3. Types of reform processes: elite majority imposition and elite-mass interaction Flashcards

1
Q

benoit –> motivations for electoral system in three main types

A

self-interest derived explanation

general interest derived explanation

non-instrumental motivations

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2
Q

self-interest derived preference explanation (benoit)

A

policy seeking

office seeking

personal gain

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3
Q

policy seeking

A

parties push for electoral systems that will help them achieve certain policy goals

aim here = ensure that they have enough political power to pass laws and policies that align with their ideology / agenda

for example: proportional representation might give a party a strong enough presence in parliament to drive policy

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4
Q

which type of reform is benoit

A

elite majority imposition.

his model: if political parties think they can benefit (win seats) by a new electoral system, they will implement a new electoral system.

people / principles / media / outside world do not exist

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5
Q

office seeking

A

main goal is not necessarily to enact specific policies, but to hold as many seats as possible

= maximizing power in general sense

party will support the system that it thinks will give it the most seats in legislature.

might involve backing a system that favours larger parties / reduces competition from smaller ones

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6
Q

personal gain

A

key individuals might influence electoral rules for personal gain or status (personally benefiting > party benefits)

could involve seeking leadership positions, securing inflluence, making deals.

acknowledges that internal party politics can play a significant role in decision-making, not just party strategy

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7
Q

general interest derived explanations (benoit)

A

representation

governability

social / political engineering

other general motivations

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8
Q

representation

A

parties might advocate for systems that they believe will lead to a fairer representation of different groups in society.

could mean supporting proportional representation (allows smaller parties / minorities to have a voice, instead of winner-takes all, which tend to favour larger parties).

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9
Q

governability

A

focuses on the stability / efficiency of governance.

involves choosing an electoral system that will lead to a stable government capable of making decisions effectively (preferring systems that produce clear majorities, enabling a single party / coalition to govern without constant need for negotiation / compromise)

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10
Q

social / political engineering

A

sometimes electoral systems are designed to manage conflicts between different social groups.

system might be chosen to encourage cooperation between ethnic groups or to prevent one group from dominating others.

in cases where conflict management is paramount, this may override other criteria in electoral system choice.

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11
Q

non-instrumental motivations (benoit)

A

historical precedent

sociological

economic

technocratic decision

popular demand

external influences

idiosyncratic factors

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12
Q

historical precedent

A

decisions about electoral systems can be influenced by the past.

in moments of crisis, political actors may look back to what worked during previous periods.

= can lead to a revival of old systems as a way to legitimize current system.

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13
Q

sociological

A

consider the social composition of a country (ethnic / religious diversity) which might push for electoral systems that take these factors into account.

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14
Q

economic

A

economic conditions / pressures can shape political institutions.

a country’s reliance on international trade or the strength of particular economic sectors might influence the choice of electoral systems that favour stability.

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15
Q

technocratic decision

A

sometimes electoral systems are designed by experts who choose based on technical criteria like efficiency, ease of implementation, or administrative capacity, rather than political concerns.

= decisions made by committees or outside experts, may prioritize functionality over strategy.

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16
Q

popular demand

A

change of electoral institutions by popular demand may occur when the normal process for institutional reform is bypassed and placed before the public in the form of a plebiscite.

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17
Q

external influences

A

foreign powers / international organizations / colonial legacies can shape electoral choices.

a country might inherit its electoral system from a former colonial power, or a new system might be recommended or imposed by international actors during political transitions.

18
Q

idiosyncratic factors

A

electoral systems are shaped by unique, one-off events / chance occurrences / influential personalities, or particular historical moments.

19
Q

benoit his model of electoral system change

A

= seat-maximizing model

based on the assumption that the objective of political parties is to maximize their share of seats in the legislature.

– stability is achieved when no party coalition expects to gain from further adjustments

important: fiat power / decision rules / equilibrium

20
Q

fiat power

A

power a coalition holds to unilaterally change electoral laws

21
Q

decision rules

A

institutional thresholds required to alter electoral systems

the kind of majority that is needed to change or pass a law

can vary, is not fixed. determines how many votes yo need to have fiat power

22
Q

equilibrium

A

the system reaches stability when further modifications would not advantage any coalition.

