AOP1 Flashcards
State entry conditions for OS1201.04 - RCS Valve Stem Leak
Abnormal RCDT level or run times on RCDT pumps
Computer alarms associated with a high stem leakoff condition
State entry conditions for OS1202.04 - Rapid Boration
Inadequate SDM
Unexplained or uncontrolled reactivity addition
Failure of two or more rods to insert fully shutdown or reactor trip
State entry conditions for OS1210.05 - Dropped Rod
DRPI dropped rod bottom light lit
Rod Deviation alarm
State when AOPs can be used in parallel with EOPs
AOPs may be used in parallel with EOPs provided AOP actions do not interfere with EOP strategy, intent or TCAs
This should be generally avoided
State major actions of RCS leak
Check if Pressurizer level can be maintained
- adjust charging or letdown
- Trip and SI if PZR level can’t be maintained >7% with 1 CCP
Determine appropriate procedure step transition
Isolate potential RCS leakage sources
Check for RHR leakage
Isolate leakage from Letdown or Charging
State E-Plan entry from RCS leakage
MU4:
RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage >10GPM for 15min
- OR -
RCS identified leakage >25GPM for 15min or longer
- OR -
Leakage from the RCS to a location outside containment >25GPM for 15min or longer
State the major actions on OS1201.07 - Pressurizer Level Channel or failed controllers
Identify the failure
Compensate for failure
Restore system alignment back to normal
Review TS requirements
State the major actions of OS1201.06 - PZR Pressure Channel failed
Mitigate the effects of failure
Identify the failure
Realign Pressurizer Pressure Channels
Verify TS compliance
State the major actions of OS1211.01 PR NI failure
Check if PR failed high Bypass the failed PR channel Verify proper P-10 indication Verify TS compliance Defeat affected PR NI inputs Restore rod control to AUTO
State what is required if P-10/13 is not in its required state
Restore P-10/13 w/in 1 hour
- OR -
Initiate plant shutdown as required per T.S. 3.0.3
State Major actions of dropped rod
Stabilize the plant Evaluate conditions for dropped rod recovery Notify I&C Recover the dropped rod Restore the controls to normal
State the difference between a dropped rod and a misaligned rod
A dropped rod reaches the bottom of the core
A misaligned to only drops partially into the core
State what must be done if the reactor is made subcritical from a dropped rod
Shutdown the plant to MODE 3.
The rod will be recovered during the subsequent reactor startup
State the major action for a misaligned Rod
Validate misaligned Rod Stabilize Plant Conditions Verify TS Compliance Notify SM and RE Check Rod Control Status Perform Rod Realignment Restore control to normal
State what must be done if more than one control rod is misaligned >48 steps
Trip the reactor
Go to E-0
State Alert and Danger Values for RCP shaft vibes
Alert: 15 mils and increasing at 1 mil/hr
Danger: 20 mils
State Alert and Danger Values for RCP Frame vibes
Alert: 3 mils and increasing at 0.2 mils/hr
Danger: 5 mils
State actions for stopping an RCP with power < P-8
Place affected SG FRV in manual
Feed SG to 60 to 70% NR level
Defeat affected loop Delta-T and Tave inputs
Stop affected RCP
State Rx trip for #1 seal and temp
1 seal leak off flow <1 GPM
- AND -
Temp increasing
Trip the Rx
State the Rx trip for #1 seal, total seal flow and temp
#1 seal >6 GPM - AND - Total <8 GPM - AND - Temp increasing Trip the Rx
State the Rx trip for total seal flow
> 8 GPM
Trip the Rx
State the Rx trip for motor bearing or winding temp
Motor bearing >/= 195F
- OR -
Winding >/= 302F
Trip the Rx
State the conditions for total loss of seal cooling and actions
RCP seal injection <6 GPM
- AND -
No Thermal barrier cooling pump running
Then: trip the Rx
State the Rx trip for RCP seal inlet temp
RCP seal inlet temp >230F
Trip the Rx
State basis for 230F to seal inlet temp
Ensures that the RCP has stopped rotating by the time seal water heats up to 230F to ensure that the SDS is not damaged
DO NOT REESTABLISH COOLING FLOW
State Temp Rx must be cooled to and why on an RCS high activity
<500F to prevent lifting an ASDV incase of a primary to secondary leak
State major actions of an inadvertent phase A
Verify Containment Isolation is not required Charge to seals only Check if letdown can be established Realign PCCW system Valves Restore systems as Required Reset CVI Determine if Plant operation can continue Verify Normal Component Positions
How do we verify that a rod is trippable
If no rod stops are present
- AND -
The IN/OUT rod demand light does not lite with rod motion requested,
THEN the control failure is electrical in nature and rods are verified trippable
State what must be done if SDM is less than the requirement in the COLR
Immediately and continue boration equivalent to 30 gpm at a boron concentration greater than equal to the limit specified in the COLR until the required SDM is restored
Why do we maintain AFD within the limits
This assures that the design limits on peak local power density and minimum DNBR are not exceeded and the consequences of any non-LOCA event would be within specified acceptance criteria
