Cold War: Historians Flashcards
Lundestad, G - Empire by Invitation?
What are the key arguments presented by Lundestaad?
- If American expansionism during the Cold War was imperial, it was definitely an Empire by Invitation
- Traditional perspective: USSR expansionism dominated Eastern Europe, and strengthened positions in Mongolia and Vietnam
- Revisionist: US dominated expansionism. Only the US became a global power in the years dealt with.
- US practiced power politics - dominating navy, air force and gold control
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Lundestad, G - Empire by Invitation?
How did GNP change between 1939 and 1945 in the US?
- US GNP: $209.4 billion 1939 -> 335.2 billion by 1945 (Half of global goods and services)
Lundestad, G - Empire by Invitation?
How many stationed US troops were there abroad in 1938?
- None. The US had no military alliances and no US troops were stationed on territory it did not control.
- Postwar - defence budget $12 billion
Lundestad, G - Empire by Invitation?
When was the explosion in defence spending?
- Much later than dictated in conventional wisdom - actually post-1950.
- Quadrupled to $12 billion
- Significant treaties signed in Asia.
Lundestad, G - Empire by Invitation?
What did the American monopoly on the bomb provide?
- European security prior to NATO’s formation
Lundestad, G - Empire by Invitation?
Stats on BRI, FRA & GER showing dependence on Washington
Britain - 70% in favour of receiving American loan. 63% in favour of govt position on American-British relationship
France - 47% favoured US domination, 23% USST
Germany - 63% trust US above all others
Lundestad, G - Empire by Invitation?
When did the empire fade?
By 1960s, recovery in Europe reduced the need for dependency on the U.S.
Nevertheless, military independence still far off
Lundestad, G - Empire by Invitation?
Why did the empire fade?
Quintessentially liberal empire
Financially intolerable to maintain entangling financial alliance with Europe
Joseph Siracusa - Reflections on the Cold War (2009)
What is the main thrust of Siracusa’s argument?
Whilst the anticommunist colouring of the U.S. was decided in the Red Scare era of the 1920s, it was political differences during WWII which confirmed the Cold War.
US wanted a return to a Versailles Status Quo. whereas the USSR wanted a fundamental reorientation of Europe for security purposes. This was superceded by the arms race
Joseph Siracusa - Reflections on the Cold War (2009)
What position does Siracusa take with regards to Washington’s reaction to Russia as a harbinger of global communism?
Washington actively stimulated its own ideological foundation - a blind, knee-jerk anticommunism which bordered ‘control hysteria’.
From Truman to Reagan, America’s political establishment conducted a ‘war on communism’ that refused to consider any resolution short of the Soviet Union’s surrender
Joseph Siracusa - Reflections on the Cold War (2009)
What role did the media have to play concerning the USSR?
“Worst case assumptions about Soviet intentions were fed by worst case assumptions about Soviet capabilities”
Joseph Siracusa - Reflections on the Cold War (2009)
Where does Siracusa stand on the position of global stability during the period?
“Politics in the post-World War II era, therefore, was characterised by remarkable stability. produced partially by the dangers of thermonuclear war, but especially by the relative absence of vital conflicting interests
Joseph Siracusa - Reflections on the Cold War (2009)
What is important an important check on pursuits of universal liberty?
Fundamentally impossible. The world is replete with examples where self determination led to political and economic retrogression.
Mark Mandelbaum - Ending the Cold War
What conclusion does Mandelbaum draw about the end of the Cold War for Eastern Europe?
The cold war did not necessarily end in Eastern Europe at all.
Robert Jervis - Legacies of the Cold War
What are the key points raised by Jervis?
- US military inflated to unprecedented size and prestige
- The claim that American security requires commitments, strong political ties and military assertiveness is conventional wisdom; those hwo disagree are stigmatised as ‘isolationists’
- Diplomacy became devalued during the Cold War, perhaps because security was so central and defined largely in military terms
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Wilfrid Knapp - The Cold War Revised (1968)
What does this revisionist argue about?
