Component Cooling Water Flashcards

1
Q

What is the function of Component Cooling Water?

A

Safety-related: Cooling for CTMT and RCS decay heat removal with single failure and LOOP during postulated accidents and for safe shutdown.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

List CCW Essential Header Loads

A

Unit 1
‘A’ Train————————–‘B’ Train
SDC HX A————————SDC HX B
CTMT Cooler A&B————CTMT Cooler C&D
CS Pump A———————-CS Pump B
HPSI Pump A——————-HPSI Pump B
LPSI Pump A——————–LPSI Pump B
N/A———————————N/A
N/A———————————N/A

Unit 2
‘A’ Train—————————‘B’ Train
SDC HX A————————-SDC HX B
CTMT Cooler A&B————-CTMT Cooler C&D
CS Pump A———————–CS Pump B
HPSI Pump A——————–HPSI Pump B
N/A———————————N/A
Fuel Pool HX A or B———–Fuel Pool HX A or B
CR A/C 3A, 3B, 3C————–CR A/C 3A, 3B, 3C

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

List CCW Non-Essential Header Loads

A

Unit 1
* RCP’s and motors
* Primary Sample Coolers
* CEDM Coolers
* Letdown HX
* Waste Gas Compressors
* SG B/D Sample Panel
* Quench Tank HX
* Fuel Pool HX
* N/A
* N/A

Unit 2
* RCP’s and motors
* Primary Sample Coolers
* CEDM Coolers
* Letdown HX
* Waste Gas Compressors
* SG B/D Sample Panel
* N/A
* N/A
* Post-Accident Sample HX
* Boric Acid RM

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

List the sources of In-Leakage to the CCW System.

A

Higher pressure systems than CCW, leaks at interfaces (if in-service) = CCW in-leakage.
* RCP Seal Cooler HX
* RCP Thermal Barrier HX
* Letdown HX
* Primary Sample Cooler HX
* SDC HX
* CNMT Spray Pump Seal Coolers
* HPSI Pump Seal Cooler
* LPSI Pump Seal Coolers {Unit 1 Only} (No LPSI Pump Seal Cooling on U2)

Many questions which require that you determine if intersystem leakage would flow into or out of the CCW system.
* For example: If a Letdown HX tube leak to CCW leak was occurring, you would expect flow from RCS letdown into the CCW system, therefore you would expect CCW surge tank level and radiation to increase
* However, if an SFP HX to CCW leak was occurring, the CCW system would leak into the SFP, causing CCW inventory to deplete and the SFP to become diluted.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

List the sources of In-Leakage to the CCW System.
(SCHLLRP)

A

“SCHLLRP”
SDC HX
CS Pump
HPSI Pump
{LPSI Pump} (Unit 1 Only)
LD HX
RCPs
Primary Sample

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

Discuss CCW Chemical Addition Tank.

A

Located near the CCW HX’s; Sodium Molybdate added as corrosion inhibitor

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

Discuss CCW Pumps.

A
  • A & B Pumps: powered from 4160V A3/B3 Buses
  • C Pump: powered from the 4160V AB Bus (Switch kept in PTL if not running)
  • Capacity - 8,500 gpm; Max Flow - 10,800 gpm
  • START/STOP/PULL-TO-LOCK – Any Pump that is in PTL will not respond to any auto signals

‘A’ or ‘B’ Pump:
 Will re-start on a LOOP only if Control Switch is Red Flagged
 Will re-start on SIAS regardless of flagged position (if NOT in PTL)

‘C’ Pump will start in place of A or B on a SIAS or LOOP only if:
 The A or B pump control switch is in PTL and;
 The ‘C’ pump is powered from the same train as the pump in PTL (AB 4160 Bus aligned to the proper train)

On a LOOP specifically:
 ‘A’ & ‘B’ Pump breakers will re-start on the Zero-load block. The breakers never opened.
 If the ‘C’ Pump is running, the breaker will get an UV breaker trip (breaker opens), but once the EDG output breaker closes and re-powers the bus, the ‘C’ Pump breaker will reclose immediately and start the ‘C’ Pump.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

Discuss the ICW/CCW Third Pump Interlock Failure.

A

Unit 1 Only
* {CCW third pump interlock failure, monitors power to relays that align C CCW and ICW pumps for SIAS starting in place of A or B pumps}
* {Instrument Bus 1MB or 1MA power is required for relay auto actuation. Can still manually start}

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

Discuss the ‘C’ CCW Pump Hdr Valves / AB Bus Misaligned Alarm.

