britain and eu integration Flashcards
British Cold War Foreign Policy
Self -Perception of being a ‘Great Power’ with global role
Strategy:
Churchill’s 3 Circles:
-Empire/Commonwealth
- Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’
- Europe
Objectives:
- Anti-communism
- Preserving Britain’s international position
Problems:
- Relative decline
- Economic weakness
- Two dominant superpowers
- Developing World nationalism
- ‘Overstretch’
traditional britain and eu
Seen initially as a drain on British resources Consistent reluctance to ‘pool’ sovereignty
Reluctant EC membership 1973:
Twice vetoed by de Gaulle
Series of problems:
- Re-negotiation of terms
- British Budgetary Question (BBQ)
- Thatcher’s Bruges speech, 20 September 1988
after ww2
After the Second World War II Great Britain no longer was an empire and it began to
search for new tools to increase its influence on the global stage, among which the European
Community stands out. The deepening of the Western European integration marked the need for
Britain to rethink its European identity.
It was the British Conservative Party that led the country into the EEC. Later the position
of subsequent governments in relation to the integration processes, in particular, their deepening,
changed significantly.
During the first 15 postwar years Britain strongly opposed the entry into the EEC, but
eventually it had to ask for an entry.
intensification of European direction
of foreign policy of the country began in the 1950 -1960s, when the reduction of economic
power and political influence of the UK along with the prevailing global ambitions in London
increased its interest in utilizing the advantages of Western European cooperation.
As noted by D. Gowland, a small and
decreasing group of opponents of the EEC was “anyway linked to the dominant in the past “colonial” orientation of the British imperialism”
and therefore had no future. British industry
began to feel acutely its dependence on the continental Europe.
Macmillan acknowledged the fact that the country entered the 1960s with weakened
positions in all the three circles: there was uncertainty in relations with the new Kennedy
administration in the United States, Western Europe demonstrated the success of the “Common
Market”, the Commonwealth was torn by internal contradictions.
the EEC would
be “almost certainly” the best solution. However, the dilemma was in the fact that outside of
Europe a weak British economy would not allow it to maintain a leading position in the
Commonwealth, and joining the EEC Britain would likely lose its favorable position in the trade with its former dominions
The entry into the EEC was part of the plan to modernize British economy
britain applying to EEC
July 31, 1961 Macmillan declared the intention of Great Britain to apply for EEC
membership as a full member on certain conditions, which would suit the UK.
The decisive factor that determined the failure of the first attempt of Britain to join the
EEC were neither technical problems at the talks in Brussels, nor any cultural differences and
nor the existence of a serious opposition within the country (although they took place), but the
disagreement of France and Germany. Their position was determined by fundamental differences in interests and in plans of building a European security with the position of the UK. The criticism by de Gaulle of the “special relationship” with the United States and the global ambitions of London certainly had its influence.
The new Labour government, which came to power in 1964 headed by H. Wilson also did not reach success. In 1967 its attempt to enter the Community again failed with the rejection
of de Gaulle.
In general, the motto of the British governments in 1950-1960s on the matter of
European integration was”interdependence,” which meant not the creation of a federal state in Europe or a complete fusion of all the military forces of the West (and thus the rejection of national armed forces), but quite a pragmatic approach - convergence in monetary and economic
policy of Western states in the interests of British economy
The British government wanted by joining the EEC to raise tariffs in some sectors (such as textiles) and to revise the outdated system of preferences with the Commonwealth
when did negotiations for the common market start
tough negotiations on conditions of the British membership in the “Common Market”, took place in May 1971. At the meeting of E. Heath and French President Georges Pompidou, an agreement was reached on the conditions of admission into the Community
declassified in 2000 internal report of the Foreign Office “Accession of Britain in
the European Community” 38
shows, the main components of success in the negotiations were
not the technical details, but a favorable external environment (retirement and death of de Gaulle, constancy in the composition of heads of government of the key EEC states) and, most importantly, the fact that the application was filed already in 12 days after the Conservative
victory in the elections
The treaty on accession of Great Britain to the EEC , signed on 22 January 1972 and
entered into force on January 1, 1973
what happened after Britain joined
Contradictions between Britain and its new European partners latent in the course of
negotiations began to show with greater force after the actual inclusion of Great Britain into the “Common Market” in early 1972. The enlargement of the EEC led to the growth of internal contradictions
The clearest manifestation of this was found in:
- in discrepancies between the UK and Germany, on the one hand, and France, on the other, on the question of relations with the United States
- disagreements between Germany and the Netherlands, on the one hand, and Britain and France on the other, concerning the common energy policy of the “Common Market.”
