Homicide Offences

Question 1

R v Poulton

Answer 1

D strangled her baby to death; issue was when a foetus is a ‘human being’ for the purposes of murder and manslaughter
RATIO: to be given the protection of the law of homicide the child must be wholly expelled from the mother’s body and be alive and must have an existence independent of the mother. Existence independent of the mother means the child should have an independent circulation and that is should have drawn breath after birth

Question 2

R v Malcherek & Steel

Answer 2

Both D’s assaulted victims, resulting in brain damage; victims put on life support machine; doctors said they were brain dead and disconnected the machine and pronounced dead; defendants argued that it was the doctor’s who had caused their death
RATIO: The legal definition of death is the irreversible death of the brain stem.. when that occurs it is said that the body has died, been though by mechanical means the lungs are being caused to operate and some circulation of blood is taking place
Legal causation will not be broken by an intervening act where 1) the intervening act was foreseeable and 2) the injuries caused by the defendant are still an operating and substantial cause of death.

Question 3

R v White

Answer 3

D poisoned his mother intending to kill her, she suffered a fatal heart attack after drinking a small amount but it had been due to heart failure unconnected to poisoned drink; D not liable for causing the death
RATIO: The D’s acts must be a substantial/significant cause of the victim’s death (must pass the ‘but for’ test)

Question 4

R v Cheshire

Answer 4

D shot a man who underwent surgery as a result; 2 months later died due to scar tissue at the tracheotomy site obstructing his breath; D argued the negligent medical treatment broke the chain of causation
RATIO: The acceleration of death must be ‘significant’ i.e more than negligible (this is a question for the jury)
Only where negligent medical treatment is ‘so independent of the defendant’s acts and in itself so potent in causing death, that the jury regard the contribution made by the defendant’s acts as insignificant’ will the d be said not to have caused the victim’s death.

Question 5

R v Malcherek & Steel

Answer 5

Both D’s assaulted victims, resulting in brain damage; victims put on life support machine; doctors said they were brain dead and disconnected the machine and pronounced dead; defendants argued that it was the doctor’s who had caused their death. Rejected by Cof A
RATIO: The legal definition of death is the irreversible death of the brain stem.. when that occurs it is said that the body has died, been though by mechanical means the lungs are being caused to operate and some circulation of blood is taking place
Legal causation will not be broken by an intervening act where 1) the intervening act was foreseeable and 2) the injuries caused by the defendant are still an operating and substantial cause of death.

Question 6

R v Pagett

Answer 6

To resist lawful arrest, D held a girl in front of him as a shield and shot at armed policemen. The police instinctively fired back and killed the girl; held that the D’s act had caused the death and that the reasonable actions of a third party by way of self-defence were not an intervening act.
RATIO: Ds actions need not be the sole cause of the victim’s death, it is enough that his act (or omission) contributed sig. to that result.

Question 7

R v Blaue

Answer 7

D stabbed a women, who refused a blood transfusion because of her religious beliefs and died as a consequence; D held to have caused her death even though medical evidence suggested that a blood transfusion would have saved her life.
RATIO: you take your victim as you find him; defendants will answer for the consequences that follow from the injury they have inflicted, even if those consequences are completely unforeseeable.

Question 8

R v Watson

Answer 8

87yr old man suffered from a serious heart condition; D threw a brick through window; man awoke to find the Ds in his room, who proceeded to verbally abuse him; 90 mins later he died of heart attack – convicted manslaughter – appealed – C of A (allowed on different grounds) confirmed jury open to decide the D had caused the Victim’s death
Ratio: Test for causation caused by something other than physically inflicted injuries is the same as for physically inflicted injuries – if it was foreseen or foreseeable that such an outcome could occur the D can be said to have been the legal cause of death.

Question 9

R v Wallace

Answer 9

D threw sulphuric acid at partner whilst he was asleep. Suffered horrific injuries – 25% burns, come 4 months, lost sight in one eye and most of other, left leg amputated & paralysed. After further complications he applied for euthanasia – legal in Belgium & it was granted.
C of A rejected defence that actions of doctors broke chain of causation and the act of voluntary euthanasia was a free deliberate informed decision sufficient to count as an intervening event.
Judges stated qu was whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the victim would commit suicide as a result of his injuries considering all circumstances.
In this case found not guilty of murder – in principle voluntary euthanasia does not break chain of causation.

