by the party who is the last to communicate those terms before performance of the contract commences.Where there is a battle of the forms whereby each party submits their own terms the last shot rule applies whereby a contract is concluded on the terms submitted by the party who is the last to communicate those terms before performance of the contract commences.Where there is a battle of the forms whereby each party submits their own terms the last shot rule applies whereby a contract is concluded on the terms submitted by the party who is the last to communicate those terms before performance of the contract commences.Where there is a battle of the forms whereby each party submits their own terms the last shot rule applies whereby a contract is concluded on the terms submitted by the party who is the last to communicate those terms before performance of the contract commences.
entores v miles far east corporation (1955)
The claimant sent a telex message from England offering to purchase 100 tons of Cathodes from the defendants in Holland. The defendant sent back a telex from Holland to the London office accepting that offer. The question for the court was at what point the contract came into existence. If the acceptance was effective from the time the telex was sent the contract was made in Holland and Dutch law would apply. If the acceptance took place when the telex was received in London then the contract would be governed by English law.To amount to an effective acceptance the acceptance needed to be communicated to the offeree. Therefore the contract was made in England.:“if the offerer was on the bank of a river and shouted his offer to the offeree on the other bank of the river and the offeree accepted but at the same time an airplane flew over there would be no formation of contract because the acceptance would have failed to be communicated
Taylor v Laird (1856
nTaylor v Laird (1856)the captain of a ship resigned during a voyage. The former captain provided navigation services for the remainder of the voyage even though this had not been requested by the owner of the ship. The former captain later claimed in the courts for proper remuneration for his services from the owner. The captain had not communicated his offer to provide such services. As such the owner did not have the opportunity to refuse or accept the offer as he had no knowledge of its existence. There was no binding contract.nTaylor v Laird (1856)the captain of a ship resigned during a voyage. The former captain provided navigation services for the remainder of the voyage even though this had not been requested by the owner of the ship. The former captain later claimed in the courts for proper remuneration for his services from the owner. The captain had not communicated his offer to provide such services. As such the owner did not have the opportunity to refuse or accept the offer as he had no knowledge of its existence. There was no binding contract.nTaylor v Laird (1856)the captain of a ship resigned during a voyage. The former captain provided navigation services for the remainder of the voyage even though this had not been requested by the owner of the ship. The former captain later claimed in the courts for proper remuneration for his services from the owner. The captain had not communicated his offer to provide such services. As such the owner did not have the opportunity to refuse or accept the offer as he had no knowledge of its existence. There was no binding contract.The court held that the claimant was not entitled to wages for the return journey on the basis that he had not entered into any contractual agreement with the defendant for the performance of his work as an ordinary crew member. The defendant had not received any communication or offer of work in this capacity from the claimant, and there was therefore no basis for a contract. The court reasoned that it would be unjust to hold a party bound by an offer which he had not been made aware of, and therefore had no opportunity to accept or reject; as such it is not possible in English contract law to accept an offer ‘in ignorance’.owners said there was no offer, no new contract. (went to help them by himself)The court held that the claimant was not entitled to wages for the return journey on the basis that he had not entered into any contractual agreement with the defendant for the performance of his work as an ordinary crew member. The defendant had not received any communication or offer of work in this capacity from the claimant, and there was therefore no basis for a contract. The court reasoned that it would be unjust to hold a party bound by an offer which he had not been made aware of, and therefore had no opportunity to accept or reject; as such it is not possible in English contract law to accept an offer ‘in ignorance’.owners said there was no offer, no new contract. (went to help them by himself)The court held that the claimant was not entitled to wages for the return journey on the basis that he had not entered into any contractual agreement with the defendant for the performance of his work as an ordinary crew member. The defendant had not received any communication or offer of work in this capacity from the claimant, and there was therefore no basis for a contract. The court reasoned that it would be unjust to hold a party bound by an offer which he had not been made aware of, and therefore had no opportunity to accept or reject; as such it is not possible in English contract law to accept an offer ‘in ignorance’.owners said there was no offer, no new contract. (went to help them by himself)
Felthouse v Bindley (1862)
uncle + nephew->uncle was interested in buying the horse et wrote to the nephew “if I hear no more about it I consider the horse mine”.Nephew didn’t answerbut sold the horse to a 3rd party.The uncle sued the owner for a tort of conversion.uncle + nephew->uncle was interested in buying the horse et wrote to the nephew “if I hear no more about it I consider the horse mine”.Nephew didn’t answerbut sold the horse to a 3rd party.The uncle sued the owner for a tort of conversion.uncle + nephew->uncle was interested in buying the horse et wrote to the nephew “if I hear no more about it I consider the horse mine”.Nephew didn’t answerbut sold the horse to a 3rd party.The uncle sued the owner for a tort of conversion.The court held that there had been no contract between plaintiff and nephew => necessity of communication. There was no contract. You cannot have silence as acceptance.The court held that there had been no contract between plaintiff and nephew => necessity of communication. There was no contract. You cannot have silence as acceptance.The court held that there had been no contract between plaintiff and nephew => necessity of communication. There was no contract. You cannot have silence as acceptance.
