Case Law Black & White Cards ONLY Flashcards
Commonwealth v. Kobrin (1985) MA Supreme Court
Psychiatrist Dr. Kobrin was subpoenaed to release all patient records during a Medicare fraud investigation. Only those portions of the record necessary to determine fraud (e.g., time, length of appointments, fees, diagnosis, treatment plans/recommendations) need to be released. Private communications (e.g., about thoughts/feelings) remain private and do not need to be produced to the grand jury (psychiatrist-patient privilege).
Cites v. Iowa (1982)
Little Timothy Clites was diagnosed with ID, placed in residential care, administered major tranquilizers without parents being informed of side effects or consent obtained. Intrusive treatment and management techniques (e.g., major tranquilizers, restraints, etc.) should be used on a limited basis and for necessary therapeutic reasons rather than convenience of treatment provider. Patients should receive least intrusive treatments, and patients/guardians must be informed of risks of medications. *This is the landmark case for successful damage awards for patients administered antipsychotic medications without informed consent of parents.
Doe v. Roe (1977) NY Supreme Court
Drs. Roe and Roe published a book extensively detailing the Does’ psychoanalysis. Drs. Roe argued that the book had such “scientific merit” as to “transcend” the patients’ rights to non-disclosure. The Court awarded compensatory damages to Doe but declined to award punitive damages on the grounds that the Roes had not acted maliciously. The Court ruled “in no case has the curiosity or education of the medical profession superseded the duty of confidentiality.” The agreement to keep disclosures in confidence is especially important in psychotherapy given the patient’s need to discuss embarrassing or socially unacceptable issues in the context of a trusting relationship.
Menendez v. Superior Courts (1992) CA Supreme Court
The Menendez brothers killed their parents and later confessed to their therapist, Dr. Oziel. He alerted police after the brothers threatened him. Privilege may not hold for records/audio recordings when disclosures must be made (to law enforcement or victims) where there is reasonable cause to believe a patient might be dangerous. The Dangerous Patient Exception can overcome privilege when there is a reasonable belief that disclosure is necessary to prevent harm.
Jenkins v. U.S. (1961)* DC Court of Appeals
Jenkins was arrested and committed for a CST/CR evaluation. Psychologists provided diagnosis and opinion, and the trial judge instructed the jury to disregard because “not qualified.” This decision secured the right for psychologists to offer mental health diagnoses I Court. Their qualification depends on training and competence, not just the claim to the title of psychologist. This case included a scathing dissent about psychologists not being qualified.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971) SCOTUS
The power company was segregated. After the Civil Rights Act, they instituted tests/procedures that disproportionately discriminated against Black applicants. The Court ruled that under the CR Act, if employment tests disparately impact ethnic minority groups, businesses must demonstrate that such tests are “reasonably related” to the job for which the test if required. This case held that discrimination need not be intentional to be illegal.
Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens & Assocs. Eng’rs (1989) WA Supreme Court
Bruce & Smallwood sued Byrne-Stevens, alleging land restoration costs were double the amount of the estimate. Alleged negligence. Privately-retained and court-appointed experts are immune from civil suit. This also extends to their reports and all actions forming the basis of testimony. The Court ruled in favor of immunity over liability threat because the latter could result in opinions motivated by litigant interests (aka allowing experts to be sued would prevent them from being objective). This rule dates back to English common law and is intended to encourage full and frank testimony, preserving the integrity of the justice system.
Deatherage v. Examining Board of Psychology (1997) WA Supreme Court
Dr. Deatherage was alleged to not meet professional ethical standards. The Board of Psychology suspended his license for 10 years due to misconduct. Absolute judicial immunity only pertains to civil suits, like in Bruce. It doesn’t extend to disciplinary action from a licensing board.
Budwin v. American Psychological Association (1994) CA Court Appeals**FAMILY LAW
Dr. Budwin testified in a child custody hearing. The mother filed a complaint, and the APA sustained, censuring him for failing to produce records or acknowledging the limits of his observations. The APA (or any entity in which you are a professional member) is able to censure members for unethical behavior.
Murphy v. A.A. Mathews (1992) MO Supreme Court
American Drilling Co. alleged negligence and breach of contract against Mathews. The Court retained the narrow definition of witness immunity (to defamation, defamation-type, or retaliatory cases against adverse witnesses). The Court did not believe that immunity should apply to bar a suit against a privately-retained professional who negligently provides litigation support services. Experts retained by one party are not immune from liability because they are “selling their services” rather than serving as an unbiased court servant.
Jenkins v. U.S. (1961) DC Court of Appeals
Jenkins was arrested and committed for a CST/CR evaluation. Psychologists provided diagnosis and opinion, and the trial judge instructed the jury to disregard because “not qualified.” This decision secured the right for psychologists to offer mental health diagnoses I Court. Their qualification depends on training and competence, not just the claim to the title of psychologist. This case included a scathing dissent about psychologists not being qualified.
Seiling v. Eyman (1973) Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Gilbert Seiling was charged with multiple counts of assault. Found CST, pled guilty, and later argued that he had been incompetent to plead guilty. The Court ruled that the criteria for pleading guilty is higher than CST due to several constitutional rights that are at stake. Therefore, a defendant can be CST but not competent to plead guilty. A defendant is “not competent if mental illness has substantially impaired their ability to make a reasoned choice among alternatives and to understand the nature and consequences of a plea.” This case was later overturned by Godinez. This case introduces the reasoned choice standard.
Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) SCOTUS
Van Chester Berghuis was a suspect in a fatal shooting. He was interrogated and did not make any statements about his right to remain silent. He made a few sporadic comments, then replied to a different line of police questions. The Court determined the defendant understood his rights, was not coerced, and waived his rights when answering questions, indicating a “course of conduct indicating waiver.” Unless a suspect actually states they are relying on their right(s), their subsequent voluntary statements may be used in court and police interactions can continue. The mere act of remaining silent is, on its own, insufficient to imply the suspect has invoked their rights.
Brown v. Mississippi (1936) SCOTUS
Brown and two others were questioned about a murder. They were tortured and told it would continue until they confessed in detail to the murder. The Court ruled that in no circumstances are confessions obtained with coercion, force, or torture acceptable as “free and voluntary.” They violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth amendment and are not admissible.
Crane v. Kentucky (1986) KY Supreme Court
16-year-old Crane was arrested for murder in a liquor store. “Out of the clear blue sky,” he confessed to numerous past crimes and the murder. Police only had his confession, which was given in a questionable interrogation environment. The Court said that evidence about the manner in which a confession was obtained is often highly relevant to its reliability, credibility, and voluntariness. The Constitution guarantees the defendant “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense,” which includes presenting information at trial about the conditions of the interrogation/confession.
Dickerson v. United states (2000) SCOTUS
Charles Dickerson was arrested for a series of bank robberies. He said he gave statements and then Miranda was read. The state argued that the only requirement for admissibility of confessions was that they be voluntary. SCOTUS disagreed, preserving Miranda rights. Miranda is a clear warning. The alternative, “totality of circumstances,” is more difficult to conform to and for courts to apply consistently.
Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) SCOTUS
Danny Escobedo was arrested without warrant for murder of his brother-in-law. He was interrogated over 14 hours. He repeatedly asked for a lawyer, who came to the station but was denied access by police. He made incriminating statements and was convicted of murder. The Court found that defendants have a right to counsel pre- and post-indictment (i.e., as soon as they become a primary suspect), including during police interrogations.
Fare v. Michael C. (1979)* SCOTUS
Michael C. (age 16.5 years) was taken into custody on suspicion of murder. He was advised of Miranda, asked for his probation officer. He incriminated himself in the murder. The Court ruled that a juvenile’s request to speak to his probation officer did not constitute invocation of his Fifth amendment rights. The attorney plays a unique role – a probation officer cannot offer the same legal protection. The admissibility of statements are considered within the “totality of the circumstances,” which permits flexibility for the Court to consider on a case-by-case basis.
Fellers v. United States (2004) SCOTUS
John Fellers was indicted for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. He was arrested as his home, made statements, then was transported to the county jail. He waived Miranda and repeated his earlier inculpatory statements. The Court said it violates a defendant’s Sixth amendment right to counsel if officers “deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information” from a defendant without the knowledge of his attorney after judicial proceedings have been initiated.
G.J.I. v. state (1989)* OK Court of Criminal Appeals
G.J.I. was in a home for emotionally disturbed children for five years. He was discharged due to payment problems. Six weeks later, he sexually offended against his two-year-old sister. He was found delinquent of Attempted Second Degree Rape. The Court ruled that the nature of juvenile proceedings are not criminal. The point is to provide rehabilitation and treatment. Mental health was considered at the hearing and will be factored into a treatment plan. Children under a certain age are presumed incompetent, but the Court can still with children as delinquent.
J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011)* SCOTUS
Police questioned J.D.B. at school regarding burglaries for 30-45 minutes. He made statements and signed a written statement. SCOTUS said that whether a subject is in-custody for Miranda purposes is objective, including 1) the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and 2) whether a reasonable person would have felt at liberty to leave. A child’s age must also be considered because “what would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a teen.”
Whalem v. U.S. (1965) DC Court of Appeals
Whalem committed at age 13 to St. Elizabeth’s for murder of an 80-year-old woman. While on leave, he was charged with robbery and an attempt to commit rape. He was found CST, convicted at trial, and refused the insanity defense. The Court held that a trial judge must have discretion to impose an unwanted defense on a defendant and place the burden of proof on the prosecutor. The major foundation of criminal law is CR. If there is a question about a defendant’s mental state, it must become part of the case.
Edney v. Smith (1976) NY District Court
Edney was charged with kidnapping and murder of an eight-year-old. He raised the insanity defense but was found guilty, sentenced to 25 years. The Court ruled that a defendant waives privilege with a defense-appointed expert in insanity evaluations. The prosecution is permitted to call that psychiatric expert and has access to reports/conclusions drawn by experts, even if the defense decides not to use it. A defendant cannot “suppress an unfavorable witness” under the guise of privilege while he shops around for a “friendly expert.” Of note, MN is an Edney state, not Alvarez, per State v. Dodis.
Kansas v. Cheever (2013)* SCOTUS
Scott Cheever killed sheriff Matthew Samuels while using methamphetamine. Asserted a voluntary intoxication defense, said meth made him mentally incapable of premeditation required for murder. Underwent psychological examination, found guilty and sentenced to death. SCOTUS held “when a defense expert testifies that a defendant lacked requisite mental state to commit the offense, the prosecution may present psychiatric evidence in rebuttal.” Not allowing this would “undermine the adversarial process” and provide “one-sided and potentially inaccurate view of his mental state.” This case reaffirmed the Buchanan v. Kentucky decision.
