15 MARKER 1

Question 1

What is the question

Answer 1

(b) Critically assess Russell’s views on the nature and existence of matter. [15]

Question 2

How many paragraphs?

Answer 2

6 (+ intro and concl)

Question 3

How many in intro

Answer 3

2

Question 4

How many in 1

Answer 4

5

Question 5

How many in 2

Answer 5

2

Question 6

How many in 3

Answer 6

4

Question 7

How many in 4

Answer 7

4

Question 8

How many in 5

Answer 8

3

Question 9

How many in 6

Answer 9

3

Question 10

How many in concl

Answer 10

2

Question 11

intro

Answer 11

• Russell’s representational realist views that there exists a physical world independent of perception, that corresponds to sense-data, at first look seems to solve many of the key issues that undermine direct realism whilst allowing for interaction with the physical world.
• When considered in detail however, the issues faced by direct realism do not require the positing of sense-data, and Russell’s account of sense-data and a separate, perceptual realm in fact render his views unable to provide any meaningful interaction with the physical world and ontologically indefensible.

Question 12

1

Answer 12

• Russell’s representative realism is primarily attractive because it is able to stand up against, and even seem to be bolstered by, the same key issues of perception that undermine direct realism.
• Most patently, Russell’s assertion that we perceive sense-data that no more than correspond to physical objects is in perfect agreement with perceptual relativity, that is the matter that one’s experience of an object seems to be subject to a plethora of factors (e.g. light, vantage point etc.).
• Whilst perceptual relativity is a major stumbling block for direct realism, it rather seems to be evidence of the private and percipient-dependant sense-data posed by Russell.
• Furthermore, whilst even individual instances of perceptual error undermine the notion of perceptual reliability and so the entire direct realist account of perception, such instances are easily incorporated into the representative realist account of perception.
• Cases of illusion are explicable simply as occasions in which the sense-datum fails to match with a particular physical object, and cases of hallucination as ones in which there is a sense-datum that does to not correspond to a particular object.

Question 13

2

Answer 13

• Russell’s views on matter and its perception are moreover alluring due to their ‘everyday’ applicability.
• As Russell poses that there are “private spaces” of sense-data, which “correspond” to “physical space” of independent matter, meaning that whilst sense-data are not a ‘mirror image’ of the physical world, the correspondence affords enough similarity for one to be able to make useful decisions and have meaningful conversations in regard to the physical world.

Question 14

3

Answer 14

• The relative appeal of Russell’s representative realism is greatly dependant, however, on its ability to withstand the issues of perceptual error and relativity that supposedly pose devastating threat to direct realism- yet many direct realists argue that these ‘issues’ in fact can be incorporated into direct realist accounts of perception.
• P. F. Strawson contends that perceptual variation and error are quite straightforward parts of the ‘common-sense’ realist account of perception. For example, a stick half-immersed in water seems to be bent simply because the stick is being viewed half-submerged in water, rather than there being a fundamental breakdown in perception.
• Furthermore, it seems that perceptual error is always able to be rectified by further perceptual investigation, and we would not even be aware of perceptual error if we did not eventually recognise it.
• Indeed, if perceptual variation and realism is able to be assimilated into the direct realist account of perception, then Russell’s representative realist positing of sense-data seems to be wholly redundant.

Question 15

4

Answer 15

• Moreover, the ‘everyday’ practicability of Russell’s account of matter and its perception seem to be far less viable under closer inspection.
• Russell’s reification of “private spaces” in addition to “public space” does attempt to eliminate the ‘veil of perception’, the problem that, as a result of the assertion that one only ever has access to sense-data, it is seemingly impossible to know anything about the “real world” or the experiences of others, through Russell’s assertion that there is a “correspondence” between the perceptual and physical realm.
• Even Russell, however, is forced to admit that the most that can be known about the physical world through his representative realism is “only what is required in order to secure the correspondence”, which is limited to the “spatial relations” of physical objects and gives no knowledge of the “intrinsic nature” of the physical objects.
• Direct realism, on the other hand, faces no such issue regarding a ‘veil of perception’, as the same physical objects are directly perceived by everyone alike, and so there is no such issue of ‘everyday’ inapplicability, being the ‘common-sense’ account of perception.

Question 16

5

Answer 16

• In addition, Russell’s own justification for his positing of sense-data and physical matter, appealing to the ideal of ‘simplicity’ does not seem to be consistent with his following reification of a perceptual realm of “private spaces” in order to house the proposed sense-data which is both cumbersome and counterintuitive.
• Indeed, the ontological question of how mental sense-data could mediate between the ontologically separate mental and physical realms seems hugely pressing and remains unanswered by Russell, as does that of what or where exactly is sense-data.
• Direct realism, requiring no such perceptual realm, would seem to be the most desirable account by Russell’s own proclaimed criterion of simplicity, and does not raise any ontological ambiguities.

Question 17

6

Answer 17

• Lastly, Russell’s representative realism seems simply to misrepresent the process of perception by putting forward sense-data as “things immediately known in sensation”, when they do not seem to be “things” at all.
• As Chisholm notes, “We do not see, hear or feel the appearance of things”, but rather we see, hear and feel the things themselves, that is, directly.
• Indeed, Wittgenstein argues that the particular term “sense-datum” is a misuse of language, and that the philosophical problems that seem to arise regarding perception are in fact confusions of language, which does seem to be evidenced by the sheer volume of new terms that Russell has to define in order to make his perceptual account at all tenable.

Question 18

concl

Answer 18

• Overall then, Russell’s representative realism, which initially seems to resolve the problems of perception in relation to direct realism, in fact creates huge difficulty through the reification of sense-data and private, perceptual realms.
• Crucially, these initial issues of perceptual relativity and error can be incorporated into the direct realist account of perception far more easily than the manifold ontological and practical issues that Russell’s views create can be dealt with, if these latter issues can be overcome at all.