Wilkie v London passenger Transport Board (1947)
when passenger steps on bus he accepts offer the bus to move from one stop to the other.acceptance could be affected simply by contact
Adams v Lindsell (1818)=
The defendant wrote to the claimant offering to sell them some wool and asking for a reply ‘in the course of post’. The letter was delayed in the post. On receiving the letter the claimant posted a letter of acceptance the same day. However, due to the delay the defendant’s had assumed the claimant was not interested in the wool and sold it on to a third party. The claimant sued for breach of contract.The defendant wrote to the claimant offering to sell them some wool and asking for a reply ‘in the course of post’. The letter was delayed in the post. On receiving the letter the claimant posted a letter of acceptance the same day. However, due to the delay the defendant’s had assumed the claimant was not interested in the wool and sold it on to a third party. The claimant sued for breach of contract.The defendant wrote to the claimant offering to sell them some wool and asking for a reply ‘in the course of post’. The letter was delayed in the post. On receiving the letter the claimant posted a letter of acceptance the same day. However, due to the delay the defendant’s had assumed the claimant was not interested in the wool and sold it on to a third party. The claimant sued for breach of contract.There was a valid contract which came in to existence the moment the letter of acceptance was placed in the post box.This case established the postal rule. This applies where post is the agreed form of communication between the parties and the letter of acceptance is correctly addressed and carries the right postage stamp. The acceptance then becomes effective when the letter is posted.It was held that in the case of communication by post the contract is formed at the very moment the letter is put in the box. The offerer may well never receive it and still be bound so long as there is proof.There was a valid contract which came in to existence the moment the letter of acceptance was placed in the post box.This case established the postal rule. This applies where post is the agreed form of communication between the parties and the letter of acceptance is correctly addressed and carries the right postage stamp. The acceptance then becomes effective when the letter is posted.It was held that in the case of communication by post the contract is formed at the very moment the letter is put in the box. The offerer may well never receive it and still be bound so long as there is proof.There was a valid contract which came in to existence the moment the letter of acceptance was placed in the post box.This case established the postal rule. This applies where post is the agreed form of communication between the parties and the letter of acceptance is correctly addressed and carries the right postage stamp. The acceptance then becomes effective when the letter is posted.It was held that in the case of communication by post the contract is formed at the very moment the letter is put in the box. The offerer may well never receive it and still be bound so long as there is proof.
Household fire and carriage accident insurance (1879)=
Mr Grant applied for shares in the Household Fire and Carriage Accident Insurance Company. The company allotted the shares to the defendant, and duly addressed to him, posting a letter containing the notice of allotment. The letter was lost in the post and he never received the acceptance. Later the company went bankrupt, and asked Mr Grant for the outstanding payments on the shares, which he refused saying there was no binding contract. The liquidator sued. The question was whether Mr Grant’s offer for shares had been validly accepted and as such whether he was he legally bound to pay.A letter of revocation must reach the offeree, the acceptance must only be sent The mailbox rule does not apply to revocation; revocation sent by post does not take effect until received by offeree. An offer cannot be revoked after it has been accepted-> Byrone v Tienhoven (1880)A letter of revocation must reach the offeree, the acceptance must only be sent The mailbox rule does not apply to revocation; revocation sent by post does not take effect until received by offeree. An offer cannot be revoked after it has been accepted-> Byrone v Tienhoven (1880)A letter of revocation must reach the offeree, the acceptance must only be sent The mailbox rule does not apply to revocation; revocation sent by post does not take effect until received by offeree. An offer cannot be revoked after it has been accepted-> Byrone v Tienhoven (1880)
Byrne v Tienhoven (1880)
On October 1st Van Tienhoven mailed a proposal to sell 1000 boxes of tin plates to Byrne at a fixed price. On October 8th, Van Tienhoven mailed a revocation of offer, however that revocation was not received until the 20th. In the interim, on October 11th, Byrne received the original offer and accepted by telegram and turned around and resold the merchandise to a third party on the 15th. Byrne brought an action for non-performance.What is the relation between the postal acceptance rule and revocation?Lindley held that the revocation of the offer was not effective until it had been communicated to Byrne. While the postal rule remains good law for acceptance, he finds no support for the premise that revocation of an offer is also completed once it has been put in the mail. As a result, the revocation was not communicated to Byrne until the 20th, at which point the contract was already formed and thus the revocation is of no effect. To rule otherwise would be impractical for commercial realities.Revocation must be communicated to the offeree so that the offeree has knowledge of the revocation.Mere posting of a revocation is not sufficient communication.
