Competencies, Sanity, Death Penalty Flashcards
1
Q
Decisional competence
A
Defendants competence to make choices in the criminal process
(Pleas, jury v bench trial, raise certain defenses)
Assessment aimed at protecting the autonomy of the defendant
2
Q
Amendment most heavily related to competency to proceed
A
Sixth amendment
Represented effectively, confront accusers, present evidence…
3
Q
Dusky Standard
A
Capacity to understand the criminal process (in general and specific case)
Ability to function in the court process, usually through counsel to assist in their defense
PRESENT ABILITY (capacity v willingness, reasonable degree of understanding)
4
Q
Wilson v United States
A
Amnesia doesn’t equate to competence
Ability to consult, ability to testify, if evidence can be extrinsically reconstructed, strength of prosecution’s case
United States v Stubblefield - prosecution has an obligation to assist
5
Q
When can competency concerns be raised
A
At any point during the criminal process
Drope v Missouri
6
Q
Prosecution-raised (or judge-raised) competency concern
A
The eval may happen without the defense counsels knowledge, or may happen before counsel is appointed
Skirts the protections afforded in Estelle v Smith
7
Q
Reasons defense may resist comp eval
A
Plea bargain may be preferable to lengthy hospital admission
Want them to look crazy at trial
Desire to do clients bidding (client does not think they are mentally ill)
8
Q
Percentage of evaluator-judge agreement
A
90% (despite competency ultimately being a LEGAL decision and not a criminal one)
Zapf et al found this was because of the belief that MH experts are more qualified to answer the question of competency than a judge or legal professional
9
Q
Competency restoration until the 1970s
A
Defendants were sent to a state hospital or long term facility indefinitely…treatment was only a secondary objective
No trial or conviction of their crime
Then came Jackson v Indiana in 1972
10
Q
Competency restoration post-Jackson
A
Many states limited the amount of time a defendant could be confined (but some don’t)
May only commit someone for a “reasonable period of time”
But these time limits are arbitrary
11
Q
Rate of competency restoration
A
75% are returned and found competent within six months (think mental illness and med issues)
Incompetent defendants have the right to refuse medication
Per Sell, someone can only be force medicated for competency if it is least intrusive, medically appropriate, and does not infringe on trial rights (eg right to testify)
12
Q
Three situations for involuntary medication per Sell
A
Defendants who are dangerous and need meds to reduce danger to self or others
Any defendant that is incompetent to make treatment decisions can be involuntary medicated
Nondangerous defendants who can make tx decisions but have “serious” charges
(If someone doesn’t meet these situations, Sell suggests they be released)
13
Q
Competency to be sentenced
A
More informal process
Fewer or no constitutional rights to waive for comp to be sentenced
Standard parallels Dusky…needs ability to offer mitigating information
14
Q
Features of incompetent defendants
A
Psychotic disorder Extensive MH/legal hx Marginalized group Below avg education Higher rates of unemployment
15
Q
Competency screening instruments
A
Competency Screening Test - 22 item sentence completion test
False positive because those with LD/low edu may bomb items
Georgia Court Competency Test - 17 questions in fixed order
Argued it, or the revised form with more items, fails to tap into decisional capacities or deep understanding
Computer-Assisted Determination of Competency to Proceed - 272 questions including social hx and psych fxning
Poor predictive validity, reliance on self report, takes so long to give
DONT USE IT
16
Q
Semi-structured Interviews for Competency to Proceed
A
Competency Assessment Inventory - not standardized with Likert scoring on items, can’t interpret the ratings you give the responses
Fitness Interview Test-Revised - 16 items for adults or kids, provides structure for an examiners assessment of CST // fac, cwc, consequences
Interdisciplinary Fitness Interview - covers five aspects of comp based on Dusky, requires the presence of an attorney and to be administered with another MH professional // still considered experimental
17
Q
Second-Generation Adjudicative Competence Measures
A
MacCAT-CA - three domains (fac, rac, assist), vignette based, education as necessary, is NOT a test for competency (you should still do an evaluation above and beyond this)
ECST-R - content formed by a panel of legal and MH professionals, map directly onto Dusky, also includes atypical presentation scale for feigning detection
Good psychometric, allows for educating, standardized, feigning scale
Some issues with internal validity, rating format dilutes impairment
18
Q
CAST-MR
A
Competency measure for defendants with ID, 4th gr reading level
Multiple choice, which authors argue is better suited for an MR population, unlike the open-ended approach of other instruments
Recommended use alongside another structured instrument/inquiry
