Week 8 - Cooperation in repeated games Flashcards

Again there is maths in this week to go over

1
Q

Why might people ‘cooperate’ in a one shot prisoners dilemma

A
  1. mistake/misunderstanding the game
  2. inequality aversion, altruism
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2
Q

When you add social preferences such as inequality aversion, what happens to the game table and therefore equilibrium?

A

You change the game table to represent utilities instead of monetary payoffs. You use the utility function to calculate the new numbers. Equilibrium can change

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3
Q

What are 2 interpretations of infinitely repeated games?

A
  1. Uncertain future - the game continues with probability x and therefore payoffs in the later period are discounted
  2. impatience - The game is infinitely repeated but the players are impatient, valuing earlier payoffs more than later ones
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4
Q

What are 3 repeated game strategies?

A
  1. grim trigger
  2. tit for tat
  3. tit for 2 tats
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5
Q

What is the equation for payoffs in an infinitely repeated prisoners dilemma?

A

pi1 +dpi2 + (1-d)0 + d^2 pi3 + d(1-d)0…

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6
Q

What is the payoff is players pay TFT in every round?

A

pi1/1-d

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7
Q

In a TFT repeated game, how do you work out the incentive to deviate once?

A

Workout payoffs from both strategies
See the difference in payoffs (usually delta would be in one)
Say there are incentives to deviate if x>=y.
Solve for delta i.e. the continuation probability

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8
Q

What are the rollback equilibrium strategies in a repeated prisoners dilemma?

A

TFT
D forever
grim trigger
- It depends on the strategy of the other player to decide which strategy is the best

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9
Q

In a prisoners dilemma, what is the difference between an infinite and a finite repeated game as we approach the end?

A

In a finite game, as we approach the end less and less people cooperate.

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10
Q

If we play a prisoners dilemma sequentially, what will happen?

A

Nothing. People still play the dominant strategy of defect

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11
Q

What are contingent strategies?

A

A move you are going to do depends on the previous moves

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12
Q

What is the formula for finding an infinite sum of a fixed payoff in repeated games?

A

5/1-delta

delta = probability game will continue until the next round

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