Chapter 6: Purpose Trusts Flashcards
- Introduction to purpose trusts
In this chapter we will explore the key exceptions to the beneficiary principle, namely charitable purpose trusts and non-charitable purpose trusts.
Charitable purpose trusts
(a) Charitable purpose trusts are recognised despite the absence of ascertainable beneficiaries
because they are for the public benefit.
Non-charitable purpose trusts
(b) Non-charitable purpose trusts have been recognised as valid in specific, exceptional cases.
These are known as the Endacott exceptions. This section introduces and compares these two types of trust. They are then considered in more detail later in the chapter.
1.1 Charitable purpose trusts
Charitable purpose trusts are not void for infringement of the beneficiary principle because there
is a mechanism for their enforcement. They are enforceable by the attorney general, with
practical responsibility for enforcement lying with the Charity Commission.
Charity
Charity is a status, not a legal form or structure. A charitable organisation can be established via various legal structures of which a charitable purpose trust is one option. For example, a charity could be established by way of a limited company. This Workbook focuses
only on charitable purpose trusts, but it is important in practice to be aware that charities can take other forms
1.1.1 Benefits of charitable status
There are a number of key benefits to trusts having charitable status. These include:
(a) No requirement to comply with the beneficiary principle
(b) More flexible rules on certainty of objects (ie certainty of purpose)
(c) No limit on their duration (ie they can exist in perpetuity)
(d) A rule known as the cy-près doctrine which allows the trust property to be applied for other
charitable purposes even if the specific trust fails
(e) Tax benefits: These are outside the scope of the module but are a major practical advantage
to having charitable status
1.2 Non-charitable purpose trusts
In order to be valid, the purpose of a non-charitable purpose trust must fall within a recognised
exception to the beneficiary principle. These exceptions apply only when a trust is created in a will
and were classified in the case of Re Endacott [1960] Ch 232.
The trusts recognised in Re Endacott are anomalous exceptions to the beneficiary principle. Only
very limited types of trust fall within this category and it is a closed class which is narrowly construed. No further exceptions are likely to be recognised. Unlike charitable purpose trusts, there is no recognised method of enforcement for non-charitable purpose trusts. They are therefore known as ‘trusts of imperfect obligation’.
1.3 Key differences between charitable and non-charitable purpose trusts
It is also important to be aware of the following differences between the two categories of purpose
trust:
(a) Enforceability: As we have already seen, charitable purpose trusts are legally enforceable while non-charitable purpose trusts are ‘trusts of imperfect obligation’.
(b) Certainty of objects (ie certainty of purpose): Charitable purpose trusts benefit from relaxed
rules of certainty of purpose.
(c) Perpetuity: Charitable purpose trusts can last indefinitely while non-charitable purpose trusts are restricted in duration by the common law perpetuity rules (discussed in the chapter
on ‘Perpetuity’).
1.3.1 Perpetuity
In general terms the law prevents people from tying up their assets on trust in perpetuity (indefinitely). This is for policy reasons – it prevents people with wealth locking their assets away on trust and therefore out of circulation in the wider economy. If they were able to lock assets away on trust in this way, they could effectively control their assets for many generations into the
future from beyond the grave.
Two related rules
There are two related rules in this area:
(a) The rule against remoteness of vesting: This applies to trusts with beneficiaries or charitable purposes as their objects.
(b) The rule against inalienability: This only applies to non-charitable purpose trusts.
1.3.2 Certainty of purpose
The rules in relation to certainty are much more flexible for charitable purpose trusts than for private trusts:
* It is sufficient that there is an intention to apply property for a charitable purpose.
* If there is uncertainty as to how this intention is to be carried out the trustees can direct that
the property be applied for such charitable purposes as they select.
1.3.2 Certainty of purpose
For charitable purpose trusts, the court will strive to resolve any uncertainty and hold the trust
valid once it has established charitable intent.
* The Charity Commission or the court can provide a ‘scheme’ to specify the charitable
purposes the property should be applied to. This is not true of non-charitable purpose trusts. Such trusts will be void for uncertainty of objects if the purpose (or means of achieving the purpose) is unclear.
