Chapter 8: Royal Prerogative Flashcards

You may prefer our related Brainscape-certified flashcards:
1
Q

1 The prerogative - overview

1.1 What is the ‘royal prerogative’?

A

What type of power did Tony Blair use to take the UK to war in Iraq in 2003 or Margaret Thatcher
to send the ‘task force’ to the Falkland Islands in 1982? Did this power derive from a statute
passed by Parliament, or did they use a power that came from another source entirely? The answer is the latter: the source of the power used to make these decisions came from the prerogative power of the Crown.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

Prime Ministers do not require parliamentary consent

A

Prime Ministers do not as a matter of law need parliamentary consent to commit British troops, though Blair did seek parliamentary approval for this course of action for political reasons. That remains the position. In 2013, the House of Commons voted against possible UK military action against Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad’s government to deter the use of chemical weapons. A vote was not legally required, but it was taken (and respected) for political reasons.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

1.1.1 Dicey’s definition

A

The prerogative: The classic, and often quoted, definition of the prerogative was laid down by
Dicey, who stated that the prerogative was:

[T]he residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority, which at any given time is legally left in the hands of the Crown […] Every act which the executive government can lawfully do without the authority of an Act of Parliament is done in virtue of this prerogative. Note that the courts (Administrative Court and upwards) are the arbiters of the existence and
extent of a claimed prerogative power

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

1.2 Absolute monarchy to democratic constitutional monarchy?

A

The UK has developed from an absolutist monarchy to a democratic constitutional monarchy with
limited powers. The prerogative powers are the remnants of the old ‘monarchical’ powers - these
have been gradually eroded since 1688 but some very significant ones remain. Although these are
the executive powers of the monarch, they are exercised on his behalf by the government.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

Prerogative Power at the heart of the government

A

These powers are exercised, for instance, when the government decides to commit troops to war,
when it enters into a treaty, or when an appointment is made to the House of Lords. Prerogative
power was at the heart of the Government’s attempts in 2016 to trigger the Article 50 ‘Brexit’
process without initial parliamentary approval, which led to the case of R (Miller) v SoS for Exiting
the EU, decided in the Supreme Court

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

1.3 Development of prerogative power

A

Prerogative powers have historically been exercised without the need to gain the consent of Parliament and with little or no control by the courts. In a modern democracy, however, where accountability of the Executive is vital, the courts’ control of the exercise of prerogative power has become increasingly important.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

House of Lords’ decision in GCHQ

A

The landmark House of Lords’ decision in GCHQ significantly
extended the reviewability of prerogative powers and, since that time, control has been tightened
further.

Reform of some areas of prerogative power has occurred in piecemeal fashion. For instance, the
Constitutional Reform and Governance Act, passed in April 2010, made provision for treaties to
be ratified only after Parliament has had the opportunity to raise opposing resolutions.

This provision is obviously quite limited as it only covers a specific aspect of prerogative power (the
process relating to approval of treaties).

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

1.4 The position of the Crown in law

A

The UK is a ‘constitutional monarchy’, ie a nation in which the monarch is the head of state but not the political head of government, and whose powers to govern are limited. In a gradual process from 1688 power to govern the UK has effectively passed from the monarch to the executive, ie the central government, with the Prime Minister at its head. However, the monarch still performs the formal or ceremonial exercise of that power.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

King acting on advice

A

The term ‘royal prerogative’ refers to those powers of the ‘Crown’ that are recognized by the
common law, as distinct from those conferred and exercised under statute. In this context, the
term ‘Crown’ refers to the executive, not simply the monarch.

This is because it is now highly
unlikely that the royal prerogative will be exercised in any other way than by the executive on behalf of the monarch. This reflects a very strong constitutional convention that the executive exercises the monarch’s powers, a position which is sometimes phrased as the King acting ‘on the advice of’ the Prime Minister.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

1.4.1 Control by statute and convention

A

Although the prerogative remains important, the business of government is now largely conducted through statutory powers. In those areas where the prerogative retains significance (such as military action) how the power
is actually used is largely governed by convention.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

1.5 Ministerial prerogative powers

A

The House of Commons Library briefing paper on the Royal Prerogative (August 2017) provides
very useful background reading on this topic.
https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN03861/SN03861.pdf

Ministerial prerogative powers are those which can be exercised by government ministers, relating
to:
* The judicial system
* Foreign affairs
* Armed forces, war and times of emergency - ‘defence of the realm’

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

1.5.1 Judicial system – prerogative of mercy

A

The Home Secretary (on behalf of the Crown) may pardon those convicted of criminal offences
prosecuted by the Crown. Historically, the principle of a pardon pre-dates the Act of Settlement
1700, which altered the law so that a pardon could not ‘stop an impeachment […] but there is to be
nothing to prevent the king from pardoning after the impeached person has been convicted and
sentenced