A
  • Disagreement between C CCW pump header valves & 4160 VAC AB Bus alignment
  • AB to A (B) side 4160 bus alignment requires both C to B (A) train header valves fully closed
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

Discuss CCW Pump Normal/Isolate Selector Switch.

A
  • Normal/isolate switch in ISOLATE, pump inoperable per TS
  • “Normal” - Control from RTGB
  • “Isolate” - Control from Local Pushbutton OR SWGR Mounted Close/Trip Switch
  • “Isolate” - Auto Start Features are Disabled (SIAS/LOOP)
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

Discuss CCW Pump Local Start/Stop Pump Pushbutton.

A
  • If local PB is used, the RTGB Control Switch must have the Flag Matched for CCW pumps to start on LOOP
  • A & B CCW pumps will start on a SIAS even if the flag is not matched, unless it is in PTL
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

Discuss the Chemical Drain Tank in relation to the CCW System.

A

Serves as an Alternate Vent for the CCW Surge Tank on Hi Rad conditions

Unit 1 Location:
- 0.5 elevation of the RAB near the Sodium Hydroxide Tank

Unit 2 Location:
- 0.5 elevation of the RAB near the Hydrazine Tank

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

Discuss CCW Surge Tank.

A

Capacity: 2000 gallons.
Provides NPSH to CCW pumps

2.5’ baffle plate divides tank into two compartments, essentially two tanks from 0-30”. Provides for separation of A & B Headers during accidents
Normal makeup: Demin water via automatic AOV controls level between 36” – 48”
Backup (Alternate) Makeup: Fire Water thru a removable spool piece and LC valves. Has to be manually aligned
No level indicators on the RTGB.
Vented to Atmosphere, On CCW Hi Radiation – (RCV-14-1) vent alignment shifts to Chemical Drain Tank

Unit 1
Accessible from the CR
Low Tank Level alarm at 29” – Alarm Only

Unit 2
Accessible from RAB roof w/key
Low Tank Level alarm @ 29”
2 Extra Level Switches that isolate “N” Header on Low Surge Tank Level (29”),
1 switch for each Essential Header

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

Discuss CCW Surge Tank Auto Operation.

A

Unit 1
* 54” – Hi Level Alarm – (Tank overflow routed to CDT via local floor drain)
* 48” – Makeup stops
* 36” – Makeup starts
* 30” – Top of Baffle
* 29” – Low Level Alarm (below divider plate)

Unit 2
* 54” – Hi Level Alarm – (Tank overflow routed to CDT via local floor drain)
* 48” – Makeup stops
* 36” – Makeup starts
* 30” – Top of Baffle
* 29” – Low alarm AND N-Header Isolates (below divider plate)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

Discuss CCW Heat Exchangers.

A
  • CCW flows through the shell of the HX. ICW through the tubes
  • Max Shell Side flow (CCW) - 14,600 gpm
    Cannot put 2 CCW Pumps with full flow through 1 CCW HX (14,600 gpm max)
  • Max Tube Side flow (ICW) - 18,500 gpm
  • CCW outlet temperatures monitored & input into a common “CCW HX high temperature” alarm at 150°F
  • TCV-14-4A/B (CCW outlet temp inputs to control ICW flow) have minimum open stop at 8%:
     Minimizes valve cavitation damage at lower flows, and
     Keeps ICW flow @ minimum velocity to prevent sediment deposit in channel heads
  • CCW flow monitored by FT-14-1A/B, RTGB 106 [206] indication
  • CCW pressure > ICW pressure. Therefore a HX tube leak would result in CCW level lowering and leak into ICW system
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

Discuss CCW Headers.

A

Essential (A & B HDRs) and Non-Essential (N HDR)

17
Q

Discuss CCW Header Flow & Pressure Alarms.

A
  • High flow – 9500 gpm
  • Low flow – 4000 gpm
  • A & B header low pressure – 60 psig
  • Normal pressure - ~ 80 psig
18
Q

Discuss CCW A & B Essential Headers.

A

Class 1, seismic
A & B headers are independent and are normally isolated from each other (T/S 3.7.3).
However, they may be cross tied in Modes 5 & 6 or in emergencies

19
Q

Discuss CCW Non-Essential “N” Header.