State major actions for Rod or Rod bank failure to move or stop moving
Stabilize Plant Power Level
Try to determine Cause of Rod Control Failure
Check if Rod control is restored
State what happens if an urgent failure alarm is reset, without correcting the cause of the alarm
A group of control rods may drop
State what must occur if 1 CRDM coil fuse is replaced
Replace both fuses to prevent premature failure of the remaining fuse
State what must happen if 1 or more full-length rod is immovable due to friction or mechanical interference
Determine SDM per T.S. 3.1.1.1 within 1 hr and be in hot standby within 6 hr
State what must be done if rod motion can not be stopped
Trip the Reactor
State major actions for loss of MPCS
Determine if Plant Computer Available Mitigate loss of Computer Functions Monitor reactor Power to Ensure that Power Level of an 8hr shift will not exceed 3648MW Check for Loss of an IRTU Restore Normal Computer functions Restore Plant Calorimetric Functions Restore Normal Plant Conditions
State Major Steps for Loss of Vital PP A-D
Stabile the Plant
Dispatch NSO to restore instrument bus
Restore letdown
Restore valid inputs
State SSPS response to a loss of PP-1A or 1B
Slave relays have lost power
Safeguards equipment must be manually aligned
SSPS power supplies must be reset upon re-energization
State Major Steps for Loss of Vital PP-E/F
Dispatch NSO to restore bus
Manually control affected systems
Verify RDMS in service
Power restoration may isolate PCCW to WPB and Containment
State how loss of PP-1E affects Charging and Letdown
CS-HCV-182 fails open
CS-HCV-189 fails closed
State what will cause a CVI
COP rad monitor 2/2 in either train Manipulator crane rad monitor Any S signal Phase A (T) Manual CVS
State the major actions for PZR level Inst Failure
Identify the failure
Compensate for the failure
Restore system alignment back to normal
Review tech specs
State major actions for PR NI failure
Verify load is stable and place rod control in MANUAL Bypass the failed channel ROD STOP Restore Tave Bypass the failed power Range Channel Verify P-10 Verify Tech Spec Compliance Defeat PR NI inputs Restore rod control to AUTO
State what must be done if P-10 is not in its required state
Restore P-10 w/in 1 hour
- OR -
SD the unit per T.S. 3.0.3
State Turbine Runback/Setback major steps
Verify turbine load decreasing Verify rod motion inward Verify S/G pressure <1150# Verify S/G levels trending to 50% If RIL Lo-Lo alarms, and not restored within 30 min, then verify SDM and restore if needed Monitor Steam Dumps After turbine load stabilizes, check AFD
State Turbine Runback/Setback Rx trip Criteria
turbine load can not be reduced
S/G pressure >1150#
S/G level cannot be maintained >20%
State why Tref may not reflect actual pressure when Steam Dumps are in service
SD bypasses PT-505, the input to Tref, so Tref is not representative
State why MGB must be opened if GSC flow is lost and conductivity is >0.5 micormhos
GSC water will act as conductor and could result in a phase to phase fault
State basis for AFD limits
The limits assures that peak local power density and minimum DNBR are not exceeded
State Turbine trip below P-9 major steps
Verify SG pressure <1150 Place rods in manual Verify turbine trip Verify S/G levels trending to 50% Stabilize RCS temperature with Steam Dumps Reduce power to <20%
State Rx trip criteria for Turbine trip below P-9
Trip Rx if:
Turbine will not trip
S/G pressure >1150
S/G level cannon be maintained >20% and <90.8%
State we can’t run indefinitely on SD above 20% power
SD groups 2, 3, and 4 could damage the condenser due to the condenser tubes not being shielded
State the cause of feedwater flow instability when power is less than 25% w/o feedwater heating
Water entering the SG is not preheated and Flow and SG NR level instability may result
State major steps of high turbine vibrations
Monitor Lower Load Verify MGB closed Consult with engineering Trip Rx if needed
State RX trip criteria for TG high Vibes
Above P-9
- if >800 rpm, >11 mils sustained
Below P-9
- If > 800 RPM, >11 mils sustained
- If <800 RPM, >8 mils sustained
in all cases if >14 mils break vacuum
State why TG has a 3 second turbine trip delay
This is a design feature and prevents transient conditions from tripping the TG
State why VAR loading should be reduced prior to reducing load
reducing VAR loading can reduce the torques angle of the shaft, and may be effective in reducing vibration
State why running the TG at low speeds can be bad
Long duration operation at low speeds can result in heating of the last stages of the LP turbines. this can cause expansion which may lead to blade-nozzle contact
State why we don’t operate the TG at critical speeds
There are elevated vibrations at these speeds
State the major steps for TG system oil leak
Check for fire condition Check for catastrophic failure Determine location of oil leak Reduce power and S/D plant Isolate oil source, purge main generator H2, respond to spill
State the basis for movable control assembly T.S.