Holwell v Hughes (1974
Dr Hughes granted Holwell Securities an option to purchase his house for £45,000. The option was to be exercisable ‘by notice in writing’ within 6 months. Five days before the expiry, Holwell posted a letter exercising the option. This letter was never received by Hughes. Holwell sought to enforce the option relying on the postal rule stating the acceptance took place before the expiry of the optionBy requiring ‘notice in writing’, Dr Hughes had specified that he had to actually receive the communication and had therefore excluded the postal rule
Tinn v Hoffman (1873)=
The defendant, Mr Hoffman wrote to the complainant, Mr Tinn with an offer to sell him 800 tons of iron for the price of 69s per ton. He requested a reply to this offer by post. On the same day, without knowing of this offer, Mr Tin also wrote to Mr Hoffman. He offered to buy the iron on similar terms. This case concerned the validity of these two cross offers.The issue in this case was whether there was a valid contract between Mr Tinn and Mr Hoffman for the sale of the iron. There was also the issue if acceptance had to be by post for it to be valid, as this was specified in the offer.if offeree gets quicker way to accept it will be valid even though it has not been made in stipulated manner.It was held in this case that there was no contract between Mr Tinn and Mr Hoffman for the iron. The cross offers were made simultaneously and without knowledge of one another; this was not a contract that would bind the parties for the iron. There is a difference between a cross offer and a counter offer. In order to form a valid contract, there must be communication that consists of an offer and acceptance. There was no acceptance by post, as had been stated in the offer. The court also said that while post had been indicated in the offer, another equally fast method would have been successful, such as a telegram or verbal message.
The Brimnes (1975)=
The telex was sent within business hours but read only the next morning. IS the contract formed when the communication is affected or when it could have been affected.The contract was formed when it could have been read and not when it was actually read.
Payne v cave (1789)=
Withdrew before the auctionner had struck the hammer downA counter-offer cancels the original offer .if unreasonable delay court may consider that the offer has lapsed
-> Ramsgate Victoria Hotel v Montefiore (1866)=
Offers to buy shares in the plaintiff’s company , he accepted to sell shares but 5 months later.The court held the offer had lapsed because of unreasonable delay.
Currie v Misa (1875)
A company named Lizardi & Co,then in good credit in the City, sold fourbills of exchangeto Mr Misa, drawn from a bank inCadiz. Mr Currie was the owner of the banking firm and the plaintiff bringing the action. The bills of exchange were sold on the 11th of February, and by the custom of bill, brokers were to be paid for on the first foreign post-day following the day of the sale. That first day was the 14th of February. Lizardi & Co. was much in debt to his banking firm, and being pressed to reduce his balance, gave to the banker a draft or order on Mr Misa for the amount of the four bills. This draft or order was dated on the 14th, though it was, in fact, written on the 13th, and then delivered to the banker. On the morning of the 14th the manager of Misa’s business gave a cheque for the amount of the order, which was then given up to him. Lizardi failed, and on the afternoon of the 14th the manager, learning that fact, stopped payment of the cheque.A company named Lizardi & Co,then in good credit in the City, sold fourbills of exchangeto Mr Misa, drawn from a bank inCadiz. Mr Currie was the owner of the banking firm and the plaintiff bringing the action. The bills of exchange were sold on the 11th of February, and by the custom of bill, brokers were to be paid for on the first foreign post-day following the day of the sale. That first day was the 14th of February. Lizardi & Co. was much in debt to his banking firm, and being pressed to reduce his balance, gave to the banker a draft or order on Mr Misa for the amount of the four bills. This draft or order was dated on the 14th, though it was, in fact, written on the 13th, and then delivered to the banker. On the morning of the 14th the manager of Misa’s business gave a cheque for the amount of the order, which was then given up to him. Lizardi failed, and on the afternoon of the 14th the manager, learning that fact, stopped payment of the cheque.A company named Lizardi & Co,then in good credit in the City, sold fourbills of exchangeto Mr Misa, drawn from a bank inCadiz. Mr Currie was the owner of the banking firm and the plaintiff bringing the action. The bills of exchange were sold on the 11th of February, and by the custom of bill, brokers were to be paid for on the first foreign post-day following the day of the sale. That first day was the 14th of February. Lizardi & Co. was much in debt to his banking firm, and being pressed to reduce his balance, gave to the banker a draft or order on Mr Misa for the amount of the four bills. This draft or order was dated on the 14th, though it was, in fact, written on the 13th, and then delivered to the banker. On the morning of the 14th the manager of Misa’s business gave a cheque for the amount of the order, which was then given up to him. Lizardi failed, and on the afternoon of the 14th the manager, learning that fact, stopped payment of the cheque.Currie v Misa(1875) LR 10 Ex 153; (1875-76) LR 1 App Cas 554, is anEnglish contract lawcase, which in the Exchequer Chamber contains a famous statement byLush Jgiving the definition ofconsideration in English law. Lush J said,A valuable consideration, in the sense of the law, may consist either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility, given, suffered, or undertaken by the other..Currie v Misa(1875) LR 10 Ex 153; (1875-76) LR 1 App Cas 554, is anEnglish contract lawcase, which in the Exchequer Chamber contains a famous statement byLush Jgiving the definition ofconsideration in English law. Lush J said,A valuable consideration, in the sense of the law, may consist either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility, given, suffered, or undertaken by the other..Currie v Misa(1875) LR 10 Ex 153; (1875-76) LR 1 App Cas 554, is anEnglish contract lawcase, which in the Exchequer Chamber contains a famous statement byLush Jgiving the definition ofconsideration in English law. Lush J said,A valuable consideration, in the sense of the law, may consist either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility, given, suffered, or undertaken by the other..
