Bulletins rev 10 Flashcards
(ELA-9) Nuisance TAIL STRIKE Messages:
A TAIL STRIKE message that first shows during takeoff indicates a tail strike. A TAIL STRIKE message that first shows later in flight does not indicate that a tail strike occurred.
If the TAIL STRIKE message does not show during takeoff, but first shows later in flight, the crew may consider it a nuisance message. The crew does not need to do the TAIL STRIKE checklist. The crew may override the non-normal checklist in ECL.
(ELA-10) Anomalous TAT Probe Logic Affecting Manual Operation of Anti-ice Systems:
Ground Operation and Takeoff:
Operate anti-ice per normal and supplementary procedures. This anomaly does not affect TAT indications on the ground.
Automatic Anti-Ice Operation - In-Flight:
No crew action is required for automatic operation of anti-ice at any temperature.
Manual Anti-Ice Operation - Initial Climb:
When TAT is 10°C or less, wing and engine anti-ice must be ON before entering icing conditions.
When TAT is 15°C or less, and greater than 10°C and visible moisture is present, engine and wing anti-ice must be ON. If performance permits, selecting engine and wing anti-ice ON may be delayed to 1500 feet AGL during climb, but no later than 2500 feet AGL.
Note: This procedure assumes that AFM performance data using anti-ice OFF shows that the airplane will achieve flaps-up, final climb speed and clear all obstacles at a height of 1500 feet AGL or less.
Manual Anti-Ice Operation - In-Flight:
When TAT is 15°C or less and visible moisture is present, engine and wing antiice must be ON.
WARNING: Do not rely on airframe visual icing cues before turning ON engine and wing anti-ice. Use the temperature and visible moisture criteria because late activation of engine anti-ice may allow excessive ingestion of ice and result in engine damage or failure.
When engine and wing anti-ice are needed:
CAUTION: Do not use engine or wing anti-ice when TAT is above 15°C
ENGINE ANTI-ICE selectors (both) ……………………………….. ON PM
WING ANTI-ICE selector …………………………………………. ON PM
Note: When the anti-ice system is ON and the displayed TAT is above 10°C the EICAS advisory message ANTI-ICE ON will show. Disregard this message and override the ANTI-ICE ON checklist in the electronic checklist (ECL).
(ELA-12 R1) Blank Cabin Temperatures:
GND PROX SYS Nuisance EICAS Advisory message:
Blank Cabin Temperatures:
This anomaly may occur due to a condition on the ground in which the Cabin Zone temperatures may be blank on the EICAS Air Synoptic display due to the LAV/Galley vent fan not operating. No flight crew action is needed.
GND PROX SYS Nuisance EICAS Advisory message:
When the airplane is flying faster than 250 knots, selecting FLAP OVRD or GEAR OVRD may cause the EICAS Advisory GND PROX SYS to show. No flight crew action is needed
(ELA-14R7) MCP Altitude Anomalies:
MCP can change without flight crew action:
Be aware that the MCP altitude setting can change without flight crew action.
If an uncommanded altitude change occurs on the MCP, these effects can occur:
• The AUTOPILOT message shows
• The flight director pitch bar or the integrated flight director cue is removed
• A line through the pitch FMA
• If the flight crew selects a different pitch mode, the mode changes but a line remains through the pitch FMA
• If the flight crew tries to select a different pitch mode, the mode does not change and the pitch FMA does not change
These same effects can occur during normal operation of the MCP altitude selector.
If these effects occur, or if the MCP altitude setting changes without flight crew action, do these steps:
• Verify the last cleared altitude.
• Set the correct altitude on the MCP. If the correct selected altitude has not changed, rotate the selected altitude selector at least one click and then reset to the correct altitude.
• Disengage the autopilot.
• Select both flight directors to OFF.
• Select both flight directors to ON, then select and verify the desired modes.
• Engage the autopilot, then select and verify the desired modes.
Note: The anomaly clears only when the autopilot is disengaged and both flight director switches are OFF at the same time.
There is no action the flight crew can take to cause or prevent this anomaly.