19
Q
Competency to proceed in juveniles
A
15yo and younger were less likely to appreciate risks and think about long term consequences
But most juveniles transferred to adult court were 16-17, and less immature
20
Q
Juvenile Adjudicative Competence Interview (JACI)
A
Questions about 12 areas of inquiry related to ability to understand legal progress and problem solve
No ratings, scores, or norms
21
Q
Asking MSO-type questions in a comp eval
A
Cons: may be used later on if MSO is raised, can impeach a defendant who testifies in a trial, could lead to prosecutorial leads
Pros: can discuss real life and case-related information
Per AAPL, best to ask about it and place caveats if asked during testimony…definitely leave it out of your report
22
Q
If you need to provide an opinion about restorability…
A
Address issues of probability of restoration under various treatment regimens
Whether such tx can be administered on an outpatient basis
Length of time that would constitute a “reasonable” treatment trial under the proposed regimens
23
Q
Some predictors of restorability (or not)
A
Less likely to restore: tx refractory, older, chronic
More likely to restore: axis 2, criminal histories, nonpsychotic disorders
24
Q
Restoration rates for those with ID
A
24-33%
25
Dusky v US
| 1960
Having a basic knowledge of your charges is NOT sufficient for competency to stand trial
26
Pate v Robinson
| 1966
Defendants are required to have a competency hearing
| Constitutionally entitled to a comp hearing
27
Wilson v US
| 1968
Permanent retrograde amnesia does not automatically render a defendant incompetent to proceed
Sufficient extrinsic information on what happened, defendant can follow the proceedings, can discuss rationally w attorney, can testify on own behalf
28
Jackson v Indiana
| 1972
A defendant cannot be committed indefinitely if found ITP and unrestorable
Violates eighth amendment due process if held longer than “a reasonable period of time,” without other (civil commitment) proceedings
29
Drope v Missouri
| 1975
A judge should interrupt criminal proceedings if a defendant appears to be incompetent
30
Medina v California
| 1992
Placed burden (incompetence) of proof on defense
31
Riggins v Nevada
| 1992
You cannot be forced to take antipsychotic medication when standing trial
Must be medically appropriate, and least intrusive option
Found the fourteenth amendment considerations taken in Harper to apply here too, when someone is going to trial
32
Cooper v Oklahoma
| 1996
Preponderance of the evidence is a sufficient burden of proof form competency to proceed
Better to err on the side of sending someone to restoration than sending an incompetent defendant to trial
33
US v Duhon
| 2000
Rote memorization is not enough to demonstrate competency
Emphasized the importance of rational understanding
34
Sell v United States
| 2003
Antipsychotic drugs can be forced on a defendant facing serious criminal charges to restore to CST
Important government interests are at stake, tx is medically appropriate, likely to render defendant competent, substantially unlikely to have SEs that interfere with ability to assist, no less intrusive methods exist
35
Competency to consent to search and seizure
Fourth Amendment
Must involve “reasonable” police action…meaning the consent must be voluntary (so almost always focuses on coercion, with the persons knowledge of whether they have a right to refuse being secondary)
36
Competence to waive Miranda
Must be knowing, voluntary, intelligent
Miranda isn’t necessary if the person is not “in custody” (in their home, during traffic stops, some police station interviews provided they’re not the “functional equivalent of arrest”)
37
Topics of focus in competency to waive Miranda evaluations
Person-centered factors: IQ, suggestibility, oral and reading comprehension
Situational factors: intoxication, MH sxs, how the defendant was informed of their rights, bx of interrogator, setting and context of interrogation process
38
Competency to waive Miranda
| “Knowing”
Ability to understand the rights in the manner they were delivered
39
Competency to waive Miranda
| “Intelligent”
Capacity to use the information about their rights to make a rational and self-interested decision
40
Predictors that are (not) associated with Miranda understanding
Previous court experience is not a predictor, and mental health history is also not a strong predictor of not understanding it
Juveniles under 15, those with ID, generally have difficulty with Miranda
41
Measure of Miranda Comprehension
Grisso’s Instruments for Assessing Understanding and Appreciation of Miranda Rights (comprehension, follow up comprehension, vocabulary, vignettes - for juveniles)
Not the best measure, limited comparison groups, limited research
Rogers’ Standardized Assessment of Miranda Abilities (SAMA)
Comprehension of the interrogation process, true/false about misconceptions, comprehension of relevant words, quiz about right to refuse
Similar to Grisso, lacks embedded response style assessment
42
Competency to waive Miranda
| “Voluntary”
