15 MARKER 2

Question 1

What is the question

Answer 1

(b) Evaluate Russell’s underlying assumption that the physical world really does exist. [15]

Question 2

How many paragraphs

Answer 2

6 (+ intro and concl)

Question 3

How many in intro

Answer 3

1

Question 4

How many in 1

Answer 4

3

Question 5

How many in 2

Answer 5

4

Question 6

How many in 3

Answer 6

2

Question 7

How many in 4

Answer 7

4

Question 8

How many in 5

Answer 8

4

Question 9

How many in 6

Answer 9

5

Question 10

How many in concl

Answer 10

2

Question 11

intro

Answer 11

• Russell’s underlying assumption that the physical world does exist, whilst sound in itself, is inseparable from Russell’s representational realist theory of the existence of sense-data in a separate, perceptual realm in addition to the physical world, which brings about inadmissible practical problems and ontological uncertainties.

Question 12

1

Answer 12

• Russell’s underlying assumption that a mind-independent physical world does exist does appeal, not as a claim to any certain truth about the world, but as the most systematic and economic hypothesis in response to the sense-data that we irrefutably receive.
• To illustrate, Russell uses the example of a cat which he does not perceive between feedings but nonetheless seems to become hungry writing that the cat’s behaviour becomes “utterly inexplicable when regarded as mere movements and changes of colour”.
• Indeed, Russell highlights that despite not “being able to find demonstrative reasons” for his assumption it is nonetheless “rational” as a working hypothesis of the world as there is no evidence to falsify it.

Question 13

2

Answer 13

• Russell, however, is unable to accept that this physical world is perceived directly, and so instead posits intermediary “sense-data” that exist in each percipient’s “private space” which “corresponds” to independent objects in “physical space”.
• The positing of sense-data does seem to be able to resolve the fundamental stumbling block of direct realism- the threat posed by non-veridical sense experience being phenomenologically identical to veridical sense experience.
• Whilst even individual instances of perceptual error undermine the notion of perceptual reliability and so the entire direct realist account of perception, such instances are easily incorporated into the representative realist account of perception.
• Cases of illusion are explicable simply as occasions in which the sense-datum fails to match with a particular physical object, and cases of hallucination as ones in which there is a sense-datum that does to not correspond to a particular object.

Question 14

3

Answer 14

• Russell’s views on matter and its perception are moreover alluring due to their ‘everyday’ applicability.
• As Russell poses that there are “private spaces” of sense-data, which “correspond” to “physical space” of independent matter, meaning that whilst sense-data are not a ‘mirror image’ of the physical world, the correspondence affords enough similarity for one to be able to make useful decisions and have meaningful conversations in regard to the physical world.

Question 15

4

Answer 15

• Russell’s assumption of the existence of the physical world, however, is inextricably yoked to a wholly unacceptable ‘veil of perception’ as a consequence of his refusal to accept that the physical world is perceived directly, which leads to his representative realism.
• This ‘veil’ or ‘problem’ of perception is the issue invoked by representative realism that each individual percipient is trapped in their own perceptual ‘cinema’, or “private space” as Russell optimistically rebrands it, that prevents the percipient from having any meaningful knowledge about the physical world.
• Russell, however, is forced to admit that the most that can be known about the physical world through his representative realism is “only what is required in order to secure the correspondence”, which is limited to the “spatial relations” of physical objects and gives no knowledge of the “intrinsic nature” of the physical objects.
• Direct realism, on the other hand, faces no such issue regarding a ‘veil of perception’, as the same physical objects are directly perceived by everyone alike, and so there is no such issue of ‘everyday’ inapplicability, being the ‘common-sense’ account of perception.

Question 16

5

Answer 16

• The relative appeal of Russell’s representative realism is greatly dependant, moreover, on its ability to withstand the issues of perceptual error and relativity that supposedly pose devastating threat to direct realism- yet many direct realists argue that these ‘issues’ in fact can be incorporated into direct realist accounts of perception.
• P. F. Strawson contends that perceptual variation and error are quite straightforward parts of the ‘common-sense’ realist account of perception. For example, a stick half-immersed in water seems to be bent simply because the stick is being viewed half-submerged in water, rather than there being a fundamental breakdown in perception.
• Furthermore, it seems that perceptual error is always able to be rectified by further perceptual investigation, and we would not even be aware of perceptual error if we did not eventually recognise it.
• Indeed, if perceptual variation and realism is able to be assimilated into the direct realist account of perception, then Russell’s representative realist positing of sense-data seems to be wholly redundant.

Question 17

6

Answer 17

• More generally, Russell’s representative realism seems simply to misrepresent the process of perception by putting forward sense-data as “things immediately known in sensation”, when they do not seem to be “things” at all.
• As Chisholm notes, “We do not see, hear or feel the appearance of things”, but rather we see, hear and feel the things themselves, that is, directly.
• Indeed, Wittgenstein argues that the particular term “sense-datum” is a misuse of language, and that the philosophical problems that seem to arise regarding perception are in fact confusions of language, which does seem to be evidenced by the sheer volume of new terms that Russell has to define in order to make his perceptual account at all tenable.
• Furthermore, the ontological question of how mental sense-data could mediate between the ontologically separate mental and physical realms seems hugely pressing and remains unanswered by Russell, as does that of what or where exactly is sense-data.
• Direct realism, requiring no such perceptual realm, would seem to be the most desirable account by Russell’s own proclaimed criterion of simplicity, and does not raise any ontological ambiguities.

Question 18

concl

Answer 18

• Overall then, Russell’s underlying assumption in the existence of the physical world would be acceptable were Russell to maintain that this world could be perceived directly.
• However, this assumption is unavoidably entangled with his further assumption that there is an additional “private space” of “sense-data”, which is insupportable due to its invocation of a ‘veil of perception’ and a spate of ontological ambiguities.