A
  • Can be supplied from Either / Both Headers.
  • Normal Alignment - All 4 valves N-HDR isolations valves are open being supplied with both A & B Essential Headers

Unit 1
* N-HDR isolation valves will automatically isolate on a:
 SIAS

Unit 2
* N-HDR isolation valves will automatically isolate on a:
 SIAS or
 Surge Tank Low Level
* Note: This is train specific signal
 ‘A’ side CCW Surge TK low level gets ‘A’ N-Hdr valves
 ‘B’ side CCW Surge TK low level gets ‘B’ N-Hdr valves

20
Q

Discuss Non-Essential Header isolation Valves.

A

A Train: B Train:
Supply: HCV-14-8A HCV-14-8B
Return: HCV-14-9 HCV-14-10

Unit 1
* Operated from RTGB 106
* “Close / Auto / Open” switch positions:
* ‘Open’ position will open the valves w/ SIAS present
* Fails closed on loss of air or power

Unit 2
* “Close / Open / Override” switch pos:
 Override will open valves w/SIAS present
 Must take switch first to “Close” then to “Override”
 If switch is left in Override, when SIAS is reset, the valves will re-close
* On Unit 2, the HCV-8A valve can control HCV-9, and HCV-8B valve can control HCV-10. Procedurally we manipulate both valves control switches.
* They are interlocked, the supply valves go open first followed by return valves 5 seconds later
* Fails closed on loss of air or power

21
Q

Discuss Non-Essential Header Containment Isolation Valves.

A

Unit 1
* Isolates CCW flow to the CTMT loads: RCP coolers & CEDM coolers
* HCV-14-1/2/6/7
* Close on SIAS
* “Close – AUTO – OPEN” - Going to open will re-open valve with a SIAS signal present
* All valves outside CTMT – (in pipe pen)
* Air Operated, Fail Closed - 125VDC

Unit 2
* Isolates CCW flow to the CTMT loads: RCP coolers & CEDM coolers
* HCV-14-1/2/6/7
* Close on SIAS
* “Close - AUTO - OPEN-RESET” - Going to “Open-Reset” will re-open valve with a SIAS signal present
* 2 valves inside and 2 outside CTMT
* Air Operated, Fail Closed - 125VDC

22
Q

Discuss CCW Radiation Monitoring.

A
  • High Radiation isolates the CCW surge tank vent to atmosphere and diverts it to Chemical Drain Tank
  • CCW supply line to the radiation monitor is from downstream of the CCW HX. It goes thru the monitor and is returned to the CCW pump suction

Unit 2 Only
* A pressure switch isolates the radiation monitor via solenoid-operated isolation valves at 52 psig and rising.
Low pressure conditions is assumed to be caused by a leak on the radiation monitor supply line
Reset from push-button on the Rad monitor Panel in CR

23
Q

Discuss SDC Heat Exchangers.
(HCV-14-3A & 3B)

A
  • Normally closed.
  • Auto opens on SIAS

Unit 1
* 5000 GPM max designed CCW flow

Unit 2
* 4915 GPM max designed CCW flow

24
Q

Discuss CCW to Containment Fan Cooler.

A

Unit 1
* 1350-1450 gpm CCW flow
* 50 GPM diverted to Fan Motor. Remainder of flow to cooler
* All 4 CFC’s normally running
* CFC’s start signals:
SIAS – All 4 start. U1 - only one speed
LOOP – Previously running fans restart
* ‘A’ header supplies CFC’s A & B.
* ‘B’ header supplies CFC’s C & D
* Low flow alarm - 1250 GPM
* Minimum TS flow - 1200 GPM
* Alarm on RTGB 106
* Relief valves on discharge of CFC CCW lines actuate at 125 psig

Unit 2
* 1350-1450 gpm CCW flow
* No cooling to motor. Full flow to cooler.
* Only 3 CFC’s normally running (in FAST)
* CFCs start signals:
SIAS - All 4 CFC’s start in SLOW speed
LOOP - All 4 CFC’s will start in FAST speed
* ‘A’ header supplies CFC’s A & B.
* ‘B’ header supplies CFC’s C & D
* Low flow alarm - 1250 GPM
* Minimum TS flow - 1200 GPM
* Alarm on HVCB
* Relief valves on discharge of CFC CCW lines actuate at 125 psig

25
Q

Discuss CCW to Control Room Air Conditioning.

A

Unit 1
N/A - Unit 1 CR Air Conditioning does not use CCW

Unit 2
* 3 units - each supplied with 80 gpm CCW
 HVC/ACC-3A: ‘A’ CCW Header
 HVC/ACC-3B: ‘B’ CCW Header
 HVC/ACC-3C: ‘A’ OR ‘B’ CCW Header
** A & B supplies cannot be open at the same time, or will result in making both trains of CCW INOPERABLE ** Cross-ties the trains
* No CCW indications available
* Control Room Air Conditioning (CRAC) unit will trip, if running, on a loss of CCW flow to the condensers
* CCW flow to condensers controlled by CRAC unit specific PCV-25-46A/B/C

26
Q

Discuss CCW to Spent Fuel Heat Exchangers.

