1NOG NIET AF!!!!!! 4. Taliban regime and state building Flashcards
5 Myths about the Taliban
(Jackson, 2021)
- Pakistan controls the Taliban
2.The Taliban fragments easily - The Taliban has a plan for running Afghanistan
- The Taliban will bring back Al-Qaeda
5.The Taliban doesn’t reflect Afghanistan diversity
Mythe 1: Pakistan contorls Taliban
If it is indeed a creature of Pakistan, the creature definitely escaped.’
It is true, the Taliban had complicated relations with Pakistan.
However, another group.. Pakistan tried to bring Sharia into Pakistan; which it not the Taliban.
Mythe 2: The Taliban fragments easily
Mostly pushed idea by the US.
Taliban is made out of different networks, and people with different degrees of ideologies. This came with the idea that people could be switched. The Taliban was seen as an onion that could be peeled.’’ However, what we see throughout the years, there is an immense level of discipline, hierarchy (supreme leader); and a very strong network.
After 2013 the Taliban knew some tension, but they still have a very strong military front.
Mythe 3: The Taliban has a plan for running Afghanistan
Taliban had a poor track record in the 1990s. In reality they only have limit experience of governance. In 2021 the Taliban is still focused on just being a military organisation (issue of bureaucracy)
Mythe 4:Taliban will bring back Al-Qaeda
Taliban still has tied links with Al-Qaidda (last year killed, hosted by Hanakun).
This brings help with international legitimatization. In 1990 they needed the resources like finances, guns etc. However, currently they do not need the same ties anymore,
Taliban is not interested in global war= Interested in own survival
Mythe 5:The Taliban doesn’t reflect Afghanistan diversity
Taliban remains Pashtun nationalism over time, but includes diversity.
Two sets of challenges to survival of regime
State capacity
unprecedented crisis (economic, financial, humantiarian) + organisational and political challenge.
State legitimacy
violent, and non-violent regime
International leverage
- Taliban are in ‘‘position of weakness.’’
(Baczko & Dorronsoro) - The West has ‘‘the upper hand’’ in bargaining with Taliban
( Girod, 2021) - High-level diplomacy: benchmark approach (EU), US statements, etc.
- Diplomats: perceived leverage confirmed in Doha interviews (Malejacq Terpstra, 2023)
Why is there no leverage?
Idea of leverage is based on the idea that State survival is key
In Post-war environments, the urge for international cohesion, once facilitated by pursuit of a common objective, trumpts the need for international engagement (aid + interantional recognitions)
Reverse leverage?
Ideologically- consistent policymaking serves as a signalling mechanism to domestic audiences (population, rank-and-file, commanders, hardliners)
Diplomatic deadline & counterproductive effect.
* In Post-war environments, the urge for international cohesion, once facilitated by pursuit of a common objective, trumpts the need for international engagement (aid + interantional recognitions)
.
o Taliban does not do much in service provision
o Taliban can demand things, because the US and UN will not let the people starve
o They might not want international recognition it as much as we believe they do not enough in order to make concessions.
o Taliban believes that they earn international recognition have the right to rule the country in their own way not something to be negotiated, according to them.
o There are countries that have engage more in Afghanistan, but there are not countries to recognize the Taliban. Will happen once the US will recognize it.
o According to them, they earn recognition for their two first years ‘in government’.
o Has been made very clear that international recognition is not on the table has not respected the Doha agreements
Ideological reason Taliban does not want to take leverage (2 explanations):”
- Extremist advantage logic (Walter, 2017)
- 2 level- game Putnam (1988)
Extremist advantage logic (Walter, 2017)
Taliban is moving to the extremes
Taliban is aware of the fragmentation forces
Some think that the Taliban is not going far enough
Moderate members were telling the diplomats that the schools would reopen, because the leadership got complaints about this less costly to listen to the extreme members.
- 2 level- game Putnam (1988)
as explanation of Taliban not taking leverage
Self- reinforcing the more the international community is pushing the less they want to do it values of the west, so the more the extreme members are against it.
- International leverage: supposed to moderate the Taliban
Taliban was supposed to need foreign aid Taliban did not respond to this.
o Western diplomats were convinced that the girls schools would reopen.
Regulations of Taliban (structure of rules)
- not black and white. Some rules are supposed to be temporary
- Definitely more space than in 1990s.
- The society that the Taliban is facing right know, is very different from the society that it faced in the 1990s.
- There might be still some flexibility to leave the country
- Large numbers of people from Taliban are in fact in favour of girls going back to school
- A lot of ambiguity and vagueness in how Taliban is ruling the country
- A lot of ambiguity and vagueness in how the Taliban is ruling the country.
no one seems to want to make the big decisions
disorganised, but centralised despotic power from the Emir.
very limited infrastructural power
Should the world engage with the Taliban?
No
Moral arguments:
* as a form of symbolic support to the Afghan population
* as a way to avoid legitimizing the Taliban actions internationally
practical arguments:
* engaging will not achieve anything
Taliban has been consistent in their demands, values, ideals
-Taliban has always been very vague about human rights and women rights.
they never really make concessions.
- engaging will strengthen the regime’s hardliners
- Engaging will weaken those who are pressuring them domestically
civil society actors - Engaging will strengthen regime politically/ economically
Should the world engage with the Taliban?
Yes
VOEG TOE
How to not negotiate with Taliban
5 common mistakes
- Misjudge the diplomacy of pariahs
(a person who is not accepted by a social group, especially because they are not liked, respected, or trusted) - Commit exclusively to Human Rights discourse
- Fail to interpret the discourse of Jihadists
- Assume rigidity in discourse equals rigidity in policymaking
goes back to the point of 2 level game
the most moderate ones should be the ones with the most power –> importance of international engagement. - Avoid establishing a clear international roadmap of engagement.
They also have to realise of why they are in fact engaging right now very unclear.
