3. Logical Positivism Flashcards
Q: Who were the logical positivists and where did they originate?
A: Logical positivism emerged in Vienna in the late 1920s, primarily through the Vienna Circle, a group of physicists, mathematicians, and philosophers who gathered to discuss the implications of major scientific revolutions, especially those triggered by Einstein’s work.
Q: Why did logical positivism arise?
A: Logical positivism arose as a reaction against the prevalent style of German philosophy, which was characterized by obscure and difficult writing. The Vienna Circle members doubted whether such writing conveyed any meaningful content and attributed many scientific confusions, particularly in social and behavioral sciences, to unclear language.
Q: What was the main goal of the logical positivists?
A: The main goal of the logical positivists was to construct a universal and intersubjective language for science, separating meaningful sentences from meaningless ones. They aimed to eliminate metaphysics, which they considered unverifiable and beyond human experience, from scientific discourse.
Q: What are pseudowords and pseudostatements according to Rudolf Carnap?
A: Rudolf Carnap argued that a sequence of words is meaningless if it does not constitute a statement within a specified language. He criticized metaphysics for being filled with pseudowords (words mistakenly thought to have meaning) and pseudostatements (meaningful words arranged syntactically incorrectly, resulting in meaningless statements).
Q: What examples does Carnap provide to illustrate pseudowords?
A: Carnap provides examples like “teavy” (a word with no empirical criteria for application), “toovy” (a redundant synonym for an existing word), and “principle” in a metaphysical sense (lacking clear empirical criteria). These demonstrate how words can be meaningless if they don’t correspond to observable criteria.
Q: What constitutes an ill-formed syntax and a category mistake in logical positivism?
A: An ill-formed syntax involves logically unsound arrangements of words, such as “Caesar is and,” which are meaningless despite using real words. A category mistake occurs when a word is applied inappropriately, as in “Caesar is a prime number,” which is syntactically correct but meaningless because “prime number” is a predicate of numbers, not people.
Q: How does logical positivism classify sentences to determine their meaning?
A: Logical positivism classifies sentences as:
True by virtue of their form (e.g., “2 + 2 = 4,” analytic statements).
False by virtue of their form (e.g., “2 + 2 = 5”).
Empirical statements or protocol sentences (e.g., “The height of this table is 100 cm”), which can be empirically verified.
Q: What are theoretical statements (T’s) and how are they verified?
A: Theoretical statements (T’s) are those not based directly on observations, such as the theory of gravity. They are meaningful only if observable deducible observations (O’s) follow from them. For example, the theory of gravity predicts that objects will fall towards Earth, which can be empirically tested.
Q: What is the verification principle in logical positivism?
A: The verification principle asserts that a statement is meaningful only if it can be empirically verified. This means that for a theoretical statement to be meaningful, it must lead to observable consequences. If no observable outcomes follow from a statement, it is considered meaningless in a scientific context.
Q: Why is logical positivism considered a theory of meaning rather than a theory of science?
A: Logical positivism is considered a theory of meaning because it focuses on constructing a logical language for science that distinguishes between meaningful and meaningless statements. It aims to clarify the language used in science rather than developing scientific theories themselves.
Q: How did logical positivists view scientific theories as axiomatic structures?
A: Logical positivists viewed scientific theories as axiomatic structures built on fundamental principles (axioms) and primitive terms. From these axioms, specific laws could be derived, similar to Newton’s mechanical theory, which provides laws about motion and gravity. This approach aimed to unify all branches of science into a cohesive framework.
Q: What was Carnap’s view on psychology as a physical language?
A: Carnap believed that psychology could be conducted in an intersubjective and universal way without invoking unobservable properties like consciousness. He argued that all sentences in psychology describe physical occurrences, specifically the physical behavior of humans and animals, making psychology a testable science through observable phenomena.
Q: How did Carnap propose ensuring the translatability of psychological language into physical language?
A: Carnap proposed that for psychology to be translatable into physical language, every psychological expression must have a definition that can be directly or indirectly derived from physical expressions. This ensures that psychological statements can be empirically verified and formulated in a physical language.
Q: What did Carnap mean by “sentences about other minds”?
A: Carnap used the concept of “sentences about other minds” to illustrate how psychological statements should be reducible to physical observations. He argued that statements about mental states should be describable in terms of physical behavior and physiological responses, avoiding the invocation of unobservable occult properties.
Q: Why did logical positivists consider introspection to be of no special status?
A: Logical positivists viewed introspection as protocol sentences that describe one’s own mental states. However, these introspective statements were not considered to have any special epistemic status because they lacked intersubjective verifiability, unlike physical observations that could be empirically tested and verified by others.