(ELA-20) potential for LNAV activation during departure:
If an approach is loaded before departure, be alert for unexpected or unwanted autopilot modes and flight director indications if a TO/GA switch is pushed after takeoff.
To prevent unwanted automatic LNAV activation on departure, do not load an instrument approach until after the departure phase of flight.
(ELA-23 R1) potential for an unwanted GLIDESLOPE alert on an IAN approach:
During approach, make sure the correct altimeter setting is set on each altimeter.
At higher temperatures (approximately 10°C or more above ISA), the FMC generated IAN glide path can be higher than the guidance provided by the runway VGSI.
At or below applicable weather minima, when suitable visual references are established, transition to use of the VGSI path for the approach.
If a GLIDESLOPE alert occurs in VMC at low altitude, after confirming the aircraft is on a safe VGSI path, the crew can do one or more of these steps:
• silence the GLIDESLOPE aural and continue on the VGSI path
• re-establish the FMC-based barometric IAN glide path and transition to a visual approach and landing in the touchdown zone
• discontinue the approach.
(ELA-24) premature climb thrust reduction when the thrust reduction point is set to FLAPS 5:
To avoid premature climb thrust reduction, when the takeoff flap setting is greater than FLAPS 5, set the thrust reduction (THR REDUCTION) point based on a height, not a flap setting.
Background Info:
during a FLAPS 10
takeoff when the thrust reduction (THR REDUCTION) point was set to FLAPS 5. Thrust reduced from the selected takeoff setting to the climb thrust setting when VNAV engaged at 400 feet RA, even though the flaps were still at FLAPS 10. Premature thrust reduction can occur when the Thrust Reduction (THR REDUCTION) point is set to FLAPS 5.
The FMC does not properly recognize takeoff flap settings greater than FLAPS 5 on 787-9 and 787-10 airplanes.
(ELA-25 R2) engine fire switch can fail in a locked or unlocked condition:
Engine Fire Switch Fails Locked:
If an engine fire switch fails locked, the engine fire switch stays locked if there is an engine fire warning. The engine fire switch cannot be pulled even if the override switch is pushed. Engine fire extinguisher bottles cannot be discharged.
Do the appropriate non-normal checklist.
Setting the fuel control switch to CUTOFF shuts down the engine and closes the fuel spar valve.
The affected side VFSG goes offline when engine speed decreases below idle.
Do this additional step: Set the hydraulic ENG PRIMARY pump switch for the affected side to off.
Land as soon as possible if an actual engine fire exists, or is suspected.
Engine Fire Switch Fails Unlocked:
Be aware the engine fire switch can fail in the unlocked condition. The engine fire switch is not protected from being pulled inadvertently. The engine fire bottles can be discharged.
(ELA-28) Nose gear isolation valve (NGIV) fails closed:
During approach, if the SLATS PRIMARY FAIL message shows, when the slats are in the commanded position, move the flap lever to 5.
If the FLAPS PRIMARY FAIL message shows, the following messages can also show: GEAR DISAGREE and NOSE WHEEL STEERING.
Do the checklists for all messages that show. Plan additional time for flap and slat operation in secondary mode.
Use the Non-Normal Configuration Landing Distance table for FLAPS PRIMARY FAIL. Plan additional time for alternate gear extension.
Advise ATC that steering is inoperative and the airplane needs to be towed from the landing runway.
Background Info:
some NGIVs can fail in the closed position. If this happens during approach, it affects primary mode operation of slats and flaps, nose gear extension, and nose wheel steering.
The following effects can occur:
• When the flap lever is moved from UP to 1: SLATS PRIMARY FAIL (Caution)
• When the flap lever is moved from 1 to 5 or higher: FLAPS PRIMARY FAIL (Caution)
• When the landing gear lever is moved to DN: GEAR DISAGREE (Caution) after 40 seconds
• When alternate gear extension is performed: GEAR DOOR (Advisory)
• When the nose gear is down and locked: NOSE WHEEL STEERING (Advisory)
If the NGIV fails closed, the HYD VLV ISLN NOSE GEAR status message
shows approximately 20 seconds after the flap lever is moved from UP or the landing gear lever is moved to DN. On the hydraulic synoptic display, the valve failed symbol (amber valve with an X) shows for the NGIV.
