Assessment 1

Question 1

What is rulership?

What is it not therefore?

Answer 1

The chance that specific or all commands will be met with obedience on the part of a specifiable group of persons

It is not therefore each and every kind of chance of exercising power and influence over other people.

Question 2

What can individual instance rulership (authority) also rely on?

Answer 2

The most varied motives for conformity from dull habituation to purely purposively rational considerations.

Question 3

Present in every genuine relationship of rule is …

Answer 3

A specific minimum of willingness to obey hence an interest in obedience

Question 4

Not every instance of rule makes use of economic means or ends.

But all rule over any
number of men and women usually has need of a…

Answer 4

staff, if not absolutely always: there
is a (normally) reliable chance that a predictably obedient group of men and women exists whose action is dedicated to the execution of general directions and substantive commands

Question 5

This staff ’s obedience to ruler or rulers can be based entirely on: (4)

Answer 5

• custom and practice,
• entirely on affect,
• on material interests,
• on ideal, value-­rational motives

Question 6

Purely material and purposively rational motives for solidarity between ruler and administrative staff here as elsewhere imply…

Answer 6

relative instability for the
latter

Question 7

There are quite usually other motives as well, such as those related to ______ or ______-___________

These can become quite critical in extraordinary circumstances. This relationship, like others, is rooted on a daily basis in custom and practice, together with _________, purposively rational interest.

However, neither custom and practice, nor interests, nor the solidarity fostered by purely affectual or value-­rational motives, could provide a reliable basis
for rule. Normally, there is a further element: belief in _________.

Answer 7

There are quite usually other motives as well, such as those related to affect or value-rationality

These can become quite critical in extraordinary circumstances. This relationship, like others, is rooted on a daily basis in custom and practice, together with material, purposively rational interest.

However, neither custom and practice, nor interests, nor the solidarity fostered by purely affectual or value-­rational motives, could provide a reliable basis
for rule. Normally, there is a further element: belief in legitimacy.

Question 8

All experience shows that no rulers will voluntarily rely merely on
material, affectual, or value-­rational motives for their __________of
_________. Instead, they all seek to arouse and foster belief in their
“____________.” Besides the nature of the legitimacy so claimed, there
are fundamental differences in the type of ___________, the nature
of the administrative staff whose work it is to assure such obedience, and the character of ____itself. Also important are the associated differences in impact. It is therefore convenient to distinguish forms of rule according to the typical claim of legitimacy that they make. In so doing, it is easiest to begin with modern, familiar relationships

Answer 8

All experience shows that no rulers will voluntarily rely merely on
material, affectual, or value-­rational motives for their Chancen of
survival. Instead, they all seek to arouse and foster belief in their
“legitimacy.” Besides the nature of the legitimacy so claimed, there
are fundamental differences in the type of obedience, the nature
of the administrative staff whose work it is to assure such obedience, and the character of rule itself. Also important are the associated differences in impact. It is therefore convenient to distinguish forms of rule according to the typical claim of legitimacy that they make. In so doing, it is easiest to begin with modern, familiar relationships

Question 9

1. The choice of this and not some other point of departure in making such distinctions can be justified only by its result. No especial problem is presented by the fact that in so doing, the significance of some other typical characteristic is underemphasised, to be then dealt with at a later point. Because of the
   way that the “legitimacy” of rule has very ____________ ___________ to the legitimacy of _________, it is in no respect only “______” in nature

Answer 9

1. The choice of this and not some other point of departure in making such distinctions can be justified only by its result. No especial problem is presented by the fact that in so doing, the significance of some other typical characteristic is underemphasised, to be then dealt with at a later point. Because of the
   way that the “legitimacy” of rule has very particular relationships to the legitimacy of property, it is in no respect only “ideal” in nature

Question 10

2. Not every conventionally or legally secured “claim” will be considered here a relationship involving rulership. If this were true, then the worker would, with regard to his claim to a wage, exercise “rule” over his or her employer
   since a court officer could, on behalf of the former, require the latter to present themselves in court. In fact, the worker is formally a partner in exchange with an employer with a “right” to receive payments. All the same, the concept of a relationship between ruler and ruled should not, of course, preclude its foundation in a formally free contract: hence, the way that the terms and conditions of employment provide for rule by the employer, and the way the feudal lord exercised rule over the serf who voluntarily entered the state of serfdom.