Suspects vulnerability to strong assertions of guilt, or insinuations that the interrogators are there to “help” the suspect
Consider age, deference to authority (Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale), strong desire to please others (ID/kids)
43
Requirements for competency to plead guilty
Similar to Miranda…knowing, intelligent, voluntary
SCOTUS: nature of the charge, penalties, rights waived by plea of guilt
44
Competency to waive counsel and represent oneself
| “knowingly”
You’re aware of the advantages and disadvantages of self-representation
45
Conducting a competency to proceed prose eval…
Start with a standard CST eval
Then further inquiry into whether they understand advantages and disadvantages of self-representation, ability to attend and concentrate, reasoning, communication capacities
46
Competence to refuse insanity/mental state defense
Per Frendak, follow the defendants preferred defense provided they are competent to make it (includes refusal to introduce mitigating evidence)
May not want an insanity commitment, may believe tx would be better in a prison than in state hospital, avoid MH dx stigma, MH commitment may result in loss of legal rights…
47
Competency to testify
Seen in civil and criminal cases
Can apply to ANYONE who may testify (not just the defendant, but also witnesses)
Ability to observe the event, remember the event, communicate the memory, tell the diff btwn truth and fiction, understand obligation to tell the truth in court
48
Competency to be executed and to participate in, and waive appeals
Does a mental disorder or disability significantly impair someone’s ability to understand the nature and purpose of the punishment, or appreciate the reason for its imposition
Came from SCOTUS in Panetti v Quarterman
49
Measures for competency to be executed
Elbert’s Competency to be Executed Rating Instrument
Interview Checklist for Evaluations of Competency for Execution (consistent with Panetti, goes into more depth than Elbert’s instrument)
Focus on (1) awareness of why they are being executed, (2) understanding the execution is occurring because of the convicted crime, (3) ability to assist counsel
50
Constitutionality of medicating those to be competent to executed
Perry v Louisiana - found incompetent to be executed without meds…was initially forcibly medicated
SCOTUS remanded for reevaluation under Harper, and the case determined you can’t medicate solely for the purposes of execution
51
Four general categories for sentencing
Retribution - receiving deserved punishment for actions committed (focused on culpability)
Deterrence - how much punishment is needed to keep others from committing similar acts (general), how much punishment is needed to keep the offender from engaging in further crime (specific)
Incapacitation - aims to prevent further crimes by the offender by focusing on what the offender would do if unpunished
Rehabilitation - oriented to reduce specific bx by the defendant
52
Institutions that can influence sentencing
Legislature - statutory schemes
Prosecutors - selects the charge(s) and number of counts, through the plea bargaining process
Courts - judges imposing sentences (consecutive v concurrent, fines, restitution, etc.)
Parole boards - comprised of citizens and correctional officials, determines if parole is granted and under what (if any) conditions
53
Mentally disordered sexual offender statutes
| MDSO
Divert SOs with multiple offenses to special, indefinite treatment programs
Primary goals are to protect the public from dangerous sex offenders, and rehabilitate the MDSOs
Criminal MDSO laws typically happen post-conviction, civil laws happen after the charge but before the conviction
54
Laws regarding MDSOs
Foucha v Louisiana - you can’t continue to confine someone absent a dangerous mental illness
Kansas v Hendricks - SVP commitment wasn’t cruel or unusual because it’s treatment and not punishment
Specht v Patterson - sex offenders facing indeterminate sentences are entitled to adversarial proceedings
Kansas v Crane - tried to define “dangerous beyond control” standard for commitment
55
Case law in death penalty cases
Furman v Georgia - no more death penalty for rape
Atkins v Virginia - no more death penalty for ID
Roper v Simmons - no more death penalty for kiddos
Ake v Oklahoma - entitled to psychiatric assistance when dangerousness is of issue in a capital case, but not one of defendants choosing
56
Factors that influence sentencing
Defendants who go to trial often receive harsher sentences
More variance in sentencing is attributed to individual judges than any other single factor
Other influences: degree of harm to the victim, prior convictions, race and gender
57
Considerations for reports/evaluations of treatment needs
Psychiatric treatment is not necessarily the best response to all crimes
Be familiar with community treatment resources and be specific about their utility in each case
Ethical conflicts if you also provide some of the treatment being recommended
Offenders can miscalculate their willingness and capacity to engage in treatment