Question 10

R v Smith

Answer 10

Victim died at an army medical centre shortly after being stabbed by the D; evidence that medical treatment received had been thoroughly bad and might have affected victim’s chances of recovery
RATIO: If, at the time of death, the original wounding still an operating cause and a substantial cause, then the death can properly be said to be the result of the wound, albeit that some other cause of death is also operating. (Note: departed from R v Jordan where negligent medical treatment held to break chain of causation)

Question 11

R v Cheshire

Answer 11

Leading case. D shot a man, who underwent surgery as a result of the gunshot wound. Died 2 months later due to scar tissue at the tracheotomy site obstructing his breathing. D argued not responsible as negligent medical treatment broke chain of causation. Cof A would be extremely reluctant to allow a D to escape liability because of poor medical treatment received except in most exceptional cases. Only where it was “so independent of [the defendant’s] acts, and in itself so potent in causing death, that [the jury] regard the contribution made by [the defendant’s] acts as insignificant” will D be said not to have caused the v’s death.
This test will apply where a question of causation falls to be decided in a medical case applying the particular facts of the case.

Question 12

R v McKechnie

Answer 12

D attacked his victim, causing him to suffer severe head injuries; due to injuries it was not possible to operate a duodenal ulcer which was discovered; victim died 5 weeks later when ulcer burst. D convicted of manslaughter. On Appeal C of A upheld conviction.
RATIO: Ds take their victims as they find them; where the D’s actions prevent an operation for another medical condition, the decision not to operate will not be so independent of the d’s actions that it can be regarded to have caused the victim’s death.

Question 13

Attorney- General’s Reference (No 3 1994)

Answer 13

D stabbed pregnant girlfriend. Stab wound penetrated the foetus. Born prematurely as a result and died after 120 days. H of L held murder could not be committed where unlawful injury had been deliberately inflicted to a mother carrying a child where the child subsequently born alive and then died as a result of injuries inflicted while in the uterus. Reasoning was that ant MR the D had re the mother could not be transferred to the unborn foetus.
However, did conclude could be liable for constructive manslaughter and therefore acknowledged baby was capable of being victim of homicide – precise charge is dependent on the D’s MR

Question 14

R v Lloyd

Answer 14

D strangled wife; medical evidence that he suffered from reactive recurrent depressions and his mental responsibility was impaired by that abnormality to some extent, but not to any substantial degree
RATIO: For impairment to be ‘substantial’ it must be ‘more than trivial or minimal’ (question of degree and a question for the jury)

Question 15

R v Golds

Answer 15

the Supreme Court reviewed the authorities from both England and Scotland on the meaning of ‘substantial impairment’ and concluded that ‘substantial’ meant ‘important or weighty’. Ordinarily there would be no need to direct a jury on the meaning of ‘substantial’. It is therefore clearly a question of degree and a question for the jury to consider.

Question 16

R v Dietschmann

Answer 16

D had an intimate relationship with aunt; following death he began to drink heavily and was given anti-depressants and sleeping tablets by GP; a few days later became involved in a fight with the victim, who died as a consequence; 2 psychiatrists agreed he was suffering from an abnormality of mind
RATIO: if a D relies on diminished responsibility due to alcohol dependency syndrome but was also drunk at the time of the offence, the jury may still establish the defence if they are satisfied that, if he had not been drinking, the defendant would have killed and would have been under diminished responsibility when he did so.

Question 17

R v Wood

Answer 17

D was an alcoholic who befriended a group of alcoholics, was drinking with them for 2 days before sleeping at the victim’s house; woke up to find the victim performing oral sex on him; killed him with a meat cleaver and lump hammer
RATIO: the defence of diminished responsibility is not precluded by the fact the defendant voluntarily consumed alcohol before committing the act; the jury should focus exclusively on the effect of the alcohol consumed as a direct result of the defendant’s illness and ignore the effect of any alcohol consumed voluntarily.

Question 18

R v Dowds

Answer 18

D killed his partner in a frenzied knife attack while heavily intoxicated; he had no alcohol dependency and exercised control over when he drank
RATIO: Acute intoxication (by alcohol or another substance) which is uncomplicated by any alcoholism or dependence cannot be relied upon to find diminished responsibility

Question 19

R v Clinton, Parker and Evans

Answer 19

3 unconnected cases of husbands killing their wives and pleading loss of control; Parker and Evans lost their appeal on their conviction; In Clinton’s case the trial judge had not allowed the defence of loss of control to be raised in front of the jury because he argued it was triggered by sexual infidelity; held that sexual infidelity will not be wholly excluded when it provides important context to consider other evidence
RATIO: where sexual infidelity is part of the context of other possible relevant triggers, then evidence relating to that sexual infidelity (although not a qualifying trigger itself) may be relevant when assessing that other possible qualifying trigger.