A

Unit 1
* Supplied by the Non-Essential Header
* Isolated on a SIAS - due to N-HDR isolation valves automatically closing
* Unit 1 has only 1 HX
* 3,700 GPM Max CCW flow

Unit 2
* Supplied by the Essential Header (A or B)
* Isolated on a SIAS – due to supply MOV’s automatically closing
* Unit 2 has 2 HX’s, but only 1 is normally in-service
* Normally the ‘A’ HX is in-service, supplied from the ‘B’ header
* Can be placed in parallel operation (if needed)
* 3,700 GPM Max CCW flow
* The full open limit switches for MV-14-20, Header A from Fuel Pool HX, and MV-14-19, Header B from Fuel Pool HX, are set to stop valve opening at approximately 20% open. The valves will also indicate full open when the 20% open position is reached. In MODE 6 these valves are capable of being manually opened greater than the 20% limit to provide sufficient flow to maintain SFP cooling.

27
Q

Discuss CCW to CEDM Air Coolers.

A

Unit 1
* 150-200 GPM normally supplied
* Outlet CCW temperatures read behind RTGB 102

Unit 2
* 550-600 GPM normally supplied
* Outlet CCW temperatures read behind RTGB 202

28
Q

Discuss CCW to RCPs.

A
  • 200 – 250 GPM per RCP
  • CCW supply pressure is an input to RCP starting interlock: (>30 psig)
  • Supplied RCP components include:
     RCP Seal Cooler
     Thermal barrier HX
     Motor Air coolers (2)
     Lower Oil Coolers (2)
     Upper Oil Cooler
  • Unit 1 CCW low flow alarm only/Unit 2 has alarm & indication on DCS
    Seal Cooling
  • Each RCP CCW return line has an AOV which:
     Closes if CCW return temp > 200°F.
     Indicative of a Seal Cooler tube leak. Isolation valve closes to prevent contaminating the CCW system
     Fails open on Loss of IA OR Control Power
     “Reactor Coolant Pumps Seal Tube Leak, Valve Closed” – annunciator if closed
  • “Close – Auto – Open/ Reset” positions
     “Open / Reset” allows the valve to be re-opened after High Temp trip
     Valve will re-close after 60 sec if High Temp condition still exists
    Loss of Component Cooling Water to RCP’s:
  • If CCW CTMT header return flow is ≤ 1200 gpm for >10 minutes:
     Unit 1 has no auto trip/Unit 2-Automatic reactor trip, manually secure
    RCPs
     Manual RX trip will be ordered before the 10 minutes time has been reached based on conservative operator action
     RCPs can operate a maximum of 10 minutes with no CCW cooling without damage occurring
29
Q

Discuss CCW Control Room Indications.

A
  • CCW Pump Amps
  • A and B Header CCW Flow, Pressure, and B SDC HX Flow
  • Fuel Pool HX Flow, Letdown HX Flow
  • CCW Process Radiation Monitors

Unit 2 only
* CCW Flow, Temp from each RCP & CCW Flow from RCP HX

30
Q

Discuss CCW System Normal Operations.

A
  • Essential headers are split
  • N-HDR supplied from both essential header trains.
  • A & B pumps operating. ‘C’ in PTL
31
Q

Discuss Loss of CCW Pump.

A
  • Prompt alignment of spare pump required, ensure proper 4160 V, 480 V, and 125 V alignment
  • If in one pump in operation, total pump flow must remain below 10,800 gpm
  • Modes 1-4: implement TS action(s) for current configuration
32
Q

Discuss a rupture of the CCW ‘N’ Header.

A
  • Trip the Reactor and Turbine, N Header supplies the RCP’s
  • Stop ALL RCP’s after RX / Turbine trip
  • Monitor RCP temperatures
  • Secure letdown (No cooling to Letdown HX)
  • Monitor PZR Level,

Unit 1 Only
{Monitor SFP Temperature}

33
Q

Discuss Loss of the CCW Heat Exchanger.

A
  • Align the “C” CCW pump to take suction on the affected header
  • Align “C” CCW pump discharge thru the non-affected (good) HX
  • Flow goes to both A & B Headers and N Header thru the normally open N Header x-tie valves