(ELA-33) autopilot flight director system (AFDS) not capturing the localizer:
Background info:
The failure to properly capture the localizer can take place at any airport, but has been most common when conducting the ILS RWY 25R approach at Hong Kong International Airport (VHHH).
Operating Instructions:
When conducting an approach with a localizer-based navigation aid, monitor localizer raw data and call out any significant deviations. If AFDS performance is not satisfactory, the flight crew must intervene. Perform an immediate goaround if the airplane has not intercepted the final approach course as shown by the localizer deviation.
(ELA-34) the autothrottle does not automatically activate during a go-around from an integrated approach navigation (IAN) approach:
Background info:
An anomaly prevents the automatic activation of the autothrottle when the autothrottle is armed and not connected (A/T mode is blank). This anomaly prevents the autothrottle from providing stall protection when conducting a goaround from an approach using IAN when the go-around is initiated from a radio altitude of 50 feet or below.
Operating Instructions:
If conducting a manual landing from an approach using IAN, keep the autothrottle connected to allow the autothrottle to maintain the selected speed. If the autothrottle is disconnected, automatic activation does not occur if the airspeed decreases. If the airplane is in the air and the TO/GA switch is pushed, the autothrottle connects in the THR mode.
(ELA-35 R1) autothrottle can fail to disconnect when thrust levers are advanced during a balked landing:
Background Info:
In reported events, the autothrottle stayed connected in the IDLE mode when the pilot advanced the thrust levers to conduct a balked landing (a go-around initiated after touchdown but before thrust reverser selection). Once airborne, the autothrottle remained in IDLE and moved the thrust levers to idle. This caused a reduction in airspeed and eventually stick shaker activation.
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When the autothrottle is connected during a manual landing, manually advancing the thrust levers after the autothrottle has transitioned to IDLE mode is designed to disconnect the autothrottle system.
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As a reminder, when landing, the TO/GA switches are inhibited on the ground. If the TO/GA switch is pushed while airborne (above 5 feet radio altitude), the TO/GA mode connects the autothrottle in the thrust mode (THR) and the thrust levers advance to provide a climb rate of 2,000 FPM. A second push of the TO/GA switch changes the autothrottle to the thrust reference mode (THR REF) and provides full go-around thrust.
Operating Instructions:
If a go-around is initiated after touchdown but before thrust reverser selection (balked landing):
• Disengage the autopilot and disconnect the autothrottle, while smoothly advancing the thrust levers to go-around thrust (the configuration warning siren sounds due to the landing flap configuration).
• Verify the speedbrakes retract and autobrakes disarm.
• Maintain landing flap configuration and smoothly rotate towards 15° goaround pitch attitude at no less than VREF.
• Once airborne, push the TO/GA switch. This will activate the F/D goaround mode and re-engage the autothrottle in the THR mode.
• When safely airborne with a positive rate of climb, continue the Go-Around and Missed Approach procedures as described in the FCOM/QRH.
(ELA-37) potential for lateral navigation (LNAV) path deviation from the published procedural path:
During preflight, if there are waypoints on a SID that are closer than approximately 10 NM and/or have course changes greater than approximately 120 degrees (total for all connected turns), manually insert a lower climb speed on the VNAV CLB page or waypoint speed constraint on the LEGS page that complies with the published speed restrictions. This lets the FMC calculate a path with a smaller turn radiuses that complies with the SID. Also, follow these instructions after preflight or during initial climb if the path on the ND changes back and forth between a normal and wide turn. At high takeoff weights and with low airspeed constraints, delay flap retraction as necessary until the series of turns has been completed.
Background Info:
Opening the speed window and selecting a lower speed does not redraw the path with smaller turn radiuses. The airplane follows the wide path on the ND using a shallower bank angle. The lateral cross-track deviation shown on the PFD and ND is based on the lateral path shown, which can be different from the published path.
