2.2 Debating the outbreak of the war: a hundred year controversy & 2.3 Flashcards
Blame post war
France and Britain convinced of Germany’s war-guilt especially its invasion of neutral Belgium an France
German government portrayed this as defensive action to the German People ‘In the midst of peace the enemy attacks us’ Kaiser Wilhelm II 1914. Germans annoyed for being blamed for a war that (they think) they had not started
Treaty of Versailles 1919 (1 of 4 treaties made as per the Paris Peace Settlement) turns the screw,’war guilt clause’ article 231 clearly places name for the war on Germany and its Allies and suggests Germany accept the blame. Germany wants to fight the treaty re moral and reparations grounds article 235 20,000,000,000 gold marks Articles 231 - 247 deal with reparations
2.2.1 Versailles abd revisionism
Germans try to counter with proof of war’s origins and declaring their innocence
Journal Die Kriegsschuldfrage dedicated to war-guilt question and subsidised revisionist school’ of historians supported by Weimar and foreign historians encouraged to disprove Germany’s guilt and instead suggest a collective responsibility for the war - results in failure of Versailles not revised or repaired
2.2.2 The new interwar orthodoxy
Reparations were however scaled down and payments lapsed in the depression of the 1930’s. The Federal Republic made the final interest payment in October 2010
But…revisionist theory becomes predominant in classrooms and popular accounts in interwar years, causing festering animosity
Lloyd George interestingly states (1938 ‘all nations slithered over the edge of the boiling cauldron of war in 1914’) old man’s regret but inherently WRONG- though becomes widely accepted
2.2.2 The new interwar orthodoxy 2
Not Germany, Burt the alliance system that is blamed as well as imperial rivalries
Marxists claim ‘the inevitable outcome of the excesses of capitalism’
1930’s Historian Gooch ‘The belief that any nation or statesman was the arch criminal in 1914 is no longer held by serious students of history’ - WRONG!
Late 1930’s default on payments to Versailles treaty, Germany rearming
1951, Germans (historian Gerhard Ritter) still proffering the ‘collective responsibility’ hypothesis - WRONG
2.2.3 Challenges to the interwar orthodoxy: the Fischer Controversy
Italian historian Luigi Albertini 1952 challenges the revisionists
AJP Taylor also states 1914 German war policy not just a Hitler aberration and part of a tradition that started at Bismarck
Fritz Fischer Hamburg University presents the first real challenge to the revisionists. Suggests 1914 war aims similar to Hitler’s ands designed and brought about by German decision makers and had clearly defined and wide ranging war aims
Fischer - Germany’s political ambitions ‘German Hegemony over Europe’ (1975) and an attempt by the ruling elite to diffuse domestic unrest. Fischer attacked by 1970’s professional and personal attacks and criticism
2.2.4 Consensus and continuing debates at the time of the centenary
Fischer’s claims once so controversial have found their way into mainstream books
There is continued disagreement over the aims for which Germany went to war in 1914
Nobody would Agee that all Europe ‘Slithered’ into war but some still disagree that Germany was more to blame
Austria-Hungary is singled out for blame (Williamson 1991 and Kronenbitter 2003) and Steiner and Neilson have examined Britain’s role, Clark 2012 has put greater emphasis on Serbia’s role
The ‘Improbability thesis’ considers 1871-1914 a time of conflict avoidance and that the war was ‘a consequence of carelessness caused by overconfidence’ Afflerbach and Stevenson 2007 - WRONG Wilhelm II was psychologically maladjusted (inferiority complex) and pushed Germany to war aided by sycophants like Von Moltke
2.3.1 Long and short-term causes of the first World War
Historians differentiate between long-term causes - trends (Alliances, Old-Stle diplomacy, Militarism, Nationalism. Imperial Rivalries, Arms race) and short-term causes - triggers )Assassination of the Archduke, diplomatic crisis following this, domino effect of mobilisation, military plans, July crisis, declarations war)
Accession of Impetuous Kaiser Wilhelm II 1888 causes erratic German foreign policy and destabilises Bismarck’s alliances and balances and begins to threaten balance of power - visualised in the Punch cartoon of 1890 ‘Enfant terrible’ Wilhelm destabilising the balance of powers boat
2.3 Long and short-term causes of the first World War (2)
First Moroccan Crisis - Germany attempts to beak up the new allies
Britain is moved to openly challenge Germany due to the build up of German Naval power which creates enmity and suspcion - introduces the Dreadnought class in 1906
2.3.2 International Crisis before 1914
The Moroccan Crises 1905 and 1911 Germany interferes in French expansion in Morocco but is pushed off by British support for France. Germany was attempting to undermine the fledgling Entente Cordial between Britain and France by testing it via the Moroccan Crises
US special envoy Edward House in May 1914 thinks situation in Europe’ extraordinary… militarism run stark mad’, war likely, though it seemingly appeared less tense to others Sir Arthur Nicholson at Foreign Office thinks it a time of ‘calm waters’ - though it was actually the calm before the storm
2.3.3 The Arms Race
Sir Edward Grey (Foreign secretary at the start of the war) wrote in 1925 - The enormous growth of armaments in Europe, the sense of insecurity and fear caused by them - it was this that made war inevitable’.
