Case Law RED Cases ONLY Flashcards
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993) SCOTUS
Children were born with birth defects after mothers took Benedictin during pregnancy. Defense experts said the drugs did not cause defects; eight plaintiff experts said it did. Court listed four factors for judges to consider regarding admissibility of scientific evidence: 1) Whether the theory/technique has been tested; 2) Whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; 3) The known or potential rate of error; and 4) The degree to which it is generally accepted by a relevant scientific community. All evidence must be relevant and reliable. The judge has “gatekeeping function.” This case sets the minimum standard – states can keep a stricter standard (i.e., Frye). This is a broader/more flexible test than Frye.
Frye v. U.S. (1923) DC Court of Appeals
Frye was accused of murder, took a “deception test” that showed innocence despite his prior confession. Judge excluded the test results from trial. This case sets the standard for expert admissibility. “The evidence itself must be so as to be generally accepted in its field.” Fun fact: Marsden also created Wonder Woman.
General Electric Co. v. Joiner (1997) SCOTUS
Robert Joiner worked as an electrician. He was exposed to PCBs (toxins) and developed lung cancer. The Judge is the gatekeeper and has broad latitude to ensure relevant/reliable evidence. There is no requirement in Daubert or Federal Rules of Evidence to admit evidence if the gap between the studies presented and the opinion reached is too large. The Court can conclude there is too great an analytical gap between the data and opinion.
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999) SCOTUS
Carmichael’s minivan tire blew out. Expert testimony by tire failure analysis expert suggested defect in tire caused the blowout. Court said Daubert factors (which are not a definitive checklist or test) can be applied to non-scientific testimony (i.e., “technical or other specialized knowledge”). The judge’s gatekeeping function applies even to non-scientific testimony, and the judge has broad latitude about reliability in a given case.
Drope v. Missouri (1975) SCOTUS
Drope was charged with the rape of a man’s wife. The Court denied request for psychological evaluation. Drope then shot himself in the stomach and was absent for the remainder of trial. SCOTUS said the Court must consider any evidence or factors suggestive of mental illness; even one factor may be enough to warrant a CST evaluation. In this case, the Court established a very low threshold for referral for CST evaluation. This case adds to Pate “at any point during the trial.” The responsibility extends to all parties. It also adds the “assistance of counsel” prong beyond Dusky.
Dusky v. U.S. (1960) SCOTUS
Milton Dusky kidnapped a 15-year-old and crossed state lines. The Judge found him competent because he was oriented and had some recollection of the offense. This case affirmed a defendant’s right to a CST evaluation before trial. It also set the basic standard for CST in federal court and most states: A defendant is incompetent and must not plead, be tried, or be sentenced if he lacks “sufficient present ability to consult with their lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and a “rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Of note, there is no mention of mental illness in the standard.
Estelle v. Smith (1981)* SCOTUS
Ernest Smith robbed a convenience store and was indicted for capital murder. A CST evaluation was done by Dr. Grigson, who did not disclose that the information would be used at sentencing or that it would include an opinion on dangerousness. Defense counsel was not notified of the examination. The Court said it violated the defendant’s Fifth and Sixth amendment rights because Smith was not informed, information was not freely given, and was denied the option to consult with an attorney.
Jackson v. Indiana (1972) SCOTUS
Theon Jackson was charged with two robberies totaling $9. He was a “mentally deficient deaf mute with the mental level of a preschool child.” He was found incompetent, committed indefinitely. SCOTUS ruled that an incompetent defendant cannot be held indefinitely if there is no real chance of recovering competency. Jackson’s rights were violated because he was held to a more lenient commitment standard (and a more stringent release standard) than other commitment types, such as the mentally ill or “feeble-minded.” Those individuals were accorded more procedural protections than Jackson. Also, the nature and duration of the commitment must be reasonably related to the reason for commitment in the first place. If the defendant is not restorable, the state must initiative civil commitment proceedings applicable to those for individuals not charged with a crime…or release the defendant. *Note: in MN, charges are maintained for three years (but there is no automatic resolution, especially for serious felony cases)
Pete v. Robinson (1966) SCOTUS
Theodore Robinson was convicted of the murder of his wife, Flossie May Ward. He had a history of “disturbed behavior.” SCOTUS ruled that “where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to a defendant’s CST, the judge on his own motion must impanel the jury and conduct a hearing.” Failure to do so deprives the defendant of their Fourteenth amendment right to a fair trial.
Wilson v. U.S. (1968) DC Court of Appeals
Robert Wilson was involved in an armed robbery and chase in a stolen vehicle. He crashed, fractured his skull, and developed permanent retrograde amnesia. The Court ruled that amnesia is not, in itself, a bar to competency and instead needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis. The following factors guide this assessment: 1) extent to which amnesia affected ability to consult with and assist counsel, 2) extent to which amnesia affected ability to testify on one’s own behalf, 3) extent to which evidence could be extrinsically reconstructed (including crime and possible alibi), 4) extent to which the government assisted defense counsel in reconstruction, 5) strength of the prosecution’s case (i.e., does the government’s case negate all reasonable hypotheses of innocence), and 6) any other facts about the fairness of trial.
