Computationalism

Question 1

Eliminativism

Answer 1

A strong form of anti-realism about intentionality (Quine)

Question 2

Intentional realism

Answer 2

Realism regarding representation
Hold that representational properties are genuine aspects of mentality

Question 3

Levels of analysis

Answer 3

Marr had 3 levels: Computational theory, representation and algorithm, and hardware implementation

Question 4

Computational theory

Answer 4

Psychology
Premise/goal
What is the goal of the computation, why is it appropriate, and what is the logic of the strategy by which it can be carried out?

Question 5

Representation and algorithm

Answer 5

Computer science
Procedure
How can this computational theory be implemented? In particular, what is the representation for the input and output, and what is the algorithm for the transformation?

Question 6

Hardware implementation

Answer 6

Neuroscience
How can the representation and algorithm be realized physically?

Question 7

3 tenets of computationalism

Answer 7

Systematically interpretable
Implementation independence
Symbol manipulation

Question 8

Systematically interpretable

Answer 8

Symbols are interpreted the same way

Question 9

Implementation independence

Answer 9

Since C = C it can be implemented everywhere

Question 10

Symbol manipulation

Answer 10

Symbols can be manipulated so they mean new things

Question 11

C = C

Answer 11

Cognition = computation

Question 12

Turing indistinguishability

Answer 12

Can the machine and human being be separated, do they look/act the same?

Question 13

Turing machine

Answer 13

An abstract model of an idealized computing device with unlimited time and storage space at its disposal. The device manipulates symbols
Input: symbols
Operations: formal
Output: processed symbols

Question 14

Turing test

Answer 14

Test to see if a computer can “think”

Question 15

Deterministic

Answer 15

Believing that everything that happens must happen as it does and could not have happened any other way, or relating to this belief

Question 16

Representation (Marr)

Answer 16

A formal system for making explicit certain entities or types of information, together with a specification of how the system does this

Question 17

Description (Marr)

Answer 17

The result of using a representation to describe a given entity

Question 18

Formal scheme (Marr)

Answer 18

A set of symbols with rules for putting them together

Question 19

Process

Answer 19

Very broad term: “I want to restrict our attention to the meanings associated with machines that are carrying out information-processing tasks”

Question 20

The purpose of vision

Answer 20

Vision, in short, is used in such a bewildering variety of ways that the visual systems of different animals must differ significantly from one another.
The main job of vision [is] to derive a representation of shape

Question 21

Algorithm

Answer 21

An explicit, step-by-step procedure for answering some question or solving some problem

Question 22

Symbols

Answer 22

Primitive symbols are drawn from a finite alphabet.
Something is a symbol only if it has semantic or representational properties

Question 23

Turing model

Answer 23

Mathematical model of computation describing an abstract machine that manipulates symbols on a strip of tape according to a table of rules

Question 24

Universal Turing machine (UTM)

Answer 24

Can mimic any other Turing machine
A programmable general purpose computer
Has unlimited memory

Question 25

AI

Answer 25

Aims to construct “thinking machinery”
Aims to construct computing machines that execute core mental tasks such as reasoning, decision-making, problem solving and so on

Question 26

Classical computational theory of the mind (CCTM )

Answer 26

The mind is a computational system similar in important respect to a Turing machine, and core mental processes (e.g., reasoning, decisionmaking, and problem solving) are computations similar in important respects to computations executed by a Turing machine.
Core mental processes are computations similar to important respects to computations executed by a Turing machine.
Claims that mental activity is “Turing-style computation”, allowing these and other departures from Turing’s own formalism

Question 27

Functionalism

Answer 27

A system has a mind when the system has a suitable functional organization
Mental states are functional states (Marr’s second level)

Question 28

Machine functionalist

Answer 28

Emphasizes probabilistic automata, which are similar to Turing machines except that transitions between computational states are stochastic

Question 29

Mentalese

Answer 29

Thinking occurs in a language of thought

Question 30

The representational theory (RTM)

Answer 30

The meaning of a complex Mentalese expression is a function of the meanings of its parts and the way those parts are combined

Question 31

The representational theory of the mind

Answer 31

A combination of CCTM and RTM

Question 32

Implementationist

Answer 32

Allows for Turing-style models and neural networks
Turing-style model is higher-level
Neural network is lower-level

