chapter 18+19 decisionmaking Flashcards
EU policy actors
- those associated with the EU institutions
- those associated with the gov. of the member states
- those with Euro-level and national-level non-institutional and non-gov. interests
!EU policy process is variable and fluid -> nature responsibilities/roles can differ acc to circumstances
EMU major policy actors
- Ecofin Council of Ministers = outlines EU macroeconomic policy + some EMU responsibilities
- Eurogroup: Ministers of Finance, convenes monthly to discuss eurozone interests (euro crisis -> Eurogroup main crisis management institution)
- European Council: Heads of Gov and state makes broad outlines
- Euro Summit: twice annually, but usually when necessary = Eurozone leaders
- ECB: manage eurozone monetary policy, has strayed into fiscal policy
- European Commission: policy reports and recommendations + eco surveillance
- Economic and Financial Committee of the Council: all aspects EU eco. and monetary policies
- EP: few powers in relation to EMU, range of consultation and information-receiving rights
EU policy channels vary in:
- complexity and exhaustiveness
- relative importance of EU, MS, and subnational processes and in the links between these levels
- in their levels of seniority
- in their degree of formality and structure
factors determining EU policy processes
- the treaty base
- proposed status of the matter under consideration (procedures more fixed when EU law is envisaged than when it is not)
- Council + Council and EP legislation = full legislative procedure
- Commission legislation = less review and discussion (bc legislation is normally administrative V amendments/applications/updates)
- no law making => often: Council resolutions, declarations, agreements, conclusions (no legal instruments, big political/policy impact) - degree of generality or specificity of the policy issue (EU policy-making may consist of little more than exchanges of ideas + seeing if there is common ground)
- newness, importance, controversiality, or political sensitivity of the issue in question
- balance of policy responsibilities between the EU and national levels (determines the scope of activity at the EU level)
- (perceptions of) circumstances
- e.g. AFSJ (area of freedom, security and justice): in the 80s intergov. -> now more powers: EU enlargement (-> more concerns border controls) + increase threat of internatoinal terrorism = communitarisation AFSJ
four frameworks of EU policy processes
- The Community method
- intensive transgovernmentalism
- open coordination
- centralised decision-making
based on (Paul Magnette):
- degree of involvement of institutions independent of gov.
- decision-making rules in the Council
- legal character of many decisional outcomes
the Community Method
1950s
!now declining importance (other frameworks have come into use + enlargement (-> more flexible policy processes) + MS suspicion that supranational institution over-used the method as it works in their favor)
“Commission proposes, Parliament advises (on a restricted range of matters), Council disposes (decides), and the Court adjudicates’’
- to avoid paralysing effects intergov. decision-making + to ensure national ultimate control
two important changes:
- extension EP powers since the mid-1980s: now a co-decision-maker with the Council where the Community method is used (90% EU law)
-> Commission-Council-EP triangle - extension QMV ability Council
key features:
- Commission takes policy lead + has monopolistic power over the drafting and tabling of legislative proposals
- Council is always final decision-maker, by itself or with the EP + QMV is often but not always available for decision-making
- EP normally has co-decision-making powers with the Council (ordinary legislative procedure), when this power is absent the EP still needs to be consulted before final decision
- EU’s courts have final jurisdiction over all EU legislation
intensive transgovernmentalism
= national gov. are key actors + decisions require unanimity + many decisional outcomes don’t involve making laws
- European Council and/or Council of Minsiters are the sole decision-makers
first used in the early 70s: EC foreign policy cooperation (sovereignty sensitivity -> community method not suitable: cooperation rather than integration)
use has grown: intergov. cooperation -> intensive transgovernmentalism (constantly ongoing interactions)
*use e.g. in ‘history-making’ decisions + foreign policy
key features:
- right of policy initiation also by MS gov (so not exclusive to the Commission)
- EP weak consultative position
- focus on cooperation govs rather than on law-making
- gov. interact intensive
- decisions are made by European Council or the Council of Ministers by unanimity
open method of coordination
= OMC (Open Method of Coordination)
- 90s, somewhere in between community method and intergov. cooperation
- originally: macroecon. (Broad Ecnomic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) + employment policy
- Lisbon Treaty: OMC for Lisbon Strategy (make econ. more competitive, dynamic and knowledge based)
*main disadvantage: voluntary nature -> gov. not legally bound -> might not implement
*advantage: policy remains national responsibility, national diversity respected, gov. may agree to commit (would not accept stricter/mandatory policy instruments)
key features:
- Council (unanimity) sets out broad policy goals and guidelines (don’t have legal status, have voluntary nature)
- MS draw up national action plans on how they will achieve the goals
