9) Looking for a partner

Question 1

How do we treat marriage markets differently?

Answer 1

-we want THE job not a job

Question 2

Economic assumptions in marriage markets?

Answer 2

-Gains from being together are specific to the match

• Indivisibility: cannot give a little bit of good to different people (can’t divide people)
• Frictions in matching: no “market”, but rather mix of choice and chance

Question 3

Pairwise matching assumptions?

Answer 3

-fully informed of payoffs
-unmatched = 0

Question 4

What is equilibrium in pairwise matching?

Answer 4

-stability
-when no one can deviate as they do not have a pair to

Question 5

What does stability enable?

Answer 5

-prevent reshuffling
-voluntary participation

Question 6

What is efficiency?

Answer 6

maximizes the total output

Question 7

Super modularity?

Answer 7

-reflects complementarity

-get more by matching better people with better people

Question 8

When does a match have positive assortative matching?

Answer 8

-when qualities are complementary (super modular)

Question 9

Examples of shifting utility?

Answer 9

-bride prices and dowry

Question 10

Differed acceptance?

Answer 10

-proposes , the other picks

-keep proposing until all married

Question 11

Properties of DA?

Answer 11

-ends in finite time, as proposed only proposed once

-leads to stability

-different outcomes depends on who proposes

Question 12

Stability criticisms?

Answer 12

-weak requirement like pareto optimum

-can lead to inequality

Question 13

Assortative mating in DA?

Answer 13

-individual contribution rather than super modularity

Question 14

Immediate acceptance algorithm?

Answer 14

-rank their favourites
-then first choice is matched with whatever proposed favours
-

Question 15

Issues with IA?

Answer 15

-incentive to lie