Hanson’s interpretation of Combe v Combe (1951)= there was no contract because the 2 parties had not connected their undertakings Hanson’s interpretation of Combe v Combe (1951)= there was no contract because the 2 parties had not connected their undertakings Hanson’s interpretation of Combe v Combe (1951)= there was no contract because the 2 parties had not connected their undertakings
A husband promised to make maintenance payments to his estranged wife but failed to do so. The wife brought an action to enforce the promise invoking promissory estoppel.The husband promised his wife during divorce instance a permanent allowance, when she could in fact have applied judicially for a maintenance order but she didn’t immediately. The husband stopped paying, she sued him for breach of contract (promise to pay v forbearance of her right to obtain a maintenance order)It was argued successfully that there was no contract because not explicitely connected+ no consideration +Her action failed. There was no pre-existing agreement which was later modified by a promise. The wife sought to use promissory estoppel as sword and not a shield.
Price v Easton (1833)=
William Price agreed with Easton to do some work for him. But WP requested that the payment should be made to his brother John Price because WP owed him money. E failed to pay the money to JP who sued him for breach of contractHe wasn’t successful because he wasn’t a party to the contract, he had not provided consideration for E’s promise to pay.
Scotson v Pegg (1861)=
A purchaser of some coal paid the defendant to carry and to unload the coal. The claimant was the supplier of the coal who had also paid the defendant to carry and unload the coal. The claimant brought an action to recover the money paid arguing the defendant was already under an existing duty to carry and unload the coal and thus provided no consideration.An existing contractual duty owed to a 3rd party to the contract can amount to valid consideration for a new promise. Consequently the claimant could not recover the sums paid and the defendant was entitled to get paid twice for doing the same thing.= the performance of an obligation by one party under another contract can be sufficient consideration on another contract with another party. An existing contractual duty owed to a 3rd party to the contract can amount to valid consideration for a new promise. Consequently the claimant could not recover the sums paid and the defendant was entitled to get paid twice for doing the same thing.= the performance of an obligation by one party under another contract can be sufficient consideration on another contract with another party. An existing contractual duty owed to a 3rd party to the contract can amount to valid consideration for a new promise. Consequently the claimant could not recover the sums paid and the defendant was entitled to get paid twice for doing the same thing.= the performance of an obligation by one party under another contract can be sufficient consideration on another contract with another party.
Eastwood v Kenyon (1840)=
Following the death of John Sutcliffe, his estate went to his only child called Sarah. Being an infant she came under the protection of the executor of the will who started spending money for the benefit of Sarah , to improve the realty out of his own pocket, even had to borrow money (140£).When Sarah came of age she promised that she would pay his debt. She married Mr Kenyon who very nicely repeated the promise. BUT they didn’t pay. Eastwood brought suit and lost because the promise was made when sarah was adult. Promises are not sufficient to found a contract.Consideration made in the past is no consideration at all +Moral obligation does not constitute consideration
Roscola v Thomas (1842)
An agreement for the purchase of a horse had been completed between buyer and seller. Following the completion of the contract, the seller made a warranty that the horse was “free from vice”. Upon delivery, it was discovered by the buyer that the horse was vicious in behaviour. The buyer consequently sued”It may be taken as a general rule, subject to exceptions not applicable to this case, that the promise must be coextensive with the consideration… a consideration past and executed will support no other promise than such as would be implied by law.”The Court found for the defendant because his promise was unsupported by consideration. The consideration for the soundness warranty had already been made through the original contract of sale, and so new consideration would have had to be provided in order for the warranty to have legal effect. This decision demonstrates the rule in English contract law that consideration contracted for in the past does not amount to good consideration for a present agreement. notable case in English contract law which demonstrates that past conduct is not sufficient consideration to support a contract.”It may be taken as a general rule, subject to exceptions not applicable to this case, that the promise must be coextensive with the consideration… a consideration past and executed will support no other promise than such as would be implied by law.”The Court found for the defendant because his promise was unsupported by consideration. The consideration for the soundness warranty had already been made through the original contract of sale, and so new consideration would have had to be provided in order for the warranty to have legal effect. This decision demonstrates the rule in English contract law that consideration contracted for in the past does not amount to good consideration for a present agreement. notable case in English contract law which demonstrates that past conduct is not sufficient consideration to support a contract.
