Chapter 7: Terms Flashcards
Definition of Terms
The terms of a contract are its contents. They define the rights and obligations arising from the
contract. Contractual terms may be express or implied.
Express Terms
Express terms are statements made by the parties, by which they intend to be bound. A contract
can have terms agreed in writing, or agreed orally, or a mixture of the two.
Implied Terms
Implied terms are not formed by statements made by the parties – they have not been agreed
upon, orally or in writing. Nonetheless, the law deems that they exist.
- Express terms contrasted with representations
One challenge in relation to express terms is to pick out from the many statements which might
have been made orally or in writing those which have become terms of the contract. Statements made by the parties during negotiations leading up to a contract can be divided into
three groups: mere puffs; representations and terms.
Mere puff
Statements of no legal significance.
Representations
Statements of fact or law which induce the making of the contract which the parties do not intend to be binding.
Terms
Statements of fact which the parties intend to be binding.
2.2 Why does the distinction between representations and terms matter?
Violation of Term = Contractual Breach
The distinction between representations and terms becomes important when the statement turns
out to be untrue, or the promise is not fulfilled. The court then has to decide which statements are
contractual terms and which are non-contractual representations, inducing the contract but forming no part of it. If a statement is a term of the contract and this term is not fulfilled, this will amount to a breach of contract, for which the innocent party may claim, amongst other
remedies, damages
Violation of a no-term = misrepresentation
If the untrue statement is not a term of the contract but a representation, this may amount to a misrepresentation. This is not the same as a breach of contract, but the innocent party may still be able to obtain a remedy in the law of misrepresentation
Both breach & misrepresentation
Also note that a statement can be both a term and a representation, giving rise to an action for
both breach of contract and misrepresentation.
2.3 How do I know if a statement was a representation or a term (or both)?
The difference between a representation and a term is that only the latter is intended to be
binding. In seeking to discover whether the parties intended to be bound by a statement made by
one of them, the court will apply an objective test based on the question: ‘what would a reasonable person understand to be the intention of the parties, having regard to all the circumstances?’
Negotiations during a contract
Where a statement is made during negotiations to induce the other party to enter into the contract, there is, prima facie, ground for inferring that the statement was intended
to be a binding term of the contract. However, the inference can be rebutted if the party making
the statement can show that it would not be reasonable to hold them bound by it
2.4 The importance of the statement
A statement may be regarded as a term of the contract if it can be shown that the injured party considered it so important that it would not have entered into the contract but for that statement
Bannerman v White (1861) 10 CB NS 844.
In this case, in respect of negotiations to purchase hops, the defendant said: ‘if they have been treated with sulphur, I am not interested in even knowing the price of them’. When the plaintiff produced samples, the defendant again enquired whether
sulphur had been used and was assured that it had not. In fact, a small amount of the crop, some
five acres out of a total of 300 acres, had been treated with sulphur.
Bannerman v White (1861) 10 CB NS 844.
The defendant treated the
contract as repudiated, and the question as to whether they were entitled to do so hinged upon
whether it could be regarded as a condition of the agreement that the hops may be rejected if sulphur had been used. It was argued by the plaintiff that the conversation relating to the sulphur was preliminary to entering the contract and, as such, was not part of the contract. The court held that the statement was understood and intended by the parties to be a term of the contract
of sale.
2.5 Timing
The time of the making of the statement appears to be an important factor. If the statement was made at the time of contracting, it is more likely to be a term of the contract than if it was made at an early stage of the negotiations. If, on the other hand, there is a delay between the making of the statement and the parties entering into the contract, then it is less likely to be treated as a term
Routledge v McKay [1954] 1 WLR 615 (Issues with Lapse of Time)
The private seller of a motorcycle told the buyer, in good faith, that it was a 1941 or 1942 model. One week later, the buyer and seller entered into a contract of sale. The written memorandum of the sale did not mention the year of the model. The
motorcycle was a 1930 model and the buyer sued for breach of contract. The Court of Appeal
held that the lapse of time between the making of the statement and entering into the contract meant the statement as to the year of the model was a representation and not a term of the contract.
2.6 Reduction of the contract into writing (Routledge v McKay)
It is also apparent from the decision in Routledge v McKay that the court was influenced by the fact that the contract had been reduced into writing and the written contract made no mention of the previous oral statement about the motorcycle being a 1941 or 1942 model.