In re Gault (1967) SCOTUS
Gerald Gault (age 15) was charged with lewd calls to a neighbor. He was taken into custody without parents knowing and committed until age 21. This case operationalized due process for juveniles. For the first time, the Court acknowledged that juveniles had their own protected rights: 1) notice of charges, 2) right to an attorney, 3) right to cross-examination and confront witnesses, 4) right to avoid self-incrimination, 5) right to appellate review, and 6) right to transcript of proceedings.
Clark v. Arizona (2006) SCOTUS
17-year-old Eric Clark charged with murder of police officer. Claimed paranoid delusions rendered him insane. AZ statute included only moral capacity to know his actions were wrong, nothing about the cognitive capacity to know the nature of one’s actions. The judge said that per State v. Mott, a defendant cannot use psychiatric testimony for the purposes of negating intent short of insanity. SCOTUS said there is no constitutional requirement to include any specific language as NGRI defense. A state can decide what, if any, standard to adopt. Also, there are risk to admitting unreliable psychiatric testimony, including controversial diagnostic categories, the potential of experts misleading the Court/lay people, and affording too much weight to expert testimony. Therefore, states can limit forensic testimony to insanity issues and prevent experts from testifying about intent.
Durham v. U.S. (1954) DC Court of Appeals
Monte Durham was convicted of housebreaking after multiple commitments to St. Elizabeth’s and well-established mental illness. The Court found that previous insanity tests (e.g., right-wrong, irresistible impulse) were insufficient and required a broader test: “An accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of a mental disease or defect.”
Foucha v. Louisiana (1992)* SCOTUS
Terry Foucha was found NGRI on the basis of drug-induced psychosis for aggravated burglary and illegal discharge of a firearm. He was committed; four years later, no longer mentally ill but still antisocial. SCOTUS found that confinement only on a diagnosis of Antisocial PD violates due process. The state can only confine if it shows by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is mentally ill and dangerous. Otherwise, the defendant should be confined for punishment or go through civil commitment proceedings.
Barefoot v. Estelle (1983)* SCOTUS
Thomas Barefoot was convicted of capital murder of a police officer. Two psychiatrists testified at sentencing regarding dangerousness. Barefoot got the death penalty. The APA filed an amicus brief about the inadmissibility of testimony on future dangerousness because such predictions are unreliable and wrong two-thirds of the time. This case involved Dr. Grigson (“100%, absolute chance of future violence”) and Dr. Holbrook (“criminal sociopath”). SCOTUS said such testimony is permissible due to no merit to the argument that psychiatrists are incompetent to make such predictions with an acceptable degree of reliability. The dissent argued there should be greater reliability in testimony and that psychologists have “undue effect on the ultimate verdict.” The Court should therefore exclude non-probative, highly prejudicial testimony.
Atkins v. Virgina (2002) SCOTUS
18-year-old Daryl Atkins and an accomplice abducted, robbed, and killed Eric Nesbitt. Atkin had evidence of low IQ, and his’ confession had a number of inconsistencies. He was convicted of capital murder. SCOTUS ruled that it is cruel and unusual punishment to execute individuals with an Intellectual Disability. Such executions were prohibited, as it does not promote the goals of retribution and deterrence, only resulting in “purposeless and needless imposition of pain.” People with ID are also at increased risk for wrongful execution due to their poor ability to assist counsel/testify. They left it to individual states to define an ID.
Ford v. Wainwright (1986)
Alvin Ford was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Later, he was diagnosed with Paranoid Schizophrenia and developed a delusion that he was the target of a complex conspiracy by the KKK and others to force him to commit suicide. SCOTUS ruled it is a violation of the 8th Amendment to execute an insane prisoner, calling it “savage and inhuman:” 1) it offends humanity, 2) doesn’t contribute to deterrence value, 3) is uncharitable to dispatch to another world one not ready for it, 4) “madness is its own punishment. Therefore, sanity is a prerequisite to execution, as one must know they’re being executed and the reason for it. SCOTUS left it to the states to develop ways to enforce this
Panetti v. Quaterman (2007) SCOTUS
Scott Panetti killed his in-laws, then took his ex-wife and daughter hostage. He was found CST, then convicted and sentenced to death. His trial was called a “judicial farce” and a “mockery of self-representation,” as he wore a cowboy costume and tried to call over 200 witnesses due to gross delusions (e.g., the Pope, JFK, Jesus Christ). SCOTUS determined that the trial court applied an “improperly restrictive test” to Panetti’s claims of incompetence, stating he had a factual understanding of why he was being executed. The purpose of capital punishment is to “make the offender realize the gravity of the crime.” A prisoner’s awareness of the State’s rationale does not equate to a rational understanding of it. This re-affirmed the Court’s ruling in Ford v. Wainwright.
Roper v. Simmons (2005)* SCOTUS
Christopher Simmons (age 17) kidnapped Shirley Crook and threw her over a bridge, where she drowned. He was charged, tried as an adult, found guilty, and sentenced to death. SCOTUS held the 8th Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders. Juveniles are “categorically less culpable.” Death penalty should be limited to “a narrow category of the most serious crimes” for those whose “extreme culpability makes them the most deserving.” Juveniles are not the worst offenders because 1) lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility, 2) more vulnerable and susceptible to negative influences and external pressures, 3) character is not well-formed, transitory and less-fixed. This case overturned previous cases allowing execution of juveniles ages 16-18 years (Stanford v. Kentucky).