High Military expenditure - huge military budgets especially in Germany and Russia ‘ Europes security dilemma’ - a spiral of increased armaments spending - Sondhaus 2011)
Germany worried about Austria’s weakness and Russia’s growing strength Russia estimated to overtake Germany in military strength by 1917 - Buchanan Ambassador to Russia (encirclement by France and Russia)
Preventative wars had been demanded by German military leaders 76 times between 1906-14
2.3.4 The War Council of 8 December 1912
Kaiser and closest military advisers meet
Admiral von Muller’s (Chief of the German Naval cabinet) personal diary entry, Attendees Alfred von Tirpitz (Head of Navy Office), Vice Admiral von Heeringen and Helmuth von Moltke chief of the General Staff - Germans advised that Britain would go to France’s aid if she was attacked
Kaiser over-reacts at hearing this (unstable) a premeditated desire to start a war he and his advisers feared German encirclement . A crisis needed to provide a trigger for war, preferably a Balkan crisis
2.3.5 The July Crisis and the outbreak of the war
Archduke’s assassination the spark that sets Europe ablaze and start this intentional (for several factors) war, Berlin and Vienna wanted it and took the risk
Chief of the Austrian General Staff Conrad von Hotzendorf ‘desperate for any excuse to wage war with Serbia - 1913 advocated this 13 times (Strachan 2001)
Germany issues Austria (envoy Count Hoyos) with the ‘Blank Cheque’ 5th july
2.3.6 The blank Cheque
Austrian envoy Count Hoyous in Berlin, assured that Germany would support Austria all the way, even to go to war - the ‘blank cheque’
Wilhelm actively encouraged Austria to take action against Serbia and even insisted that such action should not be delayed - he thought Russia ill prepared and not inclined to take up arms in Serbia’s support ‘One of the most momentous assurances of European history’ Jarausch 1969
23rd July ultimatum sent to Serbia, a deliberately unacceptable one, despite international efforts and Serbia’s acceptance to all but one point, Austria declares war on 28th July 1914 triggering the Great Powers’ war plans
2.3.6 The Plans
The German Schlieffen Plan - invade via Belgium
The French Plan XVII (17) - Respect Belgium neutrality
German aggression triggers the ‘Plucky Belgium’ scenario bringing Britain into the war a violation of the 1839 treaty and gives Italy excuse to remain neutral as it had not been consulted about the offensive (not defensive) Belgium incursion
Britain declares war 11PM 4th August following invasion of Luxembourg and Belgium by Germany
2.3.7 Was war the only possible outcome in 1914?
There had been two international peace conferences at the behest of the Tsar at the Hague in 1899 and 1907
Socialism’s advance also gave peace a voice (call for general strike in 1907 if pan-pan-european war broke out) Socialists like Kier Hardie in Britain, Rosa Luxembourg and Karl Liebknecht in Germany, Bolsheviks in Russia oppose war
If Europe’s people weren’t belligerent, some of their governments most certainly were. London’s mediation turned down by Vienna with firm support from Berlin, once decision had been made war was inevitable
Vienna and Berlin did not realise just how bad the war would be - naive, over confident of victory