23
Q

seat-maximizing model by Benoit in steps

A
  1. common knowledge of electoral system alternatives
  2. believes about relative political support
  3. beliefs about expected seat shares under each electoral system alternative
  4. seat-maximizing preference among electoral system alternatives
  5. electoral system change
24
Q

which type of reform is renwick

A

elite-mass interaction

(the process whereby you can see that there is interaction between politicians and citizens)

= politicians / elites bypassed. Bottom-up process with gathering for example signatures

25
Q

elite-mass interactions: 3 steps

A
  1. minority of politicians favours reforms (principled). they are not succesfull because the majority opposes the reforms
  2. mass mobilization (inherent weakness, contingent crisis, strategic leadership)
  3. public pressure causes minority to convince majority (act-contingent motivations +preference change)

majority votes against their own interest, because they are worried about the next elections.

26
Q

difference act contingent / outcome contingent

A

act contingent = linked to the mere act of supporting a change, linked to public opinion. Also linked to the fear. Fear of media / opinion polls / the people (elections)

outcome contingents = only the benefits matter

27
Q

act contingent and elite-mass interaction

A

linked to the fear. Fear of media / opinion polls / the people (elections).

if there is more media attention, negative polls and election looming, it is more likely you see elite-mass interaction.

28
Q

what causes popular mobilization to occur around such an issue as reform of the electoral system

A

three factors:

  1. inherent weaknesses in the prevailing system
  2. contingent crises that focus attention on these weaknesses
  3. strategic leadership
29
Q

why do politicians bow to popular pressure

A

answer lies in act contingency: politicians fear that they will lose votes at the next election if they ignore voters’ demands for change.

cases suggest that other factors matter too: experiences gained during an extended reform process might change politicians own preferences

30
Q

onion model (jacobs)

A

political elites rank reforms according to their impact.

includes inside-out reasoning and outside-in reasoning

–> it is mostly about why and when do which types of electoral reform occur

31
Q

inside - out reasoning onion model

A

high impact changes are hard / the core.

you only do that when you can maximize your benefits.

when you do not benefit that much, you move further outside of the onion.

32
Q

outside - in reasoning onion model

A

pressured from outside (demonstrating), to show that you are responsive / doing something, you implement a small change.

if they do not notice, you move further in.

you can also first start at local level, then provincial, afterwards national level.

33
Q

act contingent motivation and onion model

A

the act of supporting a change looks good to voters. So politicians follow this thought.  

34
Q

onion model - public dissatisfaction

A

when confronted with public dissatisfaction or reformist politicians, non-reformist politicians are most likely to give up the outer layers and allow, for instance, an increase in the impact of preference votes

35
Q

onion-model - self interest

A

when politicians expect to maximize self-interest they will reason inside out and focus on the inner layers (the electoral reforms that political elites deem to have the greatest impact) and implement reforms affecting proportionality of the electoral system

36
Q

ranking types of reforms

A

major proportionality reform > minor proportionality reform > major ballot structure reform > minor ballot structure.

first is the ‘core’, the last the ‘outer layer’.

37
Q

theories about the field of major electoral reform / onion model

A

rational choice (seat-maximizing)

sociological-institutionalist approach

38
Q

rational choice & onion model

A

Political parties will implement an electoral reform when
1. they have the required majority to do
2. such a reform would increase their seat share.

political elites are primarily interested in the outcome of a reform

political elites optimize

political parties actively seek information about the consequences of reforms

39
Q

sociological-institutionalists approach & onion model

A

reforms occur as an elite response to popular demands for new forms of participation.

political elites are always involved, but here they interact with the public opinion

40
Q

combination of theories

A

neither rational choice, nor sociological institutionalism by itself can explain all of the instances of major electoral reform –> combining needed

when public dissatisfaction is high, one can expect reforms through elite mass interaction.

conversely if there is little or no public dissatisfaction, government politicians can freely introduce a blatantly partisan electoral reform

41
Q

theories and the way of reasoning

A

Rational choice is connected to inside-out reasoning and sociological institutionalism to outside-in.

the inner layers include the reforms that are perceived to have most impact and thus provide most opportunities to reformers who are driven by outcome-contingent motivations (rational).

the sociological institutionalist considers reform to be an act of adapting to legitimacy of the system. they are expected to protect the inner layers even though they cannot ignore the pressure on them.