That obedience to military discipline is formally “involuntary,” while that of the workplace is formally “voluntary,” does not change the fact that subordination to workplace discipline also implies submission to rule. Appointment as
an official is also assumed by contract and, once appointed, an official can also be dismissed; even the relationship of “subject” can be voluntarily assumed and, to some extent, dissolved. Absolute lack of voluntary involvement is found
only with slavery. Of course, on the other hand economic “power” secured by the enjoyment of a monopoly—in this case, the prospect of “dictating” terms
of exchange to economic partners—has in itself as little to do with “rule” as it might have with “influence” arising from any kind of advantage, whether erotic, athletic, or in discussion. If a large bank is in a position to impose a standard-­setting cartel on other banks, this should not be called “rule” so long
as there is no kind of related obedience involved. This would mean that orders made by that bank’s managers make a claim to obedience and have the chance
of being observed, execution of such orders also being subject to supervision.

Of course, here as everywhere else there are marginal cases. For example, there are all kinds of intermediate stages between indebtedness and debt slavery.
Even the stance of a “salon” can imply something very like authoritarian power without at the same time being necessarily a form of “rule.” In reality, it is often not possible to make such precise distinctions, but in these cases precise concepts are all the more important.

Answer 10

2. Not every conventionally or legally secured “claim” will be considered here a relationship involving rulership. If this were true, then the worker would, with regard to his claim to a wage, exercise “rule” over his or her employer
   since a court officer could, on behalf of the former, require the latter to present themselves in court. In fact, the worker is formally a partner in exchange with an employer with a “right” to receive payments. All the same, the concept of a relationship between ruler and ruled should not, of course, preclude its foundation in a formally free contract: hence, the way that the terms and conditions of employment provide for rule by the employer, and the way the feudal lord exercised rule over the serf who voluntarily entered the state of serfdom.

That obedience to military discipline is formally “involuntary,” while that of the workplace is formally “voluntary,” does not change the fact that subordination to workplace discipline also implies submission to rule. Appointment as
an official is also assumed by contract and, once appointed, an official can also be dismissed; even the relationship of “subject” can be voluntarily assumed and, to some extent, dissolved. Absolute lack of voluntary involvement is found
only with slavery. Of course, on the other hand economic “power” secured by the enjoyment of a monopoly—in this case, the prospect of “dictating” terms
of exchange to economic partners—has in itself as little to do with “rule” as it might have with “influence” arising from any kind of advantage, whether erotic, athletic, or in discussion. If a large bank is in a position to impose a standard-­setting cartel on other banks, this should not be called “rule” so long
as there is no kind of related obedience involved. This would mean that orders made by that bank’s managers make a claim to obedience and have the chance
of being observed, execution of such orders also being subject to supervision.

Of course, here as everywhere else there are marginal cases. For example, there are all kinds of intermediate stages between indebtedness and debt slavery.
Even the stance of a “salon” can imply something very like authoritarian power without at the same time being necessarily a form of “rule.” In reality, it is often not possible to make such precise distinctions, but in these cases precise concepts are all the more important.

Question 11

3. Of course, the “legitimacy” of rule can only be viewed as the Chance of
   being regarded with a relevant degree of respect, and in practice being so treated. It is far from the case that all compliance with rule is primarily, or even always, oriented to this belief. Compliance can be feigned by an individual or by an entire group purely opportunistically, can be practised out of purely material self-­interest, or simply accepted as unavoidable out of individual weakness and helplessness. None of this is decisive for the classification
   of rule. What is important is that the form of its own claim to legitimacy is “valid” to a relevant degree, supporting its existence and defining the kind of means of rule selected. It can also happen, and in practice it frequently does,
   that there is such an obvious community of interest between a ruler and the administrative staff (bodyguards, praetorian guards, “Red” or “White” guards) with respect to a defenceless people that all claim to “legitimacy” can be disregarded. All the same, the nature of the legitimating relationship between ruler and administrative staff can vary greatly, depending on the manner in which
   authority has been founded, and to a great extent this is decisive for the structure of rule, as will become apparent.