58
How psychologists can contribute in assessments of culpability
Inform court of situational factors that contributed to the commission of the defense
Educate the court on the offender’s life in general
Explanations of cultural factors in how the offender experienced the situation that lead to the charge
Evaluating culpability (intrinsic/extrinsic factors that undermined self-control related to culpability of the offense
59
Problems with assessing violence risk
No professional consensus on how best to measure this
Dangerousness is not solely a trait
Recency and salience of the offense may disproportionately impact clinical judgements
Potential for bias, and illusory correlations
60
Sensitivity v specificity
Sensitivity - true positive rate
Specificity - true negative rate
61
Problem with relying solely on base rates for assessments of violence risk
Neglect to consider graded levels of confidence about future violence
Seen as a 2x2 table of violent v nonviolent, and predictions v outcomes
62
Receiver operating characteristic analyses for violence risk
Graphs the trade offs between sensitivity and specificity
Utilizes AUC analyses, higher AUCs mean more accuracy in classification
63
Five approaches to assessing violence risk
Unstructured clinical assessment - most often used, worst kind, most flexible approach, courts don’t necessarily demand anything different
Anamnestic assessment - evaluator attempts to identify risk factors based on an examinee’s detailed history (not far from unstructured)
SPJ - gathers relevant data, structured methods to direct your attention
Actuarial assessment - comparisons between violent and nonviolent samples and determining the factors that best discriminate them
Adjusted actuarial - actuarial procedures but then you’re fucking with the estimates (why even use an actuarial in the first place then?)
64
General recidivism risk assessment tools
LSIR
YLS/CMI
65
SPJ risk assessment tools
HCR-20
Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth (SAVRY)
66
Actuarial risk assessment measures
Violence Risk Appraisal Guide
Classification of Violence Risk (COVR)
67
Sexual reoffending risk assessment tools
Static-99-R
Sexual Violence Risk 20 (SVR-20)
68
Single best personality predictor of future dangerousness
Psychopathy
Although ASPD as delineated in the PCL is not as useful as a predictor
69
Types of risk factors for future dangerousness
Dispositional - sex, age, personality
Personal - arrest hx, age of onset
Contextual - weapon and victim availability
Clinical - substance use disorder, major mental illness
70
Strongest historical factors for dangerousness
Adult criminal record
Delinquency history
71
Whalem v US
| 1965
Competency hearings are not required if both parties stipulate to the finding of the evaluation
A court can impose an insanity defense onto a defendant against their desires (overturned by Marble in 1991)
72
Miranda v Arizona
| 1966
Police ARE required to inform a suspect of their rights to remain silent and have an attorney present
73
Faretta v California
| 1975
A state may not force a lawyer upon a defendant when the defendant wishes to conduct their own defense
Right to self-representation - decision must be made knowingly and intelligently
74
Crane v Kentucky
| 1986
The constitution permits evidence on the conditions under which a confession is obtained
75
Godinez v Moran
| 1993
The standard to waive constitutional rights is NOT higher than CST
76
Indiana v Edwards
A state can deny someone the right to self-representation even if they were found CST
Even if competent under Dusky, Godinez only allows you to waive your right to counsel, NOT to self-representation (so prose is not guaranteed)
77
JDB v North Carolina
| 2011
Courts should consider the age of a juvenile suspect when determining if a juvenile could have consented/waived Miranda
Age informs the “Miranda custody analysis”
78
Two elements of a crime
Actus reus - the prohibited act itself
Mens rea - the mental state with which the defendant must have acted (purpose, knowledge)
Even if both elements are met, a defendant can avoid criminal responsibility by raising an affirmative defense (such as NGRI)
79
Two main types of affirmative defenses
Justification - wrongful conduct was objectively permissible under certain circumstances (self-defense)
Excuse - conduct was objectively wrong but the defendant was not a responsible moral agent and is therefore not blameworthy (insanity)
80
Four levels of mens rea
Purpose - crime is a result of the agents conscious object
Knowledge - defendant is aware of some prohibited circumstance, or is practically certain that some prohibited result will occur as a result of their action
Recklessness - defendant is consciously aware of a great and unjustifiable risk of a social harm that they have created
Negligence - defendant is not aware of the substantial risk but should have been reasonably aware of it
81
Intoxication and partial defenses
Voluntary and involuntary have a place in case law in many states to negate mens rea