Question 33

Computational neuroscience

Answer 33

Describes the nervous system through computational models

Question 34

Truth-conditions

Answer 34

Beliefs are the sort of things that can be true or false

Question 35

Accuracy-conditions

Answer 35

Perceptual states are the sorts of things that can be accurate or inaccurate

Question 36

Fulfillment-conditions

Answer 36

Desires are the sorts of things that can fulfilled or thwarted

Question 37

Intentional descriptions

Answer 37

Descriptions that identify mental states through their representational properties

Question 38

Structuralist conception of computation

Answer 38

A computational model describes an abstract causal structure, without taking into account particular physical states that instantiate the structure
This perspective views computation as an abstract causal structure, focusing on the pattern of causal interactions among system parts rather than specific physical states.

Question 39

Combinatorial-state automaton (CSA)

Answer 39

Subsumes most familiar models of computation (including Turing machines and neural networks). A CSA provides an abstract description of a physical system’s causal topology: the pattern of causal interaction among the system’s parts, independent of the nature of those parts or the causal mechanisms through which they interact. Computational description specifies a causal topology.

Question 40

Systematicity

Answer 40

There seem to be systematic relations between mental states. A good theory should reflect those systematic relations.

Question 41

Productivity

Answer 41

CCTM explains the productivity of mental computation by positing a central processor that stores and retrieves symbols in addressable read/write memory. When needed, the central processor can retrieve arbitrary, unpredicted combinations of symbols from memory.

Question 42

Formal-syntactic conception of computation (FSC).

Answer 42

Computation manipulates symbols in virtue of their formal syntactic properties rather than their semantic properties.

Question 43

Arguments against computationalism

Answer 43

Triviality argument
Gödel’s incompleteness theorem
Limits of computational modelling
Temporal arguments
Embodied cognition

Question 44

Triviality argument

Answer 44

We can describe almost any physical system as executing computations. Searle (1990) claims that a wall implements any computer program, since we can discern some pattern of molecular movements in the wall that is isomorphic to the formal structure of the program.

Question 45

Gödel’s incompleteness theorem

Answer 45

Gödel’s incompleteness theorems show that human mathematical capacities outstrip the capacities of any Turing machine

Question 46

Limits of computational modelling

Answer 46

(1) Turing-style computation is sensitive only to “local” properties of a mental representation, which are exhausted by the identity and arrangement of the representation’s constituents.
(2) Many mental processes, paradigmatically abduction, are sensitive to “nonlocal” properties such as relevance, simplicity, and conservatism.
(3) Hence, we may have to abandon Turing-style modeling of the relevant processes.
(4) Unfortunately, we have currently have no idea what alternative theory might serve as a suitable replacement.

Question 47

Temporal arguments

Answer 47

Mental activity unfolds in time. Moreover, the mind accomplishes sophisticated tasks (e.g., perceptual estimation) very quickly. Many critics worry that computationalism, especially classical computationalism, does not adequately accommodate temporal aspects of cognition.

Question 48

Intentional realism

Answer 48

Realism regarding representation. At a minimum, this position holds that representational properties are genuine aspects of mentality. Usually, it is also taken to hold that scientific psychology should freely employ intentional descriptions when appropriate

Question 49

Interpretation

Answer 49

Distractor task interferes with internal memory processes

Question 50

Mental representations

Answer 50

Symbolic representations

Question 51

Lessons from early computer technology

Answer 51

1) Computation is logic – and logic is purely formal
Purely formal processes can be run mechanically

2) The logic matters, not the architecture – Implementation independence:
Humans, Mechanics, Electronics

3) Three things needed for computation:
Some input-output mechanisms (sensation)
A big internal store (memory)
Processes (programs) to do the logic

Question 52

Visual illusions

Answer 52

Especially revealing. The computer model should “suffer” from the same bistability

Question 53

Church-Turing thesis

Answer 53

The Church-Turing thesis is a fundamental principle in the theory of computation and computer science, formulated independently by Alonzo Church and Alan Turing in the 1930s. It asserts that any function which can be computed by an algorithm can be computed by a Turing machine. In other words, it provides a precise definition of what it means for a function to be “computable.”