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

The Prerogative Mercy

A

The prerogative of mercy is an example of a prerogative which the courts have willingly reviewed. In the case of R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Bentley [1993] 4 All ER 442 it was held:
The court had jurisdiction to review the exercise of the royal prerogative of mercy by the Home Secretary in accord with accepted public law principles since the exercise of the prerogative was an important feature of the criminal justice system and a decision by the Home Secretary which was infected with legal errors ought not to be immune from legal challenge merely because it involved an element of policy or was made under the prerogative.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

1.5.2 Foreign affairs – prerogative powers

A
  • Granting and revoking passports is a Ministerial prerogative power.
  • As are the recognition of other sovereign states and their representatives,
  • the making and ratification of treaties (treaties are seen as a contract between states, which
    does not generally require the approval of Parliament: see Attorney General for Canada v
    Attorney General for Ontario [1937] AC 326), and
  • the governance of British Overseas Territories.
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

1.5.3 Armed forces and emergencies

A

The taking of measures necessary in times of emergency and/or for the ‘defence of the realm’, including the control of armed forces, is a prerogative power. In Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 777, Lord Reid stated: ‘The disposition and armament of the armed forces are and for centuries have been within the exclusive discretion of the Crown […]’

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

Burmah Oil Company Ltd v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75,

A

In Burmah Oil Company Ltd v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75, installations owned by the oil company
in Burma (then a British colony) had been destroyed during World War Two on the orders of the
commander of the British forces, to prevent them falling into the hands of the Japanese army.

By a 3-2 majority the House of Lords held that compensation was payable to the company, there being no general rule that the prerogative could be exercised without compensation. Lord Reid stated: ‘[T]he prerogative certainly covers doing all those things in an emergency which are necessary for the conduct of war.’

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
17
Q

1.6 The Monarch’s prerogatives

A

In addition to Ministerial prerogatives, some ‘personal’ prerogatives which were traditionally
exercised by the Monarch still exist. These are now exercised by the Monarch ‘on the advice of the
Prime Minister’. (The Monarch could, in theory, refuse to follow the Prime Minister’s advice but has
never done so.)

  • The appointment and removal of ministers
  • The appointment of the Prime Minister
  • The right to assent to legislation
  • The creation of peers and the granting of other honours
  • The right to dissolve and prorogue Parliament
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
18
Q

1.6.1 The Crown’s legal prerogatives (fountain of justice)

A

The administration of justice was historically the prerogative of the monarch, who was regarded
as the ‘fountain of justice’, in the sense of being its distributor rather than its creator. Today, the
structure of the courts and their jurisdiction are almost entirely statute-based. The remaining legal
prerogatives of any significance

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
19
Q

Crown & Statute

A

Crown and statute: There is a presumption that the Crown is not bound by statute, meaning
that legislation will not apply to the Crown unless express words have been used or it can
inferred (by ‘necessary implication’) that Parliament did intend to bind the Crown. In Province
of Bombay v Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay [1947] AC 58, the Privy Council
reaffirmed and elaborated upon this principle.

’If […] it is manifest from the very terms of the statute, that it was the intention of the legislature that the Crown should be bound, then the result is the same as if the Crown had been expressly named.’

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
20
Q

Immunity from some litigation

A

The Crown is not directly subject to the contempt jurisdiction
(ie contempt of court); and the sovereign has personal immunity from prosecution or being
sued for a wrongful act.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
21
Q

1.7 Control of prerogative power

A

In summary, prerogative power can be ‘controlled’ in four ways:

(a) By the application of public law (the judicial review jurisdiction of the courts)
(b) By the over-riding effect of statute (legislation ‘trumps’ the prerogative)
(c) Informally, by political pressure in government and public life (eg the media)
(d) Informally, by changes to convention over time

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
22
Q

1.8 Summary

A
  • Prerogative powers are those common law powers which the government can exercise without
    authority of Parliament.
  • Contemporary prerogative powers were historically exercised exclusively by the monarch, and
    now are exercised by the executive.
  • The courts have the power to decide whether a prerogative power exists, what its scope is, and
    (following the GCHQ decision) whether it has been lawfully exercised.
  • Ministerial prerogative powers include those relating to ’defence of the realm’ and to diplomatic
    relations and treaty making.
  • The Monarch’s ‘personal prerogatives’ such as the power to prorogue and dissolve Parliament,
    are exercised ‘on the advice of’ the Prime Minister.
  • Legislation does not bind the Crown unless this is stated or clearly implied.
  • The Crown is immune from some types of legal action.
  • Prerogative power can be controlled by legislation, the courts, or political pressure.
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
23
Q

2 Control of the prerogative - legality

2.1 Control of prerogative powers

A

As we have seen, prerogative power is a residual form of legal authority which the executive ‘owns’ but which has not been legitimated through the parliamentary process.
The potential for it to be abused is therefore higher than with statutory power, created by Parliament and often hemmed in by certain restrictions and conditions for its use laid down in the legislation.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
24
Q

Primarily through courts that prerogative powers are controlled

A

Certain political mechanisms can be adopted to modify this effect, for instance through constitutional conventions. But it is primarily through the courts that the use of prerogative powers has been controlled. This tension between this old form of power and the requirements of legality has been in evidence for a long period of history and involved certain long-term trends.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
25
Q

2.1.1 Degree of control

A

However, the most clear-cut developments have occurred since the 1980s following the seminal
case of ‘GCHQ’. That case and its aftermath will be explored later in this topic, but it is important
firstly to assess the early stages of the courts’ interaction with the executive or ‘Crown’.