- contradictions between the UK and Germany on the issue of regional policy in the
EEC
one of the main goals of the integration policy of Great Britain after its adoption into
the Community was to establish control over the excessively successful eastern policies of
Germany, France, Italy and then other possible contenders for the establishment of a “special
relationship” with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries
from the very beginning of her stay in the EEC Great Britain acted as a “reluctant partner”
- For a quarter of a century, it did not put forward a single major initiative, which would become a milestone in the development of the integration. On the contrary, whenever such initiatives were
put forward by its partners, Great Britain obstructed
internal factors: skeptical moods of the population and the press, political parties separated by their attitude to European processes did not contribute to
convergence with a unified Europe
what was Thatcher’s Bruges speech, 20 September 1988
Thatcher’s speech recounted Britain’s history within and close connection to Europe and called for the EEC to resist a move towards centralisation of power. She called for reforms to the Common Agricultural Policy and for the EEC to continue to support the work of NATO.
1979-1984
In 1979-1984 the activity of the Community was complicated by the protracted litigation
with London concerning the size of Britain’s contribution into the budget of the EC. This conflict
was caused by fundamental differences between Britain, which sought to slow down the
expansion of the monetary and financial sphere of competence of the Community, and its partners, who had come to the conclusion of a necessary activation of the EC policy and a
corresponding increase in own funds
At the heart of the economic disagreements between Great Britain and its partners in
the “Common Market” lay the issue of the British assessments to the treasury of the Community, which greatly exceeded the funds received by the UK from the budget of
the organization. In 1980 this difference was about 1.2 billion pounds sterling. Great Britain made a contribution of 20% from the total Community budget, but it got from it in the form of various payments only about 10%. In this regard, Margaret Thatcher began the struggle for the reduction of the British contribution to the Community budget.
in November 1979 at the meeting of the
Council of Ministers of the EEC she demanded the return of one billion pounds sterling from the Community budget, not 350 million as EEC Commission offered
This was met with sharp resistance from Germany and France, who in case of reduction of the contribution of Great Britain would have to bear a substantial part of the costs to cover the financial gap.
this question dominated at all EEC
Council meetings until 1984.
The British government regarded the solution of the budget issue in Fontainebleau as a
big success
Having secured the reduction of the contributions, the government of the UK
continued the struggle for cutting down the spending of the EEC, more than 70% of which was allocated to finance the European agricultural policy (in 1989 - 59%)53. For Thatcher, who carried out the policy of reducing the public expenditure in the country, it was a matter of principle. London insisted on lowering the price of grain, while Bonn opposed.
London also spoke out against reinforcing the thesis of assisting “poor” countries of the
European Community with particular financial obligations.
All this illustrates that the United Kingdom in the EEC defended its own interests
inhibiting the adoption of measures running contrary to them, hindering the advancement of the
economic integration.
how was the single european market created
Having stabilized its financial and economic
situation, London called for the establishment of a single European market , removal of barriers to the movement of goods, the adoption of common European standards, the establishment of a
free market in the field of transport, insurance and capital movements that promised great
benefits to the British companies.
In other words, the government of the UK advocated for such
a monetary and financial integration, which would allow the British financial capital and large
companies to take a leading place in the Community
1985 it became evident that the attempts of the British government to turn the discussion in the Community from the reforms of the institutions towards the creation of
a single internal market were failing. The powerful bloc of countries led by France and Germany
resisted the British position
at the meeting in Milan in June 1985. Thanks to the efforts of the United Kingdom at the meeting an agreement was reached concerning the date of the creation of the single European market - by
the end of 1992.
This provision was fixed in the Single European Act adopted in 1985 in Luxembourg,
which supplemented the Treaty of Rome
thatcher
Thatcher criticized the Labour Party for non-participation in the
system, however, when she became the head of state, she took a tough stance against the
monetary integration. The isolation of Great Britain in this area became even stronger in the
summer of 1988 in connection with the discussion of creating the Economic and Monetary
Union and, in particular, the European Central Bank. Speaking in the House of Commons on the eve of the European Council meeting in Hanover, Thatcher ruled out any compromise in the
monetary and financial issues opposing the creation of the European Central Bank
Countering the idea of unification of currency, Thatcher tried
to disrupt the creation of a truly common market.
Such an approach caused a sharp controversy between Thatcher and the German leadership at the meeting in Hanover in June 1988, which ended, despite the opposition of the
British prime minister, with the decision to set up under the chairmanship of J. Delors the Committee for the preparation of further steps in the monetary integration.
The negative attitude towards the issues of monetary integration was based on the belief
of British politicians that Westminster played a key role in monitoring the pound sterling and in
the conduct of monetary policy, which, however, was not consistent with the reality
Thatcher also stated that the UK was not going to significantly limit its sovereignty even after the creation of the single market
john major
Supporter of creating the common European market, John Major, like his predecessor,
at the same time opposed those proposals that would lead to the strengthening of a centralized
control over the economy and to the growth of a bureaucratic superstructure of the EU, the socalled Eurocracy. He also advocated the limitation of EU spending including social programs.
Fearing the increase of its financial obligations, the UK blocked the attempts
of the EC Commission to considerably raise the budget of the organization.
Speaking in Leiden in September 1994, J. Major also questioned the transition of the EU
to a single currency, which in the absence of a sufficient economic convergence would be a disaster, in his opinion.