- MS submit reports on progress to the Commission and the Council
(reporting can be burdensome, esp. for small member states) - Commission: important role assisting with and monitoring OMC activities (reports that encourage/pressure achterlopers)
centralised decision-making
= supranational institutions extermely strong + relatively independent powers
areas where de-politicization was deemed necessary
in two main policy areas:
- competition: Commission big powers, is always lobbied
- eurozone monetary policy: ECB important role interest and exchange rate
Recurring Characteristics of EU Policy Processes
6
- variable institutional roles and powers
- compromises and linkages
- inter-institutoinal cooperation
- difficulties in effecting radical change
- tactical manoeuvring
- different speeds
variable institutional roles and powers
roles and powers EU institutions and political actors varies between policy processes and policy areas
- making legislation: institutional triangle Commission-Council-EP
precise distribution of powers differs with what is proposed and what procedure applies
compromises and linkages
competing interests -> success policy dev. depends on willingness to compromise
- Linking issues in ‘package deals’ = ensures that there are prices and costs for everybody, rather than just for a few
!European Council crucial role in constructing overarching deals, bc EU as a whole is ill-adapted to linking diff. policy areas and construction complex package deals
much EU policy-making and decision-making tends to be compartmentalised
inter-institutional cooperation
three crucial types of cooperation:
- intra-institutional cooperation
- inter-institutional cooperation
- inter-level cooperation between EU and member state actors
functioning EU is highly reliant on inter-institutional cooperation
- there are also disagreements between EU institution, but this should not be over-exaggerated
inter-institutional cooperation has grown as policy activities have grown + policy processes have become more complex and numerous
- more informal contact officials Commission, Council and EP
- more formal tripartite meetings (meetings between representatives
- even more formal: inter-institutional agreements to regularise, clarify, and generally facilitate inter-institutional relations
ordinary legislative procedure = stimulus ‘cultural change’ relations EP-Council-Commission: they must work closely together
- encourage compromise text at early legislative stage
- Council increased need to be sensitive to EP views
- trialogue meetings vital feature EU law-making
- promoted informal exchanges
!figures on proportions of final legislation that are ‘attributable’ to each of the Commission, Council, EP should be treated with care: they can’t measure dynamics of inter-institutionalism
difficulties in effecting radical change
EU policy- and decision-making often displays gradualism and incrementalism
- partly bc compromises
ambitious proposals can’t be expected to be adopted without significant modification
some obstacles to innovation and radical change have increased over the years
- way forward not as clear as in the 60s (then: specific treaty obligations were honoured + ‘negative integration’ (dismantling barriers and encouraging trade liberalisation))
- EU has become more politically and ideologically heterogeneous (enlargement + Keynesian consensus no longer exists)
- policy dev. has created/attached interests that have a stake in the status quo
!!still: change does occur, obstacles to change ensure that policy innovation is likely to meet resistance
tactical manoeuvring
EU multiplicity of actors + diversity of interests -> tactical manoeuvring and jovkeying for position especially apparent in the EU
e.g. national representatives need to consider tactical options:
- can a coalition be built to create a positive majority or a negative minority? should it be done via bilateral pre-meetings or in an EU forum?
- is it necessary for domestic political purposes , to formally note dissent on a proposal to which the gov. is opposed?
- where is the balance between being seen to tough in defence of national interest and being seen to European-minded
different speeds
often criticism: EU processes slow, but this is not always true
- there are procedures to allow certain types of decisions to be made and when necessary (e.g. Council regulations and decisions can be pushed via urgent procedures)
‘standard’ EU legislation: decision-making processes have speeded up over the years (despite movement to three reading ordinary procedure)
- 80s: ~36 months between transmission and adoption
- now: ~19 months
factors determining speed of adoption particular proposals
- whether or not the proposal commands initial general support in the Council and EP
- whether or not the Council and EP negotiators are sufficiently flexible to permit an agreement at first reading
- whether QMV rules apply in the Council
Voting is used most frequently in established policy areas such as trade, agriculture and the internal market. = policy fields where there is a settled rhythm to EU decision-making
decision-making weak when: no fixed timetable/deadline, contestation, policy area still under construction etc.
- Council often not forcing progress when minority states have genuine problems, as states realise they might be a minority in the future
the efficiency of EU Policy Processes
The EU lacks a fixed, central, authoritative point where general priorities can be set out and choices between competing options can be made.