Remember that the prerogative is a form of power that has legal enforceability because it is
recognised and ‘accepted’ by the courts through the common law. It is therefore the judges who should determine how and to what degree they are able to ‘control’ its use

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
26
Q

2.2 Origins of the tension

A

It is probably unwise to draw too many comparisons between later disputes between Government
and judiciary and those in the pre-1688 period when a different kind of regime was in place.

However, the use of prerogative powers by the early Stuart kings was a major source of tension in
the country and one of several factors leading to the Civil Wars in the 1640s, notably Charles I’s
imposition of the ‘Ship Money’ taxes.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
27
Q

Key case: Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co Rep 74

A

In this important historical case, the leading jurist of the day, Chief Justice Coke, established the view (later reflected by Dicey) that the royal prerogative represented a finite stock of power. Crown power was legitimated through recognition in the common law. Therefore, a particular form of prerogative power could not be said to exist unless the courts accepted that there was a
precedent for it having been used in the pastv

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
28
Q

2.3 Legality of prerogative powers

Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 St Tr 1029

A

In the case of Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 St Tr 1029 (see the Rule of Law topic), the government
of the day claimed to have the legal authority to enter and search Entick’s premises under a ‘general warrant’. He was suspected of association with the radical political leader, John Wilkes. Entick challenged this as a trespass on his property.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
29
Q

2.3 Legality of prerogative powers

A

The court consulted ‘its books’ but found no precedent for this action in common law (nor in any statute), reinforcing the point made in 1607 by Coke that the executive cannot act under a purported prerogative power that has not been recognised by the common law. Put simply, this
power didn’t exist.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
30
Q

2.3.1 350 years and a civil war?

A

In BBC v Johns [1965] Ch 32 Lord Diplock made the celebrated comment that: ‘It is 350 years and
a civil war too late for the Queen’s courts to broaden the prerogative.’

This neatly sums up the point – evident in the earlier cases and in Dicey’s writings – that
prerogative power comprises of a finite stock of executive power that can only be reduced in scope (through statutory incursion) and never expanded.

It also reiterates the point that it is the courts that have responsibility for identifying if a prerogative power exists or not (ie is lawful) and what its scope actually is.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
31
Q

2.4 The scope of prerogative powers

A

As well as being able to determine whether a purported governmental power was legitimately part
of the royal prerogative, the courts were historically able to adjudicate upon or ‘review’ what the scope of a prerogative power was – in other words what exactly that power entailed and encompassed.

This issue is also part of what can broadly be described as review of the legality of prerogative
powers. There are numerous examples of the courts being called upon to adjudicate on this question.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
32
Q

2.5 Prerogative and statute

A

There are two forms of governmental power: the prerogative, as recognised by the common law, and statutory power, as laid down in legislation.

What is the relationship between the two and what is the position if a particular executive power or function appears to be governed by both?

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
33
Q

Key case: Attorney-General v De Keyser’s Hotel Ltd [1920] AC 508

[Defense of Realm Act]

A

This concerned a dispute between the government and the hotel owners about whether
compensation should be payable for the requisitioning of the hotel for use by the Army Council
during World War One.

The Attorney-General claimed that the government could effectively choose to use its historic
prerogative power to take emergency action during war for the ‘defence of the realm’, even if
Parliament had legislated on the same ground.

The law lords decisively rejected this contention and stated that the Crown was bound in this
situation by the statutory regime applying under the Defence of the Realm Act and associated
Regulations

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
34
Q

De Keyser principle

A

In doing so, by establishing the ‘De Keyser principle, the court clearly viewed statutory power as a
superior form of power than that of prerogative, thereby reflecting the central importance of the
sovereignty of Parliament in the UK constitution.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
35
Q

2.5.1 Effect on the prerogative

A

Lord Atkinson explained that the statutory powers had ‘abridged‘ the
older prerogative powers and that the prerogative was to be considered ‘in abeyance‘, ie suspended, if not necessarily permanently extinguished.