Key case: Re Astor’s Settlement Trusts [1952] Ch 534
Re Astor’s Settlement Trusts is an example of a case where an attempted non-charitable purpose
trust was found to be void in part because the intended purposes were too uncertain.
Key case: Re Astor’s Settlement Trusts [1952] Ch 534
Facts: A trust of substantially all the shares in The Observer Ltd were held on trust for various noncharitable purposes including:
* ‘The maintenance […] of good understanding sympathy and co-operation between nations’
* ‘The preservation of the independence and integrity of newspapers’
* ‘The control, publication […] financing or management of any newspapers, periodicals, books,
pamphlets or publications’
* ‘The protection of newspapers […] from being absorbed […] or being tied by finance or
otherwise to special […] views […] inconsistent with the highest integrity and independence.’
Key case: Re Astor’s Settlement Trusts [1952] Ch 534 Judgement
Held: Roxburgh J considered the purposes too inherently uncertain to be performed and rejected
the argument that the trustees could simply disregard those purposes which were insufficiently defined.
Counsel’s argument that the trustees could apply to the court for a ‘scheme’ for the administration of the trust, as is available for charitable purpose trusts, was rejected on the basis that such a scheme would require a ‘custodian’ equivalent to the attorney general, but there is no
such equivalent for non-charitable purpose trusts.
Endacott exception, leading Roxburgh J to conclude
The trust also failed for not falling within a recognised Endacott exception, leading Roxburgh J to
conclude:
[…] while I have reached my decision on two separate grounds, both, I think, have their origin in a single principle, namely, that a court of equity does not recognise as valid a trust which it cannot both enforce and control. This seems to me to be good equity and good sense
- Charitable purpose trusts
2.1 Introduction to charitable purpose trusts
To have charitable status a trust must:
(a) Be for a charitable purpose;
(b) Satisfy the public benefit test; and
(c) Be wholly and exclusively charitable.
2.2 Charitable purposes
There is an extensive body of case law on charitable purposes, much of which refers to the charitable purposes listed in the preamble to the Charitable Uses Act 1601. Although the law on charities was codified in the Charities Act 2006 and consolidated in the Charities Act 2011, the history of the case law is important because many modern cases will still be interpreted by
reference to the cases predating the legislation
Heads of charity
For around 300 years, the case law on charitable purposes developed with reference to the preamble to the 1601 Act, with four traditional ‘heads of charity’ emerging:
(a) The relief of poverty
(b) The advancement of education
(c) The advancement of religion
(d) Other purposes beneficial to the community
These were subsequently recognised to be a ‘checklist’ only, with other purposes capable of being
charitable as long as they fell within the spirit of the preamble.
s 2 of the Charities Act 2011
The law has now been codified, with s 2 of the Charities Act 2011 providing that a charitable
purpose is a purpose which:
(a) Falls within s 3(1); and
(b) Is for the public benefit.
There are 12 specific heads of charity set out under s 3(1) as well as a wide additional head of charity which codifies the common law principle of recognising additional charitable purposes falling within the spirit of the law.
Heads of charity
The 12 specific heads of charity are:
(a) The prevention or relief of poverty
(b) The advancement of education
(c) The advancement of religion
(d) The advancement of health or the saving of lives
(e) The advancement of citizenship or community development
(f) The advancement of the arts, culture, heritage or science
(g) The advancement of amateur sport
Heads of charity
(h) The advancement of human rights, conflict resolution or reconciliation or the promotion of
religious or racial harmony or equality and diversity
(i) The advancement of environmental protection or improvement
(j) The relief of those in need because of youth, age, ill-health, disability, financial hardship or
other disadvantage
(k) The advancement of animal welfare
(l) The promotion of the efficiency of the armed forces of the Crown or of the efficiency of the
police, fire and rescue services or ambulance services
2.2.1 The prevention or relief of poverty
There is no definition of ‘poverty’ in the Charities Act 2011 and it is therefore interpreted using
existing case law from which some key principles can be derived.
