Workshop 1 - basics/criminal damage

Question 1

Hill v Baxter

Answer 1

Conduct of the D must be voluntary
Court gave example of a person being attacked by a swarm of bees while driving – such a person would not have committed the AR of the offence of careless driving as the actions weren’t voluntary.
Similarly, if cutting a birthday cake, the D’s hand is grabbed by one of the party guests and the knife while in the hand of the D is plunged into the chest of the victim there will be no voluntary act and no liability for assault.

Question 2

Woolmington v DPP

Answer 2

Burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove the D’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt
The defendant was charged with murder, having killed his wife by shooting her. H of L stated that it was for the prosecution to prove that the D had intended to kill his wife (or at least really serios harm). Not for the defendant to prove that it had been an accident

Question 3

R v Lambert

Answer 3

o There is a view that any legal burden on proof placed on defence could be challenged under Human Rights Act 1998 - Art. 6(1) European Convention of Human Rights – argument succeeded on no. of occasions

Question 4

R v Gibbons and proctor

Answer 4

Fact: A father and his partner starved their child and the child died. The court had to consider whether this was murder. Court held that as a parent had a duty to care for his child, in failing to do so he had committed the AR of murder. The partner was also convicted as despite not being the mother she had assumed duty towards the child by choosing to live with the father and receiving house-keeping money from him. Close relationship with the child that placed a duty on her to act to care for the child, in not doing so she committed the AR of murder.
Ratio: Murder can be caused by an omission if a duty is imposed on the defendant. Gibbons and Proctor were both under a duty to protect the child.

Question 5

R v Stone & Dobinson

Answer 5

Facts: 2 defendants (who had mental and physical difficulties of their own) took in Stone’s sister to live with them; she was eccentric and suffered from anorexia, and became bed ridden. She died because she was not assisted; defendants convicted of manslaughter because in addition to being blood relation, they had assumed a duty to act by the limited steps they took to try to care for her.
Ratio: Where there is a special relationship between the defendant due to family ties or because the defendant has assumed a duty towards the victim, the defendant may incur criminal liability for failure to act
Judgment suggests they may have escaped liability if they had done nothing at all to help the sister – they made efforts to care which resulted in a duty being assumed and distinguished it from a drowning stranger scenario.
Suggests no general liability to one’s relatives or towards persons staying at you rhome.

Question 6

R v Ruffell

Answer 6

Held that a defendant who assumed a duty of trying to revive a friend who took drugs, was correctly convicted of manslaughter of that friend when he failed to care for him properly.

Question 7

R v Smith

Answer 7

Defendant charged with manslaughter of his wife after she became unwell while giving birth but instructed him not to seek medical attention until it was too late to save her life.
Judge instructed the jury that when deciding if duty to act was released by his wife’s directions to consider that it may be reasonable to respect her wishes but if she was so ill that she lost the ability to make decisions it would perhaps be reasonable to override her wishes.
Jury was unable to reach a decision but it suggests that if victim is capable of deciding his or her own fate, the D should be able to be released from any duty to act established by common law.

Question 8

Airdale NHS Trust v Bland

Answer 8

Bland injured in stadium crush and was in a persistent vegetative state for over 3 years. Doctors with support of his parents applied to the court for permission to discontinue the medical treatment and artificial feeding.
H of L confirmed that doctors should seek court permission before withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.
Also confirmed if patient refused life saving treatment e.g religious reasons, a doctor would be released from his duty to act and would be committing criminal offence of assault if he did act. Endorse view of trial judge in R v Smith (above).
Court only concerned with omissions to act – there is still no legal right for a doctor to take positive steps for the purposes of ending a patient’s life e.g deliberately administering an overdose.

Question 9

Frenchay Healthcare NHS Trust v S

Answer 9

Court of Appeal accepted that there may be emergency situations where prior approval from the court may be impracticable.

Question 10

R v Pittwood

Answer 10

Facts: defendant was a railway crossing gate -keeper; responsible for opening and closing the railway crossing gate so that the person could pass safely; failed on one occasion and the person died. Convicted of manslaughter.
Ratio: Where there is a contractual obligation to act, the defendant may incur criminal liability for failure to act.