Statement not considered significant if it was not written (Routledge v McKay)
The inference drawn
by the court was that the statement could not have been regarded as significant by the parties. If
it had been, they would have ensured its inclusion in the written agreement. Consequently, the
court concluded that the statement regarding the year of the model was never intended to be a
term of the contract but a representation.
2.7 Special knowledge or skill
Where the party who made the statement had exclusive access to information or special knowledge as compared with the other party, this is likely to be taken into account in the latter’s favour.
Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams [1957] 1 WLR 370
The claimant car dealers, Oscar, agreed on a trade-in of Williams’ old car as part of a new purchase. Williams had no knowledge of the motor trade. The registration book of the car traded in gave its date as 1948 and Williams confirmed this date in good faith. It was later discovered that the date should have been 1939 and the car was worth much less than thought.
Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams [1957] 1 WLR 370 Judgement
The Court of Appeal held that the
age of the car was not a term of the contract and therefore there was no breach of contract by Williams. It was clear that the skill and expertise lay in the hands of Oscar, the car
dealers, and not in the hands of Williams, who was making the statement. Consequently, the
statement remained as a representation without contractual force
Dick Bentley v Harold Smith
[1965] 1 WLR 623.
Mr Smith, of the defendant company, told MrBentley that a car had done 20 thousand miles only since the fitting of a new engine and gearbox. The milometer also showed 20
thousand miles. Later that day, Mr Bentley took his wife to see the car and Mr Smith repeated his statement. Mr Bentley bought the
car but it soon became clear that it had done more than 20 thousand miles since the change of engine and gearbox
Dick Bentley v Harold Smith
[1965] 1 WLR 623 judgement
The Court of Appeal held that the statement as to the mileage was a term of the contract. The
defendant was a car dealer who should be taken to have better knowledge of such matters than Mr Bentley, who was not involved in the motor trade.
2.8 Assumption of responsibility/further checks
A statement may become a term of the contract where the vendor expressly accepts the responsibility for the soundness of the sale item in question.
Schawel v Reade [1913] 2 IR 81 (HL)
Here, the claimant required a horse for stud purposes. He attempted to examine the defendant’s horse but was told that he need not look for anything and that the horse was sound in every way. The price was agreed and delivery of the horse took place three weeks later. The horse was not in fact fit for stud purposes and the judge directed the jury to
consider two points: did the defendant, at the time of the sale, represent that the horse was fit for
stud purposes? Did the purchaser act on that in purchasing the horse? Both questions were answered in the affirmative and consequently, the statement was deemed to be a term of the contract.
Ecay v Godfrey (1947) 80
Lloyd’s Rep 286
Another factor which may have been at work in was that the defendant, by the strength of his statement, actually dissuaded the plaintiff from making further checks himself with regard to the fitness of the horse for stud purposes. This can be contrasted with Ecay v Godfrey (1947) 80
Lloyd’s Rep 286, where the seller of a boat stated that it was sound but advised the buyer to have it surveyed. This advice showed that the seller did not intend that his statement should be taken
as a term of the contract and that the onus of verification of the soundness of the boat lay with
the purchaser.
2.9 Summary
- Statements made by the parties during negotiations can be divided into ‘mere puffs’, representations or terms of the contract.
- If an untrue statement is a term of the contract then this may give rise to a claim for breach of
contract. - A representation is likely to be a term if the parties intended the statement to be binding. To
ascertain if this is the case, the court will consider. - The importance of the statement.
- The timing of the statement.
- The reduction of the contract into writing.
- Special knowledge or skill of the person making the statement.
- Assumption of responsibility by the person making the statement.
- Express terms
The process of ascertaining the express terms of a contract is, at heart, a search to ascertain what an objective observer would think that the parties intended to be bound by. The terms that the parties intend to be bound by (as it would appear to an objective observer) will be terms of the contract. This is the essence of a contract: agreement between the parties. However, how this ‘intention to be bound’ is demonstrated varies in different circumstances. We will now look at some of the possibilities.
3.1 A signed written contract
(L’Estrange v Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394)
Firstly, written terms might be set out in a signed written contract. In almost all such cases the signing of a contract shows that the parties intended to be bound by it. This is true even if a party signing has not read the terms or has not understood what they mean. A party can express an intention to be bound by something they have not read or understood (although it is not wise to
do so!)
