Case Law Yellow Cases ONLY Flashcards
ABPP Case Law
Jaffee v. Redmond (1996) SCOTUS
Officer Mary Lu Redmond sought therapy from an LCSW after a shooting in the line of duty. At trial, the petitioner requested all of her therapy notes. SCOTUS recognized privilege at the federal level, bringing federal courts in line with all 50 states. Privilege is absolute, not qualified by the trial judge, and “promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence.” Otherwise, it would “eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege” by making it impossible for participants to predict whether their conversations will be protected. Also, it extended privilege for the first time to social workers. *First federal case recognizing therapist-client privilege under the Federal Rules of Evidence (specifically in a case where the defendant himself did not raise the issue of mental state).
In Re Lifshutz (1970) CA Supreme Court
Housek alleged physical and emotional injury. He disclosed therapy 10 years prior, and Lifschutz, psychiatrist, refused to comply with request to testify/produce records. Court ruled that only those matters directly relevant to the nature of the specific emotional condition which the patient voluntarily brought up must be disclosed. There is no such thing as absolute patient-psychotherapist privilege. When a defendant raises an issue of his/her mental condition in court, he/she has waived this privilege. The trial courts should properly and carefully control compelled disclosures in this area. Emphasized that the patient “owns the privilege,” not the psychotherapist. *First case to assert clearly that the constitutional right to privacy includes the patient-therapist privilege.
United States v. Greer (1998) Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
Greer was sent to R. Frederick at SPG, found competent and malingering. He was sent to RCH with MA Conroy, who also said malingering. The Court affirmed sentence enhancement for malingering. Defendants have a constitutional right to competency evaluation if there is a bona fide doubt. But, they do not have the right to create such doubt. Court must determine that malingering is volitional and willful. The standard is preponderance of the evidence; circumstantial evidence is sufficient (e.g., stopping behavior when told not incompetent).
U.S. v. Duhon (2000) Western District of LA District Court SO Case
Keith Duhon was charged with sexual exploitation of children. Mild intellectual disability (FSIQ=67), found incompetent and committed to FMC Butner. After one month, he was restored after passing a competency restoration class. The Court ruled that simple, rote learning of concepts is insufficient for CST. A defendant must also be able to appreciate and understand information, not just recite it. The Court emphasized the defendant’s ability to make decisions, to have a reasonable degree of understanding to assist counsel, and a rational understanding of the proceedings.
Frendak v. U.S. (1979) DC Court of Appeals
Paula Frendak killed, fled the country, and as apprehended in Abu Dhabi with guns, ammunition, and a pocket knife. She was found CST but refused to raise NGRI defense. The court pursued it anyway, and the jury found her NGRI under the Whalem rule. The Court rules that a judge cannot raise an NGRI defense against a defendant’s wishes if their choice to waive it is intelligent and voluntary. However, a finding of competency, in itself, is not sufficient to show that a defendant is capable of rejecting an insanity defense. The trial judge must make further inquiry into whether the defendant’s decision is intelligent and voluntary: 1) informed of all alternatives, 2) understands consequences, and 3) freely chooses to waive.
Ibn-Tamas v. U.S. (1979) DC Court of Appeals **Family Law
Beverly Ibn-Tamas fatally shot her husband after alleging a long history of IPV. The trial court refused to admit information re: battered women offered by defense expert Dr. Lenore Walker. The Court determined this on two bases: 1) admissibility, using the Dyas v. U.S. three-fold test: a. the subject of testimony must lend itself to expertise, b. the expert must be qualified to give it, and c. experts must have studied it in a manner justifying the expert opinion; and 2) consider the prejudicial impact of testimony versus its probative value.
Jones v. U.S. (1983)* DC Court of Appeals
Michael Jones was charged with misdemeanor petty larceny for stealing a jacket from a department store. Found CST, pled NGRI, committed to St. Elizabeth’s. The Court said a finding of NGRI under a preponderance of the evidence standard justifies indefinite commitment until the defendant is sane or no longer dangerous without regard to the length of the hypothetical criminal sentence. Especially in misdemeanor cases, a defendant can be confined longer than jail sentence. Commitment is for treatment, not retribution. This is important for defendants to understand when weighing the pros/cons of an NGRI plea.
McDonald v. U.S. (1962) DC Court of Appeals
McDonald charged with second degree murder for aiding in a shooting. History of mental health issues and FSIQ=68. Pled NGRI, found guilty and sentenced to five to 15 years in prison. The Court found that 1) the jury should have been instructed as to the outcome of an NGRI verdict (i.e., hospital, the Lyles instruction) and 2) “mental disease or defect” is “any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavioral controls.”
M’Naghten’s Case (1843) House of Lords
Daniel M’Naghten was found NGRI for shooting of Edward Drummond, the Prime Minister’s secretary. He had a delusional belief he was being stalked and conspired against. The Court said that to be found insane, it must be clearly proven that “at the time of committing the act, the party accused was acting under such a defect of reason…as to not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing…or, if he did know, that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong.” This case set the precedent for NGRI defense, very similar to MN Rule 20.02.
Montana v. Egelhoff (1996) SCOTUS
Egelhoff went mushroom picking, was drinking with two others. Both companions were found dead from gunshots. Egelhoff’s BAC=0.36 over one hour later. He said intoxication impaired his ability to murder, found guilty and sentenced to 84 years. SCOTUS said a state can restrict evidence/claim of insanity based on voluntary intoxication. Voluntary intoxication is not an excuse or justification for a crime and does not exclude mens rea. A drunken offender should be treated the same as a sober offender.
Rex v. Arnold (1724) Court of Common Pleas
Edward Arnold shot Lord Onslow. There was some evidence of pre-meditation and planning, but his family also described a “madman.” Arnold believed he was “bewitched” by Onslow. The Court said that to be exempt from punishment, “it must be a man that is totally deprived of his understanding and memory and doth not know what he is doing, no more than an infant, brute, wild beast, such a one is never the object of punishment.” A defendant is subject to punishment if he was sensible, had use of reason, and understood what he did.