Poverty means ‘going short’
This idea from Re Coulthurst is now reflected in Charity Commission guidance which provides
that:
it is likely to be charitable to relieve the poverty or financial hardship of anyone who does not
have the resources to provide themselves […] with the normal things of life which most people
take for granted.
Poverty does not mean destitution
‘There are degrees of poverty less acute than abject poverty or destitution, but poverty nonetheless.’ (Re Gardom)
Poverty is a relative concept
It is judged against a person’s ‘status in life’. Trusts for the following have been found to be charitable:
* ‘distressed gentlefolk’ (Re Young)
* ‘ladies of limited means’ (Re Gardom)
The purpose must not benefit the rich
Otherwise it will not be ‘wholly and exclusively charitable’ - see Re Gwyon in which a trust for the
provision of clothing to boys was void on the basis that it did not require the boys to be poor and
so would benefit rich boys too.
Poverty can be temporary
The Charity Commission’s decision to grant charitable status to the AITC Foundation which provided relief for those who suffered as a result of the collapse of investment companies noted that ‘someone suffering a temporary period of financial hardship due to a sudden change in
circumstances might also be eligible for assistance’.
Poverty can be inferred
For example, the provision of a soup kitchen was implicitly for the alleviation of poverty (Biscoe v
Jackson). In contrast, a trust to provides dwellings for the ‘working classes’ was not charitable as
‘working class’ did not indicate poor persons (Re Sanders’ WT).
2.2.2 The advancement of education
Charity Commission guidance indicates that the advancement of education is not confined to formal instruction in an educational institution and could include training, research or broader education in the development of individual capabilities, competencies, skills and understanding. Case law has confirmed that the following are charitable purposes
2.2.2 The advancement of education
- The support of learning such as scholarships to support students (Re Gott) and funding of lectureships (AG v Margaret and Regius Professors in Cambridge).
- Ancillary organisations in educational institutions eg a students’ union, provided it exists to
further the educational purposes of the institution (London Hospital Medical College v IRC). - The dissemination of knowledge, as in Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales v AG in which a trust for the publication of law reports was considered charitable as it
assisted research into the law
The case law on advancement of education is not entirely consistent on what constitutes education. Compare the following cases:
Re Shaw: George Bernard Shaw left a gift for the purpose of developing a 40-letter phonetic alphabet. The purpose was held to be an increase in knowledge, but this was not a charitable object because there was no element of teaching or education.
The case law on advancement of education is not entirely consistent on what constitutes education. Compare the following cases:
- Re Hopkins’ Will Trust: A gift was left on trust for the purpose of researching whether plays attributed to Shakespeare may have been authored by Francis Bacon. Wilberforce J did not find himself to be constrained by the requirement of ‘an element of teaching or education’ and was unwilling to treat these words as meaning that the promotion of academic research could not be charitable. He held that the research must ‘either be of educational value to the researcher or must be so directed as to lead to something which will pass into the store of educational material, or so as to improve the sum of communicable knowledge’.
Both cases predate the statutory requirement
Note, however, that both cases predate the statutory requirement to prove public benefit (which was previously presumed). It is unclear whether research of value to the researcher would be sufficient to satisfy the statutory public benefit test.
The Charity Commission
The Charity Commission guidance also recognises that a wide range of organisations qualify as charitable under this heading, including:
* Museums, galleries, libraries, scientific institutes
* Pre-schools, playgroups, summer schools and homework clubs
* Organisations supporting the work of educational establishments such as parent-teacher associations, teacher training organisations or exam boards
* Organisations providing life skills training such as the Duke of Edinburgh award schemes,
Scouts and Guides
The above is not an exhaustive list
2.2.3 The advancement of religion
Section 3(2)(a) Charities Act 2011 provides that ‘religion’ includes:
(a) A religion which involves belief in more than one god; and
(b) A religion which does not involve a belief in a god.