Question 11

R v Miller

Answer 11

Squatter fell asleep while smoking; awoke to find lit cigarette had fallen on mattress causing it to smoulder. Instead of taking steps to stop the smouldering D simply moved rooms and went back to sleep; house caught fire; defendant charged with criminal damage to property because he had created a dangerous situation and having realized he was under a duty to take steps to prevent further damage.
Ratio: If a person has created a dangerous situation, he has a duty to act

Question 12

R v Moloney

Answer 12

Defendant shot step-father after drunken competition to see who could load a gun the fastest; claimed he had no direct intent to kill or cause serious harm; jury had to decide whether he had indirect intent
Ratio: Direct intent is where the result was the person’s aim, purpose, goal or desire

Question 13

R v Woollin

Answer 13

Defendant killed his 3 month old son by throwing him against a hard surface; had no desire (direct intent) to kill or injure son, but question remained as to when he had indirect intent
Ratio: question for Jury to ask are 3 bullets points
Confirmed Nedrick but stated that word infer should be replaced with find – judge should explain to jury that they may find the D had an intent to kill or do serious injury if they are satisfied of the 2 points.
Judge best placed to decide if need to give Nedrick guidance – did not have to be given in all cases.

Question 14

Maloney

Answer 14

Test was Did they (the jury) think that death or really serious injury was a natural consequence of the D’s act? An dif so, were they satisfied that the D had foreseen death or really serious injury as a natural consequence of his act?

Question 15

Hancock and Shankland

Answer 15

Court followed the Maloney guidelines. On appeal the H of L decided the Maloney guidelines were unsafe and misleading and suggested instead that the jury questions should include a reference to probability.

Question 16

R v Nedrick

Answer 16

C of A suggested the following questions should be posed to the jury:
Did the jury consider that death or serious injury was virtually certain to occur as a consequence of the D’s action?
IF so, did the jury believe that the D foresaw death or serious injury as a virtual certainty?
Jury told had to have both and even if they did did not have to infer intent they simply had evidence from which intention could be inferred.

Question 17

R v Cunningham

Answer 17

D ripped a gas meter from the wall in order to steal the money in the meter, causing gas to escape; gas seeped through small cracks in the wall to the neighbouring property where his future mother in law was sleeping and was poisoned by the gas
Ratio: Malice means either 1) an actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that in fact was done 2) recklessness as to whether such harm should occur or not (i.e the accused has foreseen that the particular kind of harm might be done and yet has gone on to take the risk of it) Recklessness is subjective.

Question 18

R v G

Answer 18

2 boys set fire to some papers in the back yard of a shop. They left without putting the fire out. The fire spread to nearby bins and the shop itself, causing £1m damage. The children stated they knew there was a risk the fire would spread but thought it would burn itself out
Ratio: There is no objective test of recklessness, the decision in R v Caldwell was overruled by this case. Recklessness is now determined by the subjective Cunningham test.

Question 19

R v Stephenson

Answer 19

D was schizophrenic, wen tinto a hollow in a haystack and lit a fire to keep warm. Caught fire and D was charged with criminal damage. Accepted at the trial he didn’t intend to cause damage judge directe jury that could conclude recklessness if satisfied he closed his mind to the obvious risk  jury convicted.
Appeal – conviction quashed – test is subjective – only reckless if carries out a deliberate act appreciating the risk
RATIO: if the D had not foreseen a risk, no matter how obvious the risk would be to the reasonable person, the D was not reckless and was therefore not criminally liable for the offence.

Question 20

Thabo-Meli v R

Answer 20

D hit man with intention to kill him; believing he was dead they threw body off a cliff, which was actual cause of death; argued they were not guilty of murder because the MR and AR did not coincide; found guilt on grounds that the acts were to be viewed as one series of events to achieve the D’s plan
Ratio: Where there is an implied series of events, the D’s actions and the chain of events should be seen as a continuing AR; it is then sufficient to show that at some time during these events, the D had the requisite MR for him to be found guilty.