Q: How did logical positivists believe psychology would evolve in the future?
A: Logical positivists believed that with enough time, psychology would be subsumed within physics. They argued that as psychological phenomena are described in terms of physical occurrences and behaviors, the field would eventually integrate fully with the natural sciences, eliminating the need for unobservable explanations.
Q: What implications did logical positivism have for metaphysics and religious statements?
A: Logical positivism implied that metaphysical and religious statements are meaningless because they cannot be empirically verified. Statements like “God is loving kindness” or metaphysical claims about the essence of spirit are considered non-scientific, serving more as expressions of emotion or art rather than factual assertions.
Q: How did logical positivists aim to unify different branches of science?
A: Logical positivists aimed to unify different branches of science by creating structured, axiomatic theories that could derive general principles applicable across various fields. This approach sought to develop a single cohesive framework, integrating specialized theories into a unified scientific language.
Q: What is the significance of observable deducible observations (O’s) in logical positivism?
A: Observable deducible observations (O’s) are crucial in logical positivism because they provide the empirical basis for verifying theoretical statements (T’s). A theoretical statement is meaningful only if it leads to specific, testable observations. This principle ensures that scientific claims are grounded in empirical evidence.
Q: How did logical positivism influence the development of scientific language?
A: Logical positivism influenced the development of scientific language by promoting clarity, precision, and empirical verifiability. By advocating for a language that separates meaningful statements from meaningless ones, logical positivists aimed to eliminate ambiguity and improve the reliability of scientific communication.
Q: What did logical positivists believe about meaningful statements?
A: Logical positivists believed that all meaningful statements are either analytically true (true by definition) or empirically verifiable (provable by experience).
Q: Who challenged the core beliefs of logical positivism and traditional empiricism, and how?
A: Willard Quine challenged these core beliefs in his essay “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” which questioned the foundations of logical positivism and traditional empiricism.
Q: What are the two central dogmas of empiricism identified by Quine?
A: The two central dogmas identified by Quine are:
The Analytic-Synthetic
Distinction.
Reductionism.
Q: What is the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction according to logical positivists?
A: The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction separates statements into two types:
- Analytic statements, which are true by virtue of their meaning alone (e.g., “All bachelors are unmarried”)
- Synthetic statements, which are true based on how their meanings relate to the world (e.g., “The cat is on the mat”).
Q: What is reductionism in the context of logical positivism?
A: Reductionism is the belief that every meaningful statement can be reduced to a series of empirical observations, meaning complex statements about the world can be broken down into simpler, directly observable components.
Q: How did Quine challenge the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction?
A: Quine argued that the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements is not clear-cut and is circular. He pointed out that defining analytic statements relies on the unclear concept of synonymy, and attempts to clarify synonymy assume analyticity, making the distinction problematic.
Q: What does Quine’s argument about the interdependence of meaning and experience imply?
A: Quine argued that our understanding of meaning is inherently tied to our empirical experiences and cannot be separated from them. For example, the statement “All bachelors are unmarried” relies on our understanding of “bachelor” and “unmarried,” which is based on experience and cultural context.
Q: How did Quine challenge the concept of reductionism?
A: Quine argued that our statements about the world face the “tribunal of experience” not individually but as a whole system of beliefs. When testing a scientific theory, we test a web of interconnected beliefs, not isolated statements, making it difficult to pinpoint the exact source of any contradiction.
Q: What example illustrates Quine’s critique of reductionism?
A: Quine illustrated that if an experiment contradicts a scientific theory, we cannot pinpoint exactly which part of our system of beliefs is at fault. It could be the theory itself, our assumptions, observational methods, or our understanding of the experimental setup.
Q: How did Quine’s critique impact the view of knowledge in logical positivism?
A: Quine demonstrated that our knowledge is a complex, interconnected web rather than a collection of isolated truths. He emphasized a more holistic and pragmatic approach to science and philosophy, acknowledging the interdependence of our beliefs and the testing of scientific theories as a whole.
Q: What are the implications of rejecting the analytic-synthetic distinction and reductionism according to Quine?
A: By rejecting the analytic-synthetic distinction and reductionism, Quine emphasized the complexity and interconnectedness of knowledge, supporting the idea that scientific theories are tested as a cohesive system rather than in isolation, leading to a more holistic and pragmatic approach to understanding science and philosophy.
Q: How does Sellars relate to Quine’s philosophy?
Sellars complemented Quine’s critique by challenging the idea of the “myth of the given.”.
According to Sellars, all knowledge is a part of a conceptual framework and there is no “given” in experience that is free from interpretation.