Grogan v Robin Meredith Plant Hire [1996] CLC 1127
By way of exception, if the document signed was not intended to have any contractual effect (eg it was a document simply acknowledging receipt of goods) then the terms within it will not form part of the contract.
This is because signing such a document does not indicate an intention to be bound by its terms, precisely because it was not intended that the document would have any contractual effect. In this regard, timing is also important: the document in Grogan was described by Auld LJ as a ‘post-contractual document’ making it much less likely it would have a contractual effect
(Curtis v Chemical Cleaning and Dyeing Co [1951] 1 KB 805)
In addition, a party may be prevented from relying on the incorporation of a clause through signature of a document if it has orally misrepresented the meaning of the clause to the other party
3.2 Incorporation by notice (Parker v South Eastern Railway Co (1876-77) 2 CPD 416)
Terms can also be incorporated by notice ie by one party notifying the other party of them. In Parker v South Eastern Railway Co (1876-77) 2 CPD 416 it was established that terms will form part of the contract if reasonable steps have been taken to bring them to the claimant’s attention. This is logical, where reasonable steps have been taken to draw terms to a party’s attention, that party’s persistence with the transaction suggests an intention to be bound by the terms
Thompson v London, Midland & Scottish Railway [1930] 1 KB 41
Established that terms may be incorporated by reference to a different document (in this case the contractual document, a ticket, referred to terms contained within a railway timetable). Examples where insufficient notice was given include
Henderson v Stevenson (1875) LR S SC & Div 470 where the clause was not referred to on the front of the ticket and Sugar v London, Midland & Scottish Railway [1941] 1 All ER 241 where the clause was illegible.
In Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking [1971] 2 QB 163, Lord Denning MR
“Printed in Red Ink” to highlight incorporation by notice
Where a party wants to incorporate terms that are particularly adverse to the other party, it must bring these to the other party’s attention. stated that where a clause was particularly onerous it would need to be ‘printed in red ink, with a red hand pointing to it, or something equally startling’ to give sufficient
notice. This principle was confirmed in the case of Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1989] 1 QB 433
Incorporation of Onerous Terms
The above discussion relates to the incorporation of onerous terms through reasonable notice.
Note that when a document containing contractual terms is signed the signing party is bound by
those terms, even if the offending clause is onerous (L’Estrange v Graucob Ltd).
3.2.1 Timing
For a clause to be incorporated into the contract, reasonable notice of it must be given before or at the time of contracting. It follows that any clause will not amount to a binding term if it is communicated only after the contract is made.
Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking [1971] 2 QB 163
- The claimant drove his car to a multi storey automatic car park that he had never used before. At the entrance was a sign giving the charges for the car park.
- The claimant drove up to the entrance. The movement of the car turned a light at the entrance
from red to green, and a ticket machine produced a ticket that stated that the ticket was
issued ‘subject to the conditions of issue as displayed on the premises’. - The claimant drove into the car park without reading the words on the ticket or those displayed
on a pillar opposite the ticket machine. - The claimant parked his car and went about his business.
- When the claimant returned to the car park, he attended the office in the car park, and paid the necessary charges.
- The claimant then returned to his car and was severely injured whilst attempting to put his belongings into his car.
Lord Denning’s judgment on the Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking [1971] 2 QB 163 case
No customer in a thousand ever read the conditions. If he had stopped to do so, he would have missed the train or the boat. None of those cases has any application to a ticket which is issued by an automatic machine. The customer pays his money and gets a ticket. He cannot
refuse it
He cannot get his money back. He may protest to the machine, even swear at it. But
it will remain unmoved. He is committed beyond recall. He was committed at the very moment
when he put his money into the machine.
The customer is bound
by those terms as long as they are sufficiently brought to his notice before-hand, but not otherwise. He is not bound by the terms printed on the ticket if they differ from the notice, because the ticket comes too late. The contract has already been made.
3.2.2 Contractual effect
Finally, terms will only be incorporated by notice if the document giving notice was intended to have a ‘contractual effect’ (there is an analogy here with the law about signed documents outlined above).
Chapleton v Barry UDC [1940] 1 KB 532
The claimant hired a deck chair. Having paid for the hire, he was given a ‘ticket’. On the back of the ticket, there were additional terms and conditions. These were held not to be binding because the ticket was not intended to have a contractual effect
–an observer would have understood it to be only a receipt
3.3 Incorporation by a course of dealing
Where a clause has been brought to the notice of the other party during previous dealings, it may be implied into the current transaction to give effect to the presumed intentions of the parties, even though it has on this particular occasion been omitted. In order for this rule to operate, it must be shown that the course of dealing has been consistent over a period of time.