[W]hen a statute, expressing the will and intention of the King and of the three estates of the realm, is passed, it abridges the Royal Prerogative while it is in force to this extent: that the Crown can only do the particular thing under and in accordance with the statutory provisions, and that its prerogative power to do that thing is in abeyance.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
36
Q

2.6 Implied suspension by statute

Laker Airways v Dept of Trade [1977] QB 643,

A

In the case of Laker Airways v Dept of Trade [1977] QB 643, the government sought to justify a
reversal of aviation policy through use of its prerogative power to negotiate international treaties,
in this case the Bermuda Agreement which regulated transatlantic flights. As part of its policy to promote B.A. (then the nationalised airline), the Department of Trade cancelled Freddie Laker’s ‘Skytrain’ approval or ‘designation’ under the Bermuda Agreement.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
37
Q

Criticised by Lord Denning in the Court of Appealcriticised by Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal

A

This was sharply criticised by Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal, who saw the purpose of the action taken under the prerogative to be sharply at odds with the statutory requirements in the Civil Aviation Act 1971 for revoking airline designations.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
38
Q

Can he displace the statute by invoking a prerogative?

A

Seeing that these statutory means were available for stopping Skytrain if there was a proper case for it, the question is whether the Secretary of State can stop it by other means. Can he do it by withdrawing the designation? Can he do indirectly that which he cannot do directly?
Can he displace the statute by invoking a prerogative?

39
Q

Laker Airways Ltd

A

If he could do this, it would mean by a side wind, Laker Airways Ltd would be deprived of the protection that statute affords them. There would be no hearing, no safeguard against
injustice […]. To my mind such a procedure was never contemplated by the statute.

40
Q

2.7 Primacy of statutory law

A

The following case accentuated the importance to the courts of following parliamentary intention if there are any forms of over-lapping statutory and prerogative powers in operation

41
Q

Key case: R v S oS for the Home Department, ex parte Fire Brigades Union [1995]
2 All ER 244

A

The then Home Secretary, Michael Howard, decided to use prerogative powers to introduce a new
‘tariff-based’ criminal injuries compensation scheme. This was even though Parliament had legislated earlier for a statutory scheme in the Criminal Justice Act 1988. Howard claimed to be
able to introduce his scheme, as the statutory scheme had not yet been implemented. His actions
were challenged by the FBU.

42
Q

Frustrate the will of Parliament

A

My Lords, it would be most surprising if, at the present day, prerogative powers could be
validly exercised by the executive so as to frustrate the will of Parliament expressed in a statute […]. The constitutional history of this country is the history of the prerogative powers of the Crown being made subject to the overriding powers of the democratically elected legislature as the sovereign body.

43
Q

The prerogative powers of the Crown remain in existence

A

The prerogative powers of the Crown remain in existence to the extent that Parliament has not expressly or by implication extinguished them. But under the principle in […] De Keyser […] if Parliament has conferred on the executive statutory powers to do a particular act, that act can only thereafter be done under the statutory powers so
conferred: any pre-existing prerogative power to do the same act is [to that extent] excluded.

44
Q

2.8 Miller: a modern variant on the theme

A

Following the EU referendum in 2016, the new Prime Minister, Theresa May, sought to trigger the
two-year Article 50 process of negotiation required before the UK left the EU. Her intention was to
use her prerogative power in relation to treaty-making and variation to bring this about.

Her power to do so was challenged in court by Gina Miller, amongst other parties, and the case, which the government lost at first instance, was accelerated for a hearing in the Supreme Court.

45
Q

Key case: R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5

A

Miller (1) can be seen as a ‘legality’ case, as the challengers’ argument was that the PM simply did not have the power to trigger Art 50 using the prerogative. The Admin Court and the majority in the UKSC ultimately agreed.

The majority decision centered around the conviction that it was constitutionally inappropriate for
the process of leaving the EU to be triggered by use of the prerogative when the effects and consequences of this process would be so significant for the UK.

46
Q

Notable change in the law of the land

A

It was felt that a step of such magnitude, leading to a notable change in the law of the land and
in individual rights, could only be sanctioned by Parliament through primary legislation.

47
Q

European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017

A

[…] withdrawal [from the EU] is fundamentally different from variations in the content of EU law
arising from further EU Treaties or legislation. A complete withdrawal represents a change which is different not just in degree but in kind from the abrogation of particular rights, duties or rules derived from EU law.

[…] It would be inconsistent with long-standing and fundamental principle for such a farreaching change to the UK constitutional arrangements to be brought about by ministerial decision or ministerial action alone.

48
Q

2.9 A limit to the De Keyser principle?

A

The trend in case law following De Keyser appears to be relatively clear-cut. However, one controversial case suggests a limit in certain situations involving over-lapping statutory and
prerogative powers.

49
Q

R v SoS for the Home Department ex p Northumbria Police Authority [1998] 1 All ER 556

A

In R v SoS for the Home Department ex p Northumbria Police Authority [1998] 1 All ER 556, the issue arose after the Home Secretary sought to establish a central store for providing plastic baton rounds and other riot-control equipment to the various national police forces

50
Q

Police Act 1964

A

Northumbria P.A. argued that the Police Act 1964 gave it a monopoly over the supply of equipment to the police force in its area. The Court of Appeal held that the P.A.’s power to supply equipment under the Act did not give it a monopoly and that the Act did not override the Home
Secretary’s prerogative power to keep the peace within the realm. Croom-Johnson LJ held that the Home Secretary’s use of the prerogative was not incompatible
with the police authority’s powers under the Act.