Although Montana v Egelhoff was upheld by SCOTUS, which prevented intoxication from being used to negate mens rea (so many states allow it to speak to mens rea, but it’s not a guaranteed
82
Examples of partial excuse defenses
Provocation/passion
EED
“Imperfect self defense” - some states will allow reduction in mens rea for homicide if the defendant believed they were in danger (but a reasonable person may not have)
83
Stats for NGRI defenses
Less than 1% of jury trials have NGRI defenses, and of that 1%, only 25% of NGRI defenses are successful
84
Insanity Defense Reform Act
| 1984
Federal system
Came post-Hinckley
Insanity is affirmative, must prove by clear and convincing, if at the time of the act they could not appreciate the nature and quality of the wrongfulness of their acts, due to a mental disease or defect
Excludes partial affirmative defenses, MH experts can’t comment on ultimate issue
85
GBMI defense
Was an option in some states pre- and post-Hinckley
Guilty but had a mental illness at the time of the act
Does not impact blameworthiness so they are still tried and sentenced in the same way their non-GBMI counterparts are
86
Case law on committing insanity acquittees
Jones v United States - indefinite commitment is constitutional
Foucha v Louisiana - personality disorder is not a MD or D, once the psychosis has lifted that makes the person dangerous, you cannot continue to confine them
87
Assessment measure for insanity
RCRAS (Rogers criminal responsibility….)
Considered “acceptable” - psychometric properties are okay…
Best to use as a means to structure an MSO a eval, don’t rely on this itself
Contains many questions that tap into various insanity prongs (ALI, Durham, malingering, GBMI, etc.)
88
Sanity mental disease or defeat requirement
All states require this, and many also frown upon temporary insanity (such as dissociative states)
Most successful are psychosis and ID
Focus on the symptoms and impairment, rather than the exact label
89
M’Naghten and ALI
Both contain cognitive elements (M’Naghten more so)
MN - did not know nature/quality/act was wrong
ALI - lacked capacity to appreciate wrongfulness
MN is more restrictive, but judges apply it liberally making it essentially equal to ALI
Bigger difference is in ALI’s focus on wrongfulness (moral v legal wrong), many states lean into legal wrongfulness and only some honor deific decree
90
Insanity’s volitional impairment prong
“Irresistible impulse” test or “Policeman at the elbow”
Second prong to ALI (with cognitive component being the first)
Typically, any evidence of planning impacts this prong or test, many states don’t like the volitional piece because how do you truly know of something is irresistible?
91
Automatism Defense
Someone committing a criminal act involuntarily, such as while sleeping, when hypoxia, etc.
Largely doesn’t work in most states if you’ve had experienced such a state previously and did not take responsible steps to prevent the criminal occurrence
92
Diminished capacity v diminished responsibility
DC - defendant did not act purposefully or knowingly
DR - has a mental disorder that caused a volitional or cognitive impairment but does not produce insanity to the ability to form mens rea
93
Testimony in actus reus
Testimony stating the defendant literally could not have done the acts in question (because it was not in their personality, etc.)
Courts have generally thrown this out, because the science behind it sucks, and it can typically only come up if the defense brings mental health testimony up first
94
Standard based on self-defense, provocation, duress, and entrapment defenses
Reasonable person standard
How would a reasonable person/spouse/etc. have reacted in this situation
95
DID and insanity defenses
Little research, dx poorly understood
Many offenders report dissociation during violent acts, and thus may be a normal response to a traumatic event rather than dissociation
DID in adults can be properly diagnosed, is chronic, and is most likely seen as a reaction to an acute situational stressor
96
PTSD and insanity defenses
Many measures for PTSD can be easily spoiled by disingenuous reporting
Comorbidity with substance abuse
Likely to be a snap bx and not something planned, choice of victim must be accidental, acts must relate to the trauma in some way, benign incidents result in violence, can’t explain their bx, typically otherwise has no real criminal record
97
Insanity stats (reports)
Defendant found insane approx 13% of the time
Varies widely on rate of agreement, based on access to consultation, setting, PhD v MD…
81-95% concordance between clinical opinion and legal outcome
98
Ways in which mental illness can relate to the alleged events
Causal role - offending bx was caused by the sxs
Coincidental role - sxs were present at the time but did not directly contribute to the bx
Postevent role - sxs developed after, or may have been caused by, the criminal act
99
Rex v Arnold
| 1724
First insanity case
To be insane “a man must be totally deprived of his understanding and memory so as to not know what he is doing, no more than an infant, brute, or WILD BEAST.”
