week three and four Flashcards
(axelroad and keohane) conditions of international cooperation?
- There is a mutuality of interest (shared goals between states).
- The shadow of the future influences behavior (the expectation of future interactions encourages cooperation).
- The number of participants is manageable (fewer players make cooperation easier).
mutuality of interest
- means the players of the game identify when there is a mutual interest in cooperation - it depends not only on my interest but also on others’
prisoner’s dilemma
- Each player can either cooperate (C) or defect (D).
- the best outcome for each player occurs when they defect while the other cooperates.
- if both defect, they both receive a lower payoff than if they had cooperated.
which game does mutual interest occur
- staghunt: mutual interest in cooperation is strong, as both players can achieve the best outcome by cooperating
- prisoner’s dilemma:
- chicken: in avoiding the worst outcome (mutual destruction).
example of the prisoner’s dilemma
Cold War arms race between the U.S. and Russia, where both had the incentive to build more weapons (defect), despite the fact that reducing arms (cooperation) would have been more beneficial for both.
stag hunt
- two states can either cooperate to hunt a stag (C) or individually hunt a hare (D).
- hunting the stag requires mutual cooperation, while hunting the hare can be done alone but yields a lower payoff.
- there’s always a risk that one player may choose to defect for short-term gains.
- cooperation requires trust. if both players trust each other, they will cooperate for the best outcome.
example of the stag hunt
Paris Climate Agreement, where countries must decide between cooperating to reduce emissions (benefiting all in the long term) or prioritizing their own short-term economic interests at the cost of global well-being.
chicken
- two players must choose whether to swerve (cooperate) or stay on course (defect).
- both players risk mutual destruction if they both choose to defect.
- states may choose to cooperate to avoid the worst outcome.
deadlock
- cooperation may be less likely due to conflicting interests or irrationality.
- both players have a preference for defecting, leading to a situation where neither player can achieve a better outcome by cooperating
- there is no incentive to cooperate because defection is always the better option, even though mutual defection leads to a less ideal outcome than if cooperation were possible.
mutual interest of deadlock
mutual interest in cooperation is minimal or absent
example of chicken
Cuban Missile Crisis: where both the U.S. and the Soviet Union faced the risk of nuclear war (mutual destruction) if neither backed down. The mutual interest was in avoiding war, leading to a tense standoff where both sides ultimately chose to de-escalate
shadow of the future
- when players expect to interact with each other repeatedly over time, they are more likely to cooperate in the present to ensure mutually beneficial outcomes in the future.
- it creates incentives and shapes behavior.
class activity relevance in rounds 5-7
- the threat of retialiation is the key in generate cooperative choices.
- possibility of retaliation increases the benefit of choosing red (cooperation) over blue (defection) and the partner will adjust to your strategy
- one would shift their strategy to defect in the last round when there are no expectations of future interactions.
conditions that shape the shadow of the future
- repeated interactions
- reliable information
why is understanding the shadow of future important?
- even when two players end up in mutual defection (prisoner’s dilemma) and cooperation is possible with the long shadow of future and appropriate strategies (e.g., tit-for-tat).
- this is a safe description of world politics, and actors often have long-term interactions, regardless of whether they had been cooperative or not
- international institutions provide a long shadow of future with repeated interactions and chances of international cooperation increase