Question 21

R v Le Brun

Answer 21

D assaulted wife and then tried to move her; slipped from his grip and banged her head on pavement, thereby suffering a fractured skull from which she died; D argued the AR and MR did not coincide as when he meant the assault he did not kill her and when he did kill her he did not intend to.
Ratio: confirmed Thabo-Meli; the unlawful application of force and eventual act causing death can be seen as the same sequence of events; the fact there was a lapse in time between the two does not enable the defendant to escape liability.

Question 22

R v Latimer

Answer 22

D was quarreling with a man in a public house; aimed a blow at him with belt but struck another person who was badly injured; charged with s20 OAPA offence
Ratio – as outlined in bullet point

Question 23

R v Pembliton

Answer 23

D threw a stone at people in the street; stone struck and broke a window; charged with an offence of unlawfully and malicious causing damage to property; on appeal acquitted
Ratio: Malice will only be transferred if the aR committed is the same type of crime as the D originally had in mind.

Question 24

McCrone v Riding

Answer 24

standard of the reaosnable driver is fixed objective test. Hewart CJ:
“The standard is an objective standard, impersonal and universal, fixed in relation to the safety of other users of the highway. It is in no way related to the degree of proficiency or degree of experience attained by the individual driver”

Question 25

Roe v Kingerlee

Answer 25

D smeared mud over the walls of a police cell; cost £7 to clean it; conviction of criminal damage upheld
Ratio: the issue of whether damage has been caused is a matter of fact and degree to be determined in the common sense way.

Question 26

Hardman v Chief Constable of Avon & Somerset Constabulary

Answer 26

Damage need not be extensive
Drawings on pavement were made using soluble chalks; amounted to criminal damage because local authority incurred expense in cleaning it up
Ratio: If expense is involved in restoring the property to its previous conditions the court is likely to find that damage has been stablished.

Question 27

R v Smith

Answer 27

The D (who was a tenant of a propery) damaged fixtures at the property, wrongly believing that those fixtures belonged to him. His conviction for criminal damage was quashed on appeal. 
Held that if a person honestly believe the property was theirs then they lacked the mens rea – does not matter if reasonably held as long as it was an honest belief.

Question 28

R v Hunt

Answer 28

Court of Appeal made it clear that the question whether or not a particular act of destruction or damage was done or made in order to protect property belonging to another must be, on the true construction of the statute, an objective test

Question 29

R v Hall

Answer 29

Whether the defendant believed the property was in immediate need of protection and whether the defendant believed the means of protection adopted were reasonable in all the circumstances are judged subjectively

Question 30

Jaggard v Dickinson

Answer 30

laeful excuse based on voluntary intoxication has been allowed despite basi intent crime
D broke window to get into a house she thought belonged to her friend; she correctly believed that her friend would consent therefore s5(2)(a) CDA would have applied; however, broke the window of the wrong house because she was drunk
Ratio: A D will be able to rely on s5(2)(a) and a mistaken belief in the owner’s consent, even though this is a drunken mistake resulting from voluntary intoxication.

Question 31

R v Dudley

Answer 31

Life doesnt actually have to be endangered
D set fire to a house by throwing a fire bomb into the property; fire quickly extinguished; held that the MR has to be considered at the time the D did the act which caused the damage; therefore D convicted of aggravated criminal arson
Ratio: Life need not actually be endangered for the defendant to be convicted of aggravated damage. If at the time, by the property damage, the D intended to endanger life or was reckless to that risk, in that he foresaw the risk that life might be endangered and went on to take that risk, he is guilty notwithstanding that no-one’s life was actually put in danger.

Question 32

R v Steer

Answer 32

The endangerment to life must be from the damage/destruction itsellf
D had an argument with former business partner; went to his house armed with a gun; rang doorbell and then fired shots through windows and doors; held he was not guilty of aggravated criminal damage (s1(2) CDA) because danger to life came from gun not damage to property
Ratio: The question to ask with regards to aggravated criminal damage is whether the D intended that the damage or destruction caused should endanger life or whether the D was reckless as to whether the damage or destruction cause might lead to another’s life being endangered (the two must be linked).