Answer 11

3. Of course, the “legitimacy” of rule can only be viewed as the Chance of
   being regarded with a relevant degree of respect, and in practice being so treated. It is far from the case that all compliance with rule is primarily, or even always, oriented to this belief. Compliance can be feigned by an individual or by an entire group purely opportunistically, can be practised out of purely material self-­interest, or simply accepted as unavoidable out of individual weakness and helplessness. None of this is decisive for the classification
   of rule. What is important is that the form of its own claim to legitimacy is “valid” to a relevant degree, supporting its existence and defining the kind of means of rule selected. It can also happen, and in practice it frequently does,
   that there is such an obvious community of interest between a ruler and the administrative staff (bodyguards, praetorian guards, “Red” or “White” guards) with respect to a defenceless people that all claim to “legitimacy” can be disregarded. All the same, the nature of the legitimating relationship between ruler and administrative staff can vary greatly, depending on the manner in which
   authority has been founded, and to a great extent this is decisive for the structure of rule, as will become apparent.

Question 12

4. What shall obedience mean?

Answer 12

“Obedience” shall mean: that obedient people mostly conduct themselves as if they, purely for their own sake, have made the substance of the command their own behavioural maxim, and this only because of the formal relationship of obedience, without regard to their own view regarding the command’s
value, or lack of it.

Question 13

5. Purely psychologically, the ________ ________ can appear to vary, and in particular involve “___________” or “___________” However, here this distinction is not of any use in seeking to typify rule.

Answer 13

5. Purely psychologically, the causal linkage can appear to vary, and in particular involve “dedication” or “empathy.” However, here this distinction is not of any use in seeking to typify rule.

Question 14

6. The breadth of the influence that rulership exerts over _______ ______________ and __________ ______________ is much greater than it at first sight appears.

One example is the kind of rule that is exercised in school, which shapes what
is treated as orthodox ways of speaking and writing. The dialects that function as the official languages of politically autonomous organisations, hence the languages of their rulers, become orthodox ways of speaking and writing, and have led to “national” separations (e.g., of Holland from Germany). In shaping
youth, and therefore humanity in general, the rule of parents and school reaches well beyond an influence over (apparently) formal cultural goods.

Answer 14

The breadth of the influence that rulership exerts over social relationships and cultural phenomena is much greater than it at first sight appears.

Question 15

7. That the director and administrative staff of an organisation can adopt the stance of being the “___________” of those over whom they rule of course says nothing at all about the respective character of “rulership.” The material circumstances of so-­called democracy will be dealt with separately later.

Answer 15

7. That the director and administrative staff of an organisation can adopt the stance of being the “servants” of those over whom they rule of course says nothing at all about the respective character of “rulership.” The material circumstances of so-­called democracy will be dealt with separately later.

Question 16

There are three pure types of legitimate rule. The validity of their legitimacy can be secured primarily:…

Answer 16

1. in a rational manner: a belief in the legality of statutory orders and the right of those appointed to exercise rule to give directions (legal rule);
2. in a traditional manner: an everyday belief in the sanctity of long-­established traditions and the legitimacy of those whose authority derives from these traditions (traditional rule);
3. in a charismatic manner: the exceptional sanctity or heroic qualities or exemplary character of a person, and of the orders that this person proclaims or creates (charismatic
   rule).

Question 17

Where rule is statutory, the legally formulated substantive impersonal order and the persons thereby appointed to exercise authority by this order are obeyed by virtue of the formal legality of its ordinances and the domain over which they have force.

In the case of traditional rule, obedience is owed by virtue of piety and familiarity with the person of the ruler appointed by tradition (and
bound by it).

