conflict - lecture 1

Question 1

what is the framework for the puzzle of war based on the simple version of Jackson and morelli?

Answer 1

consider two countries i and j, with wealth wi and wj with wi>wj, assume i can start a war with j. in the event of war , i wins with a probability pi(wi,wj). the cost of war is C and if i wins it gains a fraction G>o of Js wealth.

Question 2

what is the payoff of i for winning the war under jackson and morelli framework?

Answer 2

the payoff of i winning th war is wi +Gwj - C

Question 3

what is the payoff of i for losing the war under the jackson and morelli framework?

Answer 3

Wi- C

Question 4

what is the cost benefit analysis for country i for starting a war?

Answer 4

pi( wi +Gwj -C) + (1-pi)(wj - C) > wi or simply piGwj>C, this means that country i will start a war when the gains from war are greater then the costs of the war

Question 5

for a simple probability function pi=wi/(wi +wj), what occurs to the benefit of the war with wealth inequality?

Answer 5

the benefit is decreasing with wealth inequality as the probability of winning the war will decrease

Question 6

suppose the war condition holds ie the benefits outweigh the costs, what could the inferior nation j do to avoid war?

Answer 6

they could pay to avoid the war. i would be willing to accept payment aslong as the payment is greater then their gain from war ie piGwj -C + e. j would prefer to pay aslong as the net cost of war is greater then the payment. ie wj - piGwj + C - e > wj(1-piG) or C-e>0

Question 7

is it pareto improvement for transfer payments to avoid war?

Answer 7

yes as everyone pays the cost C and the gains of war are usually transfer payments so making the transfer to avoid cost is a pareto improvement

Question 8

what are the raison d’etre of wars?

Answer 8

irrational behaviour
moral hazard ( leaders benefit public, soldiers pay the cost)
rational behaviour: assymetric information, commitment problems, indivisibilities

Question 9

what is the general framework for political bias and war?

Answer 9

Consider two countries i and j
* Either country can start a war. We assume the general contest
success function
* the cost C is the fraction of the country’s wealth. Also C + G ≦ 1
* Winning the war gives i
wi(1 − C) + Gwj
* Loosing the war gives i
wi(1 − C − G)

Question 10

what is the framework for crisis about leaders

Answer 10

• Leader i - leader of country i - controls fraction ai of country’s
  wealth wi
  . Winning war gives leader i fraction a′i
  of Gwj.
• Political bias is defined Bi =a′i/ai
• Return of winning war ai(1 − C)wi + a′iGwj
• Return of loosing war aiwi(1 − C − G)

Question 11

what is the condition for leaders of country i to choose the war?

Answer 11

piGa’iwj > [C +(1-pi)G]aiwi or equivalently BipiGwj> [C+(1-pi)G]wi

Question 12

what are the factors are increasing incentives to start a war?

Answer 12

• Increasing incentives with political Bias and G (the fraction of the countries wealth remaining after the war

Question 13

what are the factors that are decreasing incentives for war?

Answer 13

decreasing incentives with Cost

Question 14

what do the incentives of war not depend on?

Answer 14

it does not depend on levels but ratios of C/G and B

Question 15

what are the assumptions for war with transfers?

Answer 15

• One country would like to go to war in the absence of transfers, but
  other would not.
• No commitment issues e.g., signing an enforceable treaty to commit
  peace.
• Leaders’ biases towards transfers are same as those towards gains
  and losses from war. That is, leader of losing country pays ai and
  leader of winning country a′i.

Question 16

what is the issue with transfers?

Answer 16

there is no commitment in the real world for which if a transfer does occur that the challenger wont then go back on his deal and invade. plus if the transfer did occur then it will increase the probability that the challenger will win due to the increase in wealth

Question 17

what are the three things that transfers do to the countries at war?

Answer 17

1) they make the target poorer which makes the war less appealing so decreasing the chance of war
2) they make the challenger richer therefore with more to lose which also decreases the chance of war
3) it increases the probability that the challenger will win which increases the chance of war.

Question 18

what is the endogenous bias hypothesis for transfers?

Answer 18

with no transfers, everyone prefers unbiased leader, because the leader maximises the same object as the population
with transfers, citizens might prefer a biased leader if it induces more transfers from the other side

Question 19

what is the condition for j to be willing to make a transfer tj to avoid war?

Answer 19

pjG(wj+Bkwi) < (C+G)wj -tj

Question 20

what is the condition for i to avoid going to war with transfer from j?

Answer 20

piG(wi +Biwj)< (C+G)wi +Bitj

Question 21

what is the range of bounds for which C/G is increasing for transers with committment?

Answer 21

Bj is decreasing since j is less likely to go to war so willing to pay more
pi increases since it makes i more likely to go to war and j more willing to pay to avoid it
wj/wi increases (for the same reason as the previous one)

Question 22

what occurs when there is no bias with transfers and commitment?

Answer 22

there will be no war when there are no biases

Question 23

what are the propositions that arise from the wars with leaders?

Answer 23

1 If Bi = Bj = 1, then at most one country wants to go to war.
2 Fixing, C/G, if Bi and Bj are both sufficiently large, then both countries want to go to war.
3 Fixing Bi and Bj, if C/G is sufficiently large, then neither country wants to go to war