= no single framework/mechanism for determining and implementing an overall policy view (where diff policy areas are weighted and evaluated in relation to each other)
“policy is not normally completely made via a proce-
dure in which problems are identified, objectives are
set, all possible alternatives for achieving the objectives
are carefully evaluated, and the best alternatives are
then adopted and proceeded with. Rather, policy tends
to evolve in a somewhat messy way,”
3 points in favor of EU decision-making
- EU policy processes are not so different from national processes
- many EU policy-making ‘problems’ also in states: e.g. tensions between levels of gov (who does what + who pays what) - not all EU policy processes consist of cobbling together deals that can satisfy the current complexion of political forces
- there is now more emphasis on initiating rather than just reacting
- focus on coordinated forward thinking and planning (in the form of e.g. multiannual programs of the Commission (approved by the Council to be given effect) - considerable degree of policy cooperation and integration has been achieved at the EU level (shouldn’t be overlooked, criticism should be put in this context)
- no comparable intern. dev. where states have voluntarily transferred so many state competences -> given enormity of the exercise caution, uncertainty and conflict and competition are not surprising
box 18.7 - examples of policy- and decision-making models useful for understanding EU policy- and decision-making processes
- political interest models: attention on competing interests in the EU + compromise and bargaining
- policy network models: focus on how EU decision-makers and outside interests come together
- political elite models: highlight considerable concentrations of power across EU’s policy- and decision-making processes + focus on mecahnisms available to EU citizens to ensure accountability
- institutional models: emphasise how rules/understandings via which EU decisions are made shape the nature of the decisions themselves
legislation that is subject to a full legislative procedure =
legislation that is not subject to a full legislative procedure
is = especially significant and/or concerned with establishing principles
- usually directives
isn’t = narrow in focus + of administrative/implementing character
- usually regulations or decisions
!recent years decline in both: lightening the EU’s legal load
3 forms of legislation
- regulations = binding on MS
- decisions = binding on those to whom they are addressed
- directives = binding as the result to be achieved (require transposition by the appropriate national authorities)
3 legislative procedures:
- consultation procedure
- ordinary procedure (pre-Lisbon: co-decision)
= most often used (90%) - consent procedure (pre-Lisbon: assent)
!pre-Lisbon: also cooperation procedure (two-reading procedure), was replaced by co-decision procedure
special legislative procedures
- ad hoc procedures (annual budget: joint decision EP and Council)
- EP acts (requires consent of Councli and Commission)
- Council acts
- unanimity and consent or consultation of EP
- QMV and consent or consultation of EP
The consultation procedure
- pre-proposal
- prior to SESA: only procedure for non-administrative legislation
- now: only used in a small nr of policy areas
= single-reading procedure, Council is sole final decision-maker (but has to have received opinion EP (+sometimes of European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) + Committee of the Regions (CoR)))
- initiation = usually Commission, Council or EP -> progress is dependent on Commission acting
*Lisbon Treaty: new source of legislation = European Citizen’s Initiative (ECI)
!Commission is not obliged to respond positively to requests - preparation of a text
- proposal needs correct legal base (based on correct treaty articles) (can be controversial: if you’re against the proposal, you want it to be decided in a policy area with unanimity decision-making)
- justification: application o the subsidiarity and proportionality principles
- (justification environmental impact)(where relevant, e.g. agriculture)
- probable financial implications for the EU budget
usually:
- ‘lead’ DG responsible for dossier/draft (=individual responsibilty/expertise),
- vertical communication with the DG, other DGs, Legal Service and Secretariat General must have opportunity to voice opinion (e.g. via inter-service meetings)
- draft sent to cabinets of the Comissioner and his/her Vice-President
- cabinets can persuade Commission officials to rework the draft
- Secretarat General summits the draft to the College of Commissionners
- meeting of special chefs / chefs de cabinet = scrutinize, amend etc.