This T.S. ensures that acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, the minimum SDM is maintained and the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses are limited. operability of the control rod position indicators in required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.
State major actions for a continuous rod insertion
Verify secondary plant parameters Check Rod Control System Check for a failed power range channel Check for a failed RCS NR temp Check for failed PT-505 Check Tave/Tref Matched (W/IN 1F) Verify T.S. compliance Notify I&C
State major actions for Condenser tube sheet leak
Notify Chemistry Isolate CO Spill to CST Verify CST levels Validate Salt Water intrusion Align CPS if leak rate is less than 0.01 GPM Evaluate if Rx trip is required Evaluate continued plant operation
State basis for starting a CST fill as soon as possible
Seabrook is challenged with a low margin CST volume
State why we can only isolate 1 Condenser water box at a time
for power operation CW must be aligned to more than 1 water box
State the SUFP caution when running it for a tube leak
SUFP may trip on low suction pressure is CST level decreases below 310,000 gallons
State Rx trip criteria for a condenser tube sheet leak
IF CO pump discharge cation conductivity >1 micromho
- AND -
Valid salt water intrusion exists
Trip the Rx
State major actions for Loss of Condenser vacuum
Verify all mechanical vacuum pumps running With Condenser vacuum lowering - lower TG output to 360 MWe - Check CW system - Check steam seal pressure >3# - Locate source of vacuum loss Notify chemistry
State the basis for why SDs are blocked at 25”Hg
This is the minimum vacuum that support SD
State the basis for not starting a tripped CW pump
This could cause severe water hammer
State Rx trip criteria for loss of vacuum
TG output = 360MWe
- AND -
vacuum can not be maintained > 25” Hg
State Rx trip criteria for < 2 CW pumps running
If 1 or no CW pumps are running
Trip the Rx
Close MSIVs after E-0 step 4
State major actions for GSC high conductivity
Evaluate conductivity
Verify proper Deionizer operation
Check for a leaking Heat exchanger
Monitor GSC Conditions
State Rx trip criteria for GSC high conductivy
Inlet conductivity >9.9 micromho/cm - And - Outlet conductivity >9.9 micro mho/com - AND - Power > P-9 Trip the Rx
State Rx trip criteria for GSC high conductivity with chemistry involvement
If inlet or outlet >9.9 micromho/cm - AND - Chemistry confirms >9.9 - AND - Power > P-9 Trip the Rx
State major actions for CW system malfunction if it is due to a Lube Water issue
Verify CW lube water is running
Verify CW lube inlet valve to running CW pumps
Adjust Lube water flows
Stop CW pump is 3 are running and flows not sat
State Rx trip criteria for loss of CW lube water
if Lube water flows are 1/2 sat - AND - Two CW pumps are running THEN Trip the Rx Stop the affect CW pumps Close MSIVs
State Rx trip criteria for lowered Lube water flows
if lube water flows are less than sat values - AND - Flows can not be restored to within 20min - AND - Two CW pumps are running THEN Trip the Rx Stop the affected CW pumps Close MSIVs
State major actions for CW malfunction due to a fouled screens
Operate CW screens in fast Transfer SW to CT for sand/silt Reduce screen fouling by: - Screen wash - Opening CW-V-40 - Decrease plant load Check vacuum >25" and reduce load if needed If CW screens are fouled - monitor CW pump discharge valves
State the basis for for TG should not go below 360MWe
Below this value a plant trip is required due to buffeting the last stage LP turbine buckets
State major actions of SGTL
Determine if plant shutdown is required
Initiate boration
Depressurize RCS to minimize RCS subcooling
Identify and isolate affected SG
Cooldown RCS to target temp
Prepare for plant CD using appropriate post-SG tube leak procedure
State Rx trip criteria for SGTL with PRZ <7%
With charging maxed and both charging pump running
Trip Rx and actuate SI
This is now a SGTR
State actions if VCT level can not be maintained >15%