51
Q

Purchas LJ

A

Purchas LJ took the view that a prerogative power may still apply if it is directed to the benefit or protection of the individual – as opposed to restricting the rights of the individual (as could be argued was the case in De Keyser or Fire Brigades, for instance) – and if the statute does not unequivocally deprive individuals of that benefit or protection.

52
Q

Do not distinguish between judicial review of statutory and prerogative powers.

A

This remains a much-disputed decision but arguably it is less functionally significant in the
modern day, now that in principle (following the GCHQ case) the courts do not distinguish between judicial review of statutory and prerogative powers.

53
Q

2.10 Summary

A
  • Tension between the Crown, and Parliament, and the courts has foundations going back to the Stuart period (1603 - 1714).
  • The courts will only accept that a purported prerogative power exists if there is a precedent for it.
  • There is a finite stock of prerogative power in law – new prerogative powers cannot be created.
  • The relationship between statutory and prerogative power is governed by the De Keyser principle.
  • Statutory duties or obligations on government cannot be indirectly or impliedly by-passed through use of prerogative power.
  • The important recent case of Miller (1) represents a continuation of the principles in earlier ‘legality’ based cases.
54
Q

Control of the prerogative – GCHQ and substantive review

3.1 Overview of position before GCHQ

A

Until the mid-80s the senior UK courts had not reached a point where they were prepared to
review how the government used its prerogative powers. Some traces of future developments can be detected in earlier cases decided at a lower level, notably R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte Lain [1967] 2 QB 864, but these were not conclusive.

55
Q

Substance of the governmental
action

A

They had not reached the point where it was accepted that there could be a review or scrutiny of
how these ancient powers were exercised – in other words the substance of the governmental
action taken.

56
Q

3.2 The issue in GCHQ

Key case: Council for the Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374

A

The case of GCHQ was prompted by a decision by the then Minister (and Prime Minister), Margaret Thatcher, to ban trade union membership at the government’s listening base in
Cheltenham.

Her authority to do this came from the PM’s prerogative power to regulate the working terms and
conditions of the Civil Service.

The issue therefore was not whether the PM had the authority to do this – that was not disputed by the CCSU. Instead, it was the manner in which she had used her prerogative power. The allegation was that she had done so in an unfair way.

57
Q

3.2.1 Legitimate expectation

A

This basis or ‘ground’ for judicial review will be covered in more detail in separate materials. For now, it’s important to note that this is a form of legal interest that can be protected by the courts. In short, it means that the government made a promise, or acted consistently in the past, in a way which the claimant relied on.

In GCHQ the unions claimed successfully that they had a legitimate expectation of being
consulted before any notable changes were made in working conditions. This was because they
had consistently been consulted in such situations over the previous four decades. Therefore, they were claiming that the PM had acted unfairly by frustrating their LE by
announcing the ban on union membership without any prior consultation.

58
Q

3.2.2 The government’s defence

A

The first and most fundamental line of argument in defence was that the courts were simply not permitted to review how the PM used her prerogative powers. If it was accepted (as it was) that the PM had the power in question, judicial review should go no further.

This was the key issue of principle in the case and the House of Lords’ ruling against the PM on this point set the tone for a notable development of the law in this area.

The essence of the law lords’ ruling was that it made no constitutional sense for prerogative powers to be seen as having a special status just because of their historic origins and association with the Crown. Both prerogative powers and statutory powers were forms of executive power; the latter had for many decades been reviewable. So, why the differentiation?

59
Q

3.2.3 Source of power no longer relevant

A

Therefore, the traditional distinction between power given by Parliament and that bequeathed by the prerogative should no longer determine if government actions were reviewable or not. Put another way, the government could no longer shelter behind the fact that a power came from the prerogative – in principle all executive powers should be reviewable in order that the rule of law be promoted effectively.

60
Q

3.2.4 PM’s second line of defence

A

The law lords accepted that the unions had a LE of being consulted and acknowledged that this
had been ‘frustrated’ by the PM. However, they did not find this ultimately to be unlawful as they
accepted the PM’s argument that there was a justifiable public interest factor in not consulting, as advance notice may have triggered strike action and that may have jeopardised the country’s
national security (given the highly sensitive work carried on at GCHQ). In other words, the court had reviewed how the PM used her prerogative power, but they
ultimately considered this has been done lawfully.

61
Q

3.2.5 A word of caution

A

The judges’ bold main line on reviewability came with a notable word of caution, however.
They pointed out that, even though there should be no future differentiation between prerogative
and statutory powers, a number of notable prerogative powers governed areas that broadly
involved matters of high policy

62
Q

Lord Roskill

A

Have assumed considerable subsequent influence on the development of the law, though it’s important to note that they were obiter rather than being part of the main ratio in GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters.