In the case of charismatic rule, the charismatic leader acquires this role by virtue of personal trust in revelation, heroism, or exemplary qualities within the domain where belief in such charisma prevails

Answer 17

Where rule is statutory, the legally formulated substantive impersonal order and the persons thereby appointed to exercise authority by this order are obeyed by virtue of the formal legality of its ordinances and the domain over which they have force.

In the case of traditional rule, obedience is owed by virtue of piety and familiarity with the person of the ruler appointed by tradition (and
bound by it).

In the case of charismatic rule, the charismatic leader acquires this role by virtue of personal trust in revelation, heroism, or exemplary qualities within the domain where belief in such charisma prevails

Question 18

1. The utility of this classification can only be judged by its success in furthering systematic analysis. The concept of “charisma” (“gift of grace”) is taken from ancient Christian terminology. Rudolf Sohm’s Kirchenrecht was the first to clarify its meaning for Christian religious organisation, even though he did
   not use the same terminology; others, such as Holl in Enthusiasmus und Bußgewalt, made clear some important consequences

Answer 18

1. The utility of this classification can only be judged by its success in furthering systematic analysis. The concept of “charisma” (“gift of grace”) is taken from ancient Christian terminology. Rudolf Sohm’s Kirchenrecht was the first to clarify its meaning for Christian religious organisation, even though he did
   not use the same terminology; others, such as Holl in Enthusiasmus und Bußgewalt, made clear some important consequences

Question 19

2. That none of these three ideal types discussed below has ever appeared in a historically “____” form should no more prevent conceptual identification in as pure a form as possible than it does elsewhere. In §11.ff., I discuss the modification of pure charisma through ____________, and in so doing increase appreciably its connection to empirical forms of rule. But it is also true that any empirical historical form of rule is rarely simple and straightforward.

And a sociological typology provides empirical historical study with an advantage that should not be underestimated: in a particular individual form of rule, it can identify in what way this is “charismatic,” “___________ charisma”, “the charisma of ______,” “_____________”, “______________”, related to “_______ rank,” or is similar to such types; in so doing, it works with
precisely defined concepts. The following is far removed from any belief that a historical reality can be entirely “captured” in the following ____________ schema.

Answer 19

2. That none of these three ideal types discussed below has ever appeared in a historically “pure” form should no more prevent conceptual identification in as pure a form as possible than it does elsewhere. In §11.ff., I discuss the modification of pure charisma through routinisation, and in so doing increase appreciably its connection to empirical forms of rule. But it is also true
   that any empirical historical form of rule is rarely simple and straightforward.

And a sociological typology provides empirical historical study with an advantage that should not be underestimated: in a particular individual form of rule, it can identify in what way this is “charismatic,” “hereditary charisma”, “the charisma of office,” “patriarchal”, “bureaucratic”, related to “social rank,” or is similar to such types; in so doing, it works with
precisely defined concepts. The following is far removed from any belief that a historical reality can be entirely “captured” in the following conceptual schema.

Question 20

2. Legal Rule with a Bureaucratic Administrative Staff

Legal rule relies on the validity of the following interconnected ideas:

Answer 20

1. that any legal norm can be established by agreement to or imposition of rationally oriented statutes—purposively rationally, or value rationally, or both—with a claim to
   observance at least by members of the organisation; it can also be regularly observed by persons who become involved in social relationships or social action considered
   relevant to the organisation, and which are within the powers of the organisation, or for territorial organisations, within their territory
2. that every body of law is in essence a cosmos of abstract rules that have normally been established intentionally; that the administration of the law is the application of these rules to individual cases; that administration is the rational maintenance of interests anticipated by organisational orders within the bounds of legal rules; and finally, that this occurs according to general specifiable principles that can be confirmed in organisational orders, or that are at least not contravened by them.
3. that therefore the typical legal ruler, the “principal,” in making orders and issuing commands adheres to the impersonal order to which his instructions are oriented.

This is also true of a legal ruler who is not an “official,” such as an elected state president

4. that as it is usually expressed, the person who obeys does so as a member of the organisation, and is obedient only “to
   the law.

