Chapter 7 Flashcards

1
Q

Game (game theory)

A

consist of a set of players, a set of rules and actions, and a set of payoff functions

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2
Q

Normal form

A

A matrix where each cell corresponds to a combination of strategic choices by each player, with the payoff received by that strategy

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3
Q

Dominant strategy

A

a dominant strategy yields a player the highest payoff regardless of the other players’ choices

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4
Q

Prisoner’s dilemma

A

Depicts the conflict between individual incentives and joint incentives

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5
Q

Dominated strategy

A

A dominated strategy yields a player a payoff that is lower than that of a different strategy, regardless of what the other players do.

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6
Q

Rationality in game theory

A

It is not only important whether players are rational; it is also important whether player believe the other players are rational

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7
Q

Absolute and relative payoff

A

In game theory, rationality means we assume that a player’s goal is to maximize their payoff

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8
Q

Nash equilibrium

A

A pair of strategies constitutes a Nash equilibrium if no player can unilaterally change its strategy in a way that improves its payoff

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9
Q

Best response

A

Mapping that indicates a player’s best strategy for each possible strategy of another player.

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10
Q

Focal point

A

A solution that people tend to choose by default in the absence of communication

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11
Q

Games in extensive form

A

Games which are represented by trees (sequential)

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12
Q

Backward induction

A

The process of reasoning backwards in time, from the end of a problem or situation, to determine a sequence of optimal actions

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13
Q

Subgame-perfect equilibria

A

A refinement of a Nash equilibrium used in dynamic games

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14
Q

Short-run and long-run

A

The sequence of moves plays an important role when the game under consideration depicts a long-term situation where players choose both long-run and short-run variables.

Long-term there is a strategy, short-term there is an action

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15
Q

Credible commitment

A

A credible commitment may have significant strategic value. Introducing credible commitment can raise the payoff, which is the value of the commitment.

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16
Q

Retaliation

A

Situation whereby a player changes its action in response to a rival’s action. This cannot be achieved in a static, simultaneous-move game.

17
Q

One-shot game

A

A game in which each player chooses one action only once - also referred to as stage game

18
Q

Repeated game

A

Defined by a one-shot game which is repeated a number of times

Games ends with probability: 1- delta

19
Q

Payoff in repeated game

A

Total expected payoff is obtained by multiplying payoffs by delta, the probability that the game will continue.

Nash equilibrium if V => V’

20
Q

One-shot game vs repeated game (equilibrium)

A

Because players can react to other players’ past actions, repeated games allow for equilibrium outcomes that would not be an equilibrium in the corresponding one-shot game.

21
Q

Relational contracts

A

High-value transactions which are based on unwritten contracts

22
Q

Different interpretations of delta (2)

A

The game will end infinite time, but it is unknown when. The game ends with probability of 1 - delta.

The game lasts for an infinite number of periods and the players discount future payoffs with the discount factor delta

23
Q

Nature (player in game theory)

A

It has no strategic motives, and its actions are limited to choosing different branches of a game tree according to predetermined probabilities.

Added in order to model games where there is uncertainty and asymmetric information

24
Q

(un)informed player moves first

A

If an uninformed player has to move first: adverse selection

If an informed player has to move first: signaling game