The prerogative powers itemised by Lord Roskill, in a non-exhaustive list, were in his view ‘[…] not
[…] susceptible to judicial review because their nature and subject matter are such as not to be
amenable to the judicial process.’

63
Q

Itemised prerogative powers

A

They included:
* The making of treaties
* Defence of the realm
* Mercy
* Granting of honours
* Dissolution of Parliament
* Appointment of ministers (‘and others’)

64
Q

3.3 Separation of powers concerns

A

When Roskill referred to the ‘amenability‘ of such matters to the process of JR, he demonstrated
how the judiciary regulate the extent of their own involvement in the more political areas of public law.

Reflecting back on the earlier part of the course, we have seen that there are no formal lines of responsibility laid out in the UK’s uncodified constitution.

Instead, the judiciary attempts to respect appropriate informal lines of responsibility in the UK’s
constitution delicate ‘separation of powers’ balance.

It does so by assessing the differing competencies of the three bodies of state – their varied stores of experience and knowledge, and differing sources of authority. The judiciary, of course, have no electoral mandate.

65
Q

3.4 Non-justiciability

A

This is an area in which the phrasing used by the judiciary is perhaps not always that precise or helpful. Some viewpoints, following on from Lord Roskill’s sentiments, have used phrases such as ‘forbidden areas’ or ‘excluded categories’.

It is debatable in the modern day whether the issue is as binary as this.
Certainly, some of the powers exercised under the prerogative involve matters which are not
suitable for court adjudication, as they are essentially political judgement-calls.

66
Q

3.5 Substance and not form

A

Aside from those latter prerogative powers – which essentially govern political patronage – most
of the powers listed by Lord Roskill and other similar ones contain within their remit a number of
different elements.

Some of these involve considerations of high policy but a number of others do not – they could be
described as falling at a more administrative or operational end of the spectrum of governmental
powers.

In the years following GCHQ, the courts have increasingly taken an approach – and tailored the
degree of their interventionism – based on the nature of the power that the government has used
rather than its form.

67
Q

3.6 Summary

A
  • Prior to the decision of the House of Lords in GCHQ, the courts had not intervened in or reviewed the manner in which prerogative powers were exercised by the government.
  • The Prime Minister tried to ban union membership at the British Intelligence headquarters
    (GCHQ), without consulting civil servants.
  • Civil servants argued that they had always been consulted about significant changes to their
    working conditions, and so should be consulted on this restriction because they had a legitimate expectation based on the government’s past conduct.
  • The government argued that the court was not able to interfere in how it had used its prerogative power to regulate the working conditions and terms of the Civil Service. The House of Lords disagreed, (though the government eventually won the case on a different point).
  • Lord Roskill’s obiter statement helpfully summarises the areas of prerogative power.
  • The judgment shows that the courts have power to review whether the exercise of the prerogative has been carried out lawfully.
68
Q

4 Control of the prerogative – post-GCHQ

4.1 Context

A

As a matter of principle, the manner of its exercise should be just as reviewable by the courts as the way in which statutory powers were exercised. However, concerns persisted over the nature of some prerogative powers which were seen to involve matters engaging issues of higher policy. The question therefore was to what extent the judiciary as an unelected body should be able to intervene in such areas.

69
Q

4.1.1 Rule of law and accountability

A

Judicial review over the last half century has been towards greater promotion of a substantive
conception of the rule of law. One of the key elements of this has been the drive towards greater accountability in government.

As we have seen, judicial review is the main mechanism whereby this vital aspect of public law
protection can be achieved.

However, the context in which the judges operate is also conditioned by the delicate (and at times tense) separation of powers relationship between the courts and the executive.

70
Q

4.1.2 Subsequent pattern

A

Following the concerns raised by Lord Roskill in the GCHQ case, the subsequent pattern of development can be categorised as a further expansion of the remit of judicial review, though one in which the judiciary still display some caution about their constitutional role.

In matters involving substantive issues - as opposed to those of pure legality – the approach applied by the judiciary is contextual. This applies equally, in principle, to situations in which they are asked to review the exercise of prerogative or statutory power.

If the matter is one of higher policy, the degree or ‘intensity’ of review is light or ‘low’; in contrast – at the other end of the spectrum of issues the intensity of review is higher.

71
Q

4.2 Expanding judicial involvement

Key case: R v SoS for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Everett [1989] 1 All ER 655]

A

This case provides an early indication of the trend. It concerned an application for a new passport
from a UK national, residing in Spain, for whom an arrest warrant had been issued.