This can be as a member of an association, commune, or church, or in a state, as a citizen

5. the idea prevails that members of the
   organisation in obeying the ruler are obedient not to his or her person, but to impersonal orders, and so they owe this obedience only within this established, rationally bounded
   substantive competence

Question 21

The basic categories of rational rule are therefore:

Answer 21

1. the continuing rule-­governed conduct of official functions within
2. a sphere of competence that covers
   a) a substantive separation of duties based on a division of labour
   b) with assignation of the required powers of command and
   c) with definite demarcation of the means of compulsion probably required, and the conditions for their use.

An operation ordered in this manner will be called a “public authority”

There is then also the question of

3. the principle of administrative hierarchy (Amtshierarchie), the ordering of permanent supervisory instances for each public authority having right of appeal or of registering
   grievances made by subordinates with respect to their superiors. There are, however, dif­ferent ways of determining whether and when the instance with which the grievance was
   registered itself has the power to replace an instruction requiring change, or whether this is delegated to the subordinate office about whom the complaint was first made.
4. the “rules” of procedure, which can be
   a) technical rules, or
   b) norms

both cases, their application makes specialist training necessary for complete rationality. Hence, participation in an organisation’s administrative staff is normally open only to those who can certify that they have received specialist training and have become qualified; only such a person is capable of appointment as an official. The typical administrative staff of rational organisations is composed of officials, whether these be political, hierocratic, economic (especially capitalist), or any other kind of organisations

5. Rationally, there is a principle of complete separation of the administrative staff from the means of administration and production. The officials, clerks, and workers belonging to the administrative staff do not personally own the material means of administration and production; these are supplied to them either in kind or in money, and they are held accountable for them. Here there is a principle of a complete separation of official or enterprise property or capital from private (household) property, and the workplace, the office, is separated from the home
6. Where there is complete rationality, there is no appropriation of the official position to its incumbent. Where a “right” to a “post” has been created (as has happened, e.g., with judges, and these days for an increasing proportion of
   officials and even workers), this normally does not have as its purpose the appropriation of the post to the official; instead, [the intention is] to secure the purely substantive and “independent” character of the work done in that post such that it is bound by norms.
7. The principle that all administrative work is done in writing is maintained, even when oral discussion is the actual rule, or even a requirement, at least for preliminary
   discussion and submissions, and the final decisions. Dispositions and instructions are made in writing. Together, paperwork and the continuing conduct of business by officials create the office as the focal point of the action taken by any modern organisation.
8. Legal rule can assume many dif­ferent forms, as will be discussed later. To begin with, the following presents a quite deliberate ideal-­typical analysis of only the purest ruling structure of the administrative staff: officialdom,” or the “bureaucracy.”

Question 22

There are “authorities” in this sense in large private enterprises, parties, and armies in exactly the same way as in “state” and “church.” An elected state president is also an “___________” according to this terminology (or a minister’s council or elected “popular representatives”). For the moment, these categories are not of central interest. Not every authority has powers of command in the same sense, but this _____________ is of no importance here.

Answer 22

There are “authorities” in this sense in large private enterprises, parties, and armies in exactly the same way as in “state” and “church.” An elected state president is also an “authority” according to this terminology (or a minister’s
council or elected “popular representatives”). For the moment, these categories are not of central interest. Not every authority has powers of command in the same sense, but this differentiation is of no importance here.

Question 23

That the typical kind of director is left to one side is explained by circumstances that will become entirely clear later. The formal nature of the leadership of very important types of rule can be found in other types (___________ and _____________ —hereditary monarchy; charismatic—the president chosen by plebiscite; others again are substantively rational in some important respects, but occupy a position lying between bureaucracy and charisma [cabinet government]; others again are directed by the [charismatic or bureaucratic] director of other organisations [parties]—ministries whose leadership is assumed by representatives of a particular party). As a type, the rational and legal administrative staff can be applied universally, and the type is what counts in everyday life; for on an everyday basis, rule is primarily _______________