Re (=about) v Mcartle
a wife and her 3 grown-up children lived together in a house. The wife of one of the children did some interior decoration and all the children promised to pay her 488£ and even signed a document. The work is done at T1 and the promise at T2 but the consideration has already been performed= not a considerationThe promise to make payment came after the consideration had been performed therefore the promise to make payment was not binding
Lampleigh v Braithwait (1615)=
James the 1st was king. B had killed someone with a sentence of the death-penalty. B asked L to ask for the king’s pardon and L got it. Afterwards they agreed that B in consideration of L obtaining the pardon would pay him a sum of money but he didn’t. James the 1st was king. B had killed someone with a sentence of the death-penalty. B asked L to ask for the king’s pardon and L got it. Afterwards they agreed that B in consideration of L obtaining the pardon would pay him a sum of money but he didn’t. Whilst the promise to make payment came after the performance and was thus past consideration, the consideration was proceeded by a request from the defendant which meant the consideration was valid. The defendant was obliged to pay the claimant £100.
Collins v Godefroy (1831)=
Godefroy promised to pay C if C would attend court and give evidence for G. A witness can declare himself freely C was not in this situation he had been served a subpoena, he was under a public obligation to attend court and if he didn’t was exposed to punishment.G’s action failedC was not in this situation he had been served a subpoena, he was under a public obligation to attend court and if he didn’t was exposed to punishment.G’s action failed
Glassbrook brothers v glamorgan county council (1925)
The defendant owners of a colliery asked the police to provide protection during a miner’s strike. The police provided the protection as requested and provided the man power as directed by the defendants although they disputed the level of protection required to keep the peace. At the end of the strike the police submitted an invoice to cover the extra costs of providing the protection. The defendants refused to pay arguing that the police were under an existing public duty to provide protection and keep the peaceIn providing additional officers to that required, the police had gone beyond their existing duty. They were therefore entitled to payment
Stilk v Myrick (1809
The claimant was a seaman on a voyage from London to the Baltic and back. He was to be paid £5 per month. During the voyage two of the 12 crew deserted. The captain promised the remaining crew members that if they worked the ship undermanned as it was back to London he would divide the wages due to the deserters between them. The claimant agreed. The captain never made the extra payment promised.The claimant was under an existing duty to work the ship back to London and undertook to submit to all the emergencies that entailed. Therefore he had not provided any consideration for the promise for extra money. Consequently he was entitled to nothing.
Exceptions:Hartley v Ponsonbuy (1857)= Exceptions:Hartley v Ponsonbuy (1857)=
number of men employed under contract, 36 men on board, 19 deserted. Thought he could use Stilk v Myrick and promised more money but he didn’t. The court said that the case had to be distinguished because before it was 1/6 but now more than ½ so the amount of work was really considerable and sufficient consideration for the extra-money promised
Pinnel’s case (1602)=
The claimant was owed £8 10 shillings. The defendant paid £5 2 shillings and 2p. The claimant sued for the amount outstanding.he claimant was entitled to the full amount even if they agreed to accept less. Part payment of a debt is not valid consideration for a promise to forebear the balance unless at the promisor’s request part payment is made either:before the due date, with a chattel, to a different destination
This rule has been confirmed in Foakes v Beer(1884)
Dr Foakes owed Mrs Beer £2,000 after she had obtained judgment against him in an earlier case. Dr Foakes offered to pay £500 immediately and the rest by instalments, Mrs Beer agreed to this and agreed she would not seek enforcement of the payment provided he kept up the instalments. No mention was made in this agreement of interest although judgment debts generally incurred interest. Dr Foakes paid all the instalments as agreed and Mrs Beer then brought an action for the interest.Dr Foakes was liable to pay the interest. The agreement reached amounted to part payment of a debt and under the rule in Pinnel’s case this was not good consideration for a promise not to enforce the full amount due. confirmed in Ferguson v davis (1996).Pinnel’s case ->Beer v Foakes (doctor case with interests)=part-payment is no consideration BUT the case is almost famous for the rule that part-payment on an earlier date than the date required at the request of the creditor or at the request of the creditor or in chattel (removable property =en nature pas en espèces) that would extinguish the debt, if the creditor asks to be paid elsewhere =a change in time, in place or in nature extinguishes the debt, will be considered good consideration. In Pinnel’s case the debitor had been asked to pay at another date by the creditor. The reason why the plea failed was that at the time there was an error in the following of the pleadings procedureDr Foakes was liable to pay the interest. The agreement reached amounted to part payment of a debt and