Ch. 18 Flashcards

1
Q

oral auction or English Auction

A

in this auction type, bidders submit increasing bids until only one bidder remains. The item is awarded to the last remaining bidder.

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2
Q

Three bidders with values of $5, $100, and $20,000 are participating in an oral English auction. What is the likely resulting price?

a. $5	
b. $100	
c. $10,000	
d. $20,000
A

b. $100

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3
Q

Two bidders are participating in an English auction. The price will be primarily determined by

a. the value of the winning bidder.	
b. the value of the losing bidder.	
c. the value of the bidder with the higher value.	
d. The auctionee
A

b. the value of the losing bidder.

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4
Q

vickrey auction or a second-price auction is

A

a sealed-bid auction in which the item is awarded to the highest bidder, but the winner pays only the second-highest bid.

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5
Q

The optimal strategy in a second-price auction is to bid _____ your value

A

exactly

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6
Q

a second-price auction is actually strategically equivalent to the _______ auction.

A

English

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7
Q

In an English auction, everyone is willing to bid up to his or her value, and the highest-valued bidder wins at a price equal to (or just above) the __________.

A

the second-highest value.

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8
Q

A second-price auction allows _________ to simulate what would have happened in an English auction, but without the need to have bidders show up at the same place and time.

A

the auctioneer

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9
Q

As in the second-price auction, the ___________ determines the price.

A

highest losing bid

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10
Q

As in the second-price auction, it is optimal to ___________.

A

bid your value

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11
Q

A bidder values a rare sports card at $400, and expects that other bidders value it between $200 and $1,000. The auction is a sealed-bid second-price auction. Which of the following is likely to be the best bid?

a. $250	
b. $300	
c. $400	
d. $1,000
A

c. $400

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12
Q

In a sealed-bid first-price auction, the highest bidder wins ________

A

the item at a price equal to the highest bid.

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13
Q

In contrast to a second-price auction, in a sealed-bid first-price auction, you have to ____________.

Therefore, each bidder faces a __________: he can bid higher and raise the probability of winning, but doing so lowers his surplus (or profit) if he does win.

A

pay the amount you bid.

trade-off.

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14
Q

In first price auction, bidding exactly your value guarantees ________ profit whether you win or lose, each bidder shades his bid; that is, he balances these two effects by bidding _____ his value.

You should bid more—shade your value _____ —if the competition is stronger.

A

zero

below

less

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15
Q

A bidder values a rare sports card at $400, and expects that other bidders value it between $200 and $1,000. The auction is a sealed-bid first-price auction. Which of the following is potentially an optimal bid?

a. $300	
b. $400	
c. $600	
d. $1,000
A

a. $300

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16
Q

In oral/English auctions the _________ bidder determines the price

A

losing

17
Q

viceroy or second price auctions are easier to run and well suited for the

A

internet

18
Q

in sealed bid first price auctions bidders must balance the _________ of winning against the _______ they will make if they do win.

A

probability

profit

19
Q

in sealed bid first place auctions, optimal bids are ______ than bidder’s private value

A

optimal

20
Q

Collusion or bid rigging is one of the biggest _______ for auctioneers.

A

challenges

21
Q

bidders can raise profits in collusion or bid rigging by

A

agreeing not to bid against each other

22
Q

if collusion is suspected, do not:

A

hold open auctions

hold small and frequent auctions

announce the winners or the winning bids

23
Q

agreement between bidders is a _______ violation of ________.

A

criminal

antitrust laws of the U.S. and most of other developed countries

24
Q

collusion creates __________ among conspirators.

A

prisoner’s dilemma

25
Q

Collusion is more likely in ________, _________ auctions than in big, infrequent ones.

A

small, frequent

26
Q

Collusion is more likely in _________ than in sealed-bid auctions.

A

oral-auctions

27
Q

Collusion is more likely when __________ and _________ are identified.

A

winning bidders

winning bids

28
Q

Which of the following is true about collusion in auctions?

a. Collusion is more likely in oral auctions than in sealed-bid auctions.	
b. Collusion is more likely when winning bidders are not identified.	
c. Collusion is more likely in infrequent auctions than in frequent ones	
d. Collusion is likely to lead to higher prices for the auctioneer.
A

a. Collusion is more likely in oral auctions than in sealed-bid auctions.

29
Q

in a common value auction everyone has the ______ value but each has only an _________ of what it is.

A

same

estimate

30
Q

winner’s curse

arises in _____________.

A

common-value auctions.

31
Q

Winner;s curse refers to the fact that the “winner” of the auction is usually the bidder with the _____________.

To avoid bidding too aggressively, bidders should bid as if their estimate is the ____________ and ________ their estimate accordingly.

A

highest estimate of the item’s value

most optimistic

reduce

32
Q

to avoid a winner’s course in common-value auctions, _____________.

Bid as if your estimate is the most __________, and everyone else thinks it is worth less.

A

bid below your estimate value.

optimistic

33
Q

To avoid the winner’s curse, you bid as if everyone else thinks the ____________.

A

value is less than your estimate.

34
Q

To avoid the winners’ curse, you bid ______ as the number of bidders increases.

A

less aggressively

35
Q

The winner’s curse is especially bad when rival bidders have ______ information about the value than you do.

A

better

36
Q

If you’re the auctioneer, you want to encourage aggressive bidding by _______ as much information as you can about the value of the item.

By reducing _________ about the value of the item, you mitigate many of the effects of the winner’s curse, which encourages bidders to bid closer to their estimated values.

A

releasing

uncertainty

37
Q

Oral auctions return higher prices in a common-value setting than sealed-bid auction because they _______.

A

release more information

38
Q

How does one avoid the winner’s curse?

a. Bid lower when there are more bidders than when there are fewer bidders.	
b. Assume that everyone else thinks that the value of the item for sale is less than your estimate.	
c. Avoid auctions when others have more information about the object's value than you do.	
d. All of the above.
A

d. All of the above.

39
Q

Which of the following about private-value and common-value auctions is true?

a. In common-value auctions, bidders don't know their values.	
b. In private-value auctions, bidders can suffer from the winner's curse.	
c. In common-value auctions, every bidder's value is the same.	
d. In common-value auctions, bidders bid their expected value.
A

c. In common-value auctions, every bidder’s value is the same.