McCutcheon v David MacBrayne [1964] 1 WLR 125
An attempt to incorporate by a course of dealing was unsuccessful because the written terms relied upon had not been consistently
incorporated in the past – sometimes a signature in relation to those terms had been required, sometimes it had not
In Hollier v Rambler Motors (AMC) Ltd [1972] 2 QB 71
Course of dealing has to be consistent over a period of time and sufficiently regular
As well as being consistent, a course of dealing must also have been regular. Incorporation by a course of dealing will not be established if the parties have contracted with each other on only a few occasions over a number of years.
In Hollier v Rambler Motors (AMC) Ltd [1972] 2 QB 71 three
or four transactions over a period of five years was held to be insufficiently regular to establish a
course of dealing
Henry Kendall & Sons v William Lillico& Sons Ltd [1969] 2 AC
31 and Petrotrade Inc v Texaco Ltd [1999] 12 WLUK 745 w
Contrast this with Henry Kendall & Sons v William Lillico& Sons Ltd [1969] 2 AC 31 and Petrotrade Inc v Texaco Ltd [1999] 12 WLUK 745 where three or four times per month and five instances over 13 months respectively appeared sufficiently regular.
3.4 Other ways of agreeing express terms
However, the terms of a contract can be arrived at in many other ways provided that the parties adequately express an intention to be bound by those terms. Obvious and common examples include the agreement of terms in a conversation or verbal exchange (such terms often being quite simple), or terms being set out in writing (for example in an email) and the other party agreeing to those (for example, by agreeing in reply by email).
3.5 Incorporation and exemption clauses
Such ‘exemption clauses’ are often ‘onerous’ in the sense that they can leave one party with a dramatically reduced remedy than would
otherwise be the case, in the event of breach. Much of the case law about incorporation and about giving ‘reasonable notice’ of clauses was created in the context of exemption clauses.
3.6 Entire agreement clauses
We have already explored the challenges of:
(a) Distinguishing representations from terms of the contract.
(b) Identifying whether there are binding oral terms alongside the written terms
These challenges can cause uncertainty and confusion for the parties to the contract. The parties
might seek to reduce this uncertainty and confusion by including in a written contract an ‘entire agreement’ clause. In its simplest form, such a clause provides that a particular document or set of documents constitutes the entire agreement between the parties
Possible boilerplate clause – ‘entire agreement’ clause
The parties agree that this agreement constitutes the entire agreement between them and supersedes any previous understandings and/or arrangements between them, whether oral or written.
The courts will uphold such clauses where they are indeed an attempt to avoid any misunderstanding about the scope of the parties’ agreement. Such a clause might therefore be
effective in avoiding confusion about whether any oral terms or preceding written statements form part of the contract.
3.7 Summary
- The terms that a party intends to be bound by will be the terms of the contract. How the
‘intention to be bound’ is demonstrated varies in different circumstances. - Signing a written contract almost always shows an intention to be bound.
- Terms can be incorporated by notice, but ‘reasonable steps’ need to be taken to bring those
terms to a party’s attention, and notice of the terms must be given before or at the time of
contracting. - Terms can be incorporated by a regular and consistent course of dealing.
- Terms can be agreed in many other ways, such as by a conversation or an exchange of emails.
- An ‘entire agreement’ clause in a written agreement helps rule out the possibility of there being
representations or terms agreed orally which form part of a contract.
- Implied terms
4.1 Introduction: There is a general presumption that the parties have expressed, orally or in writing, every material term which they intend should govern their contract. But there are circumstances where terms
which have not been expressed by the parties are inferred by the courts. An implied term is binding to the same extent as an express term.
A term may be implied in a contract based on fact or law. A term is implied in fact to give effect to the presumed but unexpressed intentions of the parties. A term is implied in law because the courts or statute require this, regardless of the intention of the parties.
4.2 Terms implied in fact
In order to discover the unexpressed intention of the parties, the courts may take notice of trade customs and the need to give ‘business efficacy’ to a contract. It must be emphasised that, where the parties have made an unambiguous express provision in
their contract, the court will not imply a term to the contrary.