8. A critique of computationalism Flashcards
Q: What led to the rise of computationalism?
A: Computationalism arose during the cognitive revolution in the 1950s, challenging the dominant behaviorist paradigm in psychology. New findings that behaviorism couldn’t explain caused a crisis, leading to a paradigm shift toward computationalism.
Q: What is the core idea of computationalism?
A: The core idea of computationalism is that the mind functions as a computing system. It asserts that cognition is systematically interpretable symbol manipulation and is implementation-independent, meaning it can occur in both hardware and wetware.
Q: What did John Searle propose to understand computationalism?
A: John Searle proposed the “Chinese Room” thought experiment to understand and critique computationalism, particularly the claim that computation equals cognition (C=C).
Q: What is the distinction between Strong AI and Weak AI?
A: Strong AI claims that properly designed programs can create literal minds, while Weak AI sees computer models as useful tools for studying the mind without claiming they are actual minds.
Q: What is Searle’s Chinese Room thought experiment?
A: Searle imagines himself in a room manipulating Chinese symbols according to a rule book, producing responses indistinguishable from a native speaker, yet without understanding Chinese. This illustrates that symbol manipulation alone does not constitute understanding.
Q: What is Searle’s first axiom in his argument against computationalism?
A: Searle’s first axiom is that computer programs are formal (syntactic), meaning they process information through precisely stated rules without attaching meaning to the symbols.
Q: What is Searle’s second axiom in his argument against computationalism?
A: Searle’s second axiom is that human minds have mental contents (semantics), meaning our thoughts and perceptions have meaning and can be about something.
Q: What is Searle’s third axiom in his argument against computationalism?
A: Searle’s third axiom is that syntax by itself is neither constitutive of nor sufficient for semantics, meaning that merely manipulating symbols does not guarantee understanding their meaning.
Q: What conclusion does Searle draw from his three axioms?
A: Searle concludes that programs are neither constitutive of nor sufficient for minds, arguing that computation alone cannot create mental states or understanding.
Q: What is Searle’s critique of the Turing Test?
A: Searle critiques the Turing Test by stating that passing it does not indicate understanding. He argues that one can pass the test through symbol manipulation without comprehending the meaning of the symbols.
Q: What is the “symbol grounding problem” in computationalism?
A: The symbol grounding problem is the issue of how symbols obtain meaning. In purely symbolic systems, symbols lack inherent meaning and rely on external interpretation.
Q: What does Harnard argue about the degrees of Turing indistinguishability?
A: Harnard argues that there are different degrees of Turing indistinguishability:
T4 involving neuromolecular indistinguishability
T3 involving sensorimotor indistinguishability
T2 involving symbolic indistinguishability.
Q: What is T4 indistinguishability according to Harnard?
A: T4 indistinguishability involves symbolic, sensorimotor, and neuromolecular indistinguishability, meaning a perfectly reverse-engineered entity would be identical to the original according to Leibniz’s law.
Q: What is T3 indistinguishability according to Harnard?
A: T3 indistinguishability involves symbolic and sensorimotor indistinguishability, meaning a functionally reverse-engineered entity simulates behavior but is not necessarily identical in structure.
Q: What is T2 indistinguishability according to Harnard?
A: T2 indistinguishability involves purely symbolic indistinguishability, meaning the system’s symbols are not grounded in sensorimotor experience and are implementation-independent.