Everett wished to challenge the refusal by the FCO to approve his application, based on its policy relating to those suspected of past criminal activity. The Court of Appeal ultimately found against Everett on the facts. but the important aspect of the case was the court’s acknowledgement that this was a matter that was suitable for JR

72
Q

Non-justiciability

A

The FCO failed in its attempts to argue that this was ‘non-justiciable’, because the power to grant
passports fell under the broad umbrella of the prerogative relating to diplomatic relations. The courts again looked to the nature of the power concerned rather than where it came from.

73
Q

Everett, explained by Taylor LJ

A

The majority of their Lordships [in GCHQ] indicated that whether judicial review of the exercise
of prerogative power is open depends upon the subject matter and in particular whether it is
justiciable. At the top of the scale of executive functions under the prerogative are matters of
high policy, of which examples were given by their Lordships; making treaties, making war,
dissolving Parliament […]

Clearly those matters […] are not justiciable. But the grant or refusal
of a passport is in a quite different category. It is a matter of administrative decision,
affecting the rights of individuals and their freedom to travel.

74
Q

4.3 Prerogative of mercy

A

A very similar approach can be seen in another significant case involving a matter that technically
fell under the auspices of the prerogative: the ancient power of the ‘Crown’ to bestow ‘mercy’ by
giving pardons.

R v SoS for the Home Department, ex parte Bentley [1994] QB 349 concerned a challenge to the
Home Secretary’s decision not to grant Derek Bentley a posthumous pardon. He had been hanged for murder in 1953 after a conviction in circumstances which several decades later were viewed as amounting to a serious miscarriage of justice.

75
Q

Availability of Conditions Pardons

A

The court distinguished between full pardons, which they saw to be an issue of higher policy (only
to be granted if the person concerned was now seen as ‘morally and technically innocent’) and
other considerations which the Home Secretary could have taken into account. These, including
the availability of conditional pardons, were not seen to be beyond the courts’ remit and so his
failure to consider such an outcome was criticised.

76
Q

Prerogative of mercy can be recognised in different circumstances

A

[A]s the argument before us developed, it became clear that the substance of the applicant’s
case was that the Home Secretary failed to recognise the fact that the prerogative of mercy is capable of being exercised in many different circumstances and over a wide range and therefore failed to consider the form of pardon which might be appropriate to meet the facts of
the present case. Such a failure is, we think, reviewable.

77
Q

4.4 Variable intensity of review (Matters of great importance)

A

Cases such as Everett and Bentley can be seen as examples of issues coming before the court in which the nature of the powers used by the executive were relatively low-level or administrative. Both cases involved matters of great importance to the individual, or (in the Bentley case) his
surviving relatives but were essentially about how relatively routine or administrative processes or policies had been implemented

78
Q

Higher Policy Level

A

In the following cases, the courts had to respond to challenges made to how the executive had used prerogative powers partly or wholly at a higher policy level. Here the courts’ approach has to be more finessed and to take into account the wider separation of powers balance previously alluded to.

79
Q

4.5 Foreign policy and diplomacy

A

Matters touching on the diplomatic relationships between the UK and other states are clearly matters of higher policy.

A more traditional outlook – and one maintained in Roskill’s obiter speech in GCHQ – would suggest that any attempt to challenge a decision taken using this part of the prerogative should be met with minimal engagement by the courts.

Nevertheless, such challenges have been accepted by the Administrative courts – in the sense that the challengers have been allowed “standing” to bring the matter before the court.

Matters touching on the diplomatic relationships between the UK and other states are clearly
matters of higher policy.

A more traditional outlook – and one maintained in Roskill’s obiter speech in GCHQ – would suggest that any attempt to challenge a decision taken using this part of the prerogative should be met with minimal engagement by the courts.
Nevertheless, such challenges have been accepted by the Administrative courts – in the sense that the challengers have been allowed “standing” to bring the matter before the court.

80
Q

Key case: R (Abbasi) v SoS for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2002] EWCA Civ 1598

A

Following ‘9/11’ the US administration took draconian action in the so-called ‘War on Terror’. One
of the key measures taken was the setting-up of a high security detention centre on land owned
by the USA at Guantanamo Bay on the Cuban coast.

One of the captives exposed to the highly controversial regime in the centre was a UK national,
Feroz Abbasi. His family sought to challenge the UK Foreign Office on the basis that it had not done enough to try to extricate him from this predicament, which the US declared was not subject to international law

81
Q

Lord Phillips MR

A

To what extent, if at all, can the English court examine whether a foreign state is in breach of
treaty obligations or public international law where fundamental human rights are engaged?
To what extent, if at all, is a decision of the executive in the field of foreign relations justiciable
in the English court?

82
Q

4.5.1 Abbasi – the response (competing considerations)

A

The fact that the court accepted the challenge in this case but ultimately found for the Foreign Office demonstrates competing considerations in this area. The court clearly felt it important that
the individual should have the right of challenge if there was a recognised legal interest that
needed to be considered – here it was his legitimate expectation of diplomatic assistance

83
Q

Lord Diplock

A

The kind of evidence that is admissible […] and the way in which it has to be adduced tend to
exclude from the attention of the court competing policy considerations which, if the Executive discretion is to be wisely exercised, need to be weighed against one another — a balancing
exercise which judges by their upbringing and experience are ill-qualified to perform.