under the rule in Pinnel’s case this was not good consideration for a promise not to enforce the full amount due. confirmed in Ferguson v davis (1996).Pinnel’s case ->Beer v Foakes (doctor case with interests)=part-payment is no consideration BUT the case is almost famous for the rule that part-payment on an earlier date than the date required at the request of the creditor or at the request of the creditor or in chattel (removable property =en nature pas en espèces) that would extinguish the debt, if the creditor asks to be paid elsewhere =a change in time, in place or in nature extinguishes the debt, will be considered good consideration. In Pinnel’s case the debitor had been asked to pay at another date by the creditor. The reason why the plea failed was that at the time there was an error in the following of the pleadings procedure
Ferguson v Davies (1996)
c. Foakes
Hirachand Punamchand v Temple (1911)
The claimants were money lenders in India. They lent money to the defendant Lieutenant Temple who was an army officer serving in India. The claimants sought return of the money from the claimant but were unable to get any response so they contacted his father. Some correspondence went between the claimant and the father’s solicitors. The claimants asked how much the father would be prepared to pay to settle the son’s accounts. An amount was agreed which was a substantial, amount although not the full amount due. The claimant promised to send the promissory note relating to the son’s debt to the father once they received payment. The father paid, but the claimant retained the promissory note and sued the son to enforce the balance.The payment made by the father was sufficient to discharge the full balance. Where the person making payment in return for discharging the debt owed by another this will amount to good consideration as the existing duty to make payment was not owed by them but a third party.
Bainbridge v Firmstone
the plaintiff at the request of the defendant allowed the latter to take his boilers and to weigh them in consideration of the promise to bring them back in the same state. The defendant dismantled the boilers completely and returned them in that state. The plaintiff sued and the defendant said there was no consideration for the promise to bring them back in the same state.The court held that the fact he had lent the boilers was good consideration for the promise made by the defendant to retrun the boilers in the original state
Thomas v Thomas (1842
Following Mr thomas’ death it was agreed that his wife could live in the house for 1£/year. The executors agreed in consideration of the deceased wishesThe court held that 1£ was sufficient consideration
White v Bluet
D complained about not getting as much money as siblings to father. F agreed and said if he didn’t complain anymore he would discharge D of liability in a promissory noteWas this a contract? Was their valid consideration?There must be valid consideration for a contract. Reciprocal exchange is a necessary element of consideration.No consideration – he is not giving anything in return for something the father was giving him.
→Reciprocal exchange is necessary for consideration.
Consideration is giving up something you are able to do and there is no prohibition against it.
→If you give up a freedom that you have that does have value and should be considered consideration
→No consideration when you give up something that you aren’t legally entitled to do
Ward v Byham
An unmarried couple had a child together and lived together for five years. The father then turned the mother out of the house and sent the child to live with a neighbour and the father paid the neighbour £1 per week. The mother then got a job as a live in house keeper and wished to have the daughter live with her. The father agreed to allow the daughter live with the mother and agreed to pay her £1 per week provided she ensured the child was well looked after and happy. The father made payments but then when the mother remarried he stopped making payments. The mother brought an action to enforce the agreement. The father argued that the Mother was under an existing legal duty to look after and maintain the child and therefore was not providing any consideration for the promise to make payment.By promising to ensure the child was well looked after and happy she had gone beyond her existing legal duty and therefore had provided consideration. She was entitled to the payment
In select move v Inland Revenue 1995 if the principle ofWilliams v Roffey Bros Ltdis to be extended to an obligation to make payment, it would in effect leave the principle inFoakes v Beerwithout any application
When a creditor and a debtor who are at arm’s length reach agreement on the payment of the debt by instalments to accommodate the debtor, the creditor will no doubt always see a practical benefit to himself in so doing. In the absence of authority there would be much to be said for the enforceability of such a contract. But that was a matter expressly considered inFoakes v Beeryet held not to constitute good consideration in law.Foakes v Beerwas not even referred to inWilliams v Roffey Bros Ltd, and it is in my judgment impossible, consistently with the doctrine of precedent, for this court to extend the principle of Williams’s case to any circumstances governed by the principle ofFoakes v Beer. If that extension is to be made, it must be by the House of Lords or, perhaps even more appropriately, by Parliament after consideration by the Law Commission.