- Stalin was not an ideologist, had led his country away from that mode of thought
- Stalin was nutured in a system and ideology of mistrust - think Nazis
- The bomb, far from bringing security, accelerated the CW- ‘dual insecurity’ - USSR of the bomb, US of the lack of ground forces it had
- Korea = TP
Mark Kramer - Ideology and the Cold War
What are the key arguments of Kramer’s piece?
- Realists of a neoclassical persuasion argue that great-power behaviour cannot be properly understood without taking account of at least one or two domestic-level factors such as perceptions of external threats or relative power
- Gaddis - conflict arose because of incompatible ideologies and only ended when the Soviet ideology lost its hostile edge. these scholars deny that structural conditions alone would have brought about US-USSR conflict.
- Careful handling documentary records - containment for instance - balance power vis-a-vis Waltzian theory, or counter to Moscow’s quest to overthrow captialism?
- The US had no eason - nor any inclination - to impose an Athenian style alliance on Western Europe.
- Soviet clampdown on East European leaders tried to pursue an independent course or allowed anti-communist riots - in this sense, more like ancient Athens
- The return of ideology is good, but should not eclipse material drivers in the cold war.
Mark Kramer - Ideology and the Cold War
What do Kramer, Gaddis and Westad argue about the Korean War?
- Gaddis and Westad see as highly ideological. Establishment of communism in China led to communist rivalry. Ideological jealousy at play
- Kramer - new material suggests Stalin was not being ideological. Stalin apprehensive about getting involved - declared he wouldn’t. Attempted to force Chinese support.
- Nothing about this story needs to be construed in terms of ideology. The outcome is perfectly compatible with the notion that Stalin was seeking to expand Soviet power and influence at relatively low cost and minimum risk- as shown through politicking between the three nations
Mark Kramer - Ideology and the Cold War
What does the situation in Czechoslovakia indicate?
- Initially, the concept of the Brezhnev doctrine seems compelling - all fates of soviet nations bound together - with this driving intervention in Czech.
- However, arguably intervention in Czechoslovakia was a purely military concern. If Czech misaligned with the Warsaw pact, security would be severely compromised. This seems logical given the insistence on the Russian behalf of not getting involved in national domestic affairs.
- Ideology only comes into play when Dubcek attempted to manipulate the line on domestic intervention to his own ideological end - removal was therefore and thus ideological.
Mark Kramer - Ideology and the Cold War
NATO?
- Compared to the Warsaw pact - solely a military venture. Eastern European Warsaw nations far more subservient to SU
Mark Kramer - Ideology and the Cold War
Who else was given recovery support in the aftermath of WWII?
- Japan - so that West Europe and Japan both could develop prosperous, dynamic economies and stable, democratic systems - which collectively would be able to offset soviet military power
Mark Kramer - Ideology and the Cold War
What was an important aspect of the Eastern European currencies?
- The continued salience of bilateral trade between the soviet union and the East European countries was reinforced by the non-convertibility of CEMA currencies.
Mark Kramer - Ideology and the Cold War
Why were Eastern European goods of poor quality?
- The capacity of the Soviet economy to absorb goods that would have been unacceptable on the world market gave the East European regimes an incentive to continue production of low-quality items without due regard for international competitiveness.
Mark Kramer - Ideology and the Cold War
What demonstrates US commitment to Capitalism over democracy?
- The lack of a Marshall Plan for the Third World
Mark Kramer - Ideology and the Cold War
What was a notable hindrance to the USSR economy?
- It fell behind on the technological front - by the 1970s, it was falling stradily behind the US and others in many key technologies
Mark Kramer - Ideology and the Cold War
What is interesting about the end of the Cold War, esp. for neorealists?
What did William Wohlforth append in his conclusions on the end of the CW?
- ‘The events of 1989-91 make sense only in terms of ideas. There was no military defeat or economic crash’
- Wohlforth argues that perception of each side’s relative power changed massively. USSR relative decline was seen in a lot of Gorbachev’s policies. Declining hegemons, Wohlforth asserts, are more likely than declining challengers to resort to violence to stave off the loss of their position.