84
Q

4.5.2 Lower intensity review

A

Whether to make any representations in a particular case, and if so in what form, is left
entirely to the discretion of the Secretary of State. That gives free play to the “balance” to which Lord Diplock referred in GCHQ. The Secretary of State must be free to give full weight to foreign policy considerations, which are not justiciable.

However, that does not mean the whole process is immune from judicial scrutiny. The citizen’s legitimate expectation is that his request will be “considered”, and that in that consideration all relevant factors will be thrown into the balance.

85
Q

Per Lord Phillips MR, Abbasi

A

The outcome, therefore, in Abbasi was that the challenge was unsuccessful. However, the court
did make a significant point that, if there had been no ‘consideration’ of making representations,
the court would have ordered the Foreign Office to make them.

86
Q

4.6 Defence of the realm

A

As with diplomatic relations, this area of prerogative power encompasses a wide array of differing governmental functions.

At one end there are decisions to take military action and how to conduct such operations – these
are clearly matters of higher policy, in which the executive effectively have sole competence. The courts remain very likely to see these types of decisions or actions as non-justiciable.

This approach can be seen in a number of cases relating to the legality of the war in Iraq. In R
(Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) v Prime Minister of the UK (2002) EWHC 2759 QB Simon
Brown LJ stated that it was: ‘accept[ed] that the decision to take military action is beyond the
court’s purview‘.

87
Q

4.6.1 Operational issues

Smith, Ellis and Allbutt v Ministry of Defence [2013] UKSC 41

A

The Supreme Court held that the
doctrine of combat immunity (which excludes liability for negligence in relation to military combat) should be construed narrowly.

The claimants, who represented UK soldiers killed on active service in Iraq, claimed that the Ministry of Defence had been negligent in the provision of equipment and training.

88
Q

Judicialising warfare

A

The court recognised that decisions taken by military commanders in relation to military engagements should not be subject to JR, because of the danger of ‘judicialising warfare‘. It did not, however, accept the Ministry’s arguments that immunity should apply in relation to failings that were remote from the pressures and uncertainties of the battlefield.

89
Q

4.6.2 Membership of the armed forces

A

The most notable case relating to this area of the prerogative has been R v Ministry of Defence, ex
parte Smith [1996] QB 517. (Note that this case was later heard in Strasbourg as Smith & Grady v
UK.)

This was a challenge to the MoD’s policy at that time of not allowing homosexuals to be employed
in the armed forces. Smith and three others had been summarily dismissed from the armed
services for no other reason than their sexuality. They claimed that the decision to do so was
unreasonable/irrational (which, as you will see in Public Law II, is a ground of JR which presents a
particularly high threshold for challengers).

In the Court of Appeal, Sir Thomas Bingham MR acknowledged the well-trodden competence concerns but clearly considered that the court had a role to play in a matter that had a profound effect on the livelihood and employment rights of the four individuals who had been dismissed.

90
Q

4.6.3 Smith - the balance (presence of competing interests)

A

The present cases […] concern innate qualities of a very personal kind and the decisions of which the appellants complain have had a profound effect on their careers and prospects. The
appellants’ rights as human beings are very much in issue. It is now accepted that this issue is
justiciable.

This does not of course mean that the court is thrust into the position of the primary decision-maker. It is not the constitutional role of the court to regulate the conditions of service in the armed forces of the Crown, nor has it the expertise to do so. While the court must properly defer to the expertise of responsible decisionmakers, it must not shrink from its fundamental duty to “do right to all manner of people […]”

91
Q

4.7 Colonial governance

No generic immunity from judicial review

A

One of the more esoteric areas of policy in which prerogative power is still relevant is that of the governance of the few remaining ‘British Overseas Territories’.

The case of R (Bancoult) v SoS for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2008] UKHL 61 concerned
the Chagossian people, the indigenous inhabitants of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT),
who had been removed from their home islands in the 1960s and 1970s, so that the main island,
Diego Garcia, could be used as a United States military base.

In the Court of Appeal, which found for Bancoult, Sedley LJ stated that: ’the prerogative power of
colonial governance enjoys no generic immunity from judicial review’.

92
Q

4.7.1 Bancoult

A

This issue has been the subject of protracted litigation and considerable criticism academically,
as well as disagreement within the judiciary – it is notable that there was only a 3-2 majority judgment in the end in favour of the Foreign Secretary in the House of Lords, with Lord Bingham finding against the government.

The majority effectively deferred to the government in stressing that it was a matter of executive
competence as to what was conducive to the ‘peace, order, and good government of the BIOT’, as
required in the original Order in Council which established the Territory in 1965.

93
Q
A