Competition Law Cases Flashcards
SGL
Company refused to give information on anti-competitve behaviour so fined under Directive 1/2003
Elevators Escalators Cartel
Fined bigtime
Synthetic Rubber Cartel
Fined bigtime - some got lower fines for whistle blowing, some got higher for repeat offending
Hofner
Undertakings = any entity engaged in econ activity regardless of its legal status and way its financed
Package Tours World Cup
Fifa and Italian FA are undertakings under Art 101
Motosykletistiki (MOTEO)
Undertakings BECAUSE it engaged in econ activity regardless of legal status and way its financed
Maschinenbau
Breach of Art 101(1) allowed because was trying to break into new marker under Art 101(3)
Anic Partecipazioni
EC doesnt need to establish whether it is Art 101(1) or Art 101(2) breach
Treuhand
Dont actually need to be party to cartel agmt or operate in same market to be caught - active contribution and causal link is enough
Tepea
Agmt = oral or written
Hercules Chemicals
Undertakings just need to express joint intention
Bayer
Unilateral behaviour is generally not an agmt
Vereniging
Recommendations made by Trade Associations to members can be decisions falling under Art 101(1)
Transocean Marine Paint
Would compliance with recommendations have significant influence on competition within relevant market
ANSEAU
Decision by trade association that goods distributed exclusively under common label is decision under Art 101(1)
Dysetuffs
Defines concerted practise as:
Coordination without having reached a proper agreement which effectively swaps practical cooperation for risks of competition
Ahlstrom Wood Pulp Cartel
Conduct was NOT enough to be concerted practise
STM
To fall under Art 101(1) must be forseeable that the agreement may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade Art 101(3) rule of reason is adopted
Costen Sarl
Effect on trade can be increase or decrease in trade. Territorial restriction
Pronuptia de Paris
Effect on trade can be a franchise agreement Art 101(3) rule of reason is adopted
Brasserie de Haecht
Collective effect of lots of small agreements can affect trade
Must examine the whole market to determine if Art 101(1) has been breached
ICI Polypropelene
Horizontal agreement formed by producers at the same level of industry
United Brands Co
Vertical agreements controlling each level of production
Analysis of Relative Product Market said bananas are unique
Dominance = has power to act independently of competitors and customers
Only had 50% market share but rest of market was so fragmented it was dominant
Brand identification with chiquita trademark can be dominance
European Night Services
Requires full analysis of market, product, economic conditions etc to determine whether Art 101(1) has been breached
Volk v Vervaecke
Established de minimis defence
Courage v Crehan
Application of competition law to UK.Tied house arrangements with pub
Manfredi [and Courage]
National laws in MS can be rendered redundant in order to ensure EU competition law is fully effective
Any individual can claim cimpensation for harm from causal relationship between harm and agreement/practise prohibited under Art 101
Societa Italiana Vetro Italian Flat Glass
Caught under Art 102 using dominant market position.Price fixing to eliminate competition between them, controling and stabilizing market artificially
Continental Cans
Relative Temporal Market was important - relatively easy for rival can manufacturers to break into market
Region of Germany was substantial part of internal market for RGM
Hilti
Held dominant market position based on Relative Product Market analysis - nail guns are fairly unique
Market for consumables (replacement nails) is separate to nail gun market, Hilti was dominant in both separately
RGM was the whole internal market because significant price different in different MS despite low transport costs - the differences were purely Hilti’s fault
Microsoft
Using IP rights to prevent entrance to market caught by Art 102. Bundling, locked technical aspects preventing other software being used
Hugin
Separate market for spare parts for cash registers BUT Hugin is dominant in that market so refusal to supply spare parts to other cash register owners = abuse
South West England NOT substantial part of internal market for RGM
Michelin
Tyres for different types of heavy vehicle are not interchangeable SO had dominant market position
One member state can be a substantial part of market for RGM
Boosey & Hawkes
Marketing strategy used defined a separate market for British brass band instruments
BPB Industries Gypsum
Precise definition of market is not necessary - ECJ will just look at whether the undertaking had market power or not rather than the RPM
BT
UK was substantial part of internal market for RGM
RTE McGill TV Guide
Ireland was substantial part of internal market for RGM
Refusing to give info on program schedule to competitors = abuse
Alsatel
Region of France NOT substantial part of internal market
Sealink Harbours
Holyhead port was subtantial part of internal market
Used control of port to give better better sailing times to its ferries = abuse
Tetrapak
Huge relative market share = dominance
Akzo
Huge relative market share = dominance
Used predatory pricing as abuse of dominance
Hoffman la Roche
Superior technology can mean dominance
Sophisticated distribution systems can lead to dominance
Fidelity rebates = abuse
Undertakings need to be allowed to explain their actions as a defence to accusations of breach
Intel
70% market share and rebates for buying less of competitors products was breach of Art 102
Commercial Solvents CSC
Refusal to supply competitor with material necessary to make end-product = abuse
British Leyland
Breach can exist even if behaviour only MIGHT affect trade
Garden Cottage Foods
National courts can take role judging decisions of NCAs concering enforcement of competition law
British American Tobacco
Art 101(1) used to catch anti-competitive mergers
Airtours
Commission blocked merger
Conditions for collective dominance:
Market must be suffieciently transparent so each memeber of oligopoly can monitor how other members are behaving
Must be adequate punishment mechanisms to ensure members compliance over time
Forseeable reaction of consumers and current/future competitors could not hazard the policy
Independent Music Publishers
Commission made objective grounds in favour of merger