Central London Property trust v High tress house ldt 1947
High Trees leased a block of flats from CLP at a ground rent of £2,500. It was a new block of flats at the time the lease was taken out in 1937. The defendant had difficulty in getting tenants for all the flats and the ground rent left High Trees with no profit. In 1940 many of the flats were still unoccupied and with the conditions of the war prevailing, it did not look as if there was to be any change to this situation in the near future. CLP agreed to reduce the rent to £1,250 during the war years. The agreement was put in writing and High Trees paid the reduced rent from 1941. When the war was over the flats became fully occupied and the claimant sought to return to the originally agreed rent.The rent would be returned to the originally agreed price for the future only. CLP could not claim back the arrears accrued during the war years. This case is important as Denning J (as he then was) established the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Promissory estoppel prevented CLP going back on their promise to accept a lower rent despite the fact that the promise was unsupported by consideration.Denning J “In my opinion, the time has now come for the validity of such a promise to be recognised. The logical consequence, no doubt is that a promise to accept a smaller sum in discharge of a larger sum, if acted upon, is binding notwithstanding the absence of consideration”Lord Denning opened a whole new area of contract law because he asked; “Would HTH had to pay the difference had CLPT asked?”= obiter dicta (around the case, not binding). The answer was that CLPT was bound by its promise , that there was promissory estopple.
As precedent he gave Hughes v Metropolitan Railway company case 1877
A landlord gave 6 months to repair and should he fail tenant’s lease would be forfeited. In November the landlord started negotiations with the tenant but ended in dissent. In December the tenant still had not started the repairs and when the 6 months period came to remend the landlord started proceedings to recover possession of the premises. The time limit imposed for carrying out the repairs was suspended during the negotiations There was no explicit promise but a promise implied in the conduct of the landlord and his offer to negotiate the sell.
this doctrine stands from equity. He who comes to equity must do so with clean hands:->D&C Builders v Rees 1966
The claimants were successful. Mrs Rees could not rely on estoppel as there was no true agreement to accept less and because Mrs Rees had taken advantage of the builder’s position and mislead them as to her financial positionBut didn’t respect the equity principle. But she exerted economic duress on the company which came under the goods and services provision
The CA itself or the HofL would have to have the same reasoning as a ratio for a decision.Combe v Combe 1951
A husband promised to make maintenance payments to his estranged wife but failed to do so. The wife brought an action to enforce the promise invoking promissory estoppel.the court answered in was an equitable doctrine so one must abides to the maxim “equity is a shield and not a sword” (can defend yourself but not attack).Her action failed. There was no pre-existing agreement which was later modified by a promise. The wife sought to use promissory estoppel as sword and not a shield.
Rose &frank v Crampton and Brothers 1923
The claimants and defendants entered an agreement for the supply of some carbonised tissue paper. Under the agreement the claimants were to be the defendant’s sole agents in the US until March 1920. The contract contained an honourable pledge clause which stated the agreement was not a formal or legal agreement and shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts in neither England nor the US. The defendants terminated the agreement early and the claimants brought an action for breachThe honourable pledge clause rebutted the presumption which normally exists in commercial agreements that the parties intend to be legally bound by their agreements. The agreement therefore had no legal affect and was not enforceable by the courts
Balfour v balfour 1918
Wife remained in England for health reason. Husband promised wife allowance, wife suedno consideration
Merritt v Merritt 1970
A husband left his wife and went to live with another woman. There was £180 left owing on the house which was jointly owned by the couple. The husband signed an agreement whereby he would pay the wife £40 per month to enable her to meet the mortgage payments and if she paid all the charges in connection with the mortgage until it was paid off he would transfer his share of the house to her. When the mortgage was fully paid she brought an action for a declaration that the house belonged to her.The agreement was binding. The Court of Appeal distinguished the case ofBalfour v Balfouron the grounds that the parties were separated. Where spouses have separated it is generally considered that they do intend to be bound by their agreements. The written agreement signed was further evidence of an intention to be bound.