United Kingdom, with rare exceptions like E. Heath did not advocate the integration in the monetary area and the creation of Economic and Monetary Union
the UK opposed the introduction of the Eurocurrency actively promoted by Germany.
military integration
The attitude of Great Britain to the plans of military integration in Europe was
controversial. On the one hand, the British authorities were realizing that sooner or later the
integration process should embrace the military field as well. However, for London a military
integration within NATO was more desirable. That is why Britain did not consider it worthwhile
to raise the question of establishing the system of military-political cooperation between the EEC member-states.
The line of policy
of the Thatcher government in the area of military cooperation was aimed at strengthening the
Western European component of NATO. Having agreed in 1985 with the extension of political cooperation in the European Community including security issues, London emphasized that this
did not affect the military sphere, which was the prerogative of NATO.
However, in the second half of the 1980s the search for ways to enhance the militarypolitical integration of Western Europe got a noticeable development. A significant force was
given by the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik.
London preferred the military integration of the Western European countries in the
framework of NATO and the Eurogroup. Britain reacted with displeasure to the creation of a
Franco-West German military group in January 1988
britain kept eye on US reaction to the strengthing of europes military alliance, trying not to give the United States any reasons to feel decrease of loyalty of Western Europe towards the Atlantic Alliance, which, as Britain regarded, could have the consequences of reduction of the U.S. commitments on the continent.
Britain could lose its weight in the eyes of Washington
maastrich treaty 1992
- Creates European union
- 3 pillar arrangement
EC, CFSP, JHA - Creates CFSP and citizenship
- Subsidiarity and increased power for EP
- Commitment to EMU and single currency by 1999
- Context
Momentum from the SEA, Dynamic commission leadership
End of the cold war, International expectation
Britain actively participated in the development
of one of the three pillars of the Maastricht Treaty: Common Foreign and Security Policy -
CFSP
In the fifth section of the treaty dealing with the creation, the way of functioning, goals
and tasks of the CFSP the British approach got the upper hand: decisions on specific matters of
the CFSP had to be made on the basis of unanimity. However, the European Council got the right to guide the CFSP in general
e British approach became determinant in distinguishing the functions of
security and defense with the transfer of security issues to the management of the EU itself, and
defense issues - to the WEU. -
western europe union
britain also wanted to ensure it didnt voluntarily delegate their powers in this area to foreign governments or to any collective bodies, which
would thus be permitted to dictate to Great Britain policy
chancellor khol meeting 1991
At the meeting with the Chancellor H. Kohl in March 1991, the PM J Major made his famous statement of the intention of Great Britain to be “in the heart of Europe”
which meant - to be in the centre of debates on the future of Europe. At that, this intention was
explained by the desire to protect British national interests.
One of his main achievements as Prime Minister J. Major himself believed were
negotiations in December 1991 concerning the Maastricht Treaty. He was proud that with the help of a tough stance he was able to defend the interests of the UK, to secure for the country a special status in the EU
in it London agreed to the three-section structure of the treaty and withdrew its
objections to the creation of the European Union.
Thanks to the efforts of J. Major the
Maastricht treaty was based on the principle of “subsidiarity”, which meant the delegation of some powers to a lower level
British government strongly opposed any references in the
Treaty to a European federation as an ultimate goal of the integration.
The prime minister had to agree with what M. Thatcher strongly objected to - the
creation of monetary and political unions in perspective.
Despite the pressure of the partners, the UK did not sign the Social Chapter of the
Treaty (it was placed in the annex), which proclaimed the general rules of labour relations and
social welfare.
1992 the Maastricht Treaty was approved by the House of Commons with 336 votes against 92
The struggle over the Treaty, in particular, the resistance to the formation of the EMU was aggravated by the “Black Wednesday”: September 16, 1992 Britain was forced to hastily withdraw from the European exchange rate mechanism
- This strengthened the positions of “eurosceptics” in
the British parliament
The leader of the “Eurosceptics” M.Thatcher strongly opposed to the ratification of
the Maastricht Treaty and wanted to hold a referendum on this issue. The former prime minister
accused J. Major of making concessions to the federal Europe
Eurosceptics” proposed more than 600 amendments
to the Treaty, which required an additional 210 hours of discussions
treaty of amsterdam 1997
Despite numerous objections of Britain, the Treaty of Amsterdam fixed the extension of
the provisions on the CFSP on the grounds of Franco-German ideas.
a clearer delineation of powers of the European Commission and the European Council, a new political capacity was introduced –High Representative for the
Common Foreign and Security Policy, who was also the secretary general of the Council of the EU and was to actively assist the work of the Council in the formulation of goals and targets of
the CFSP
UK aims at
achieving greater freedom of political maneuver for the EU in international affairs and
periodically tries to encourage the U.S. to listen seriously to the European Union. This is expressed and achieved through its fundamental commitment to the development of the common foreign and security policy and especially of its defense dimension, which would be able to
ensure the EU a necessary degree of autonomy in carrying out the Petersberg tasks (tasks first introduced in the amsterdam treaty)