Charity Commission guidance consolidates further case law requirements describing a religious
belief as follows:
- Belief in a god (or gods) or goddess (or goddesses), or supreme being, or divine or transcendental being or entity or spiritual principle (‘supreme being or entity’) which is the object or focus of the religion
- A relationship between the believer and the supreme being or entity by showing worship of,
reverence for or veneration of the supreme being or entity - A degree of cogency, cohesion, seriousness and importance
- An identifiable positive, beneficial, moral or ethical framework
2.2.3 The advancement of religion
Although the advancement of religion was a recognised head of charity before the enactment of
the Charities Act 2011, the earlier case law now needs to be considered in light of the statutory definition and Charity Commission guidance, which provides that it should be considered ‘in the context of current social and economic circumstances’.
2.2.3 The advancement of religion
Under the common law it was unclear whether groups which did not recognise a god could be
charitable. A prominent example was Buddhism, which was recognised by Lord Denning in R v
Registrar General Ex p Segerdal as an exception to the general rule requiring belief in a god.
Following the Charities Act 2011 it is clear that the charitable head of the advancement of religion
includes religions which do not involve belief in a god.Under the common law it was unclear whether groups which did not recognise a god could be charitable. A prominent example was Buddhism, which was recognised by Lord Denning in R v
Registrar General Ex p Segerdal as an exception to the general rule requiring belief in a god. Following the Charities Act 2011 it is clear that the charitable head of the advancement of religion includes religions which do not involve belief in a god.
R v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages the Supreme Court
Unless there is some compelling reason for holding otherwise, religion should not be confined to
religions which recognise a supreme deity. First and foremost, to do so would be a form of religious discrimination unacceptable in today’s society.
Definition of ‘religion’
Advancement of religion has been defined as meaning ‘to promote it, to spread its message ever wider among mankind; to take some positive steps to sustain and increase religious belief’ (United Grand Lodge of Ancient Free and Accepted Masons of England v Holborn Borough Council). This can be achieved by way of religious services, pastoral or missionary work.
Trusts for the following purposes have also been found to fall within this head:
- Support of a religious order such as a monastery or convent (Re Banfield)
- Public masses celebrating the dead (Re Hetherington)
- The repair of churchyards or burial grounds (Re Douglas)
2.2.4 The advancement of health/saving of lives
The advancement of health includes the prevention or relief of sickness, disease or human suffering, as well as the promotion of health. The Charity Commission takes a broad view of advancing health including complementary, alternative or holistic methods as well as conventional methods, though to be charitable there must be sufficient evidence for the claimed benefits of the method used (see Charity Commission Operational Guidance (OG) 304).
2.2.4 The advancement of health/saving of lives
The relief of the sick has long been considered charitable. It can include, for example, the provision of hospitals (Re Resch’s Will Trust) or healthcare advice (British Pregnancy Advisory Service). The saving of lives includes rescue services such as lifeboat associations, mountain rescue and cave rescue
2.2.5 Citizenship/community development
Section 3(2)(c) provides that this head includes:
(a) Rural and urban regeneration
(b) The promotion of civic responsibility, volunteering, the voluntary sector or the effectiveness or efficiency of charities
Broad group of charitable purposes
It covers a broad group of charitable purposes directed towards support for social and community infrastructure which is focused on the community rather than the individual. As always, the purpose must be wholly and exclusively charitable.
This was demonstrated in IRC v Oldham Training and Enterprise Council where an organisation was held not to be a charity because, in addition to providing vocational training for the unemployed, it also promoted trade, commerce and enterprise and provided advice to new businesses.
2.2.6 Arts, culture, heritage or science
Before 2006 these purposes could only be upheld as charitable under the head of advancement of education. A trust to promote the practice and performance of choral works was therefore established as being charitable on the basis that ‘a body of persons established for the purpose of raising the artistic taste of the country […] is established for educational purposes’ (Royal Choral
Society v IRC)
Charity Commission guidance
Provides that to be charitable the art needs to be of ‘merit’, the assessment of which may require expert evidence.
Compare the cases of Re Delius
in relation to promoting the music of the composer Delius) and
Re Pinion (in relation to the settlor’s art collection). The former was considered charitable, though
the judge left open the question as to the consequence if the trust had related to a lesser composer. In contrast the art collection in Re Pinion was described by the Court of Appeal as ‘junk’ and the trust was not charitable. These cases were decided under the old law (ie on whether they could be considered educational) but it can be presumed that similar considerations would
apply under the Act.