Johns v Padavatton 1969
A mother promised to pay her daughter $200 per month if she gave up her job in the US and went to London to study for the bar. The daughter was reluctant to do so at first as she had a well paid job with the Indian embassy in Washington and was quite happy and settled, however, the mother persuaded her that it would be in her interest to do so. The mother’s idea was that the daughter could then join her in Trinidad as a lawyer. This initial agreement wasn’t working out as the daughter believed the $200 was US dollars whereas the mother meant Trinidad dollars which was about less than half what she was expecting. This meant the daughter could only afford to rent one room for her and her son to live in. The Mother then agreed to purchase a house for the daughter to live in. She purchased a large house so that the daughter could rent out other rooms and use the income as her maintenance. The daughter then married and did not complete her studies. The mother sought possession of the house. The question for the court was whether there existed a legally binding agreement between the mother and daughter or whether the agreement was merely a family agreement not intended to be binding.The agreement was purely a domestic agreement which raises a presumption that the parties do not intend to be legally bound by the agreement. There was no evidence to rebut this presumption
Parker v Clark 1960
Mrs P niece of Mrs C who had agreed they would sell their own house and come and live with the C who would leave the house to them, written down as well as the expenses which they shared confirming the agreement. The P sold their own house, Mr C changed his will. BUT the parties were no longuer on good terms and the C asked the P to leave , sued, claimed damages for breach of contractit was held that the exchange of letters, written part shown an intention and validated the contract.Ps were entitled to damages
Simpkins v Pays 1955
A Grandmother, granddaughter and a lodger entered into a weekly competition run by the Sunday Empire News. The coupon was sent in the Grandmothers name each week and all three made forecasts and they took it in turns to pay. They had agreed that if any of them won they would share the winnings between them. The grandmother received £250 in prize money and refused to share it with the other two. The lodger brought the action to claim one third of the prize money.There was a binding contract despite the family connection as the lodger was also party to the contract. This rebutted the presumption of no intention to create legal relations
Heilbut, Symons & Co v Buckleton[1912]UKHL 2is anEnglish contract lawcase, given by theHouse of Lordson misrepresentation and contractual terms. It held that a non-fraudulentmisrepresentationgave no right to damages. This was decided some time beforeHedley Byrne v Heller, wheredamagesfor negligent misrepresentation were introduced in English law, and it would today be regarded as wrongly decided.
During aneconomic boomin therubbertrade 1910 (at the end of theAmazon rubber boom), Heilbut, Symons & Co were merchants who were underwriting shares of what they claimed was a rubber business, called the Filisola Rubber and Produce Estates, Limited inMexico. Buckleton called up a manager at Heilbut to inquire about the shares. In response to the questions, the manager confirmed that they were “bringing out a rubber company”. Based on this statement, Buckleton purchased a large number of shares. The company turned out to have far fewer rubber trees than expected. The shares performed very poorly. Buckleton sued for breach ofwarrantyThe House of Lords held that no damages could be payable because it was not a fraudulent misrepresentation.Lord Moultonidentified two ways that the action could be successful. First, if the plaintiff could show fraudulent misrepresentation “or what is equivalent thereto, must be made recklessly, not caring whether it be true or not.” Second, if there was intent (animus contrahendi)[1]to be held to a promise then there may be acollateral contract, that would bind Heilbut to their representation. However, Lord Moulton stated that such collateral contracts would be rare, and on the facts none was found. Lord Moulton said”,It is, my Lords, of the greatest importance, in my opinion, that this House should maintain in its full integrity the principle that a person is not liable in damages for an innocent misrepresentation, no matter in what way or under what form the attack is made. In the present case the statement was made in answer to an inquiry for information. There is nothing which can by any possibility be taken as evidence of an intention on the part of either or both of the parties that there should be a contractual liability in respect of the accuracy of the statement. It is a representation as to a specific thing and nothing more.”
Reynolds v John Sadler (ghost writer
Agreement between the two that S would write R’s Rags to Riches biography and following disucssions S understood there was an agreement under which he would share any profit with R 50-50. R found another writer for the job and the book came out with the title that S had thought out and the opening chapter describing R using a helicopter to visit the orphanage was also his idea. S argued breach of contract when R hired other writer and breach of confidenceIt was held it was between social exchange and business agreements= special damages for loss of opportunity among less but none for breach of confidence
Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co Ltd v Riche (1875)=Its importance has been diminished as a result of theCompanies Act 2006s 31, which allows for unlimited objects for which a company may be run. Furthermore, any limits a company does have in its objects clause has no effect whatsoever for people outside a company (s 39 CA 2006), except as a general issue of authority of the company’s agents.
Incorporated under theCompanies Act 1862, theAshbury Railway Carriage and Iron Company Ltd’s memorandum, clause 3, said its objects were “to make and sell, or lend on hire, railway-carriages…” and clause 4 said activities beyond needed a special resolution. But the company agreed to give Riche and his brother a loan to build a railway in Belgium. Later, the company refused the agreement. Riche sued, and the company pleaded the action wasultra vires.TheHouse of Lords, agreeing with the three dissentient judges in theExchequer Chamber, pronounced the effect of the Companies Act to be the opposite of that indicated byMr Justice Blackburn. It held that if a company pursues objects beyond the scope of the memorandum of association, the company’s actions areultra viresandvoid.Lord Cairns LCsaid,It was the intention of the legislature, not implied, but actually expressed, that the corporations, should not enter, having regard to this memorandum of association, into a contract of this description. The contract in my judgment could not have been ratified by the unanimous assent of the whole corporation.
Powell v Lee 1908
Plaintiff was told he had been selected a headmaster to discover he hadn’t and he sued for breach of contractthe person who had told him did not the authority to do so and it could not be considered as an official acceptance of his offer.