Swap to RWST from VCT
Trip Rx
State the T.S. limit on secondary activity
0.1 microCi/gm DEI
State major actions for Spill response
Isolate the spill Contain the spill area Refer to ER 1.1 Perform notifications Clean up spill
State spill response regulatory notification requirements
Petroleum >25gal involving groundwater
- <1 hr notify NHDES, National response center, USCG
Harmful to sanitary system
- Immediately notify Seabrook Wastewater Treatment
Hazardous material
- < 15min notify National Response center
- < 1hr, notify NHDES, USCG, NHEM, Town of Seabrook
Radiological spills
- Notify Groundwater Radioactive assessment personnel
Events involving news release or other government agencies
- < 4hr, notify NRC
State Severe weather that would cause a plant SD
hurricane with >74mph winds
State major actions for Secondary transient
Stabilize the plant
Check HD, MFP, CO pumps
Check FW heater status
State what system may isolate and why if CO-E-23C isolates
SB isolation may occur on flash tank high pressure due to loss of condensing action
State Rx trip criteria for a seismic event
Rx parameters not stable
Two or more dropped rods
Turbine Parameters not stable
State the major steps of Degraded UHS
Determine correct procedure step Check for ocean system failure Check SCCW HX outlet temp Verify TA sequence Check if both trains of TA actuated Restore SW to Secondary Loads if both trains on CT Check for cause of CT failure Determine if plant can remain at power
State how CT sprays and fans use are determined
Per attachment A:
Spray Water Return temp
AND
Ambient Temperature
State major action for a loss of a SG level controller
Check SG level Control Realign SG level Instruments Align SG Level Control Verify Redundant Channel Bistables - Not Tripped Verify TS Verify ATWS
State which channel failure will require manual FRV bypass control
519, 529, 539, or 549
State major actions for SG FF/SF failure
Check SG level control
Realign control instruments
Align SG level control
Check for failure of SG pressure Instrument
State major actions for loss of PT-507/508
Check Condenser SD system Restore Main Feed pump Speed Control Check Secondary Plant stable Check third condensate pump not running initiate repairs
State major actions for Rapid Down Power
Prepare for Down Power Set up/ Commence negative reactivity addition reduce load while controlling the plant Use Att. E to align the plant Stabilize at final power
State major strategies for PCCW malfunction
Determine appropriate section Component PCCW flow status PCCW system integrity Thermal Barrier system integrity status PCCW system cooling
State why when isolating PCCW to the WPB the supply valve should be closed first
Closing the supply valve first prevents lifting the system relief
State why RCPs must be tripped W/IN 10 min of loosing PCCW
This prevents a locked rotor accident
State limit and consequence of PCCW N2 bottle low pressure
At 1700# the PCCW temp control valves are considered inoperable
State loss of letdown Rx trip critieria
If PZR cannot be maintained >7% with normal charging then:
Trip the Rx
Actuate SI
State major actions for Charging system failure
Check letdown Monitor RCP seal and bearing Temp Check Charging pump running Check Seal Injection Flow Check if Charging is intact Re-establish Charging and letdown
State when a charging pump should not be restarted
If a charging pump was stopped due to inadvertent SI termination
- OR -
If RCP seal package has heated up to >230F, seal cooling should not be reestablished
State major steps for Security event
Land-based code red: shutdown
Land-based code yellow: alert personnel
Threat listed in Att A: confirm creditability
Cyber-based: check plant equipment
State major steps for a security code red
Close and dog CR door Notify Site personnel Activate ERO Trip Rx and Stop B and D RCPs CD with RHR Place CBA in CRFRM
State how to declare Emergency from a Security event
Use the Security abnormal
not ER 1.1
State why in SGTL we fill the affected SG to >25%
This is done for thermal stratification