Answer 23

That the typical kind of director is left to one side is explained by circumstances that will become entirely clear later. The formal nature of the leadership of very important types of rule can be found in other types (hereditary and charismatic—hereditary monarchy; charismatic—the president chosen by plebiscite; others again are substantively rational in some important respects, but occupy a position lying between bureaucracy and charisma [cabinet government]; others again are directed by the [charismatic or bureaucratic] director of other organisations [parties]—ministries whose leadership is assumed by representatives of a particular party). As a type, the rational and legal administrative staff can be applied universally, and the type is what counts in everyday life; for on an everyday basis, rule is primarily administration

Question 24

The purest type of legal rule is that effected through a bureaucratic administrative staff. Only the organisation’s director holds his
position of rule either by virtue of appropriation, election, or having been designated as successor. But even the terms of his authority are also legal “competences.” In the purest type, the totality of the administrative staff is composed of individual officials (monocracy, in contrast to “collegiality,” which will be discussed later). These officials:

Answer 24

1. are personally free and observe only substantive official obligations,
2. are placed in a fixed official hierarchy,
3. have defined official competences,
4. are appointed by contract, hence in principle on the basis of free selection, and
5. possess a specialised qualification—in the most rational case, qualified through examination and certified as such—and are appointed rather than elected,
6. are remunerated in money by fixed salaries, for the most part with a right to a pension; are liable to dismissal by a superior in some circumstances (particularly in private
   business); always have the right to resign; [receive a] salary that is graded mainly according to position in the hierarchy, as well as the degree of responsibility associated with
   the post, and additionally according to the principle that payment should be appropriate to social rank (Chapter 4),
7. treat the official appointment as their sole or principal occupation,
8. see themselves as having a career, being promoted according to age or performance, or both, depending on their superiors’ judgement,
9. work in complete “separation from administrative means” and without any personal right to the post occupied
10. are subordinate to rigorous and uniform official discipline and supervision

Question 25

Socially, bureaucratic rule generally implies

Answer 25

1. the tendency to levelling, so that recruitment may be consistently made from among the most highly qualified specialists;
2. the tendency towards plutocratisation, in the interest of the longest possible specialised training (often lasting today into one’s later twenties);
3. the rule of formal impersonality: sine ira et studio, or “without hatred or passion,” and so without “love” and “enthusiasm”; impersonality impelled by concepts of simple obligation. The ideal official fulfils his office “without regard to person”: “everyone” is treated with formal equality, that is, everyone who finds themselves in the same actual situation with regard to interest

Question 26

Generally speaking, the normal “spirit” of rational bureaucracy is

Answer 26

1. formalism, which is furthered by all parties interested in securing personal life Chancen, of whatever kind, since the alternative would lead to sheer caprice, and formalism is the line of least resistance. Apparently, and in part genuinely contradicting the tendency for this kind of interest is
2. officials’ inclination to conduct their administrative tasks in a materially utilitarian manner in the interests of the welfare of those subjects over whom they rule. However this substantive utilitarianism tends to be expressed in the furthering of corresponding regulations that are again formal, and treated formally in the bulk of cases. This tendency
   to substantive rationality finds support on the part of all those subjects who are not included in those strata identified in 1. who are interested in “securing” Chancen that are already possessed. The issues arising from this
   belong in the theory of “democracy.”

Question 27

3. Traditional Rule
   §6. Rule will be called traditional if its legitimacy is based on,
   and believed in, by virtue of the sanctity of long-­established
   orders and ruling powers that have existed “time out of mind.” The
   ruler (or rulers) are determined by traditionally established regulation. They are obeyed by virtue of the dignity attributed to
   them by tradition. The ruling organisation is in the simplest case
   an organisation based on a reverence cultivated through a life
   lived in common. The ruler is not a “superior,” but a personal
   ruler; his administrative staff is not primarily formed of “officials,” but of personal “retainers”; the ruled are not “members” of
   the organisation, but either (1) “traditional associates” (Genossen)
   (§7), or (2) “subjects.” The administrative staff ’s relationship to
   the ruler is not one of institutional duty, but of personal fidelity.