Question 20

R v Lowe

Answer 20

D had neglected child, causing death; conviction of manslaughter quashed
RATIO: There must be an unlawful act for constructive manslaughter to be established; a failure to act cannot give rise to a charge of constructive manslaughter.

Question 21

DPP v Newbury and Jones

Answer 21

D pushed a paving stone over a bridge in to the path of a train smashed through a window of the train killing the guard; convicted of manslaughter and unlawful act assumed to be criminal damage
RATIO: There must be an unlawful act for constructive manslaughter to be established; the D need not intend or foresee the risk of frightening or harming anyone (I.e the act can be criminal damage, burglary or theft, and need not be an assault)
Dangerous means carrying the risk of ‘some harm’

Question 22

R v Ball

Answer 22

D shot a gun that had both live and blank cartridge; thought he was firing a blank cartridge and only meant to fright victim; claims never intended to kill or cause GBH; convicted of manslaughter
RATIO: The question of whether the act is a dangerous one is to be judged not by the D’s appreciation but by that of a sober and reasonable man and it is not possible to impute into his appreciation the mistaken belief of the D that what he was doing was not dangerous because he thought that there was a blank cartridge in the chamber. At that stage the D intention, foresight or knowledge is irrelevant.

Question 23

R v Church

Answer 23

D knocked victim unconscious following argument; tried to wake her for 30 mins without success; believing she was dead he threw her body in the river; evidence that she died from drowning not her injury
RATIO: The unlawful act must be such as all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognize must subject the other person to, at least, the risk of some harm resulting therefrom, albeit not serious harm.

Question 24

R v Adomako

Answer 24

D was an anesthetic; was paralysing the patient during an eye operation when a tube became disconnected from a ventilator; patient suffered a cardiac arrest and subsequently died; convicted of manslaughter by breach of duty
RATIO: confirmed R v Bateman and Andrews v DPP – one could be criminally liable for causing death if one had been grossly negligent. The following elements must be present: 1) a duty of care is owed by the D to the victim; 2) there has been a breach of that duty of care, 3) there was a risk that the D’s conduct could cause death, 4) there is evidence that the breach of duty did cause the death of the victim, and 5) the jury has concluded that the D fell so far below the standards of the reasonable person in that situation that he can be labelled grossly negligent and deserving of criminal punishment.

Question 25

R v Willoughby

Answer 25

D owned a pub and had become increasingly in debt; engaged victim to help him set fire to it to claim insurance; while doing this an explosion occurred and building collapsed on victim; D convicted of gross negligence manslaughter
RAITO: whether a duty of care exists is usually a matter for the jury once the judge has decided that there is evidence capable of establishing a duty (except in circumstances where there is a clear duty of care, i.e doctor to patient or statutory)

Question 26

R v Khan

Answer 26

D was a drug dealer who supplied a 15yr old girl with heroin; she overdosed and lapsed into a coma in his flat; he left and the day after found that she had died and tried to dispose of the body
RATIO: A D will be liable for failing to act where there is a duty to do so and will be guilty of manslaughter by gross negligence if the breach (failure to act) constitute gross negligence and carried with it a risk of death.

Question 27

R v Singh

Answer 27

D managed a block of flats where one of the tenants died of carbon monoxide poisoning; gas fires in many of the flats were unsafe, and there had been complaints from other tenants
RATIO: there circumstances must be such that a reasonably prudent person would have foreseen a serious and obvious risk not merely of injury or even of serious injury but of death

Question 28

R v Rose

Answer 28

Honey Rose was an optometrist who negligently failed to perform her statutory duty to conduct an intra-ocular examination on her 7 yr old patient. As a result she failed to discover the indications of a life-threatening risk to the child who subsequently died of hydrocephalus
RATIO: Quashed her conviction on the basis that in the circumstances, where the deceased had displayed no symptoms such as headaches or nausea, the appellant’s failure to comply with her statutory duty, imposed for the purpose of detecting injury, disease or abnormality, could not be said to create situation where it was reasonably foreseeable that an obvious and serious risk of death arose.