(Taps into right v wrong understanding that we see more commonly today)
100
M’Naghten’s Case
| 1843
Laboring under such a defect of reason from disease or mind
Not know nature and quality of the act, or know right from wrong
Critics say it’s too rigid, and a literal interpretation would not exculpatory anyone…you should consider ability to control actions
101
Pre-Durham insanity statue
To help out the M’N standard came the irresistible impulse test
By reason of MD or D, could not choose right from wrong and agency was destroyed - must have been sole product of MI
Legal community believed impulsivity was easily feigned and was worried this would lead to too many acquittals
102
Durham v United States
| 1954
PRODUCT TEST
Unlawful act must be the product of a mental illness
Criticism was it was too vague
St. E’s moved to include personality disorders and everyone lost their shit in 1957
103
United States v Brawner
| 1972
ALI standard is included
Person is not responsible if they have an MD/D that causes them to lack capacity to appreciate criminality (wrongfulness) or conform conduct to requirements of the law
104
McDonald v US
| 1962
Defined mental disease or defect
“Substantially impacts or impairs”
105
Frendak v US
| 1979
A defendant can refuse an insanity defense, even if data shows likelihood of insanity at the time of the act
106
Jones v US
| 1983
NGRI acquittees CAN be subject to involuntary and indefinite commitment
107
Foucha v Louisiana
| 1992
A defendant must be both dangerous and mentally ill for a state to justify continued commitment of an NGRI acquittee
108
Clark v Arizona
| 2006
All interpretations of insanity are sufficient
You do not have the right to present MH evidence outside of an insanity defense to counter criminal intent
109
Furman v Georgia
| 1972
Death penalty for rape (where death did not occur or was even attempted) constituted cruel and unusual punishment
110
Gregg v Georgia
| 1976
Imposition of the death penalty in capital cases does not violate the 8th (cruel and usual) and 14th (due process) amendments
111
Lockett v Ohio
| 1978
It is a violation of 8th and 14th amendments to limit consideration of mitigating factors in a death penalty case
Upheld by Eddings
112
Estelle v Smith
| 1981
Information gathered as part of a pre-trial evaluation cannot be used during sentencing
113
Ford v Wainwright
| 1986
You cannot execute the insane - violation of 8th and 14th
Panetti v Quarterman - competency for execution must include a rational understanding of the states justification for executing the inmate
114
State v Perry
| 1992
You cannot force medicate someone for the purposes of competency to execution
115
Atkins v Virginia
| 2002
Execution of mentally retarded persons is considered cruel and unusual punishment
116
Roper v Simmons
| 2005
The execution of minors violates cruel and unusual punishment protection of the 8th amendment
117
Role of aggravating and mitigating factors in capital cases
Certain aggravating factors must be in play to consider the death penalty…prosecution must prove the presence of these factors to make their case for why the DP should be considered
The defense must then convince the prosecution that DP is not appropriate through the use of statutory mitigating factors
Nonstatutory factors are also permitted (info on defendants background and circumstances of the offense)
118
Barefoot v Estelle
| 1983
Permits psychiatric testimony in capital sentencing cases (dangerousness), despite clinical predictions lacking in specificity
119
Two major prongs in capital evaluations
What factors are present that may be relevant to mitigation and aggravation?
What is the likelihood that the defendant will commit acts of serious violence in the future?
120
The reliability of violence risk assessment for capital cases is best when…
The risk estimate relies on past patterns of conduct displayed by individuals in similar contexts
The risk assessment is anchored to the base rate of violence for the group to which the individual most closely corresponds, and then is conservatively individualized
The final risk estimate is adjusted for risk management or violence prevention/reduction procedures that could be applied
121
Heilbrun’s three prongs for competency to be executed
Understanding the nature of capital punishment and the reason for its existence
Ability to assist counsel in ongoing appeals
Prepare for death psychologically/spiritually
122
Heilbrun’s proposed essential components to competency to be executed evaluations
Disclosure of purpose
Multiple evaluation contacts w inmate
Specific inquiry regarding the pending execution
Comprehensive assessment for psychopathology, cog fxning, personality, and sx exaggeration and minimization
Third party interviews to obtain historical and descriptive information
Assessment context that provides appropriate interview and testing conditions