- draft can be judged uncontroversial (-> adopt by written procedure) or controversial (accept, rejcet, amend or refer back to DG)
!no standard consultative pattern/procedure pre-proposal stage Commission (-> sometimes gov. has more involvement and/or knowledge than other times(
the consultation procedure
- the opinions of the EP, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions
Commission publication -> text to Council and EP + if appropriate EESC and CoR for opinions
EP most influential (though no legislative powers):
- power of delay (withholding opinion)
- usually they vote on amendments, but not on the draft legislative resolution itself until the Commission states what it will do with the amendments
- can reference a draft back to the responsible committee
overall influence on EU legislation: hard to estimate, but:
- positive: Commission accepts 2/3 amendments
- negative: EP can’t do much if Council rejects opinion (can only hope for a reconciliation meeting) + Council sometimes takes decision in principle or subject to EP opinion before the opinion has been delivered + texts proposals can be changed after EP’s opinion
EESC and CoR not much formal powers
- consulation optional in some policy spheres
- often tight time table, Council or Commission can go on if the EESC/CoR miss deadline
- part-time capacity members + views that advisory committees and lobbying are more effective
- can’t pressure Council or Commission to change the proposal
the consultative procedure
- decision-making in the council
doesn’t wait f views EP, EESC, CoR
- proposal referred to a working party of national representatives for detailed examination
- representatives must: safeguard interests of their country + reach an agreement on a text - reference to COREPER (or in a few cases a specialised committee, e.g. agriculture): focus on policy and political implications
- resolution refered back to working party or forwarded to the ministers for political resolution
- forwarding as A points (meaning there already is agreement), or B points (meaning it is controversial) - all proposals must be formally approved by the ministers
- usually unanimity is required
ordinary legislative procedure
- foundations
= created by Maastricht Treaty (but not yet formal name until TFEU)
- grew out of the SEA cooperation procedure
reasons for creation SEA cooperation procedure:
- necessary to increase efficiency and speed decision-making processes (QMV in Council + less time for institutions to act)
- ‘democratic deficit’ concerns (two-reading procedure + increasing EP leverage over the Council at the second reading)
co-decision procedure
- gave EP power of veto if the Council was resolved to press ahead with a legislative proposal (but not in all procedures, e.g. agriculture and trade only since Lisbon Treaty)r
ordinary legislative procedure
- nature
1, 2, or 3 readigns reading procedure, with four stages at which the legislators can reach agreemeng and conclude a legislative process
= procedure with extensive inter-institutional bargaining
see the procedure on page 346-347
first reading = Council and EP examine the proposal
- if both agree and standard legislative requirements are met (e.g. EESC and CoR consultation) -> adoptation
*more and more legislation is passed in this first reading, e.g. bco more inter-institutional cooperation formulation and agenda-setting stage + institutionalisation ordinary procedure - if Council and EP dont reach agreement -> Council adopts a common position (with QMV) or indicates what its common position could and couldnt include
! drivers of the ordinary procedure = (informal) trilogues:
= try to resolve differences before formal decisions
bring together relevant actros from the Commission, Council and EP:
- usually chef de file DG and line managers - chair EP committee
- rapporteur/represenatives and senior officials from te Permanent Representation of the incumbent Presidency and of the General Secretariat of the Council
second reading
EP approves, amends, rejects or takes no action on a common position or a likely common position
Commission and Council must explain their positions
*EP has 3 month deadline
third reading when EP amends the common position by absolute majority
third reading = reconciliation stage
Reconciliation Committee (~60) of representatives Council and EP, but usually informal trilogues in advance
agreement joint document needs to be approved in both Council and EP
it is unusual for proposals to fail at this stage
Final agreements under the ordinary legislative procedure
- First reading agreement (~85%)
- Early second reading agreement = compromise text after EP first reading position, before Council’s first reading position (~8%)
- Second reading agreement = compromise text prior to Parliament’s second reading vote (~5%)
- Conciliation = agreement on a joint text within the Conciliation Committee (~2%)
The consent procedure
(established as the assent procedure by SEA)
Single-stage procedure where proposed measures have to be approved by both Council and EP
!EP can’t make amendments, can say no or yes
The procedure is more complex than it seems bc:
- unanimity not always required for Council
- EP majority often suffices, sometimes absolute majority required
- complexity is extreme in respect of (potential) breaches by member states of the fundamental principles on which the EU is founded
Used for special types of decision (e.g. Certain international agreements, EU enlargements MFF)
For legislation: only for new legislation on combating discrimination and for legislation that has no clear treaty base
EU legislation after adoption
the need for additional legislation
- often needs to be supplemented by other legislation to fit particular circumstances, adapt to changing circumstances, keep it up to date etc.
= usually in the form of Commission regulations and decisions - sometimes ‘policy’ legislation necessary, e.g. With framework legislation (e.g. A principle), needs more detail and basic rules that fall int he remit of the framework
- ‘new approach’ legislation (internal market legal framework: no full harmonisation specifications, but essential requirements): national standards need to be replaced/removed by European standards bodies
the need to transpose legislation
= directives need to be transposed to national law to assume legislative force
How this happens differs per MS
Directive specifies a final transposition date + are obliged to notify the Commission of the national legislation, regulation or administrative provisions
!not all MS have equally high/fast transposition rates
the need to apply legislation
= responsibility shared between EU authorities and national agencies
*sometimes just the EU
-EU: DGs, EU executive agencies = oversees
-national agencies: mostly monitoring authorities = front line work
three types of difficulty
1. Fraud with spending
2. national agencies not enough action against suspected irregularities bc vigours implementation could be bad for national interest
3. incorrect understanding and application of complex EU legislation
Concluding remarks
Until mid-80s: EU unicameral legislative system (Council sole legislator, EP only consultative)
Starting with SEA: EP’s power extended
Implementation of legislation is a problem for the EU (mostly: unintended administrative irregularities)
Main reason = EU’s dependence on national agencies