(ELA-39) effects of a radio altimeter in a “no computed data” status:
Background Info:
When one radio altimeter is failed or inoperative, the autothrottle does not reduce the thrust to IDLE at 25 feet radio altitude (RA) during a manually-flown landing; the autothrottle stays in the SPD mode. This can cause the autothrottle to increase thrust during the flare.
Operating Instructions:
On any approach and landing, the pilot flying (PF) must guard thrust levers and be prepared to disconnect the autothrottles and manually operate the thrust levers as needed.
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There is no action the flight crew can take to cause or prevent this anomaly.
(ELA-40 R1) changes in the flight controls electronics software that affect flight operations:
Background Info:
FCE CBP5.1 addresses two safety items with system design and crew interface changes:
• Rapid descent due to ILS glideslope fluctuations
• Failure to capture localizer in certain conditions
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Autopilot;
The autopilot system can detect the degradation of a specific autopilot mode. It can also detect an uncommanded change to the altitude selected on the MCP. When an engaged mode degrades, the autopilot remains engaged in an attitude stabilizing mode based on inertial data. The condition is annunciated on the PFD and HUD by a line through the affected flight mode annunciation (amber line on the PFD) and the respective flight director bar is removed from the PFD and the flight guidance cue is removed from the HUD. The AUTOPILOT message displays to indicate the autopilot is operating in a degraded mode.
ILS Signal Interference Monitor;
The AFDS can detect significant ILS signal interference due to service vehicles or aircraft. If localizer or glideslope signal interference is detected, the autopilot disregards the ILS signal and remains engaged in an attitude stabilizing mode based on inertial data. The AFDS uses inertial data for up to 20 seconds to allow the localizer or glideslope signal error to resolve. Most ILS signal interferences last only a short period of time, so there is no annunciation other than erratic movement of the ILS raw data during the time the interference is present. If the condition persists, the annunciations described above in Autopilot and Flight Director Mode Degradations are provided.
Glideslope Signal Interference (new subsection);
If glideslope signal interference and fluctuations occur, the AFDS limits the descent angle of the airplane to 3.25 degrees while the system is in the glideslope attitude stabilizing mode. This mode uses inertial data for up to 15 seconds to allow the glideslope signal error to resolve. This 3.25-degree descent angle limits high rates of descent and sink rates that can occur while the AFDS is in the attitude stabilizing mode.
Operating Instructions:
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WARNING: When using LNAV to intercept the final approach course, LNAV might parallel the localizer without capturing it. The airplane can then descend on the glideslope with the localizer not captured.
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WARNING: Interference with the glideslope signal can result in erroneous AFDS pitch guidance indicated by FMA mode degradation, the AUTOPILOT caution message, and removal of the F/D flight
director bar. If this occurs, do a go-around unless suitable visual references can be established and maintained.
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Interference can affect ILS localizer and glideslope signal integrity. When the autopilot is engaged, the AFDS […On an approach using IAN, the AFDS can detect a persistent error in the calculated FAC or GP…] can detect interference, indicated by a line through either the pitch or roll FMA, an AUTOPILOT alert, and the flight director and HUD pitch or roll guidance biased out of view.
Note: Autoland is not available. NO AUTOLAND shows in the ASA (green on the HUD, amber on the PFD).
When these flight deck effects occur in IMC, a go-around is recommended.
The approach {ILS or GLS} can be continued in IMC if:
• The autopilot is disconnected.
• There is no erratic movement of the glideslope or localizer pointers on the PFD and HUD on an ILS/GLS approach.
• The flight director pitch and roll bars and HUD guidance cue are in view.
• The approach is within stabilized approach criteria.
The approach {ILS or GLS} can be continued in VMC if:
• The autopilot is disconnected.
• Suitable visual external references are established.
• The approach is within stabilized approach criteria.
The autopilot automatically disconnects when the following conditions are met:
• The pilot does not push TO/GA for a go-around or disconnect the autopilot within 10 seconds of the AUTOPILOT and NO AUTOLAND messages showing.
• The airplane is above 500 feet AGL.
Note: Low speed and stall protection are still operational. The autopilot does not disconnect in an underspeed condition.
